ELECTRONIC COLONIALISM

The Future of International Broadcasting and Communication

THOMAS L. McPHAIL

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PREFACE

We live in a world comprising more and more nations; we live in a world where technological advances, particularly in broadcasting and telecommunications fields, have made information readily accessible from remotest regions to outer space. Yet, why is there a debate about international communication? What are the major concerns? Who would act to restrict information, and why? Which are the major organizations and institutions influencing the international debate? Who will be the winners and losers? These are but some of the issues discussed in this revised edition.

Rather than a world composed of individuals with international awareness and concern, we are faced with appalling situations reflecting ethnocentrism, bigotry, ideological feuds, ignorance, fear, and open warfare. All this at a time when we could counteract the paradox described above by recognizing the necessity and benefits of more and better international communication. This revised edition enlarges and updates original media concerns and debates started decades ago that now come under the umbrella of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO).

This revised second edition of *Electronic Colonialism* leaves intact the contents of the first edition, with one minor exception. That exception is the removal of the original Chapter 2, dealing with the history of the free press, in order to accommodate new issues as well as expand and update major contemporary themes. The most dramatic change has been the United States and the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) because of NWICO. The growing role and

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activities of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), in particular its Maitland Commission Report, plus the communication activities of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are detailed in this revised edition.

The label of NWICO has become synonymous with much of the concern and rhetoric between Western industrialized nations and Third World countries covering disparate pasts and conflicting philosophies about the proper role of media and communication systems in domestic and international affairs.

This book accounts for the major trends and issues affecting international communication. With the rise of nationalism in emerging Third World nation-states during the late 1950s and 1960s, a parallel concern for control of their economies, culture, and media systems was established. This concern presented itself in many ways, but crystallized on two major considerations. One was the flow and accuracy of media messages entering or leaving such countries (with the major wire services—Associated Press, United Press International, Agence-France Presse, and Reuter's—being central to this concern); and the other concern was the fear of future broadcasting and communication technologies, particularly direct broadcast satellites (DBS).

Many personalities, events, meetings, and countries are involved in the international communication story. But when all is said and done about the international information environment of the 1990s, it will most likely be that UNESCO will have been the most prominent institution. Strong supporting roles will have been played by the International Programme for the Development of Communications (IPDC) and the Maitland Commission.

The following is an overview of the major events that surprisingly have gone largely unnoticed by many Western countries and students of communication, sociology, political science, and journalism. Yet, the ability to collect and disseminate information about foreign countries, especially those

in the Third World, may well rest on the outcome of the international NWICO debate.

The stakes are high for Western nations with democratically elected governments. When one realizes that currently 1 out of every 20 jobs in North America is connected with exports to the developing world, then understanding these nations becomes critical. In addition, Western foreign policy initiatives are based largely upon their acceptance by the general public. Yet, in turn, the public's image of societies beyond their immediate border is based upon what the mass media present. If less developed countries (LDCs) begin to exclude, censor, or limit the media agencies of the West, then it will be increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to build public opinion and consensus to support substantial foreign policy initiatives by the West. With a world population growth rate of one million people every five days, adequate and accurate coverage of LDCs is more imperative now than ever. Some critics say that the NWICO will result in less rather than more coverage of LDCs in the future—the exact opposite of what is needed.

Finally, a Canadian perspective is unique and most applicable to NWICO. With the introduction of radio at the beginning of the twentieth century to current concerns over transborder data flows affecting its sovereignty in the Information Age, Canada has tried to protect and support its domestic cultural industries for decades. The concern is from U.S. cultural domination for the most part. That is why Canadian students of communication and culture understand the Third World's concerns: they have been there. The history of Canadian media has been a story of countering U.S. radio, television, film, and magazine influence; the writings of Canadians like Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan are based on the crucial relationship of media, culture, and communication.

"Information is the oil of the 1980s" was an expression that I heard frequently while at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris. Attending UNESCO General Assemblies in Paris and elsewhere enabled me to acquire insights and materials concerning

the various positions being taken about international com-
munication and NWICO. I was able to interview many
reporters, delegates to the UNESCO General Assemblies, and
senior staff members of the UNESCO bureaucracy. Thanks go
to the many people both here and abroad who assisted with the
gathering and criticisms of the material. I am also indebted to
colleagues who provided criticisms regarding the first edition.

Finally, special thanks go to Brenda McPhail for her
research abilities, critical analysis, and editorial input on the
final draft.

Of course, all materials, interpretations, and limitations are
the sole responsibility of the author.

CHAPTER 1

THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION
AND COMMUNICATION ORDER

Lord Copper, publisher, to William Boot, foreign correspondent:

> With regard to policy, I expect you already have your own
> views. I never hamper my correspondents in any way. What the
> British Public wants first, last, and all the time is News.
> Remember that the Patriots are in the right and are going to win
> quickly. *The Beast* stands by them four-square. But they must
> win quickly. The British public has no interest in a war which
> drags on indecisively. A few sharp victories, some conspicuous
> acts of personal bravery on the Patriot side and a colourful
> entry into the capital. That is *The Beast* policy for the war.
>
> *Scoop* by Evelyn Waugh

International communication is undergoing a major reexam-
ination and analysis. The outcome of this wide-ranging investi-
gation may substantially alter the nature and flow of all types
of international information in the future.

This book outlines the major institutions, individuals, con-
ferences, and issues that are altering the international informa-
tion, telecommunication, and broadcasting order. This includes
all types of mass media activities—wire services, electronic
data, satellites, journalists, film, radio, television, and adver-
tising. Traditional assumptions about media flows and prior-
ities are being challenged and altered. What follows is a

descriptive and analytical portrayal of how certain events, some very recent, are affecting the domestic and foreign information environment of the future.

UNESCO, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the New International Economic Order (NIEO), the concept of development journalism, the origins of a free press in Western societies, the International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC), the Maitland Commission, and emerging new communication technologies are but some of the interrelated issues that are evolving in such a way as to cause concern to some and hope to others. Much depends on the perspective one takes. In the final analysis, the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) may produce significant problems in the collection and dissemination of international news because the underlying philosophical stances of the major parties are totally incompatible.

NWICO is an evolutionary process seeking a more just and equitable balance in the flow and content of information, a right to national self-determination of domestic communication policies, and, finally, at the international level, a two-way information flow reflecting more accurately the aspirations and activities of the less developed countries (LDCs).[1]

NWICO seeks a restructured system of media and telecommunication priorities in order for LDCs to obtain greater influence over their information, economic, cultural, and political systems. To the LDCs the current world communication system is an outgrowth of prior colonial patterns reflecting commercial imperatives of former times. Now the LDCs want to remove the last vestige of colonial control by promoting NWICO. But

Western governments and news organizations vigorously oppose the plan, fearing it will bring increased interference with freedom of the press. But in October [1980], officials of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, where the third world enjoys large voting majorities, were authorized to draw up concrete proposals. Outvoted Western delegates, while remaining critical, agreed that further

study should proceed on the form a new order would take [*New York Times,* 1981: E3].

In seeking to attain movement toward NWICO, critics from LDCs have postulated potential mechanisms that clash with strongly held journalistic traditions in the West. The call for government responsibility and control of the media—limiting reporters' access to foreign events, journalistic codes, licensing of reporters, and taxation of the radio spectrum—are moves that the West abhors. Even the call for a balanced flow, which was approved by UNESCO in 1978, is disliked by many who claim that it interferes with the free market mechanisms and that only an open and free flow of information is consistent with the goals of a truly free press.

Many LDC critics attack the Western press as if it were a monolithic, rational system. They fail to realize that what eventually winds up in Western newspapers or on radio or television is determined by a complex, and not entirely consistent, process of decision making. Rosenblum puts it this way:

> Correspondents play an important part in selection by deter-mining what to cover in the first place. But most of the process is in the hands of editors at different stages. These are the gatekeepers. Each medium and each type of correspondent operates in a different fashion, but the principle is the same. A correspondent's dispatch first goes to one gatekeeper and then what emerges—if anything—goes on to others. All along the way, the original dispatch may be shortened, lengthened, rewritten, or thrown away entirely. This series of editors deter-mines what is to be eventually shared with the public; and they decide what the American people may never know [1979: 7-81].

This is an important point. What people in Western societies currently learn about LDCs is meager and the result of several gatekeepers. With NWICO, the Western press fears that this situation will become even worse. Licensing of foreign cor-respondents, as discussed by UNESCO in February 1981, is

seen as the first of many steps that will collectively result in
both fewer reporters being acceptable to LDCs and only
favorable, progovernment news stories being permitted out of
many LDCs. NWICO, which is just evolving as a significant
aspect of world communication, has the potential for substan-
tially altering the front pages or national newscasts for
Americans, Europeans, and other citizens alike. As this book
shows in detail, the future coverage of LDCs is going to
change, but the problem is that no one knows whether it is
going to improve in accuracy, quantity, and quality or whether
it will be restricted, biased, or heavily censored. That is why
awareness of NWICO is central to understanding of interna-
tional and world communication.

What makes this successive diminution of information
about LDCs ironic is that both technically and theoretically
there is more international information available today than
ever before. Satellites, portable teletype terminals, videotext,
videodiscs, minicomputers, high frequency radio, and direct
long-distance dialing have collectively replaced slow and
cumbersome dispatches of the past.

But practically, the story is quite different. The average mass
circulation newspaper in the West now carries less and less
international news. There are several contributing factors. The
major one is simply the high cost, roughly $100,000, to place
and equip a single foreign correspondent abroad for a year.
This has led to a net reduction of reporters that wire services,
networks, or individual papers are willing to place abroad.
Second, restrictions ranging from outright bans to censorship
of certain pieces, to withholding critical interviews past filing
time, to threats of physical abuse unless proper slants are
evident, jailing, or even death all serve to reduce or limit the
amount of available copy. Third, the high turnover of foreign
correspondents and the pack journalism phenomenon (Crouse,
1972; Epstein, 1973) make editors and publishers reluctant to
expend time and money to significantly increase foreign
coverage. Fourth, the trend to parachute journalism in which
masses of foreign correspondents, assorted paparazzi, and

belligerent camera crews descend by the plane-load to international scenes of conflict tends to trivialize or sensationalize events that are far more complex than a 30-second clip captures. Finally, the lack of public concern—as reflected in the trend toward light, fluffy, and trendy disco journalism in which people move their hips rather than their lips as they read—reduces the incentive by editors or demand by readers for any coverage, let alone in-depth and continuous coverage, of a broad range of foreign issues.

The exceptional and unusual still dominate what is reported. In-depth front page pieces on population, education, health care, and other development successes are a long way off. Mort Rosenblum, in talking about "the System," makes this point:

> Foreign correspondents do often seem to be mad as loons, waiting on some source for hours in the rain so they can write a dispatch which might well end up blotting spilled coffee on an editorial desk back home. Editors seem madder still, suffering hypertension over whether their own man reached some obscure capital in time to duplicate stories available to them by other means. And their combined effort, when it reaches breakfast tables and living rooms across the United States, often appears to be supercilious and sloppy.
>
> This system is geared as much to amuse and divert as it is to inform, and it responds inadequately when suddenly called upon to explain something so complex and menacing as a dollar collapse—or a war in Asia. Yet it is the American citizen's only alternative to ignorance about the world.
>
> Because of the system—and in spite of it—most Americans are out of touch with events which directly affect their lives. When crisis impends, they are not warned. When it strikes, they are not prepared. They know little about decisions taken on their behalf which lessen their earnings, restrict their freedoms and threaten their security [1979: 1-2].

Why is this the case? What are the implications? In an era of so much information, why is there so little useful information? That is what this book addresses.

Traditionally, mass media research looked at either select micro issues, such as agenda setting, ownership, or violence, or at a select medium, for example, television. Only from time to time do individuals deal with the macro aspects of the overall mass communication system. Harold Innis, Marshall McLuhan, and Jacques Ellul are representative of the latter school. Yet recently the concept of a new world information and communication order has emerged in several forums, which may ultimately alter the ground rules for international information and mass communication systems. The major wire services, Associated Press (AP), United Press International (UPI), Reuter's, and Agence-France Presse (AFP), are central actors, some say victims, of the emerging NWICO movement. The international debate over a shift from the free flow of information philosophy to the free and balanced flow position with the possibility of other dimensions merits additional attention.

The following outlines the major events in the origins of the demand for a NWICO. The concept of electronic colonialism reflects much of the current concern and is a good concept with which to begin.

Electronic Colonialism

Over the course of history there have been but a few major trends in empire building. The first era was characterized by military conquests; these occurred during the Greco-Roman period. The second era involved militant Christianity; the Crusades of the Middle Ages are typical of this expansion movement. The third era commenced with significant mechanical inventions in the seventeenth century and came to a rather abrupt end toward the middle of the twentieth century. It was essentially mercantile colonialism fueled by the Industrial Revolution and a desire for empire building to both import raw materials and find export markets for finished products. Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Americas became objects of conquest by the then European powers. France, Great Britain,

Spain, Portugal, and Nordic nations systematically set about extending their commercial and political influence. These expanding empires of Europe sought raw materials and other goods unavailable at home and, in return, sent colonial administrators, immigrants, finished products—and a language, educational system, religion, philosophy, culture, laws, and lifestyle that frequently did not suit the invaded country. Yet this caused little concern for the conquerers. During the latter part of this third era, industrialized nations sought to extend their influence through transnational corporations that supplemented and extended more traditional means of control. But the common denominator was a desire for trade links (involving raw materials, cheap labor, expanding markets, and so on) that carried with them many commercial imperatives and governmental practices that suited the larger and more powerful industrialized nations rather than their foreign colonies or customers.

World Wars I and II not only brought an end to major military expansion movements but also placed the industrialized nations of the West in command of international organizations along with vital trade routes and practices. During the 1950s the business and economic climate allowed transnational corporations to increase and solidify domestic and foreign markets based upon the production of mass produced goods, from cereals to computers. Basically, the industrialized revolution took its logical course. But two major changes occurred during the late 1950s and early 1960s that set the stage for the fourth and current era of empire expansion.

The two major changes are the rise of nationalism, centered mainly in the Third World, and the shift to a service-based economy in the West that relies substantially on telecommunication systems, where traditional geographical borders or technological barriers to international communications are being rendered obsolete. The postindustrial society, with information-related services being the cornerstone, has significant implications for industrial and nonindustrial nations alike. Military and mercantile colonialism of the past may be

<World Radio History>

replaced by electronic colonialism in the future. A nation-state may now be able to go from the Stone Age to the Information Age without passing through the intervening steps of industrialization.

Electronic colonialism is the dependency relationship established by the importation of communication hardware, foreign-produced software, along with engineers, technicians, and related information protocols, that vicariously establish a set of foreign norms, values, and expectations which, in varying degrees, may alter the domestic cultures and socialization processes. Comic books to satellites, computers to lasers, along with more traditional fare such as radio programs, theater, movies, wire services, and television shows demonstrate the wide range of information activities that make up the broad configuration of what is possible to send and thus to receive—and there lies the rub (Read, 1976; Tunstall, 1977).

Essentially how much of the foreign and imported material rubs off on the receiver is the critical issue. The displacement, rejection, altering, or forgetting of domestic and native customs materials is a major concern for the Third World. Electronic colonialism of the twentieth century is just as dreaded as mercantile colonialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Mercantile colonialism sought cheap labor; it was the laborer's hands, feet, or body that were required for mining, picking, shovelling, stacking, and so on, of raw goods or finished products. Not so with electronic colonialism. Electronic colonialism seeks the mind; it is aimed at influencing attitudes, desires, beliefs, lifestyles, consumer opinions or purchasing patterns of those who consume—by either eyes, ears, or both—the imported media fare. Whether it is *Sesame Street* or *Dallas,* there is a great deal of vicarious learning about Western society and ways. It leads to a certain mental set. From spaghetti westerns to soap operas shown around the world, they deliver with them the trappings of an alternative lifestyle, culture, economy, or political message that goes far beyond the momentary images flickering on a screen. Elec-

tronic colonialism is aimed at examining the mental images, and the long term consequences of exposure to imported software of all types.

The recent rise of nationalism in many Third World countries has resulted in a parallel concern for political, economic, and cultural control over their own destinies. Leaving aside the political aspects, it is with the cultural issues that students of journalism and telecommunication find theoretical and research interest. For example, two of the largest international issues that concern the Third World and the West, and frequently find them on opposing sides, are the performance of the major wire services and the use of direct broadcast satellites (DBS). The flow, accuracy, emphasis, and content of the major Western wire services in reporting Third World items have come under considerable criticism and scrutiny, particularly at UNESCO.[2]

The other fear deals with a future broadcasting technology—DBS. It represents to date the ultimate mind- and culture-invading mechanism that is being developed by Canada, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union alike. In the field of international communications, DBS is to the future what Gutenberg was to the past. DBS may go far beyond the technical and economic aspects of message transmission to create another set of diverse issues that are cultural, political, and sociological in nature. Before detailing the several critical conferences that have propelled the issue of creating a new set of ground rules for journalism in LDCs, a few comments about development journalism are appropriate, in that it attempts to counterbalance the thrust toward electronic colonialism.

Development Journalism

The demands of a mature press differ substantially from those of an infant press. To impose the legal, economic, or regulatory models of one onto the other fails to appreciate the underlying differences in needs that are a result of a combination of historical and cultural factors. Development jour-

nalism is the concept that attempts to deal with the needs, strengths, and aspirations of journalistic endeavors in emerging nation-states of the Third World.[3] It is a media theory that encourages an engineered or committed press, committed to government set priorities and objectives. Its rationale:

> All national resources—including the resource of informa-tion—must be directed toward development. If information is allowed to cause dissent or loss of international prestige, it detracts from the greater goal. By this reasoning, the control of news is not only a legitimate right but also a national necessity [Rosenblum, 1979: 206].

In terms of development journalism, it essentially serves to promote more closely and accurately the needs of developing countries. In LDCs most media systems are of an underde-veloped nature with few newspapers, some radio outlets, and usually one television system at most. Administrators, editors, and reporters in LDCs find less and less relevance with Western media traditions and systems. In terms of sources of information, few outlets or major items, other than coups and earthquakes, emanate from developing countries. The vast majority of media materials come from the following:

—Five news agencies—the big five, i.e., AP, UPI, Reuters, AFP and TASS—disseminate about 90% of all of the world's information;

—The newspapers and journals of world-wide significance are nearly all published in the USA, Great Britain and France;

—The radio programmes for foreign countries are mostly trans-mitted by broadcasting stations in the industrial states (e.g., Voice of America, BBC, Deutsche Welle and Radio Moscow), although there are varying priorities from one region to another;

—T.V. news and newsreels are largely based on film material from the USA and Great Britain where the UPI, ITN and VIS News have virtually established a world-wide monopoly;

—The offers for the sale of TV production come almost exclu-sively from Western industrial nations. Nearly two thirds come from the USA alone [Bruck, 1980: 66].

Although the seeds of a theory of development journalism were sown in the 1960s, it was the 1970s that saw the debate about the role of the mass media conducted in several forums; it will be toward the end of this century that we will see the results of both the debate and the role of Western press standards and news-gathering activities in light of the consequences of development journalism, electronic colonialism, and NWICO.

Who are the actors? What are the issues? Why is objective journalism viewed as a myth by many critics? What underlies the fear of advanced communication technologies? Why is Western advertising seen as a threat to the Third World? These are but few of the questions that cumulatively will provide the framework for the emerging international information environment heading to the twenty-first century.

Concern about the impact of communications, whether in the form of folklore transmitted orally or color television transmitted live via satellite, has heightened the need for a detailed background to the various events and positions that will alter the markets for Western media offerings as well as what the West may be able to cover, collect, and transmit from LDCs and Socialist countries in the future.

From a broad perspective, the West values freedom of the press, free speech, and the free flow of information. LDCs reject most of these and other related values, some with considerable rhetorical vehemence. The LDCs claim that they cannot afford the luxury of a multitude of competing views and media systems, that many are lucky to have a single medium, usually radio. The high illiteracy rate makes a printed press a distant dream if not an illusion for many emerging nation-states. In fact, illiteracy on a world scale is still increasing. Most LDCs lack the necessary telecommunications infrastructure required for modern media systems.

The LDCs' position on the role of government control of the media is diametrically opposed to traditional Western views. For over two centuries the West, relying for its conception of the press on British traditions and laws, has fought in the streets and in the courts for a press free from government

control. The LDCs, on the other hand, look for, encourage, and, in many countries, have no choice but to accept and repeat the official government position.

Many now recognize the differing journalistic philosophies.

> The furor over the establishment of the New International Information Order has lined up the journalists of the world in two camps—the Western-style journalists who advocate a laissez-faire policy for the gathering and dissemination of information and the Second and Third World journalists who feel the need to have varying amounts of government input in the news reporting process.

> Development journalism or development communication is a concept at the heart of this New Information Order [Ogan, 1982: 3].

The argument goes this way. Newly emerging nations tend to come from the less advanced areas of the world, many being from Africa or small islands with low per capita income, high illiteracy, and almost nonexistent media systems. The infrastructure to support an advanced telecommunications system is a dream for many. In order to rapidly improve the LDCs' economic and social position, a concerted effort by *both* government and media is required. The "luxury" of competing or critical views on government policies and programs by media is viewed as detrimental to the tremendous "catching-up" task facing the LDCs.

Rosenblum (1979: 204) discusses the weaknesses of Third World coverage and concludes:

> There are deep philosophical differences over the role of the press and government in society. Whoever is right or wrong, few Third World leaders are prepared to accept the way Western correspondents feel they are obliged to report world news.

In order to correct the imbalances and mistaken impressions created by the Western press, LDCs are promoting their media

theory, development journalism (Righter, 1978; Smith, 1980a). To give one an idea of the growing power of the LDCs, when the U.N. special agency, UNESCO, was founded in 1946, there were 20 member states; at the close of the 23rd General Assembly of UNESCO in 1985, there were 160 states—the vast majority being LDCs. Development journalism, therefore, is a modern philosophy and practice that serves the needs of many nation-states.

Finally, the different perceptions of NWICO go beyond the theoretical and abstract level. They are reflections of differences that also are found at the practical and applied journalistic level. In terms of the Western concept of the freedom of the press, the journalist role is to be neutral, objective, and clearly not influenced by favoritism, advertisers, or government directives. As such, Western journalists go about their task of reporting in such a way as to report as factually accurate a set of events as possible regardless of the consequences;[4] in addition, the editor's role is to ensure that the information gathered is of an unbiased, objective, and verifiable nature. By contrast, Socialist and Eastern Bloc journalists work on a systematically different ethic. They see their role as promoter of government objectives which, for the most part, are an extension of a communist philosophy. They engage in advocacy journalism and reflect in their reporting the stated objectives of their government. They see no conflict with this and, in fact, think that it is their role to be totally supportive of the communist philosophy and by implication negate any type of reporting dealing with Western or capitalistic enterprises. This is why, in terms of Western news items carried on Soviet television, there is a clear preponderance or preoccupation with negative items about the West. Ironically, they do follow the coups and earthquakes syndrome that the developing nations so frequently accuse the Western wire services of emphasizing. As described earlier, development journalism is also more government oriented and this is why the tendency to accept authoritarian media traditions is perceived by many Western media as being such a short step for non-free press advocates.

Development Journalism and the Canadian
Situation: A Case Study

The culturally and politically debilitating effects of media
dependence are perhaps most eloquently illustrated by taking
an example not from the non-aligned or developing countries
but from within the developed world itself. Canada has always
been obliged to struggle to maintain a thriving indigenous
culture because of the proximity of the United States with its
enormous output of information and entertainment [Smith,
1980a: 52].

THE FREE PRESS AND CAPITALISM

Although development journalism is a concept applied to
the aspirations of communication activities in the Third
World, that is not its only application. From a theoretical point
of view, the concept of a free press, or the free flow of
information philosophy, reflects a situation where the free
press is basically a development press in favor of free enterprise
and a capitalistic social system. The ideological role of the mass
media in Western nations is to protect, perpetuate, and enlarge
the role and influence of the capitalistic system in all phases of
decision making. Indeed, editorials and feature columnists
continually call for less government control and less regulation
in order that market forces be allowed to control the economy
in the spirit of the nineteenth century Spencerian philosophy.

But in the twentieth century the mass media system serves to
portray a value system that will create a climate favorable to
the economic system of Western nations. The Western news is
not value-free, in that it is ideologically supportive of the
economic system that makes the press a profitable enterprise.
Without going through the extensive literature on such
phenomena as gate-keeping, agenda-setting, and cross-owner-
ship of the mass media in the West, it suffices to say that the
Western press is a development press and has, in fact,
successfully developed itself into an ideological arm of the
capitalistic and free enterprise system. In essence it provides

free support, and support that is paid for (via advertising), of a
social and political system consistent with basically main-
taining the status quo (Klapper, 1960).

In *The Vertical Mosaic* (1965), a landmark in Canadian
sociology, Porter suggests that one social role of the Canadian
mass media is to restate and generalize a value system that will
provide for cohesion and unity in society, confer a sense of
rightness on the social order, and ascribe legitimacy to certain
social practices. This ideological function

> must provide the justification for the economic system, the
> political system, and so forth, and this it does by attempting to
> show that the existing arrangements conform with the tradi-
> tional value system [p. 460].

Porter goes on to point out that "Canada's mass media are
operated as big business. Many of them, particularly in the
large cities, are closely linked with corporate enterprise." After
reviewing the ownership and control of private media (to the
mid-1960s) he concludes:

> The ownership group in their selection of personnel to run their
> newspapers and periodicals have to concern themselves not
> only with technical competence, but also with ideological
> acceptability which means sharing the attitudes and values of
> the owner. Thus the image of Canada, inasmuch as the mass
> media contribute to that image, is created by the British charter
> group as represented by the upper class owning group or the
> successful middle class journalists [Porter, 1965: 486].

Thus, it is possible to surmise from Porter's analysis that the
manifest function of the private media in Canada is akin to
other corporate goals, primarily profit; but, in addition, the
press has a latent goal, to convey an ideology that will continue
to create a climate for a profitable press. Similar manifest and
latent objectives are true of the press in other industrial
nations.

MEDIA CONCENTRATION

Clement, in *The Canadian Corporate Elite* (1975), extends Porter's thesis and argues that control of this ideological role is vested in a media elite that is virtually indistinguishable from other corporate elite. Clement (1975: 301) not only updates the continuing trend toward media concentration among chain-ownership groups but he also refers to the standardization caused by the usage and reliance upon a single wire service:

A further way news is concentrated in Canada, beyond the limited number of dailies and media groups, is through the Canadian Press (CP) wireservices. . . . According to the Senate Report, "More than 70 papers rely on CP for all the news they publish beyond what is written locally by their own staffs" (1:230). . . . The basic source of news for most of the newspapers in Canada turns out to be identical for each of them.

The Canadian Special Senate Committee on Mass Media (1971) also expressed concern about press concentration:

But the trend towards fewer and fewer owners of our sources of news and information is already well entrenched. There are only five cities in the country where genuine competition between newspapers exists; and in all five cities, some or all of these competing dailies are owned by chains [Davey, 1970: 5].

With the closing of the *Montreal Star, Ottawa Journal,* and *Winnipeg Tribune,* another Royal Commission on the Press was established in 1980 to investigate possible government action. In addition, old distinctions are beginning to blur. A noted British student of the media (Briggs, 1977: vii) states:

Until recently it was thought possible to distinguish broadly between on the one hand systems controlled by government and on the other hand systems linked to business through private enterprise and advertising. Yet there was always a third type of system, represented formidably by the BBC, where it was neither government control nor business underpinning it.

This system, which was widely copied, was seldom copied in its entirety, and it now has many variants. In many countries also there are now dual or multiple systems, in some cases, but not in all, subject to common "supervision"; and in all countries there are degrees and nuances of control whether by governments or by market forces.

The United States system, which is important not only in itself but because of the influence it has through exports of programmes and through diffusion of broadcasting styles, is itself a complex system—containing as it does a multiplicity of agencies and a changing public service element.

Briggs underscores the link between forces, whether government or business, that affect the tone of Western information systems. A closer look at the Canadian system is illuminating.[5]

COUNTERACTING IMPORTED MEDIA

Historically, Canada has faced the media flow from the United States since the beginning of the twentieth century. Although Canada inherited many of its press traditions from both Great Britain and France in the nineteenth century, and now is influenced extensively by U.S. media, it still has a mixed model of government and business media systems (Rutherford, 1978). Yet it is interesting to note that from the early part of the twentieth century, media systems in Canada developed in such a way as to be an early example and case study of development journalism.

Beginning with the problems of radio in the 1920s with both microwave frequency interference and programming taste interference from the United States, the first Canadian Royal Commission on Broadcasting in 1929 set the precedent. It recognized that the federal government had a distinct role to play in fostering a unique Canadian broadcasting system in the public interest. The Royal Commission's final report (Canada, 1929: 6) pointed directly to a major plank of the development journalism philosophy—self-determination of a nation's culture. From the Aird Royal Commission:

In our survey of conditions in Canada, we have heard the present radio situation discussed from many angles with considerable diversity of opinion. There has, however, been unanimity on one fundamental question—Canadian radio listeners want Canadian broadcasting. . . .

At present, the majority of programs heard are from sources outside of Canada. It has been emphasized to us that the continued reception of these has a tendency to mould the minds of the young people in the home to ideals and opinions that are not Canadian. In a country of the vast geographical dimensions of Canada, broadcasting will undoubtedly become a great force in fostering a national spirit and interpreting national citizenship.

This was to be the first of several investigations of the Canadian mass media. But the media problems were not solved. Consider the Fowler Royal Commission on Broadcasting:

But as a nation we cannot accept, in these powerful and persuasive media, the natural and complete flow of another nation's culture without danger to our national identity. Can we resist the tidal wave of American cultural activity? Can we retain a Canadian identity, art and culture—a Canadian nationhood?. . . Is it possible to have a Canadian nation at all? The Canadian answer, irrespective of party or race, has been uniformly the same for nearly a century. We are prepared, by measures of assistance, financial aid and a conscious stimulation, to compensate for our disabilities of geography, sparse population and vast distances, and we have accepted this as a legitimate role of government in Canada [Canada, 1957: 8-9].

In 1935 the federal government created the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and in 1939 the National Film Board (NFB). These are examples of the federal government's direct involvement in production and distribution in order to create a Canadian awareness and presence both at home and abroad. In the 1950s the Massey Royal Commission on Culture and the Arts suggested the further development of

regulatory cultural agencies to ensure a Canadian presence. Its recommendations eventually resulted in the creation of Canadian content rules for radio and television.

In 1968 the government created the federal Ministry of Communications. It also created Telesat Canada, the Canadian domestic satellite organization. Canada and the USSR were the prime movers in the use of domestic broadcast satellites in an attempt to provide broadcasting to remote northern areas. However, a major incentive for Canada to enter the satellite race was to tie up prime parking spaces in the much sought after band 22,300 miles above the equator.

Also in 1968, the federal government created the Canadian Film Development Corporation (CFDC) to counteract the strong domination of American Hollywood films. The CFDC has now been renamed Telefilm Canada and is aggressively pursuing coproductions. Canadian movie houses, also dominated by foreign chains, show basically Hollywood films. Although the CFDC had a slow and mixed start, recent changes in the tax status allowing 100% write-offs as capital cost allowances for movie investment have rapidly altered this situation. Canada finds itself a favored feature film location with many international stars now shooting films in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver.

Another example of development journalism and fostering culture by regulation is a recent change in the Revenue Act requiring Canadian ownership in the magazine industry. *Time, TV Guide,* and *Reader's Digest* were affected most. It was hoped that by altering the tax status of these foreign magazines that their advertising would shift to a Canadian domestic magazine, namely *Maclean's.* Traditionally, it was believed that *Maclean's* could not compete against the strength and presence of large U.S. weekly magazines. It was expected that with the new legislation *Maclean's* would be able to grow and thereby foster a Canadian orientation in the weekly magazine field. To some extent this has not worked out. *Time* (U.S. edition) is now making more profit in Canada and *Maclean's* is still competing for a larger share of the Canadian market.

Canada's Future

A 1979 minicommission, headed by J.V. Clyne, was created by the federal government to look at the future of communications. Its report, *Telecommunications and Canada: The Consultative Committee on the Implications of Telecommunications for Canadian Sovereignty,* has a great deal to say about the role of new communication services and Canadian identity in the future. Essentially the report maps out what impact communication in the future will have on the Canadian business and cultural climate. A growing foreign penetration in computers and data control industries illustrates that aspects of Canada's future are foreign controlled, and transnational data flows are considered by some to be a threat to future sovereignty. Canada does not want to become an information colony of another nation. The Clyne Report states:

Canadian sovereignty in the next generation will depend heavily on telecommunications. If we wish to have an independent culture, then we will have to continue to express it through radio and television. If we wish to control our economy then we will require a sophisticated telecommunications sector developed and owned in Canada to meet specific Canadian requirements. To maintain our identity and independence we must ensure an adequate measure of control over data banks, trans-border data flow, and the content of information services available in Canada. . . .

In approaching telecommunications we should realize that its importance demands we view it in a special way. Telecommunications, as the foundation of the future society, cannot always be left to the vagaries of the market [Canada, 1979: 2].

The report uses unusually strong language for a government report when it deals with controlling future communication activities:

Unless positive action is initiated now, the sovereignty of Canada will be jeopardized in two main fields. First, Canadians

are already being swamped with foreign broadcast pro-
gramming and a new approach to the problem is urgently
required; at the same time, there is a danger that foreign
interests may achieve a predominant share of the market for
data processing services and far too much of the information
stored in databanks will be of foreign origin. Second, Canada is
heavily dependent on imports in telecommunication tech-
nology. In certain sectors, such as communication satellites and
information exchange, Canada is in the forefront of com-
petitive technological developments. The exploitation of devel-
opments requires public support that does not entail a vast
expenditure of public funds; this is an industrial sector that can
create jobs and be competitive on an international scale. The
timing is important. It may not be possible to do tomorrow
what we fail to do today [Canada, 1979: 5].

There have been other more recent examples under the
broad category of culture and sovereignty by regulation in
Canada.[6] The major ones are the Applebaum/Hebert Report
(1982), the Sauvageau/Caplan Federal Broadcasting Policy
Review Task Force reported in 1986, and a Green Paper on
Cultural Policy published for discussion in 1986; in addition,
there is a Federal Telecommunications Policy Review initiated
in the mid-80s that looked at a broad range of high technology
issues in telecommunications, particularly the influence of
foreign carriers via satellite systems.

   In sum, we are able to see that a developed Western nation
like Canada had been actively involved in activities consistent
with a development journalism philosophy. Other nations,
such as Australia, have also been very active in attempting to
influence its media culture by insisting on Australia content
rules so that the pervasiveness of U.S. television does not
overwhelm its native cultural identity. Europe, with the growth
of cable technology, now shares similar concerns. As a result,
NWICO and satellite concerns are not limited to LDCs.

   To conclude, two major points may be made. First, the
Western press is basically a development press on behalf of the
free enterprise system. This is especially true in the totally

unregulated newspaper industry. However, as newspapers turn into electronic newspapers, given the advances in videotex systems, the existing government regulation of radio and television will be extended to these communication services. Therefore the last bastion of the free press (that is, an independent newspaper system) will slowly evolve into a regulated electronic system.

Second, Canada is an early and excellent case study of a Western nation having attempted actions presently being called for by the Third World, as reflected in the MacBride International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems Final Report[7] and by NWICO. Because Canada is one of the most cabled nations in the world, having access to both domestic and foreign satellite signals, it has been on the forefront of change that may serve as a model for other nations embarking upon wired-city technologies.

BREADTH OF THE PROBLEM

The range of communication, broadcasting, media, and information activities covered by NWICO is extensive. On the one hand, there is a large group of Third World countries concerned about basics such as the introduction of first radio services, or the introduction of telephones. High illiteracy makes the introduction of print a difficult problem for many.

On the other hand, other nations, some industrialized for over a century, also have communication concerns. Basically they are concerned with their own role and survival in the Information Age. Even they do not want to become information colonies of other nations. The questions of transnational data flows, computers, data processing, privacy, and computerization effects on the work place and labor are central to policy concerns of several industrialized nations. This is highlighted by the fact that now more than 50% of the U.S. gross national product relates to information-based services. This means that employment is now directly related to the ability to supply all phases of the information process, both

hardware and software, necessary to participate in the Information Age. The concept of some nations becoming information colonies of other nations is a central public policy issue in the Information Age.

Clearly, for Western nations, issues of national sovereignty and electronic colonialism relate to questions of a free and balanced flow. Aspects of government intervention and regulation in such areas as the electronic newspaper (Compaine, 1980; Smith 1980b), interactive cable, tariffs, distribution of satellite signals, and other regulatory decisions offer a different set of propositions and outcomes that are, at first glance, remote from the concerns of the Third World and their information disparities and problems. Yet NWICO covers all these aspects.

Another relevant question: Has a free flow ever existed? Probably not.[8] Initially, custom laws, tariffs, visas, telecommunications regulations, preferential rates, and availability of transatlantic cable had an impact on early international dispatches. Reuters tried to block competing wire services, particularly American ones; so also have other competitive and commercial pressures affected news flow from the beginning. Currently the major national supporters of the free flow philosophy are governments responding to pressures from multinational corporate interests, ranging from American Express to Xerox, to protect or extend their corporate, and not necessarily national, interests. What is good for IBM World Trade, for example in selling computer systems to the USSR, is not necessarily good for the national, or indeed international, interests of the United States. Yet some individuals and firms are holding tenaciously to the old information order.

Ironically a great deal of the pressure and support for the free flow is coming largely from print groups, both daily newspapers and major weekly magazines. Their concern is intense and historically genuine. Yet technology is quickly moving them toward government involvement of some type that they vehemently reject or even abhor. Electronic information systems to the home will bring print media under some

type of regulatory control. The electronic newspaper is no longer a case of if, only when. William Paley (1980: 24), Chairman of CBS, states the case well:

> This new era of information plenty, with its convergence of delivery mechanisms for news and information, raises anew some critical First Amendment questions about our freedom which merit comprehensive rethinking. Once the print media comes into the home through the television set, or an attachment, with an impact and basic content similar to that which the broadcasters now deliver, then the question of government regulation becomes paramount for print as well.

> Too many of us in print and broadcasting have imagined that we had separate destinies and separate problems, but the destinies and the problems of each are becoming the same.

and the West. Whereas the former are actively seeking a role for government, the latter through technological innovations are increasingly finding themselves affected more and more by government decisions or indecision. The granting of cable franchises is but one example of the central role of governmental bodies, whether they be a city council or a national regulatory agency.

> The fact is that today the print and electronic media are still running on separate legal and regulatory tracks. On the one hand, the print media are increasingly restrained by the actions of the courts; on the other, broadcast journalism is restrained, not only by the same courts, but even more by such obsolete legislative and regulatory restrictions as the "equal time" and fairness doctrine provisions, the inhibiting effects which are clearly inconsistent with the spirit of the First Amendment.

> Broadcasters and print people have been so busy improving and defending their own turf that it has escaped some of us how much we are being drawn together by the vast revolution in "electronification" that is changing the face of the media today, and thereby bringing the issue of government control for both of us into even sharper focus [Paley, 1980: 24].

Therefore, the focus of NWICO on government responsibility or at least an enlarged role in the overall decision-making process is probably more related to future Western delivery systems and services rather than the myopic concern of concentrating on the free press and the traditional daily newspaper.

Just as the technology of the print press is evolving into some form of electronic publishing in a videotex format, so also are parallel decisions being made that will have some impact upon information that crosses borders electronically. In the future nearly all information will cross borders electronically whether it be by a terrestrial microwave network or via satellite. For example, at the June 1980 World Conference on Transborder Data Flow held in Rome, many items concerned balance, sensitivity to national concerns, and items similar to the debate about NWICO. Informatics, an item described in the MacBride Report, is a computer-based information system.

Consider the results and calls for additional action of the June 1980 conference on transnational data flow.

(a) A definitive progress in the description of the different technical, legal, sociocultural and economic aspects of the transnational data flow.

(b) The verification that transnational data flows are an important international dimension of informatics that must be included and integrated in the national strategies and policies for informatics.

(c) The acknowledgement that even more important than the role of transnational data flows in informatics is its impact in the informatization of societies.

(d) The proof that it is possible that developed and developing countries can discuss among themselves looking for solutions in a constructive way and also that representatives of the governmental and private sectors can work together in a positive context towards solutions.

(e) It became evident that around the subject many problems and possible solutions exist and to achieve appropriate results at

the international level requires the participation of many
intergovernmental organizations.

(f) To take advantage of the opportunities that transnational data
flows can offer it is necessary that the regulatory conditions at
the national level do not become too complicated and to
obtain a high degree of harmonization at the international
level [Ahumada, 1980: 7-8].

The significant point is that the original concerns about
NWICO dealt extensively with the printed press and interna-
tional news agencies but in the future there will be a shift to
electronic information of all forms in the West and thus the
debate about NWICO in many ways is only beginning.

Format for the Balance of the Book

Chapter 2 outlines the research traditions of both develop-
ment theory and mass communications theory and how they
have failed to provide the ideal models and empirical verifica-
tion necessary to aid LDC development. In addition, there is
some discussion of the LDCs' rejection not only of the West's
free press philosophy but also of the West's academic tradi-
tions in the communications and development theory domain.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal more directly and in some detail with
the role of UNESCO and the development of the NWICO. The
1978 and 1980 UNESCO General Assemblies held in Paris and
Belgrade, respectively, are detailed here.

Chapter 5 discusses the spectrum debate involving the ITU
and how this problem of the medium is related to UNESCO's
debate about the message.

Chapter 6 provides additional details about the major
international wire services, direct broadcast satellites, a profile
of Latin American concerns, and some additional points about
the United States' information policy.

Chapter 7 examines the origins and background activities of
the International Commission for the Study of Communica-
tion Problems (also called the MacBride Commission). Details

are provided about the final report of the commission and the establishment, by UNESCO, of a major new communication agency, the IPDC.

Chapter 8 investigates the developments that followed the tabling of the MacBride Commission's Report. These include the Voices of Freedom Conferences held in Talloires in 1981 and 1983, the Fourth Extraordinary Session of UNESCO in 1982, and the publication of the ITU's Maitland Commission Report on worldwide telecommunications development.

Chapter 9 returns to an examination of the activities of UNESCO. The events of the 22nd and 23rd General Assemblies held in 1983 and 1985 are detailed. In addition, the U.S. withdrawal from the organization is discussed, both in terms of what prompted the decision and the impact it has had upon UNESCO and NWICO debate. The chapter ends with a brief review of the United Kingdom's pullout decision.

Finally, Chapter 10 discusses the potential impact of the NWICO, the possible consequences of the new participants and agencies, and the implications of these various activities for the future of international broadcasting and communication.

Notes

1. Nomenclature: There are several ways of defining and categorizing the nations of the world. Frequent dichotomies are North-South, East-West, developed-under-developed, Socialist-Capitalist, Industrialized-Third World, and Western and Socialist countries. Although far from being perfect, this book will use the following: Western nations will include the industrialized nations, which according to the World Bank are Australia, Britain, Canada, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, and West Germany. Most of these fall in the North. The LDCs are mainly located in Asia, Africa, and Latin America or, generally in the South. There is no derogatory meaning attached to the term *less* in LDCs; in fact, some critics maintain that the LDCs are fortunate in having avoided the major industrialization problems, such as pollution or high energy consumption, of the West.

A final point: Nations are continually obtaining independence or moving back and forth on both the political and economic scale; examples are Iran, Mexico, Afghanistan, and Poland. No definition will fit accurately over time; therefore, the terms *West* and *LDC* will be used in this book for the sake of convenience because they reflect the major parties involved in the debate about the NWICO.

2. Additional details about both the wire services and DBS appear later in the book; some may wish to refer to these sections now.

3. The history of development journalism may be traced to the Department of Development Communication in the College of Agriculture at the University of the Philippines. It was established in 1973 for the purpose of training students to assist in the communication process of transmitting, via the media, the government's policies with regards to agricultural development projects.

4. This refers to journalistic limitations. For example, there should be no limitations on the political/economic/social consequences of investigative journalism but clearly there are legal limitations, for example, libel, slander, defamation, obscenity, and so forth, that do constrain, along with other sanctions, what is printed or aired.

5. The Canadian situation in broadcasting and telecommunications should be reviewed closely in that it applies both to other Western nations as well as to LDCs. For example, in terms of Western nations, many of them, with the notable exception of the United States, are currently undergoing, or will soon experience, a rapid influx of foreign (Hollywood) television, and theater, and VCR software, plus a deregulatory philosophy and environment that will likely affect their telecommunications industry. In terms of LDCs, they are confronting more elementary stages of foreign content and ownership problems, but Canada offers them a model in a series of reports and studies over several decades aimed at precisely the same problems, and in addition, these same documents offer some range of public policy options. An example of the latter is documented in Chitty and Naren (1985).

6. These items are simply listed here to make the reader aware of more recent activities in Canada. They are not dealt with in depth because of space limitations in the second edition, but readers are encouraged both to seek out the original reports as well as to monitor the public policy issues involved in attempts by a modern industrial nation such as Canada to deal with the perpetual problems of media and communications having the potential for undermining national cultural sovereignty.

7. The MacBride Report is the major document in the overall debate between the West and the LDCs. Background on its establishment and what it covered are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

8. Canadian communication lawyer and academic Charles Dalfen has presented similar arguments.

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A MISGUIDED START:
The Media and Development
Research Traditions

Several apparently unrelated forces have come together to further the movement toward NWICO. Among these forces is the dual rejection and failure of modernization theory and practice promulgated by major industrialized nations since the close of World War II. Simply put, modernization theory has failed to produce.

Within the overall theoretical framework, a substantial component of the mix of factors that cumulatively should have moved the LDCs to industrialized status is the mass communication system. Herein lies the connection between modernization theory and communication practices.

In retrospect, just as educational television in the West did not bring about the projected revolution in the classroom, so also the projection in the 1950s and 1960s of broadcasting as a panacea to rapidly bring about the transformation of LDCs into industrialized nations and markets failed to materialize.

Broadcasting has had limited success in LDCs. Indeed radio, and now television, may have done more cultural harm than good in the newly formed nations of recent decades. The appropriateness and cost of foreign content to meet the needs and objectives of these newly formed nations is now a central issue. Also, a clear and realistic set of current development objectives is still a rare phenomenon for many LDCs. And

within these objectives, exactly what role mass media is to play, other than the vague rhetoric of media being used to aid development goals, is even more elusive. Finally, some LDCs are pursuing color television as a necessary system despite its expense and limited uses. It is within this rather massive reexamination of modernization and communication policies that NWICO has looked with disfavor on the bulk of accumulated social science theory and related media research.

The following attempts to trace the various streams of theory, both American and European, and major research trends that are the underpinnings of knowledge for students of international communication; the chapter begins with development theory and then highlights major contributions to the literature dealing with theoretical and applied aspects of international mass media research.

Development Theory and the Role of Communication

Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner (1976: 15), discussing development performance in the 1960s and 1970s, state, "The impressive gains of GNP in many countries evaporated when restated in per capita terms, for these economic gains were largely swallowed by the greater increases of population." Now, unless they have domestic oil reserves, many LDCs are slipping even further behind the industrialized West. The disappointing record of Third World development efforts in general has occasioned rethinking of development theory and approaches to research among students of international and mass communication theory.

Development communication study in the last three decades, it has been charged, has been characterized largely by the application of Western, especially American, generalizations and research methodology about mass communication and the modernization processes (Schiller, 1969; Varis, 1974; Wells, 1974). In other words, it has been accused of having a distinctly made-in-America flavor.

These U.S. and other Western theoretical models of development and communication and approaches to research meth-

odology are now being questioned by both Western and Third
World critics alike. Their relevance and sensitivity to the
unique (non-Western) problems and conditions in LDCs has
brought about a different conceptual design.

The theoretical model or, as it is often called, paradigm of
development that has dominated thinking and guided most
research and even policy making vis-à-vis modernization and
aid programs has been drawn from the experience and patterns
of European and American expansion, particularly in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries.

Most Western theorists in economics, politics, and commu-
nication conceived of patterns and forces that catapulted
Europe and America into modernity as being more than part of
a culturally specific, one-time historical phenomenon. They
concluded from the example of Western progress that modern-
ization is a deterministic, inexorable, and universal process "in
which all societies participate or which is inherent in the
development of every society" (Eisenstadt, 1976: 38). They
argued that modernization has a distinct pattern with certain
reappearing characteristics. These characteristics were usually
identified by such analysts as those associated with the
economic growth and modernization of Western society, such
as industrialization, urbanization, literacy and education,
mass media, political unification, differentiation, and spe-
cialization of societal institutions and structures, plus a
breakdown of traditions that retarded the industrial process.[1]

Lerner, in his landmark work on development and commu-
nication, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1955), displays
this emphasis in early development thinking on the primacy
and universal relevancy of many features of the Western model
of development and modernization:

> As we shall show, the Western model of modernization exhibits
> certain components and sequences whose relevance is global.
> Everywhere, for example, increasing urbanization has tended
> to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media
> exposure; increasing media exposure has "gone with" wider
> economic participation (per capita income) and political partic-

ipation (voting). The model evolved in the West is an historical
fact. . . . The same basic model reappears in virtually all
modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless
of variations in race, color, creed [1955: 46].

In elaborating on this sequence, he demonstrates that a shift
of population from rural to urban settings is the first stage that
must occur before there can be a modern state. Urbanization
leads to the next step, increased literacy and mass media
exposure, which in turn trigger empathy, or the ability to
imagine oneself as socially mobile. This is a precondition for
the final step, which is greater economic and political partici-
pation. Lerner (1955) understands this sequence of institu-
tional developments to be a natural and historically deter-
mined order that governs the way traditional societies make
the transition to an industrial state and modernity.

This is consistent with a common feature of the dominant
paradigm—namely, the view that the unfolding of the develop-
ment process generally conforms through some kind of
historical or logical necessity to a series of progressive stages
that must be passed through on the way to modernity. The
order in which these stages are supposed to occur is usually
derived from the example of Euroamerican modernization.

THE ECONOMIC GROWTH MODEL

Perhaps the best known categorization of stages of develop-
ment is the one Rostow (1971) advances in *The Stages of
Economic Growth*. He finds that the development process can
be divided into five stages: traditional society, establishment of
preconditions to takeoff, takeoff into sustained growth, the
drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption.

A larger evolutionary perspective, characteristic of the domi-
nant paradigm, resonates through these stage conceptions of
development. Each stage represents an advance over the pre-
ceding one, similar to the stages of biological evolution.

In most versions of this scheme, traditional and modern
societies are placed at opposite ends of the evolutionary scale.

Development is viewed as evolving beyond traditional structures that supposedly cannot accommodate rapid social change and economic growth; the attitudes, values, and social relationships that support them are frequently conveyed by media and educational systems. Eisenstadt (1976: 33) notes that these evolutionary schemes

> chiefly attempted to explain the processes, with their variations, in the possible transition from traditional to modern society. The basic model that emerged . . . assumed that the conditions for development of a viable, growth-sustaining, modern society were tantamount to continuous extension of modern components and to destruction of all traditional elements. According to this view, the greater its characteristics of structural specialization, the higher a society ranked on various indices of social mobilization. Concomitantly, the more thorough the disintegration of traditional elements, the more able a society would be to develop continuously—to deal with perennially new problems and to increase its capacity to absorb change; and, implicitly, to develop other qualitative characteristics of modern societies such as rationality, efficiency, and a predilection to liberty.

Like biological evolution, then, development was assumed to be irreversible. Schramm (1976: 46), summarizing Eisenstadt's description of evolutionary models of development, says,

> Social modernization was able to generate continuing change, and also to absorb the stress of change and adapt itself to changing demands. In other words, the process seemed irreversible. Once the necessary conditions were established for takeoff, a country took off, became modern, stayed modern.

However, this same dominant paradigm of development did not create the success stories on which governments and aid agencies counted. Criticisms mounted during the 1970s and into the 1980s. An early critic, Inayatullah (1976), provides one of the most cogent indictments of the paradigm. He questions the validity of the assumption underlying the paradigm that

postulates development as a universal process, the internal logic of which forces all societies to approximate Western patterns of modernization and the surrounding values that facilitated it. Also, he questions the evolutionary theme of the dominant paradigm suggesting in a somewhat normative and ethnocentric way that advanced Western societies, perched atop the evolutionary ladder, are the ideal, beckoning destination of development and that traditional society, stuck at the bottom of the scale, must be completely relinquished if modernization is ever to occur. Inayatullah's critique (pp. 100-101) goes as follows:

> First the dominant paradigm presupposes that because the "traditional" societies have not risen to the higher level of technological development (since the Industrial Revolution) in comparison to the Western society, therefore they are sterile, unproductive, uncreative, and hence worth liquidating. It measures the creativity of the traditional world with a few limited standards such as urbanization and industrialization, like the person who measures the competence of everybody in terms of his own special competence. It ignores (because it cannot measure it with its available instrument) the possibility of existence (or at least the potentiality) of nonmaterial areas of creativity.

> This point of view also rests on a unilinear view and interpretation of history. It presumes that all history is inexorably moving toward the same destiny, same goals, and same value system as Western man has. It presupposes that the range of combinations of technology and values other than the Western (Judeo-Christian?) one is very limited and insists that modern technology could not be adopted without sacrificing the "traditional" values. . . . It shows remarkable ethnocentrism by equating modern society with paradise and fails to take into account the "crisis," especially in the realm of personality, which the modern society is facing.

The modernity versus tradition dichotomy that he challenges is just one of a number of linear dichotomous continua such as "industrial/agrarian," "Western/non-Western," "devel-

oped/underdeveloped" in terms of which modernization was, and for some still is, conceptualized under the dominant paradigm. Although these relationships are used purportedly as neutral conceptual tools of scientific analysis, there is a case that their use by Western analysts carries an implicit ideological affinity or cultural bias for the "modern,""industrialized," "Western" poles of the continua (Frey, 1973: 340-342).

Eisenstadt (1976: 36) notes that the presence of certain conditions of incipient modernization and even "further extension of these indices does not necessarily assure continued processes of modernization and the creation of viable political or social structures." He continues,

Several countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia seem to have reached at certain levels a negative correlation between such sociodemographic indices as literacy, spread of mass media, formal education, or urbanization on the one hand and the institutional ability to sustain growth or to develop libertarian or "rational" institutions on the other [1976: 36].

To understand the role that communication and mass media were thought to play in development under the dominant paradigm, it is important to note that perhaps the most prominent feature of the paradigm was the assumption that development could be equated with economic growth, especially the type of rapid growth the West experiences with a capital-intensive and technology-based industrialization.

Rogers (1976a: 215) points out that "economists were firmly in the driver's seat of development programs. They defined the problem of underdevelopment largely in economic terms, and in turn this perception of the problem as predominantly economic in nature helped to put and to keep economists in charge." Of course, this also connects the New International Economic Order with the questioning of Western assumptions about the logic and control of the international economic system.

The preoccupation with the economic determinism of Western models of development and modernization is reflected in a major text of the late 1960s by Rogers (1969: 7):

Economic development measures are a type of directed social change. New ideas are introduced into a social system in order to attain higher per capita incomes and levels of living through more modern production methods and improved social organization. The many government-sponsored development programs designed to introduce technological innovations in agriculture, health, education, and industry are contemporary examples of directed change.

Along with other international development specialists, Rogers (1969: 8-9) views development as "a type of social change in which new ideas are introduced into a social system in order to produce higher per capita incomes and levels of living through modern production methods and improved social organization."

THE INADEQUACY OF THE ECONOMIC GROWTH MODEL

For the most part, the attempts at directed change never materialized. The efforts of the First World to engineer change in the LDCs have been unsuccessful. In fact, the most recent World Bank's Development Report points out that developing countries are still relatively worse off, vis-à-vis the industrialized, in terms of growth. Along with economic stagnation many developing countries have massive illiteracy problems that are also getting worse. Director General M'Bow of UNESCO predicts that there will be 954 million illiterate adults in the world by the end of this century. Currently there are 814 million. M'Bow, in a 14th International Literacy Day speech, stated, "Illiteracy is closely tied to poverty. Throughout the world the illiterates are the poor, or make up poor societies. But illiteracy is not only an effect of misery, it is also one of the causes." This illiteracy also renders certain mass

media—newspapers, magazines, books—irrelevant to an ever-increasing proportion of the LDCs population.

As criticism mounts against the Western economic growth model of development, some alternatives are being developed. For example, Sharp (1979: 16) reports,

So what should be the principal ingredients in a new model of development? As yet there is no formal consensus, but the shape of such a model—its premises and priorities radically different from what has gone before—is now emerging from many strands of research, analysis and discussion.

He concludes,

The formulation of strategies to match the alternative development model is still at an early stage. A prime difficulty is that the most important distinguishing features of this model relate to intangibles: the nonmaterial dimension, which is anathema to development classicists because it cannot be quantified and because it simply doesn't show up on their intellectual radar [1979: 19].

Several aspects of cultural policies and needs—of which mass media systems are a component—fall within this intangible area. Cultural aspects are difficult to measure accurately and meaningfully; classical linear economic models fail to accommodate salient aspects of culturally based movements aiming for independence. Students of development eventually began questioning the traditional propositions underlying development theories. Rogers (1976b: 9-10) notes,

One might think that this overwhelming focus of communication research in Latin America would be consistent with the preoccupation with social change and development. However, this research generally shows that the mass media are not very important, at least directly, in fostering socio-economic development. Explanations may be in the nature of the mass media institutions and in characteristics of those who control them. In

any event, the mass media in Latin America contain little content (1) of relevance about appropriate types of development for the mass audience of rural and urban poor, or (2) about the sociostructural changes that are needed if much real development is to occur.

A leading Latin American researcher, Luis Ramiro Beltran, also notes (1976: 23) the underlying problem with the bulk of the LDC media research:

Understandably and legitimately, the United States designed and constructed, in philosophy, object, and method, the kind of social sciences that fit its particular structural (cultural, economic, and political) circumstances. These were eminently sciences for adjustment—essentially addressed to studying conformity with all the prevailing needs, aims, values and norms of the established social order, so as to help its ruling system, to attain normalcy and avoid deviant behaviours.

What he and several others are doing is calling into question the entire functional school of media theory, dating from the two classics by Lasswell (1948) and Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948). "Functional for whom" is now the critical question. In general, this school uncritically accepted the media elites' position and the reinforcement of the status quo as being legitimate and rational behavior for media systems.

It became evident that economic forces alone could not account for problems of underdevelopment and did not automatically generate the far-reaching structural and attitudinal changes such as acceptance of the "Protestant Ethic" that full development required. Attempted imported economic practices, technologies, and media fare often created confusion because traditional systems and ways were not prepared to deal with them. In turn, some analysts shifted to noneconomic explanations of development, identifying such variables as mass media exposure, telecommunications, political and social structural changes, social mobility, and individual psychology as preconditions of development. Eisenstadt (1976: 34) says,

Initially there was a strong tendency to assume the primacy of
the economic sphere: stress was placed, therefore, on the
economic solvent [or pushing force that would ignite the
"takeoff" into modernity] for development. However, the
assumption of economic primacy was discarded relatively early
in the game, when it was realized that the development and
effective functioning of a modern economic system could not be
understood in economic terms alone.

But even accounts that identified noneconomic influences
on development did not as a rule go far beyond purely
economic analyses in their explanatory power or the scope of
the insights into development they provided. They tended to
pinpoint certain individual variables such as the diffusion of
innovations or specific clusters of variables such as Lerner's
urbanization-literacy-media exposure-participation grouping
as the chief determinants of modernization. They were rarely
characterized by a broader systems approach that would aim at
measuring the interrelationships among all the variables (or as
many as data are available on) which might conceivably affect
development. These variables would range from the impact on
development of the larger international social, economic, and
political order to more microlevel considerations such as
communication patterns and networks of social interaction
and interpersonal relationships among individuals in a partic-
ular developing community that could reveal larger structural
trends in the developing society as a whole. (This point will be
taken up again at the end of this chapter.)

Moreover, although noneconomic factors were increasingly
recognized as being as essential to the bringing about of
developmental change as economic ones, economic growth as
measured in gross national product and per capita income
continued to be seen as the most important goal of such change
and its most telling index. For example, diffusion of inno-
vation theories, which generated the bulk of development
communication research in the 1960s, proceeded on the
principle that the spreading, copying, and disseminating of
inventions, new ideas, and new technology through commu-

nication channels were the main ingredients in inducing developmental change. Yet Rogers, as one of the pioneers of diffusion of innovation research who later questioned the validity of much of that research, once described the purpose of diffusion in solely economic terms.

In a similar vein, Schramm says in his influential book, *Mass Media and National Development,* that "the task of the mass media of information and the 'new media' of education is to speed and ease the long, slow social transformation required for economic development" (1964: 27). Rogers (1976a) noted that it was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that equality of distribution of socioeconomic benefits, village level participation in self-development, and economic planning were urged as goals of development efforts. It was assumed under the dominant paradigm that central economic planning of development was "a legitimate and reasonable means by which a nation should seek development goals" (1976a: 215). It was thought that economic development had to proceed on a grand scale that could only be orchestrated on a national level. Small-scale, labor-intensive operations were deemed inefficient. Rogers continues,

> The focus on economic growth carried with it an "aggregate bias" about development: that it had to be planned and executed by national governments. Local communities, of course, would be changed eventually by such development, but their advance was thought to depend upon the provision of information and resource inputs from higher levels. Autonomous self-development was considered unlikely or impossible. In any event, it seemed too slow [1976a: 216].

Development was conceived then as a one-way, top-down affair. There was no need to worry about equality of distribution of information and socioeconomic benefits. Let the central government manage the economy and the dissemination of information and, it was assumed, there would be a "trickle down" effect in which eventually the most needy would somehow reap the rewards of top-down development initiatives.

Frey (1973: 370-407) demonstrates that while communication was largely ignored as a development factor by economic theorists, it figured prominently in most political, psychological, and, needless to say, communication theories of development that emerged in the context of the dominant paradigm. Finally, Beltran (1976: 110) states that some diffusion theories went so far as to suggest that communication could by itself spur development and economic growth.

To summarize, the development of mass communication was portrayed under the dominant paradigm as part of a universal, inevitable sequence or pattern of changes that traditional societies must undergo in the transition to modernity. Mass communication was thought to function best when in the service of centralized government development agencies; it was supposed to be geared toward raising the public's aspirations and facilitating the acceptance of new ideas, values, and inventions for the purpose of overall economic growth and higher per capita income. Promoting equity of distribution and changes in dysfunctional social structures were not considered under the dominant paradigm as part of its role. Critical questions of foreign mass communication's influence and topics like effects of media ownership and control were not addressed.

The Western understanding of the role of communication in development was affected not only by the way it was conceptualized under the dominant paradigm but also by the methods and attitudes characterizing the research that was undertaken within the framework of that theoretical tradition and model.

The Research Traditions

When communication researchers turned their attention to development, they had a dual heritage. First, they were influenced strongly by the body of theory about the development process that had been built up in other fields, namely, economics, politics, psychology, and sociology. But an equally

strong influence on development communication research were the already well-established traditions, directions, and orientations of behavior research on communications in general.

FUNCTIONALISM

These traditions began to take shape with the commercially oriented mass communication research of the 1930s and 1940s in the United States that reflected the marketing concerns of a consumer society. Lazarsfeld (1941), one of the pioneers of mass communication research, described this type of work as "administrative research." Jasperse (1979: 9) characterizes administrative research this way:

Such research focuses on the media audience, and research goals include identifying the uses of the media and assessing media impact in varying circumstances, with an eye to providing informaion that will facilitate fuller realization of media purposes. Administrative research thus examines conditions within the framework of the mass media system, and, with its emphasis on gathering facts about the way the media work, inclines towards empirical methodologies.

Historically, American mass communication research isolated specific media purposes, messages, programs, and effects from overall social processes. It did not attempt to relate communication and communication needs to the overall social, ideological, political, cultural, and economic system in which they operated. Explanations about the specific communication data were seldom discussed in terms of the larger communication system or from a macro-theoretical model. A linear, one-time analysis was indicative of the early stages of research and still afflicts the discipline.

American mass communication researchers concentrated on collecting and classifying facts, usually in order to illuminate new forms of social control, persuasion, and attitude change. They did not see it as their function to interpret these

facts and build grand theories about structural and systemic determinants of communication about them. The trend that started in the 1930s and is still alive today was toward a quantitative, empirical, behavioral science method as opposed to a highly conceptual, speculative, theoretical, and philosophically or historically discursive approach in mass communication research (Jasperse, 1979: 13).

This emphasis on quantitative, empirical methodology at the micro level, as opposed to broad system and social context analysis, is hardly surprising considering that most early mass communication research studies were commissioned by broadcast, political, or advertising organizations to deal with specifically defined problems of message effectiveness. These organizations wanted to know what kind of political propaganda or persuasion techniques would produce the desired *effect,* that is, votes, purchases, conformity, and such, on the behavior of individuals. They were interested in hard data on particular messages and programs and their short-term effects on specific audiences, not well-reasoned speculation on how these findings fit into the grand social, ideological, and economic scheme of things. The study of audiences to discover effects came to almost monopolize mass communication research (De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1975).

Because of this effects emphasis and functionalist approach, with "adjustment" orientation, American influenced researchers have tended to accept the system-in-being as a given and implicitly endorse it by failing to see how their understanding of communication could be enriched by questioning such basic characteristics of the system as differential distribution of power or access to the media, conflicts of interest in media power centers, or the ideological support of society's power structures in the content of mass media messages. Herbert Schiller (1974: 15), an American Marxist communication critic, says, "A remarkable vacuum surrounds the structures and the power groups that hire the gatekeepers." Also, a lack of access to financial data of privately held newspapers and media groups has inhibited researchers in carrying out meaningful studies.

Mass communication research has been taken to task for being so inattentive to these issues. Moreover, the significance of who owns and controls the media and to what ends they are being used escalates in the case of the Third World. Clippinger (1977), in one of the few empirical studies on Third World media systems, examined who owns and controls communication systems and who benefits by them; he looked at communication technology innovations in Algeria and El Salvador and concludes that:

> A major finding in both case studies is that the governments of El Salvador and Algeria were the principal beneficiaries of communication development. In part this is not a surprising finding, as governments generally own and manage all major communications systems and are—by and large—the locus of political and economic power [p. 70].

STRUCTURALISM

Some critics, such as Schiller, have probed perhaps even more deeply into the question of who communicates and have found that the real source, the real shaper, of Third World communication systems and the messages they produce is the West. Most LDCs do not have the expertise or material resources to institute domestic communication systems that would genuinely reflect their history, needs, concerns, values, and culture. So they must rely on the transfer (usually through foreign aid programs) of Western communication technology and software such as television series, Hollywood movies, and wire copy that are far cheaper to get than the production of domestic counterparts. In addition, almost all of the international communication industry is owned and controlled by giant Western, mainly American-based, transnational media and telecommunications conglomerates. These are tied closely into a subtle and invisible network of Western political, ideological, and economic elites that use the communication industry, whether on purpose or not, to perpetuate demand and need for the products, tastes, values, attitudes, and cultural

modes that keep them on top. So when an LDC imports, either through purchase, loan, or donation, a telecommunications infrastructure (from simple shortwave radio equipment, to printing presses, to ground stations for color television via satelite) or other software, it imports a way of life. Schiller describes this as cultural imperialism or penetration and says it is

> becoming steadily more important, and more *deliberate,* in the exercise of American power. . . .

> The marketing system developed to sell industry's outpouring of (largely inauthentic) consumer goods is now applied as well to selling globally ideas, tastes, preferences, and beliefs. In fact, in advanced capitalism's present stage, the production and dissemination of what it likes to term "information" become major and indispensable activities, by any measure, in the overall system. Made-in-America messages, imagery, lifestyles, and information techniques are being internationally circulated and, equally important, globally imitated.

> Today, multinational corporations are the global organizers of the world economy; and information and communications are vital components in the system of administration and control.

> Communication, it needs to be said, includes much more than messages and the recognizable circuits through which the messages flow. It defines social reality and thus influences the organization of work, the character of technology, the curriculum of the educational system, formal and informal, and the use of "free time"—actually, the basic social arrangements of living [1976: 3].

He says elsewhere:

> The concept of cultural imperialism today best describes the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating structure is attracted, pressured, forced and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating centre of the system [1976: 9].

Others, like Guback (1969), give an account of how cultural imperialism applies in the case of the film industry in *The International Film Industry*; another work (Curran et al., 1977) suggests that alternative models are indeed being generated.

PROFESSIONALISM

An integral but seldom discussed instrument of cultural imperialism is the technocratic baggage—including technicians, engineers, producers, directors, behind-the-scenes personnel, writers, broadcasters, commentators, and so on—which is required for the technical maintenance and operation of an imported communication infrastructure. These technocrats are usually loaned from the West or trained there and bring to developing countries value systems and attitudes, associated with professionalism, about how communication systems should be run that may deflect the purpose or goal of broadcasting in the LDCs. Clippinger (1972) states,

> A technocratic "elite" is required to manage and maintain these technologies, and the interests of this group may be different from the interests of those whom the technologies are eventually intended to serve. Certainly when the population being served by the technologies is an uneducated one with relatively little understanding of Western technologies and attitudes, it cannot readily articulate, much less effectively represent, its own interests. Hence, it may be that advanced communications technologies such as ETV, satellite, and telephony, by their capital intensive and technologically sophisticated nature, introduce a complex array of factors into the development process which hamper rather than faciliate certain desired outcomes [p. 72].

Cruise O'Brien also notes that "the professionalization of broadcasting—which is based on exclusiveness and control and reflects transnational patterns of socialization, has been detrimental to initiative and adaption" (1977: 153).

Given its predilection with audience research, American mass communication study has not concentrated upon research investigating the ties that bind media institutions to other sources and structures of power, whether domestic or international. In essence, development communication experts have taken for granted that more Western-type technology and communication hardware was beneficial to more Western-type economic growth that was equated with development. In fact, the policies they supported did not advance development and the quality of life, but in fact tended to foster a colonial-type dependence on the West, to aggravate an unbalanced distribution of benefits by concentrating new communication power in the hands of ruling elites, and to create tensions and frustration in LDCs by promoting inappropriate and inaccessible Western ideals and further expanding the economic gap between the West and the LDCs.

The European tradition offers a "critical" as opposed to "administrative" school and research tradition. Jasperse (1979: 10) says about this critical school: "The critical researcher's task is to formulate a general theory explaining the dominant social and economic forces and to show how, within a particular system, human needs—including communication needs—are met, neglected, or abused." Critical research operates within a more holistic framework in which communication is examined in relation to broader sociological issues: it is placed within historical, philosophical, and socioeconomic frames of reference reflecting a macrosociological approach. The British scholar Raymond Williams (1974) has argued that communication study should be regaded as a cultural science or a part of cultural studies. According to Peter Golding and Graham Murdock (1978), of the Leicester school, cultural studies try to relate the social order to the totality of symbolic forms expressing that order such as religion, fashion, language, media products, and so on.

WESTERN FAILINGS

These exhaustive approaches, focusing on structural, contextual, and procedural determinants of communication, have

been low priority concerns in the United States. American students of communication have never strived for a conceptual inventory that would provide a basis for explaining communication in the context of an overall social system. This failure to recognize communication as inextricably tied to social structure appears in development communication research and, particularly in the most prominent variety of it, diffusion of innovation research. Beltran (1976: 10) writes,

One basic assumption of the diffusion approach is that communication by itself can generate development, regardless of socioeconomic and political conditions. Another assumption is that increased production and consumption of goods and services constitute the essence of development, and that a fair distribution of income and opportunities will necessarily derive in due time. A third assumption is that the key to increased productivity is technological innovation, regardless of whom it may benefit and whom it may harm.

The interview, sample survey, and content analysis that have been the dominant research tools of diffusion studies have been one of the greatest obstacles to the exploration of social structure as a key factor in the communication process. A preoccupation with methodological precision took precedence over macrotheoretical formulations. Beltran (1976: 121) argues,

What prevented most U.S. social scientists, including communicologists, from engaging in relevant macrosocial studies and kept them at the level of small entities were mainly their use of the survey and their concentration on "adjustment" problems. . . . The sample survey is of modest usefulness when the researcher needs to obtain complex information about large entities like total societies or their major subsystems. Interviews best capture *individual* actions and reactions of isolated communication actors, but do not fully capture the *transactions* among them. It is these interactive relationships which may "speak" for society, rather than the electronically accumulated independent and "destructured" behaviours of its components.

This brings us to another feature of most communication study, including diffusion research, which militates against the adoption of a macrosocial approach that considers the role of structural and organizational variables. Western theoretical models of development, following the assumption of individual blame, have tended to locate internal sources of problems in developing countries and "were less likely to recognize the importance of external constraints on a nation's development: international terms of trade, the economic imperialism of international corporations, and vulnerability and dependence of the recipients of technical assistance programs" (Rogers, 1976a: 219).

An example of a content analysis study of Third World media is Barghouti's (1974) investigation of Jordan's print and electronic media. Detailing the frequency with which certain topics such as politics and agricultural information appeared in these media and then relating it to the results of an audience survey, the study was effective in demonstrating that the amount of agricultural news was insignificant in relation to other categories; that Jordanian farmers consequently were not getting their agricultural information from the media; and that therefore the media were not contributing as effectively as they might to agricultural development.

However, these types of content analysis studies leave untouched the deeper information structures and communication implications latent in the overt messages. Researchers using content analysis generally fail to examine, as the Leicester school probably would, how the content of mass media messages—through the style in which it is presented and the use of language, metaphor, symbols, and so on—reflects the social order and the structural and ideological properties that characterize it.

A key problem in communication research is dealing with process. Although communication usually is defined as a process, it is treated in research in snapshot rather than motion picture fashion. It gives the impression that communication is a mechanistically simple, unilinear, nonprocess affair in which

the working of social structural forces over time on acts of communication does not figure.

It was suggested earlier that the lack of an adequate focus on structure in development communication research in particular and American communication studies in general is related to a conservative acceptance by researchers of the premises of the system-in-being as given. This acceptance made it difficult for them to perceive the point of questioning the structure and organization of that system and directed them to concentrate their attention on how mass communication could act upon audiences in such a way as to promote conformity and adjustment to the social order.

One could pose the argument that the lack of a structural focus stemmed also from the heavily empirical, quantitative slant of American communication research and a corresponding reluctance to theorize. The influence of communication on ideological and value systems, patterns of social organization, and subtle, often invisible matrices of power and social interaction are much harder to quantify with empirical precision and less subject to rigorous measurements than the effects of specific messages on specific audiences. Study of these influences necessarily involves some theorizing, hypothesizing, and a speculative thinking not always firmly rooted in hard data. But such modes of understanding run against the grain of the behaviorally exact science tradition of American communication research. Nordenstreng (1968: 213) says, "A more or less common misconception about theory among 'hyperscientists' is that anything that goes beyond the empirical or statistical evidence is 'subjective speculation' and not 'exact science.'"

The claim of scientific neutrality is being challenged by a growing number of critics precisely because—by not passing judgment on the system and by placing questions about subtle, often unquantifiable structural, ideological, and systematic dynamics outside the realm of legitimate scientific inquiry— researchers who claim such neutrality are in fact passing judgment in favor of the status quo. As a leading British student of the media, Halloran (1974: 13) says,

It seems clear that, on the whole, these "neutral" enquiries have served to maintain the status quo. If it is inevitable that built into our whole research exercise are components which work in this conservative way, then at least let us face up to it and not feign neutrality which is impossible.

New Departures

Development communication theory and research methodology alike have been found wanting in some respects. Critics have not been slack in recommending alternatives to them. On the theoretical side, Rogers (1976c: 222-223) has pointed out four main elements in a new conception of development that is beginning to emerge. They are (1) the equality of distribution of information, socioeconomic benefits, and so forth; (2) popular participation in self-development planning and execution, usually accompanied by the decentralization of certain of these activities to the village level; (3) self-reliance and independence in development, with an emphasis upon the potential of local resources; and (4) integration of traditional with modern systems, so that modernization is a syncretization of old and new ideas, with the exact mixture somewhat different in each locale. These four conditions of development strongly contrast with the economic growth, central planning, and overall modernization priorities of the earlier dominant paradigm.

Marxist models of development and the role of communication have also sprung up in the last decade. In these models, the causes of underdevelopment have to be traced back to international imbalances caused by the dominance of Western capitalist systems and the imperialist control they exercise over the Third World. Radical change both within LDCs and in the present international economic system is seen as necessary for real development to occur.

Connected with these Marxist development schemes is an increasing awareness of the role of multinationals in perpetu-

ating a colonial dependence position in the Third World, both culturally and ideologically, through their economic and political control of the international communication industry. This awareness shows up in many new models of the causes of, and solutions to, underdevelopment that consider the influence of global political and economic power structures on development in detail.

The Maoist model of development has also received attention in the 1970s. This is a model, says Yu,

> that discourages urbanization, that encourages sideline and cottage industries in the countryside, that seeks to remove the difference between manual and mental labor, between industry and agriculture, and between city and countryside, and that does not pour hordes of peasants into big cities but teaches them about industry in the countryside [1976: 232].

Other models (Schumacher, 1973) of development, some inspired by the Club of Rome's *The Limits of Growth*, focused on a "small-is-beautiful" alternative to the old-style grand development schemes.

On the research side, new departures have been in the direction of finding more sophisticated tools for measuring the influence of social structure, both at a macro and micro level, on development communication. Concern with noneconomic factors of life and culture are receiving increased attention. In sum, both the theoretical and research traditions of Western scholars are undergoing reexamination by current students of mass communication. Finally, Marxist research methodologies and European critical school cultural studies, which have been ignored in development communication studies, are gaining attention in the Western Hemisphere.[2]

In sum, both development promises and theoretical approaches plus media studies of the North American administrative school have failed to provide guidance or sufficient hope to sustain these approaches. The mostly European-based critical school offers a significant alternative, although opera-

tionalizing their premises into large-scale research projects is still wanting. It is within this vague body of usable knowledge that the NWICO is finding itself. In essence the NWICO is not itself a research methodology; at best it represents some theoretical alternatives about media flows, cultural sovereignty, and so on that deserve attention by both students of development and the media as well as media professionals actively involved in the collection and observation of LDC news.

Notes

1. Innis (1951, 1972) described the breakdown in terms of the oral (time) traditions being replaced by print (space) traditions and concerns. He further maintained that every new communication innovation brought with it certain properties or characteristics that again shifted the societal relationship between time and space concerns.

2. The traditional ethnocentric nature of the American research is reflected also in its media systems (see, for example, Lent, 1977).

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THE ROLE OF UNESCO

Historically, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has avoided controversy. Now, its role and profile in the current international information and communication debate is unmistakable. UNESCO not only funded crucial meetings and conferences along the way but its research program has been directed toward pushing new initiatives in NWICO. UNESCO has invested much, backstage as well as publicly, in NWICO. Yet NWICO has brought major problems, the greatest of which has been the U.S. and U.K. withdrawal from the organization.

Before a description of major meetings held in Bogota, Quito, Costa Rica, Nairobi, Paris, Belgrade, and Sofia and other background details are presented, a few words about UNESCO are useful, because UNESCO has been on the cutting edge of the international debate about NWICO.

Background

UNESCO is a specialized agency of the United Nations. It began in 1946 with 20 member-states and has grown to 160 at the beginning of the 23rd General Assembly in 1985. The General Assembly of all member states meets every two years to decide both programs and budget. The budget of over $200 million comes from these member-states. The program is supervised by a 45-member Executive Board and the day-to-

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day operations are carried out by the Secretariat. The Secre-
tariat draws personnel from member-states and is based in
Paris.[1] Although its mandate covers various activities around
the globe, the convening and sponsoring of international
ministerial and research conferences is a time-consuming and
important task. That is how UNESCO became a major player
in the international media debate.

Often quoted is the phrase from UNESCO's constitution
stating that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the
minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed."
From that lofty and worthwhile ideal down to its current
concern for the New International Economic Order, UNESCO
has moved from a passive to an active force in international
affairs.

A brochure on UNESCO states the following:

> Both on the theoretical and the practical level, UNESCO has a
> vital role to play. . . . The current economic relations between
> industrialized and developing countries must, certainly, be
> transformed, but they cannot on their own change the political
> and sociocultural factors which shape integrated develop-
> ments. Thus UNESCO has the task of helping: to enlarge the
> scientific and technological bases which permit each country to
> use its natural resources better; . . . to increase and improve
> communications and information systems; . . . to promote the
> progress of social sciences so that each society can undertake its
> own studies and utilize the instruments of change without
> losing its own identity [1977: 3-4].

Although UNESCO originated in Great Britain in Novem-
ber 1945 and was dominated by Western nations, particularly
Britain, France, and the United States, the late 1950s saw a
shift that is still continuing. This shift resulted from the
continual addition of newly emerging nations, mainly from
Asia, Africa, and other Third World areas. During the 1960s a
similar ideological and economic condition saw the developing
nations form a power bloc or lobby called "The Group of 77."[2]
The number of nations in the group has risen to over 100 at the
beginning of the 1980s. But Hoggart explains,

The new nations, who were in general creations of the early
sixties, tend to take the UN seriously though ambiguously.
Since the UN was set up by the victorious allied powers, it has
the stamp of Western ways of thinking. On the other hand, its
record in anticolonialism is good and it has made a con-
siderable contribution to the emergence of some new states.
Their relationship to the UN is therefore rich in ambiguities
[1978: 64].

This ambiguity is no better illustrated than in their attitudes
toward information. On the one hand they want, some desper-
ately, to become modern industrialized nations with color
domestic television and all the media trappings that money and
technology permit. Yet most lack even the basic telecommuni-
cations infrastructures for telephone or telegraph, let alone
sophisticated ground terminals for satellite television trans-
mission. On the other hand, they want no part of Western
culture. Total rejection of Hollywood films, Madison Avenue
commercials, or foreign-produced television programs is man-
datory. Only a pure domestic product is acceptable. They may
well wind up with the Western technology, with no content to
place on the systems. Even for educational, social, or health
care uses, the system will be "turned off." Software is a major
issue, or, indeed, problem.

UNESCO has not been without its critics over the years.
Part of the criticism has been a spillover from the general
negative assessment of the parent United Nations organi-
zation. Another major criticism reflected a new voting align-
ment in the mid 1970s, which excluded Israel from a European
regional grouping; this brought a barrage of criticism from the
Western press. This same action also led to the United States
withholding its share of UNESCO's budget; the amount is
about 25% of the total. The press criticism did not go unnoticed
by the Secretariat. It commissioned Roger Heacock and asked
the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva "to
investigate the claims of the media and the reality to which
those claims referred" (Heacock, 1977: 5). What UNESCO's
senior officials wanted was:

independent verification for their belief that the Western press had launched a vertible campaign against the organization, levelling false charges against it in its efforts to help restructure world mass communication systems [Heacock, 1977: 5].

In his impressive monograph Heacock (1977) maintains that UNESCO lost interest in the study after the United States paid its arrears:

I decided nonetheless to publish the study. The subject is a vital one, in an era in which ideological confrontation throughout the Third World is in no way on the wane, Africa being the most prominent current battleground, and when military confrontation between the great powers is increasingly set aside in favour of a war of information and propaganda, the battles being won or lost through the projection of images intended to justify a given model of economic, social and political organization [p. 6].

He then outlined a series of events that, some say by accident and some by oversight, propelled UNESCO into the middle of an international debate about culture and information.

General Assemblies, Meetings, and Conferences

The worldwide debate over the future of international communication systems was bound to come. But the strength and sophistication of the Third World power bloc were underestimated by multinational corporations involved in communications and by Western governments alike.

At the same time UNESCO was vaguely searching for a *raison d'être*. For the previous decade, research in education had dominated its activities, culminating with the Faure (1972) Commission Report, *Learning to Be*. It was into this vacuum-like atmosphere in the early 1970s that a series of innocent looking resolutions were introduced concerning the development of national media policies.

The following attempts to highlight the major forums where the media debate crystallized. What may be surprising is that

UNESCO, despite its ability to obfuscate and to entangle tasks with bureaucratic procedures that are Byzantine in nature, still either directly sponsored, or at least cosponsored, the preliminary critical meetings.

SIXTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF UNESCO: 1970

As LDCs reached a significant block of opinion and influence, they were joined in the media issue by the USSR. In part, the Soviet, and other Socialist countries, united with the Third World as a means of embarrassing the Western governments. It is important to recall that Tass sees government control as an accepted practice and therefore, when signs of LDC discontent with Western wire services appeared, the Soviets clearly had no journalistic qualms about supporting extended international government control.[3]

Essentially, the 1970 General Assembly outlined the need for articulating national or domestic communication policies. In fact, a series of publications has resulted from this thrust. This examination, by the developing nations in particular, led to a greater awareness and documentation of the one-way flow from the West to the LDCs. Also, national development policies for the LDCs could not be developed in a vacuum when so much of their media systems were controlled in foreign cities, namely, London, Paris, and New York.

SEVENTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF UNESCO: 1971

Three events of significance occurred during the general assembly. First, the rapid development of communication technology brought the issue of direct broadcast satellites (DBS) before UNESCO. Fear of uninterrupted transmission from a satellite directly to homes in foreign lands, rather than through ground stations that would permit control or exclusion of alien messages, saw a prior consent resolution pass by a 100-to-1 vote, with the United States voting against. Second, a resolution was passed supporting a call for meetings of experts to discuss national communication policies. These meetings were

scheduled in Third World countries and not in the West as had
been the tradition. Third, the USSR introduced a mass media
resolution that was to evolve over several versions during
future meetings. At least one title remained unmodified. It was
a declaration on "The Fundamental Principles Governing the
Use of the Mass Media with a View to Strengthening Peace and
International Understanding and Combating War Propa-
ganda, Racialism, and Apartheid."

NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

As decolonization placed many newly emerged nations with-
out a larger entity upon which to base or judge foreign policy, a
new pressure group emerged to fill the vacuum. A summit
meeting in 1973 of Foreign Ministers of Nonaligned Countries
met in Algiers. This meeting was particularly significant
because several nations sought a foreign policy stance distant
from either the United States or the USSR. Among the
demands covering the rejection of their colonial past (and
aspects of neocolonialism) was a demand for the decolo-
nization of information.

A series of nonaligned conferences followed (Peru in 1975
and Tunisia, Mexico, India, and Sri Lanka in 1976). The
rhetoric and action progressed from attacking transnational
communication corporations to an action plan for the estab-
lishment of a Third World wire service that began as a pool of
contributing government information services. More is said
about this Third World news agency, Tanjug, elsewhere.
Additional clout was achieved as the NIEO and the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries shifted international
power to a nucleus of nonaligned countries.

Along with the nonaligned summit meeting in 1973 was a
related seminar held in Finland. President Kekkonen, speaking
at a University of Tampere seminar, also talked of cultural
imperialism. The "free flow" argument was documented as a
"one-way flow" and much of the current malaise and rhetoric
was established in this era. Indeed, a major document at the
Tampere seminar was Nordenstreng and Varis's study revealing

the pervasive influence of U.S. and British television sales internationally (UNESCO, 1974).

Latin America Meetings

While the nonaligned countries were proceeding with their information plans, the UNESCO meetings commenced. They were to investigate the disparities in international information flow, as well as access and participation in determining national communication policies. Although the major meeting was to be held in San Jose, Costa Rica, in July 1976, two background meetings have significant bearing on the movement toward a New World Information and Communication Order. These meetings were held in Bogota, Columbia, July 4-13, 1974, and Quito, Ecuador, June 24-30, 1975. Background papers and research documents were presented outlining several media grievances. Foreign wire services, in particular, came in for considerable criticism. The original venue for the meeting, which resulted from a resolution passed at the 17th UNESCO General Assembly, was Asia, but the Secretariat had changed it to Latin America, because Latin America has several excellent U.S.-educated researchers and scholars.

It should be emphasized that all parties involved saw these regional conferences as building blocks for an ultimate major conference on media and information. By now just as UNESCO had investigated education (the Faure Commission) for over a decade, so information was to be the area of concern with little awareness of the polarity of opinion (that is, a free press versus government responsibility) and its possible divisiveness.

The Latin American regional conference proceeded by contacting regional experts for the purpose of assembling background papers. The mandate for the series of conferences was to take a look at the relationship between communication policies and a nation's economic, social, and cultural policies. Here lies the link between government and the media that now dominates the debate. What governments should do to encourage or develop communication policies and practices was advocated during these meetings.

A group of experts met from July 4 to July 13, 1974, in
Bogota. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Latin
America research and media problems. This meeting expanded
the underpinnings of development journalism. Some of the
research presented outlined the information dependency of
Latin America and the control of the media by economic or
military elites. Others discussed the cultural imperialism of
U.S. television, Hollywood films, and foreign wire services.
The original outcome of the meeting was to be limited to
UNESCO officials. But a Canadian official obtained the report
and turned it over to two major pressure groups, both repre-
senting private media interests. In turn, the press began
carrying analyses and editorials in the Americas about
UNESCO initiatives that went against their free press traditions.

Given the heightened profile, the Quito meeting of June
24-30, 1975, attracted considerable attention:

> The purpose was to facilitate "fuller news exchange among the
> countries of the Latin American region" and the "exchange of
> information between the region and the rest of the world." . . .
> The make-up of the observer delegations was similar to that of
> the Bogota meeting . . . and two U.S. State Department
> officials, a fact which revealed the great importance now
> attached to the question by the USA [Heacock, 1977: 32].

The Quito report dealt with the disparities in the flow of
information, and given the ongoing shake-up in staff within
UNESCO, the media issue became politically volatile as events
moved toward the main intergovernmental conference at San
Jose, Costa Rica, from July 12 to 21, 1976.

As an indication of the growing press awareness and
concern, even the agenda, which was distributed 12 days prior
to the San Jose meeting, caused a press reaction. Leonard
Sussman of the Freedom House, writing in *International
News: Freedom Under Attack,* states,

> These policies ultimately were recognized by journalists as an
> imminent threat when the agenda . . . was circulated in March
> 1976. The Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) mounted

a campaign to alert delegates to the dangers inherent in the
UNESCO discussion papers. The agenda spoke of the "right to
communicate" becoming a "central theme of future communi-
cation policies." The agenda also picked up the proposals for
broad public "access" and "participation" discussed in the
earlier papers by UNESCO experts. Perhaps most ominous of
all, the agenda (UNESCO, 1976b: 5) flatly declared,

> The old notion of the free flow of information must now
> be extended to include that of the balanced flow of infor-
> mation, which is essential in order that a new, more just
> international economic order, as defined by resolution
> 3201 (S-VI) of the United Nations General Assembly,
> may be brought into being.

The main thrust of the agenda proposals was clear: "A national
communication policy is necessary in order to help safeguard
national sovereignty" [Sussman, 1979: 121].

The media, particularly the print press, suddenly scrambled
to read the papers and reports of the Bogota and Quito
conferences. UNESCO was becoming a household, and dis-
liked, word among many journalists, and almost all owners of
media systems in the Americas.

Sussman demonstrates this:

> The San Jose conference opened in a tense setting. The IAPA's
> officers, headed by George Beebe and German E. Ornes, estab-
> lished an opposition command post across the street from the
> UNESCO conference. They held meetings with the press and
> effectually established an opposition presence. Mr. M'Bow
> invited the IAPA leadership to discuss the news media issues.
> There seemed to be some convergence of views but that did not
> persist once the sessions began. The IAPA adamantly foresaw
> the undermining of freedom of expression if "communication
> policies" were approved. "The press of the Americas," said the
> IAPA (IAPA, 1976: 2), "is before one of the most unusual
> threats it has ever faced in all its turbulent history" [1979: 121].

The San Jose conference not only dealt with further imbal-
ances in which the wire services were major actors but also a

call for regional (Latin America as well as Caribbean) wire services was strongly recommended. Perhaps because of a potential loss of markets, Associated Press and United Press International coverage of events at San Jose were negative and the editorials in the Western press against UNESCO were uniformly harsh.[4]

Other recommendations called for control of satellite distribution, development of national communication policies, national press councils, and journalistic ethics tied to some type of government sanctions for enforcement. The San Jose meeting provided great concern for the wire services and owners of the press in the West. They began working backstage to influence Third World representatives in order to deflect UNESCO's preoccupation with forwarding national communication policies as its major policy initiative in the 1970s. More recently, Mattelart and Schmucler (1985) have documented the fragile economic base and input of Latin American firms in the high technology sector.

NINETEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF UNESCO: 1976

The vital role of information, plus the differing views as to its control, now appeared front-stage at the 19th UNESCO General Assembly held in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1976. By this time, most Third World countries had abandoned any hope, if they ever had it, for a "free press." They wanted an engineered press, one that would assist in the concerted development of their nation-states. They wanted a cultural stamp of their own making and not one imported from the West or "Made in the USA." M'Bow could not agree more. The major document before the delegates to the Nairobi General Conference with reference to the media was again entitled "Draft Declaration on Fundamental Principles Governing the Use of the Mass Media in Strengthening Peace and International Understanding and in Combating War Propaganda, Racialism and Apartheid." This declaration, 19 C/91, and Article 12, dealing with government responsibility for all media systems, guaranteed extensive press coverage by the West.

Before outlining the major events in Nairobi, it is necessary to describe an ironic situation that had occurred in the early 1970s that really cemented the strength of the Western perspective, particularly in the United States, of no government control of the press, particularly print. Without dwelling on them, the "Agnew-Watergate" events enshrined the distance the newspaper and the public wanted and deserved from government control. Vice President Spiro Agnew frequently attacked the press and responses to his outbursts provided much concern in the United States about freedom of the press. This philosophical debate was followed by a major media event; two rather junior reporters, Bernstein and Woodward, took a lead and pursued it until events, despite White House intervention aimed at stopping the stories, led to the ultimate resignation of Richard Nixon from the Presidency of the United States. The disgust and tarnish of people and events known as "Watergate" was viewed by many as the exact reason why a press free from government control was needed. To talk of government control in the mid-1970s was exactly what the American public and Western journalists did not want to hear. Freedom from government control was now a renewed goal determined by events in the West. In a similar fashion the British control of the U.K. press during the Falklands invasion irritated many British reporters.

At Nairobi, the role of the media after years of preliminary debates now boiled down to a single draft declaration consisting of 12 articles. Given the heightened profile of the issue in both UNESCO and wire service offices, a move to avoid an out and out confrontation was sought. Leaving aside other issues, it was the single Article 12 calling for state responsibility for media activities that dominated events for days. In the "spirit of Nairobi" a compromise was reached, mainly backstage, to shelve the draft declaration and to reduce pressure among the militants by forming a new group to further examine the issue. This, of course, was Senator Sean MacBride's International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems. Director General M'Bow steered events

in such a way as to delay the debate—and vote—to the following General Assembly to be held in Paris in 1978. M'Bow linked the debate for a "new international information order" to the "new international economic order," but he was willing to delay an outright showdown having correctly analyzed the strong Western objection to development journalism.

One other press-related resolution was passed by the General Assembly. Tunisia sponsored a call for financial assistance and other means of support to the nonaligned news pool, Tanjug.

New International Economic Order

In order to provide a complete picture of the rise of the nonaligned movement, it is necessary to describe the development of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). During the early 1970s, the United Nations and its member agencies became major vehicles of change, and to some extent hope, for emerging Third World nations and other "nonaligned" nations. It is surprising the extent to which the resolve and the magnitude of change adopted by the United Nations was misanalyzed not only in terms of the New World Information and Communication Order currently under discussion but also in terms of the underlying New International Economic Order.

For the most part, it took economists several years to come to grips with NIEO and only a few came to realize or examine its link to international communication and NWICO. A UNESCO report, "The New International Economic Order: Links Between Economics and Communications" (Pavlic and Hamelink, 1985) makes this point.

> The substance of the relationship between the two orders, however, remains a particularly neglected issue, although it is often sporadically mentioned in some of the basic documents (such as those of the movement of the nonaligned countries, of the United Nations System, etc.) and in the works of some authors. What still prevails is the communication gap between

the economist and the communication scientist, both of whom are interested in helping the Third World, but seem to have difficulties in finding a common language. This is true not only on the international scene, but just as much (if not even more) at the national level: moreover, a communications break-down exists even among the communications people themselves. The latter manifests itself in various ways, the most striking being the systematic reduction by some communication professionals of the efforts to create a new international/world information-communication order to just one of its aspects, i.e., the role of the press and the defense of its freedom [1985: 10].

Just what is the NIEO that the United Nations and therefore UNESCO are supporting? In effect, it represents a major change for the West, which traditionally controlled the United Nations and its organizations. This is clearly not the case any longer. When 146 nations met in Paris for five weeks of UNESCO meetings in the fall of 1978, the largest group, 106 member-states, represented Third World or so-called non-aligned nations. They were originally labeled the "Group of 77" and this label is still used despite continually increasing size and influence.

On May 1, 1974, the United Nations adopted a major declaration and program of action to establish a New International Economic Order. The declaration encouraged member states to:

work urgently for the establishment of a New International Economic Order based on "equity, sovereign equality, interde-pendence, common interest and cooperation among all states," irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for future generations [1974: Res. 3201].

The fruits of the research and conferences conducted since then have dominated debate and resolutions at all UNESCO

meetings. Three major background works were produced: *Moving Towards Change, The Future of the Third World,* and *The Challenge of the Year 2000.* They outline the background of, and need to build, a New International Economic Order.

Although the concerns here are centered on issues involving international broadcasting and communications, an international conference on Population and Development sponsored by the United Nations in the mid-1970s played a central role in outlining the philosophy of the NIEO. A lack of preparation by the West in terms of confronting the new economic desires and motives of the LDCs was also apparent. The World Population Conference held in Bucharest, August 1974, examined the controversial issue of the relationships between population and development. The principal organizers, from the West, were almost totally unprepared for the introduction of the concept of NIEO as well as the political strength and resolve of those supporting it. NIEO would come to dominate North-South economic relations for well over a decade (Bhagwati: 1977).

There are several parallels with this international conference on development and the conferences and UNESCO General Assemblies dealing with the NWICO. Basically, the Bucharest Conference was to adopt a Western resolution calling for additional family planning and population control as a means of controlling development. But the draft plan submitted to the conference was confronted by no fewer than 68 amendments. The West totally miscalculated the impact of the NIEO as a philosophical rationale for developing nations that had decided to reject traditional Western solutions and instead replace them with alternate economic solutions.

The LDCs began to see the industrial nations' domination of markets, raw materials, financial institutions, and the international monetary system as being stacked against their interests. The Bucharest Conference became the earliest landmark of the LDCs putting forward their rationale that dominates the United Nations and its affiliates in terms of its perception of how things should move during the balance of this century.

That is why an understanding of the NIEO is central to an understanding of the direction and origins of the NWICO.

The other key conference was the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD-1) held in 1964.

> At that conference a bloc of African, Asian, Latin American nations (later to be known as the "Group of 77") united in supporting a series of "general propositions" that attempted to redefine the principles of governing international economic relations. The Group of 77 had enough votes to establish UNCTAD as a permanent agency of the United Nations, but, lacking the means to implement its goals, UNCTAD remained much more a symbol than a reality [Finkle and Crane, 1975: 92].

Indeed, at future UNCTAD meetings, the LDCs failed to gain significant trade concessions from the West. This lack of concessions has increased the cleavage between the LDCs and the West.

Because economic development and progress was not occurring with any considerable success, the LDCs found an unexpected opportunity and model in late 1973 when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), originally founded in Baghdad in 1960, was able to establish through a cartel a substantial increase in the price of a basic commodity—oil.[5] This, of course, became a model for other Third World nations to emulate in hopes of obtaining the type of economic concessions and financial growth that had escaped them when attempting to work through international organizations and conferences.

Although seldom stated directly, this revised conception of the economic world is dominated by OPEC nations as a result of their cartel and the energy crisis. Indeed, the push for the NIEO now has moved to include sociocultural aspects of life as well as basic economic factors. This is how the press and related media activities have become involved.

Upon analysis it is easy to understand why LDCs, particularly newly created ones, were influenced extensively by the newer, wealthy states. Arab states and OPEC provide a model for one-commodity nations to emulate. What the Arab nations have done with the international price of their primary natural resource, oil, other LDCs hope to do with their resources, whether they be basic minerals, such as bauxite or copper, or food products, such as coffee or cocoa. But the North-South alliance has not moved in such a way as to complete the shift to an NIEO.[6] In fact, the NIEO is still excessively tied to one commodity, that is, oil, and as OPEC's fortunes fade, so also do goals of NIEO. But OPEC's strength in the 1970s was sufficient to attract power in the short run for Arab countries within UNESCO and at other international meetings and conferences.

Encouraged by the success of OPEC both as a model and a means of frustrating the West, plus the U.N. resolution endorsing "A Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" gave the LDCs encouragement. It not only transformed the Bucharest population conference but also became an important instrument in deliberations affecting communications and media trends internationally.

In retrospect few from the West anticipated the central role to be played by the NIEO in future United Nations and other international meetings. As Finkle and Crane (1975: 93) state,

> Despite the mandate from the Sixth Special Session in April, there was little recognition of its implications on the part of those most directly involved in planning and preparing for Bucharest. Interviews with members of the UN Secretariat as well as delegates from the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other countries, including some from the Third World, indicate that they had not anticipated that the New International Economic Order would be injected as a major issue into the Conference, or that the Draft Plan would come under such strong attack.

The importance of the Bucharest Conference lay not so much in the amendments to the original draft plan as in the fact

that a new political order had emerged to put forward an NIEO. Upon being tested for the first time it was extremely successful and, therefore, the persistence and pace for the NIEO gained speed. The NIEO was quickly interjected into other U.N. meetings and conferences. Indeed, the rewriting of the documents for the Bucharest Conference in its early days clearly parallels the early days of the WARC Conference in Geneva in 1979.[7] It is also interesting to note that Argentina and Algeria were central at Bucharest in calling for a writing of the draft plan in terminology consistent with the NIEO.

The West was not only surprised but shocked that what they had been aiming at for decades, population reduction through family planning, was now becoming a lesser priority as compared with the demands of the NIEO. A new sociopolitical order had emerged based upon a different set of economic principles and goals that was to dominate international debates and goals (Anell and Nygren, 1980). Yet it is ironic to note that "the scope and the intensity of the Third World demands at Bucharest were not anticipated by the U.S. delegates despite the extensive preparation that went into formulating the U.S. strategy for the Conference" (Finkle and Crane, 1975: 103). Finkle and Crane state concisely the underlying problem facing the United States and the West:

> Although the United States is willing to confront Third World demands in "appropriate forums," the United States—along with most other Western industrialized nations—is simply not prepared to accede to the radical transformation of the international economic system as proposed by the developing nations. The demand for a New International Economic Order is seen as ideologically objectionable as well as a threat to American wealth and power. From the American perspective, it is an attempt to improve economic conditions in the Third World by distributing the existing wealth of the industrialized nations rather than by creating new wealth through development [1975: 104].

One could replace the city of Bucharest with Nairobi, Paris, or Belgrade. Miscalculation and underestimation appear to be

the rule rather than exception for Western nations in terms of the "quantum" change in direction and commitment to new economic priorities.

The Third World's desire to rewrite the rules for the economic environment received an unanticipated boost in late 1974. Another factor, seldom mentioned, was most important in creating a power vacuum at UNESCO. This was the simple act, by the United States, of budgetary withholding of its substantial contribution, more than one-quarter of UNESCO's annual budget, beginning in December 1974. The budget withholding began over the treatment of Israel within UNESCO's European regional grouping. The United States lost influence and prestige at UNESCO quickly. First, everyone was affected; internal budgets, projects, and promotions were slashed or stalled. Even junior employees from European nations felt some antagonism against the United States. Second, the Arab nations, along with Nigeria and Yugoslavia, bailed out UNESCO with short-term loans. This in turn resulted in much greater power and, indeed, senior posts were assigned to non-Western candidates. As a result, the NIEO was supported from within and at the top and very much continues to be so today. During the U.S. holdout many anti-West, anti-United States in particular, research projects, conferences, and programs commenced.

The changes in economic orientation brought about in recent years is reflected in all aspects of UNESCO's activities. Everything from the influence of transnational corporations to the role of popular culture is being examined in light of the goals of either the NIEO or the NWICO. The new order is rhetorically harsh on colonial domination, neocolonialism, racial discrimination, apartheid, and violations of human rights. Although the goals are indeed lofty, they blur the attempt to shift international power from the Western nations to a loose coalition of LDCs—Arab, nonaligned, and socialist (namely the USSR) countries. Much of the rhetoric is belligerent and there is little doubt that the NIEO is being set in place. The next move is to alter sociocultural priorities under the protection and guidance of the NWICO.

In their analysis, the LDCs realize the influence of the media, not only in conveying capitalist values but also in influencing cultural norms, and they are flexing their new-found political muscles. Greater control of their own destinies, including media content, is a primary goal of those who subscribe to the new-order philosophy.

Now we turn to the 20th UNESCO General Assembly held in Paris in 1978. It was totally overwhelmed by concern about the NWICO, the mass media declaration, and the MacBride Interim Report.

Notes

1. For an excellent look at the workings and problems of the Secretariat, see former Assistant Director-General Richard Hoggart's (1978) *An idea and its servants: UNESCO from within*. The issue of U.S. and U.K. personnel quotas is now under review.

2. A list of nonaligned countries is found in Appendix A. Other aspects of the nonaligned movement are discussed in the section dealing with the emergence of the New International Economic Order.

3. One could argue that the debate originated in 1968 with the amended Declaration on Human Rights that included the notion of a balanced and free flow of information. Interpretation between East and West differed, of course, but it is ironic that the United States initiated the amendment.

4. For an outline of press coverage, see Heacock (1977: 37-54).

5. The history of OPEC is also viewed by critical communication scholars as a classic case study of Western media inattention at first or biased reporting once OPEC was able to establish itself as a major instrument of political and commercial power. Consider the following sample from the OPEC wire service and written by their Editor-in-Chief, Tunji Oseni: "Vienna, 17 Jan. 85 (OPECNA). For OPEC, 1985 is not just another year. It will witness the organization's 25th anniversary, to be commemorated at an extraordinary meeting in September.

"The fact that OPEC is here to celebrate a quarter century of its existence is an event in itself, considering that it is an organization made up entirely of developing countries which have successfully challenged the dominance of forces which believed themselves destined to dictate to the entire world. . . .

"At its birth in 1960, the Western media not only failed to give OPEC a chance, but simply ignored the organization. Such coverage as there was of the historic event in Baghdad, was considered, if at all, fit for inconspicuous, unread inside pages only or in, what are called 'Briefs.'

"It was not until 1973 that it dawned on the Western Media what it had refused to take note of 13 years earlier. . . .

"The coverage of the Western media has been tailored to the intentions and interests of Western economies. This could have been seen for what it is, were it not being served up as 'objective analysis.'

"Readers, viewers and listeners are supposed to take Western coverage as dispassionate judgment, and not as an organized effort at building a psychological fortress against a fair understanding of what OPEC is and what it stands for."

OPEC still sees the "Seven Sisters," all major Western oil companies as private, foreign energy corporations which, for years, had made pricing arrangements and agreements without consultation of the governments producing the petroleum. OPEC's disapproval of the Western media is second only to its disapproval and dislike of the actions of the major oil corporations of the West.

Although OPEC members, as reflected by their wire service copy, dislike the negative tone of Western coverage of their affairs, particularly with reference to OPEC's problems and possible demise, it appears that time is on the side of Western media analysts. Indicative of the coverage of recent OPEC activities, including the decline in world spot oil prices, is the following from the *Economist* (Dec. 14, 1985).

"Twelve years ago, OPEC was busy quadrupling oil prices and boasting of its strength. This week it was boasting again, that it could push prices down if it wanted to. They duly fell, by more than $3.00 a barrel in a single day, but even the most inventive PR man could not claim a triumph for the cartel. OPEC could soon be just another four-letter word, fading from headline to history book. Its fate rests with a few hundred politicians in Britain and America. They could turn an unseasonal fall in oil prices into permanent gains for the world economy" (p. 16).

The piece concludes, "a painful cartel is dying" (p. 17).

One should also keep in mind that the NIEO is strongly tied to the success of OPEC and any further declines in OPEC's stature and influence has a parallel downward pull on the influence and impact of the call for a new economic order.

6. For additional details refer to the Report on the Independent Commission on International Development Issues chaired by Willy Brandt (1980).

7. WARC's roles and its relationship to NWICO is discussed later. Some may want to refer to that section now for background detail.

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THE MESSAGE:
The 20th and 21st General Assemblies
of UNESCO

> The African states had made it plain that they wanted a black
> African as Head of a major Specialized Agency. The bulk of
> other nations decided, severally or in groups, that the wish
> could be acceded to: UNESCO's Director Generalship became
> vacant at about the right time. As the line became clear,
> Member States began to say more and more that M'Bow was
> indisputably the best man who could be found for the job;
> which was an insupportable claim, since his candidature had
> not been seriously tested against any others [Hoggart, 1978:
> 138-139].

The sixth Director General of UNESCO, Amadou Mahtar
M'Bow from Senegal, had his career on the line. His future
rested upon how he handled the contentious draft declaration
on the mass media. He must have realized that the "spirit of
Nairobi" was a false spirit built on acrimony and distrust. It
was worked out backstage at the last moment to avoid a
walkout by Western delegations. M'Bow had arranged quickly
for the MacBride International Commission to reduce the
building pressure. In 1978, the question was, what could
M'Bow do to keep UNESCO intact and in so doing, advance
his own career aspirations possibly toward the secretary-
generalship of the parent United Nations?

By the end of the 1970s UNESCO's image was tarnished.
Within the Secretariat there was feeling that the Western press,
spurred by wire service reports, had decided to emphasize the

negative aspects of UNESCO's initiatives and programs, in its coverage of both the media issue in Nairobi and the anti-Israel resolution of 1974. However, in reality the public image of UNESCO was affected by its shift in direction from a passive pro-Western agency to an activist, prodevelopment, LDC-oriented agency. Its ideological commitment to fundamental changes (through the NIEO, for example) was little understood and was considered a threat to the future markets and economic security that the West had taken for granted since UNESCO's inception in the 1940s.

It should be understood that UNESCO has no legal force to alter the world's economic or information order. But it does have moral force and votes. Moreover, it provides an international setting for symbolic actions via declarations, that are designed to be a guide or ideal. UNESCO attempts to move beyond the purely economic functions of trade and technology, to move the debate beyond the cash register to the social, cultural, and human dimensions of international exchanges.

To say that whatever UNESCO does in the international media debate is meaningless misses the point. First, UNESCO's Constitution specifically is designed to allow nations to act for the benefit of all mankind—not just for local, parochial, or narrow concerns. Second, the media debate allowed the LDCs to again sharpen their rhetorical skills and determination of purpose for continued encounters at future meetings.

As for the plight of the LDCs, "it was as though they had moved from military colonialism to technological neocolonialism without a thought beyond the purely practical and profitable" (Hoggart, 1978: 193). They had rushed to accept Western technology designed for other cultures and other needs and now conceded that technological determinism was not the answer. The LDCs approached the media and cultural debate with fresh thoughts of what they had covered during the past five years in their quest for an NIEO. Basically, it was "a call for greater distributive justice."

In a world in which 70 percent of the population receive 20 percent of the wealth, in which millions lack bare necessities—

adequate food, medical care, employment—in which the rich,
mesmerized by the imperative that their already high standard
of living should steadily improve, get richer and the poor
poorer, it is no wonder that the statesmen of the poorer nations
are alarmed and angry [Hoggart, 1978: 193].

The LDCs had flexed their muscles in other areas and now
they were prepared to go after the Western mass media.

The 20th UNESCO General Assembly: 1978

The 20th General Assembly lasted from October 24 to
November 28, 1978. A main plenary session at which the
Director-General, M'Bow, opened general policy debate was
followed by approximately 20 days of responses by each of the
144 member-states and other officials. Concurrent with the
plenary sessions were five subcommittee sessions of which
Culture and Communication was Committee IV. As a result,
statements about the media were made in two forums, the
plenary session and Committee IV. It was in the Committee IV
meetings that the draft declaration on the media was debated,
altered, and passed.

Following the 20-odd plenary sessions there was a major
session in which the Director-General replied to the general
policy debate. Then, in the final week resolutions and conclu-
sions submitted by the various subcommittees were adopted.
The results set the budgets and priorities for UNESCO until
the 21st General Assembly, held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in
1980.

M'Bow's major statement (UNESCO, 1978: 3), which
opened the plenary session and the general policy debate,
recapped the work of UNESCO since its previous general
conference, in 1976 in Nairobi, Kenya, and set the framework
for future UNESCO work. "The establishment of a new
international economic order constitutes . . . one of the major
contexts, and no doubt the largest, within which the activities
of the Organization will take place." M'Bow continued by

pointing out that imbalances between the West and the LDCs were not limited to "solely the production and exchange of goods and monetary problems, but also—and inextricably— the creation, dissemination and exchange of information and knowledge" (UNESCO, 1978: 4). Thus the NWICO was further intertwined within the NIEO.

During the address several other topics were reviewed, including activities in areas of human rights, disarmament, science and technology, and education. In turning to communication, M'Bow stated "that the task awaiting the international community in this field over the next few years represents a real challenge, since it is a task which is at one and the same time immense, complex, essential and urgent" (UNESCO, 1978: 14). Then, the Director-General proceeded to review the origins of the MacBride Commission and highlighted five areas that required further research and clarification.

Because the Director-General is powerful in influencing the way uncommitted members vote and because he provided informal guidance for the second and final year of the MacBride investigation, the five areas outlined are worth mentioning: first, the philosophical issue of "the dialectical conflict between the notions of freedom and responsibility" (UNESCO, 1978: 15); second, "the apparent paradox existing between the superabundance of goods and services in the information field now becoming increasingly available to industrialized societies" (UNESCO, 1978: 15); third, the disparities in information resources with the information industries already representing over 50% of the gross national product of highly industrialized nations, and many Third World nations having a very small gross national product, let alone a modern telecommunications infrastructure; fourth, and one that was probably the most important, dealt with "informatics," the interconnecting of computers with telecommunications systems.[1] The fifth question related to content and the power of media for instructional uses to assist solving world problems.

What followed these five questions was an outline of the difficulties and necessity of acting on the draft declaration on the media. M'Bow (UNESCO, 1978: 15) criticized opponents and stated,

> But I believe very sincerely that the draft now before you could meet with a large measure of agreement, provided that it is read objectively and dispassionately, and that form of words are patiently sought which dispel the ambiguities of hidden motives that some people still read into it. In this way, the large measure of agreement that the General Conference considers necessary could be achieved.

The Director-General concluded with a mention of a World Conference on Communication for 1981-1982. However, he lost ground quickly as nation after nation, in response to his address, spoke against the submitted draft declaration. Activities in plenary sessions, in corridors, and in media briefings cumulatively portrayed a UNESCO, divided along East-West lines, with the East (socialist) receiving support from many LDCs. The controversial draft declaration on the role of the mass media had significant implications for foreign communication activities. It represented a distinct change from the free flow of information policy established by the United Nations in the 1940s. M'Bow, at a press conference following his opening address, left no doubt as to where he stood on the issue when he stated "journalists, no matter who they are, are not absolutely neutral."

Before reviewing the major speeches, it is important to recall the three objections to the Western media. The first was a straight anticapitalist approach that complained about the commercial orientation of the press, radio, television, and film industries. The second line of attack basically dealt with the one-way flow of information from the United States, whether the wire services or Hollywood productions, to other nations, with very little reciprocal trade. It is interesting to note that the BBC, Reuters, Spanish, and French broadcasting interests also are attacked from time to time by LDCs, particularly the

African nations, which were former colonies of these European powers. The third criticism was of cultural domination or fear of electronic colonialism. It consisted of a dislike of the history, norms, mores, and cultural aspects conveyed in the content of the press, radio, television, advertising, and film productions.

In order to redress this imbalance, the Asian, African, Latin American, and Caribbean countries have sought to establish their own regional news agencies. In addition, the LDC wire service, Tanjug, is emerging as an aspect of the new NWICO. (The historical background of the major wire services is detailed later.) The LDCs realize that given new technologies, particularly powerful satellites, there is some opportunity for them to gain greater control over what is said about their nation-states if they act now. Not only the bad news, the sensational news about coups and earthquakes, but a more balanced flow covering beneficial aspects of their development will be transmitted if they have their way. That was the basic plea by LDCs' representatives in Paris.

REACTIONS

If, as a senior editor of the international edition of *Newsweek* (Behr, 1978: xiii) has observed, "the content of newspapers and magazines, like the shape of women's clothes, follows the vagaries of fashion," then clearly it was fashionable to cover UNESCO's 20th General Assembly. Indeed, the press corps of over 350 represented an almost tenfold increase over the press assigned to the 19th General Assembly in Nairobi.[2] The major plenary speeches, the press conferences, and the press coverage by major European papers provide significant insight into the international information order debate. The following high-lights six weeks of debate that historically may turn out to be the major change in international media practices during this century.

On Monday, October 30th, Judith Hart, M.P., British Minister for Overseas Development, presented the major address representing her government's position. Given the substantial role of Great Britain in UNESCO's brief history, in

addition to its larger role in giving to its former Empire and other Western nations a foundation in both common law and philosophical writings for freedom of the press, the speech attracted considerable attention.[3] Fully 10 pages of her 11-page speech addressed various aspects of journalism and communication. She disagreed with the thrust of the media declaration. However, she agreed that the deprivation of the Third World was substantial in areas of communication; she continued,

> what matters is not international agreements on the protection of journalists, but the fact that they so often lack the minimum facilities to collect and disseminate full and fair information. Improved equipment, communications and training will enhance their status and help them in turn to protect the public's right to know and to make choices on a basis of knowledge.
>
> I believe it would be premature for this Conference to try to reach a conclusion at this time on the Draft Declaration [1978: 10].

This movement toward an avoidance of a showdown on the media declaration gathered steam during the next few weeks. So also did Hart's role in the backstage negotiations. She left Paris but returned suddenly as the media declaration issue became more controversial. She was impressive and forthright in her dealings with the press. The quality British papers, which had given a great deal of copy to UNESCO overall, followed her actions and statements closely.

The General Policy Statement by United States Ambassador John E. Reinhardt on November 3 was another major media event. Reinhardt, a black diplomat who also headed the U.S. International Communication Agency (ICA), was considered an Uncle Tom by more than one black African diplomat. He had represented the United States in Nairobi and was therefore not unfamiliar with the issues. Given that Reinhardt reported directly to President Carter, and not the State Department, the pack journalism wisdom concluded that Carter had told Reinhardt to seek a different draft using

persuasion and promises rather than threats of a U.S. pullout or withholding of budget funds.

Ironically, Ambassador Reinhardt began with a referral to the "spirit of Nairobi" and a call for a continuation of that spirit.[4] He stated that "in culture, we want to participate in strengthening the sense of cultural identity of all peoples and to recognize, at the same time, the contributions of all cultures to the like of all humankind" (1978: 5). Two new initiatives were announced in his speech. The first was "to suitably identify regional centres of professional education and training in broadcasting and journalism in the developing world . . . we will undertake to send a senior faculty member or dean of communications to each centre for a year's service" (Reinhardt, 1978: 19). (Some British journalists commented that surely the Third World delegations would suffer anything short of accepting aging deans.)

The second new U.S. project was a major effort to apply the benefits of advanced communications technology—specifically, communication satellites—to economic and social needs in the rural areas of developing nations (Reinhardt, 1978: 20). Although this project represented a major thrust for the United States, it was somewhat surprising to learn, via a hard-working wire service reporter, that in spite of the two years usually required to prepare for such agreements, the satellite deal had been worked out the previous evening, November 2, literally at the eleventh hour.

Reinhardt concluded with a strong proposal for a communication consultative group to coordinate the West's cooperation and make sure that aid was going where it was most needed. Unfortunately, this concept slipped through the cracks as the debate on the media resolution focused on "state control and responsibility."

On Monday, November 6, the Secretary of State for Canada, John Roberts, M.P., delivered one of the strongest speeches on the media issue during the entire assembly. Roberts (1978: 9) stated,

I am making no secret of my disquiet, and that of the
Government of which I am a member, concerning the Draft
Declaration on the Mass Media. . . . On every continent there
are some people who think that governments should regulate
journalists, should tell them, in the public interest, what to
write, or should pass judgement on their accuracy. Canadians
do not believe that either politicians or public servants should
have anything to say in the management, direction or cor-
rection of the media. Quite the contrary. In their view, only a
free press can guarantee that the decisions of the state power are
in harmony with the wishes of the people. Governments have
no means of knowing what the needs of society are for its own
well-being, unless they are told by an informed public.

He went on to list the reasons for a postponement of the
adoption of the contentious text. The address was well-
received. Because Canada has stature beyond the expected
level in UNESCO, the wire services from the West gave
extensive coverage to Roberts's remarks.

Another significant speech was delivered by George Beebe
of the World Press Freedom Committee. In addition to
member-states UNESCO allows a certain number of nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) to address delegates during
the General Assembly. The World Press Freedom Committee
is one such NGO.[5] Beebe (1978: 3) explained:

The World Press Freedom Committee is composed of 32 jour-
nalistic organizations on five continents. . . . It is committed to a
universal effort to help preserve freedom of expression, to
improve the international flow of information, and to coop-
erate with the media of the developing nations in training for
journalism and in the improvement of their production facilities.

The committee has 1,000 media volunteers with projects in
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Beebe was
frank about the draft declaration: "We shall certainly continue
our programme, whatever happens but this Declaration, if
unamended, will dim the enthusiasm of contributors and
participants" (1978: 3). His group had a substantial interest in

preserving the free-flow philosophy to protect their circulation figures and investments. Because the Third World position has been detailed in both the development journalism overview as well as in the highlights of the various background conferences, only a few representative highlights will be included here.

A leader of the Caribbean position was Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley. He called the outlook of industrialized nations self-induced myopia. He had taken over Radio-Jamaica, to spread the word about the evils of imperialism. However, the two privately owned Jamaican newspapers, the morning *Daily Gleaner* and the afternoon *Star*, strongly opposed Manley, a classic case of media reality being systematically different depending upon which medium the natives attended.

On Saturday, November 4, Mr. Shihepo spoke on behalf of a liberation group, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). In talking about the mental decolonialization of Africa he noted,

> We are pleased to note that UNESCO is debating the role played by the mass media in reporting on developing countries. We as liberation movements have become the victims of continuous and persistent misrepresentation by the Western media. Aggression by the minority regimes is favourably reported, while information on the struggle of the masses is distorted [1978: 4].

That same morning the Minister of State for Education from Nepal, Mr. Rana (1978: 22), discussed the gap between the West and the underdeveloped world.

> Indeed this gap is already so great that even if we had access to a great deal of their technology, much of it would be inappropriate to our scale of need, level of capability, and power of absorption. In so far as learning from the advanced countries is concerned, it is more a question of carefully gauged eclectic access. What is more important is the evolution of a technology adapted to the socioeconomic environment of underdevelopment.

Finally, Dr. Phillip Muscat (1978: 30) from Malta summed up the major grievance.

> The service that emanates from the big international press and news agencies sometimes tends to be slanted against the developing countries of the Third World and their leaders. Great prominence is given to certain news items of minor importance, while national achievements in vital sectors are barely mentioned or wrongly reported. Moreover, in certain instances the international press is used as a destabilizing factor against the governments whose only crime is generally that of standing up for their rights, their sovereignty and independence.

After the 12 days assigned to the speeches in the plenary session, M'Bow officially replied to the overall general policy debate—in all 155 statements from delegates and official NGO observers. It should be recalled that the reply was to the totality of UNESCO's concerns, but the press crowded the back of the main assembly hall for one purpose—to hear the Director-General's remarks about the media situation. M'Bow began by criticizing the press coverage, which he did every time he spoke to the issue. He referred favorably to Mrs. Hart's and Mr. Reinhardt's suggestions but avoided the point of the division between the West and the LDCs. M'Bow (1978: 13) glossed over the differences by saying, "on the contrary, through the directness of the statements made by the delegates of the Member States, the discussion is based on reciprocal knowledge of the different points of view held by the members of the international community." Continuing, he referred to the most contentious article in the declaration, the one dealing with government control:

> Some delegates did not conceal their fear that the establishment of a new international information order might result in State control over the mass media. If those media can serve a totalitarian ideology, they can, we know only too well, compound the latter's evil effects, as I emphasized in connection with Nazism . . . if such a risk is to be held in check, it is

essential to lay down a code of ethics to which those who are in charge of the media and communications throughout the world can subscribe [1978: 14].

The call for a code of ethics by the journalistic profession is an issue separate from state control. Yet it was feared that a code could lead to some type of approval system that could be used to restrict journalists from certain nations in even greater numbers than today.

M'Bow concluded with a call for a decision on a final text. Given this public push, the COM IV subcommittee on Communication and Culture had its work cut out for it when it met to discuss and vote on the draft declaration before the delegates.

PRESS CONFERENCES

To those Britons who since World War II have felt most keenly the country's loss of an empire and the failure to match the economic achievements of other modern industrialized nations, the contrast between the British strength in high-quality television and the esthetic and moral vulnerability of the programs sent to the United Kingdom from across the Atlantic has been one small area of comfort in a generally uncomfortable world [Dunkley, 1979: 33].

Chris Dunkley, television critic for the *Financial Times* of London, continues by stating that "British schedulers built up an audience with popular American programs early in the evening in the hope of passing it on to more serious programs later." Using the cheaply imported programs like "Wonder Woman," "Charlie's Angels," "Dallas," "Vegas," and "Starsky and Hutch," British viewers are consuming massive amounts of U.S. shows. In part, it is for this reason that both the press conferences of the United States and Great Britain will be highlighted here. As class shows, such as "Civilisation," "The Ascent of Man," and "Upstairs, Downstairs," travel from the Old World to the New, even industrialized nations see their cultures being affected by foreign imports. So the media flow

debate is not solely limited to LDC concerns. Canada and Australia for years have had import and content controls on select media for cultural reasons. Yet the thrust of the media declaration forced Western delegates to act in unison.

John Reinhardt, Ambassador: Press Conference. Following his major address to the Plenary Session on November 3, 1978, U.S. Ambassador John Reinhardt held a press conference attended by about 40 reporters. The first question went something like this: "Sir, if the United States puts considerable pressure in broadcasting matters on Canada, such as in the border television advertising dispute, and given Canada's cultural and political problems, how are Third World countries to react to U.S. pressure on their cultures when they lack domestic television networks which Canadians at least have?" The Ambassador swallowed hard and repeated the "free-flow-of-information" argument and said that Canadian materials can flow into the United States so why not from the United States into Canada. He did not mention, however, the inevitable advantages held by his nation of over 200 million exporting to Canada with slightly more than 20 million (one-third of those being French speaking) nor how the free flow masked a one-way flow benefiting both Hollywood and New York production centers.

A Mexican media representative followed with a question dealing with the indirect consequences of accepting U.S. technology and technicians—that a U.S. work ethic would displace native norms and mores established over time. Reinhardt seemed unconcerned and argued that the United States should indeed give more aid to assist LDCs for training in media techniques. In reply to a question from a U.S. wire service representative, he stated that the U.S. domestic media industry had made corrections to better reflect the U.S. mosaic, and Reinhardt cited the increased role of blacks and women as examples.

Ambassador Reinhardt closed his press conference with a veiled threat. In his address he had mentioned two new initiatives: more technical aid and a satellite project. He

pointed out that these two projects were outside the regular U.S. funding for UNESCO and that the additional funds would have to be approved by the U.S. Congress. He concluded, "I am not sure Congress will give the necessary funds if the original declaration is passed." "Shades of blackmail," some British reporters whispered.

Judith Hart, M.P.: Press Conference. Having departed Paris following her address to the Plenary Session, the British M.P., Judith Hart, returned and called an impromptu press briefing as events picked up steam. With typically British candor, she commenced by stating that there was "slight confusion" over four differing unofficial drafts dealing with the media declaration that were being circulated among various delegations. Two of these drafts included state control articles. She stated that her government supported the European Economic Community draft calling for an acceptable compromise, and announced that consensus could probably be achieved if a draft omitted state control or power. However, she went on to point out that "this morning's meeting does not exist," and a series of questions then ensued about what could and could not be quoted. Confusion reigned among the press corps again. Hart concluded by stating she was "not unhopeful, but skeptical" about a solution and "it would be a great pity" and hurt UNESCO's image if a state control press declaration was passed.

John Roberts, M.P.: Press Conference. On Monday, November 6, following his address to the Plenary Session, the Canadian Secretary of State, John Roberts, held an impromptu press conference. It was sparsely attended but the wire service people were there and favorable comments were heard concerning the free bar service. Following his strong speech, Roberts went on to talk of the need to separate press and governments. He criticized the Canadian Press (CP) wire service for closing its Paris bureau and attacked the U.S. film and television industries for dumping U.S. shows in Canada. The Reuter's reporter pursued the cultural invasion issue and Roberts replied at length. Upon finishing, the reporter said

that the reply was identical to Tunisia's Ambassador Mas-moudi's stand—that is, governments must control what is shown by the media in order to protect the domestic culture. However, the international wire service representatives generally admired Roberts for his strong antigovernment control stand—and the press coverage the following day reflected it.

MacBride's Interim Report: Press Conference. The Interim Report of the MacBride International Commission played a strange role during the General Assembly. It was important and unimportant at the same time. It was important because it was the most elaborate and recent statement on the entire new world information and communication order debate, and yet unimportant because the Director-General himself stated that it had nothing to do with the media declaration before the assembly.

On the evening of November 14, Senator Sean MacBride reported on the commission's progress before a packed room of delegates and the press. He took about 10 minutes to outline his points. He said that the commission was seeking a consensus on the major issues and argued that the "interim report speaks for itself." Having directed special praise to the members of the commission from Yugoslavia and Tunisia, he asked for further comments dealing with oversights and both criticism and elaboration for problems raised in the report.

Raising his voice, he attacked the worn out rhetoric of the Cold War era, calling for a maximum degree of cooperation and understanding. He asserted that the free flow of radio and satellite signals could not be prevented. He concluded with a strong endorsement of rights for investigative journalists and described their role as necessary for informing objective public opinion and, more important, exposing malpractice, inefficiency, and inertia. Protection of journalists akin to that afforded to international lawyers and diplomats had been MacBride's goal for several years.

Following MacBride's statement, member states were permitted to reply individually to the issues raised or avoided in the interim report. That evening 18 speakers were recognized.

The balance were heard during the following days. But the media attention dwindled rapidly. Reflecting the worse aspects of UNESCO's procedures, the debate did not address the principles of journalism, telecommunications, and informatics, but dealt endlessly with trivial aspects of punctuation, spelling, sentence structure, and other picayune matters. Senator MacBride had had his moment and he spent the balance of the assembly wandering the halls almost unnoticed.

THE CRITICAL COM IV MEETINGS

On Saturday, November 18, the Communication and Culture Committee (COM IV) finally met to discuss the major item on its agenda—the mass media declaration. Even before the 10 a.m. starting time, there was not an empty chair in the room; the aisles were crammed with reporters, camera crews, and UNESCO staff, many of whom came in on their day off just to witness the outcome of the debate for themselves. But it was to be a false start. The gavel did not come down until 11:20 a.m. to commence the session. During that time, and indeed continuing from a late Friday night secret meeting, a small group had been trying to work out last-minute details of a compromise.

When the Peruvian chairman of the COM IV session took his seat, a hush came over the chattering audience. He apologized for the delay and understated the situation when he said "there was a problem which had to be solved." He continued to explain that it was a procedural problem that affected the substance of the media debate. Calling for a renewal in the "spirit of Nairobi," he ventured to discuss some new options. The big change was a move to postpone the debate on Item 22 (as the media declaration was known on the COM IV agenda) until Wednesday, November 22. All hell broke loose. Shouts of "No! No!" filled the hall. Banging his gavel furiously, the chairman finally restored order and continued his explanation.

He stated that there were two reasons for the delay. The first was technical. A new draft declaration had been received

overnight (it was the Soviets that had held out the longest, until the morning, but by this time M'Bow himself was involved and some speculated that his career was on the line), and according to UNESCO's rules, an item could not be presented for formal debate until it was translated into the five official languages. This could not be done on Saturday. The second reason given was that a delay would allow heads of delegations to consult with their home governments. Because many could not vote without direction from their Prime Minister or President, directions could be sought during the four-day delay. The alternative was to begin debate on Item 22 at once as originally scheduled. Comments on the issue of starting at once or delaying the debate until Wednesday came fast and furious. "What has happened since last night? We have been discussing this issue for eight years and there is no reason for any further delay!" was the first response from a socialist delegate. Other socialist delegations responded in a similar vein, calling for immediate debate. The Tunisian representative called for closure and a vote on the issue. After further speakers, pro and con, a vote was finally taken.

At UNESCO a vote is taken as each nation holds up its large name plaque to signify yea or nay. It is by holding up these same boards that speakers are recognized for debate. At the front of the room is a raised stage for the chairman and other officials. At the end of the stage two people independently take the vote count and then return with their counts to the chairman. When this happened one could tell by the grimace on the chairman's usually smiling face that two differing totals had been tallied.

The Chairman called the meeting back to order and announced that because of the differing totals and the closeness of the votes, he was calling for a roll call vote. Again all hell broke loose. The delegate from Vietnam shouted that democracy was at stake and that the vote results not only had to be announced but should bind the group. Others spoke and it became clear during the confusion that some 10 or 20

delegates had voted one way when they meant to vote the other. A "yes" vote meant to begin debate now and a "no" vote meant delay until Wednesday (which the West wanted). By this point the chairman had even managed to break his gavel trying to control the erratic events that morning.

A roll call vote was finally taken. This involved a lengthy process, during which the only mirth was the general laughter when China abstained from voting. China could not vote with its socialist brothers while doing its modernization shopping in capitalist nations. After about 45 minutes, the official results were announced. Yes: 40; No: 55; Abstentions: 16. The West had engineered a delay until Wednesday to work out the details of a compromise declaration on the mass media.

This was the critical vote. The West had flexed its muscle and won, at least temporarily. The socialist countries and many of the LDCs had laid their cards on the table that Saturday morning and lost. It was a test run of their collective voting power and they came up short. When the chips were down, particularly during the opening roll call vote, enough nations switched or abstained to give the Western nations a clear-cut victory. It was a preview of future votes. Now there was a temporary four-day pause in the turmoil.

On Wednesday morning, November 22, the COM IV session was about to begin on time at 10 a.m. and there was a packed room once again. M'Bow himself took the chair, a step seldom taken; this was indicative of the seriousness of the situation. M'Bow now talked of a new mass media declaration that he was endorsing. The revised declaration had dropped the very contentious article dealing with government control of media systems, but it did include a call for a "free and balanced flow" to replace a solely "free flow philosophy." The Director-General referred to November 9 and his call for consensus and reminded the audience that "all possible means and ways" had been resorted to, working both day and night, to overcome obstacles. M'Bow directed that "emotion has not wiped out reason," and that a compromise text "was inevitable." Standing all the while, perhaps 10 minutes, the Director-General

concluded with the none-too-subtle directive: "The revised solution will pass." A loud applause followed.

Quickly the various delegations rallied behind the revised text. The first delegate to be recognized by the chair proposed unanimous acceptance without further deliberation. The Polish delegate said it was "a historical moment for UNESCO" and supported the first speaker. This indicated that the socialist nations had been persuaded to support M'Bow. On behalf of the Nordic countries Finland supported the call for quick adoption. A vote was taken by show of hands: 90 in favor, 3 against. Because of the crowd and confusion, no one was able to figure out for certain which nations had cast the negative votes. A highly unusual standing ovation concluded the brief morning session. M'Bow stood to acknowledge and enjoy the victory. It was over at 11:00 a.m.

On November 22, the day that the compromise media declaration was passed, U.S. Ambassador Reinhardt held a well-attended press conference at 6 p.m. It was the only press conference held. He began with a lighthearted remark that, as a former English teacher, he bore no responsibility for the poor grammar in the revised declaration. He concluded that the United States played a significant role in the compromise but he did not think that every phrase would satisfy everyone. He stated that the Director-General presented the text and it represented considerable achievement. Following his opening remarks, his responses to reporters' questions produced some surprises.

The *Washington Post* correspondent inquired about the relationship of the declaration and the ITU-WARC meetings in 1979 (discussed in detail later). Reinhardt stated that he saw no direct connection and, in responding to a series of questions, he stated that the media debate was closed. He maintained that science, education, and culture were new vistas for UNESCO to face. He conceded the point of imbalance in international media flow, and concluded that the new text would affect the status quo but other earlier drafts of the text

would have been much more difficult for the United States to accept.

MORE PRESS COVERAGE

"The press likes to cover the press" and the media declaration was no exception. This section looks at some of that coverage in order to demonstrate the significance attached to the 20th General Assembly of UNESCO and the media issue. Although many different media sources were consulted, only a selection, mainly the *International Herald Tribune,* will be highlighted here. It should be noted that the selection will not be "balanced" because only the Western press sources will be used. The non-Western point of view is included vicariously here but it has been dealt with in detail elsewhere.

The UPI story on M'Bow's opening address and press conference on October 26 dealt with the media declaration. The headline leaves little doubt about M'Bow's position: "UNESCO Head Backs Media-Control Draft." Insightful of M'Bow's personal outlook is the following:

"Journalists, no matter who they are, are not absolutely neutral," Mr. M'Bow told reporters. He said racism lurks everywhere and must be fought on every front, including the media front. He said feelingly that his own daughter, on a recent train trip in France, was asked by customs and border police officials to show her passport although nobody else in her compartment was asked to do so [*International Herald Tribune*, October 27, 1978: 1].

An Associated Press item in the same edition reported on the United States having paid its overdue UNESCO dues; in turning over more than $17 million it was the first time since 1974 that the United States was paid up.

Ian Murray reported in the London *Times* that M'Bow "did not see any reason to modify the text" (October 27,1978: 7) of the draft declaration. He concluded his item with the donation

by the Scandinavian countries of $4 million to aid African communication development.

On Monday, October 30, the British *Daily Telegraph* carried an item that was described in the Salle de Presse as reflecting a sensitive Western media concern, particularly with the "balance" concept:

Tanzania has banned all foreign journalists from entering the country to cover the summit meeting of African heads-of-state which was due to start in Dar-es-Salam yesterday [October 30,1978: 36].

Christopher Munnion covered the events surrounding his exclusion by immigration officials and how his colleague, Eric Marsden of the *Sunday Times*, was also ordered to leave. The following day the *Daily Telegraph* featured an editorial on UN-NEWS. Fearing the consequences of a new information order the editorial stated,

A motley crew of Third World and Eastern bloc countries—led by that shining example of freedom, the Soviet Union, and frequently (if tacitly) supported by UNESCO Director-General Mahtar M'Bow of Senegal—have been trying to bring the dissemination of all news under the direct control of the State [October 31,1978: 6].

That same week David Hirst of the *Guardian* was excluded from a Baghdad conference by Iraqi security police. A lengthy editorial piece by Tom Wicker entitled "No, No, UNESCO" labeled it a "dangerous declaration" and claimed that "the Soviet Union, bastion of truth and human rights that it is, is a strong supervisor of the press declaration." He concluded with a valid point:

Of course, if the press of the world is to make the claim that truthful reporting, not peace and brotherhood, is its mission, that implies a certain obligation to truthful reporting. And

while no reporters can be entirely neutral, as M'Bow observed, he or she can at least approach Third World countries with an open mind, rather than wearing Cold War blinders and burdened with "Western" assumptions [Wicker, 1978: 6].

That week's British *Economist* (November 4,1978: 15-16) went so far as to question UNESCO's own usefulness because UNESCO questioned press freedom and understood so little about the concept.

The UPI coverage of U.S. Ambassador Reinhardt's speech was optimistic: "Hoping to sidetrack a proposal for state control of the world's news media, the United States today offered journalism training and communications satellites to help Third World nations set up competitive news agencies of their own" (*International Herald Tribune*, November 4-5, 1978: 3). The same item ended with an error, frequent in the overall UPI coverage of the General Assembly: "But the Soviet Union and the United States may find themselves on the same side of the redivision of the world's broadcasting frequencies, the next issue the conference must tackle." It was another conference, ITU-WARC, in the fall of 1979 that had control over frequency allocations and the radio spectrum.

Newsweek (November 6, 1978: 61) devoted a full page to the media issue. Discussing LDCs' perception of Western reporting, the article stated,

> As they see it, the Western press views the murder of whites by blacks as headline news and the murder—or oppression—of blacks by whites as no news at all.

Pressure for the removal of the offensive media items was extensive:

> As in the past, the U.S. is counting on the threat of Western retaliation—as many as 26 countries could walk out of UNESCO—to head off a confrontation [*Newsweek*, November 6, 1978: 61].

This walkout threat was a creation of the media, not of the Western delegations. And it appeared in much of the copy under the guise of factual, objective reporting.

Sharing Monday's coverage were an unlikely duet, Mr. Roberts of Canada and Mr. Sendula of Uganda. The latter got the lead—"Hostile Western press Condemned by Ugandan"— and his grievance was quoted,

Few countries have had to contend with the adverse publicity of a hostile press as my own has. Sophisticated communications media have given some developed countries the advantage to tell deliberate untruths, distort and exaggerate events so as to evoke universal hatred against their less-endowed adversaries [*International Herald Tribune*, November 7, 1978: 2].

Roberts gained notice for his call for delaying the showdown until the 1980 General Assembly. In the same edition there was a four-column analysis on the editorial page entitled "News, Politics and UNESCO's Wrong Turn," leaving little doubt about its slant.

The following day, the UPI story (*International Herald Tribune*, November 8, 1978: 2) discussed a revised text originating from a meeting of 25 Western countries. The press was excluded from the meeting but a delegate confirmed that the state control article had been eliminated. On Thursday, *Le Monde* ran a long article by Francoise Giroud on "Decolonizing Information." That same day, the *International Herald Tribune* reprinted an editorial from the *New York Times:*

In the name of the press freedom, which few of them actually practice, a majority of the world's governments are trying once again to prescribe a code of conduct for all newspapers, press agencies and broadcasters. . . . What on earth have Pravda and The New York Times to bargain about in the definition of news? . . . If it turns out to be impossible to reject this attempt to tamper with our basic principles, there is always the alternative of rejecting UNESCO itself. The good it does is not worth the price it demands [November 9, 1978: 1].

Paul Chutkow, the hardworking AP correspondent, after tracking down some of the individuals involved backstage in drafting a compromise media declaration, reported (*International Herald Tribune*, November 10, 1978: 1) that the U.S. initiatives "were labelled a mess and confusing by some West European and Third World diplomats here today." Even Reinhardt confirmed that things were confused but a Western European diplomat put it most emphatically when he stated (*International Herald Tribune*, November 10, 1978: 2): "The negotiating for the Americans or what their real objective is remains a mystery. If their negotiating tactic is to confuse, it's working." Given the lengthy buildup to the debate plus the U.S. investment in the outcome (wire services, video markets, telecommunications equipment sales, and such), such a confusing strategy was remarkable.

The long wait for the formal committee meeting on the draft allowed the various delegations considerable time to attempt to reach a compromise prior to the scheduled meeting. West Germany, heading the European Community (EEC), took over the leadership of the counterdraft movement. In addition, some way had to be found to allow M'Bow to save face in the entire matter because he was so central to, and vocal about, the need for a new international information order to complement the new international economic order. European diplomats were clearly taking the initiative away from the ill-prepared U.S. delegation. Indicative of the split in strategy is this *International Herald Tribune* article:

> U.S. agreement to support the European text appeared to end, or at least paper over, friction between the U.S. delegation and some European diplomats who were critical of what they said was U.S. naivete in accepting changes in wording while preserving the outline of the original draft declaration [November 16, 1978: 2].

The Reuter's copy listed the parties to the Western draft: The United States, West Germany, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzer-

land. Great Britain, never feeling totally comfortable with EEC initiatives, had put forward its own draft resolution calling for a delay until the 1980 General Conference in Belgrade.

In order to move LDCs away from the concept of development journalism, some trade-offs were offered as an incentive to accept one of the Western compromise texts. Joseph Fitchett (*International Herald Tribune*, November 18-19, 1978: 5) described it this way:

> In effect, a trade-off is in the making: the Third World would get aid and a renewed commitment to anti-racism while the industrial countries would get unchallenged press rights.

In the same edition there was an interesting story on the Third World news agency, Tanjug, run by editor Boza Francuski. Stories of identical events reported by the Western wire services and the Tanjug pool read like they were reporting totally unrelated events. The concept of an alternative wire service clearly produced alternate copy:

> Three years after its launching amid expressions of grave dissatisfaction with Western news coverage of the Third World, the non-aligned pool is caught between conflicting interests and limited resources. The most important constraints on its operations are the censorship of news for political reasons, poor communications, the lack of trained journalists and the sheer diversity of the countries which participate in the pool. Some regard each other as bitter enemies [*International Herald Tribune*, November 18-19, 1978: 6].

Other critics added that the pool is mainly for government press releases from the participating 50 countries.

The coverage of the major events of Wednesday, November 22, was important. Indicative of the relief felt among Western publishers and editors is the editorial stance of the London *Times*. A three-column editorial, "UNESCO Avoids the Worst" (October 27, 1978: 6) was almost scolding in tone; shades of the Empire are revealed.

UNESCO's adoption of the compromise text of the declaration of the mass media removes a significant threat to the freedom of the international press . . . there is cause for relief and congratulations that the relatively few nations possessing a free press were able to win acceptance of the principle from many that cannot abide the practice . . . . It was the Soviet Union that first began.

The coverage also referred to an important point. The final text was loaded with vague rhetoric and some of the key phrases could be read or interpreted in several ways. The *Times* also carried an account by Ian Murray of the recent events as well as the 11-article text of the media declaration. The AP wire service copy went as follows:

UNESCO's 20th general assembly conference approved by unanimous consensus Wednesday a compromise draft declaration on the mass media, endorsing the freedom of the press.

The unanimous consensus indicated by thunderous applause before the UNESCO Commission on Culture and Communication, represented a personal victory for UNESCO Director-General Amadou Mahtar M'Bow and a significant diplomatic reversal in favour of the West and moderate developing nations [London *Times*, October 27, 1978: 6].

This section at least indicates the tone of the copy flowing from the Paris meetings. As had been indicated elsewhere, it was M'Bow who presented, endorsed, and pushed the initial controversial draft, yet in the end the Western press uniformly blamed the Soviets for the attack on the "free press philosophy" and M'Bow received diplomatic praise for engineering the "historic compromise." Both time and the writing of memoirs will reveal how and why the compromise came about. One suspects that M'Bow found his back, and career, against the wall and quickly abandoned what he cherished in October to pacify the Western nations (and thereby retain their funding) in November. Of course, M'Bow had the 1979 MacBride International Commission and the 1980 21st Gen-

eral Assembly to resurrect and rerun his NWICO tenets once again, not to mention the 22nd UNESCO General Assembly in 1982 or the 23rd in 1984 or the 24th in 1986.

The 21st UNESCO General Assembly: 1980

It is hard to imagine how the delegates to UNESCO general assemblies can continue to put a face of consensus and unanimity on international communication discussions that invariably totter on the brink of open warfare and collapse. It took a reluctantly accepted 11th hour compromise that merely postponed the major issues to pull the 20th General Assembly's session on mass communication out of the fire. The answer in 1980 in Belgrade was a resolution, adopted by consensus when nobody called for a vote on it, which in effect may as well have been two different resolutions in some respects. It was based on the findings of the MacBride Report[7] and set out for the first time, in a preliminary and preparatory fashion, some of the aims and principles of a new information order, possibly as a framework for fuller elaborations in the future. It is clear that the resolution—which capped the assembly's discussion on mass communication, more particularly on the MacBride Report and a new program to deal with development communication—was adopted by the West, the LDCs, and socialist bloc forces only because it was couched in language sufficiently ambiguous to accommodate widely divergent interpretations as to the spirit and meaning of many of the phrases and principles. In addition it included concessions to both sides in the form of recognition of some of the West's cardinal principles and some of the LDC's concerns, resulting in a rather uneven and sometimes inconsistent resolution.

Despite the unanimous approval it received largely as a result of its equivocal language and reciprocal concessions, the resolution was "one of the most bitterly fought over in UNESCO's history" (*New York Times*, 1980: 14). It appeared, at least on the basis of serious reservations expressed about some of its terms particularly by the West, to reveal more about

the extent to which the West and the developing world position on the NWICO are irreconcilable than about the possibility of some significant overlapping or balance of interests ever being achieved. Even though concessions were made by both sides, the developing world, acting with the Soviet bloc, seemed to get the better of the West judging by the cautious, reluctant approval of the resolution by the West and by the comments of the Western media.

The slight edge of the developing world and Soviet majority, according to many participants and observers, turned on the inclusion of some principles and the exclusion of others which, if interpreted in a certain way, could prove, in the words of William Haley (U.S. Information Agency, 1980c: 3-6), the American negotiator, "exceedingly troublesome," from a Western perspective. Haley, in a statement following adoption of the resolution, listed the major sore spots. He remarked that a phrase in the resolution calling for "the widest and most democratic access of all peoples to the functioning of the mass media" (U.S. Information Agency, 1980c: 3) could be a source of concern if interpreted to "imply direct involvement in the editorial process or management of the media" (U.S. Information Agency, 1980c: 3) rather than as the expression of a desire to see "greater participation of the people in all forms and channels of communication" (U.S. Information Agency, 1980c: 2-3), the meaning that Haley said the United States would like to attach to it. Haley also said that the encouragement, embodied in the resolution, to "make communications an integral part of all development strategy is another cause for our concern, since it is subject to varying interpretations, including that governments should use the media for all governmental purposes" (U.S. Information Agency, 1980c: 4). Furthermore, Haley implied that the association of "freedom of journalists" with the "responsibility of journalists" could spell restrictions on news gathering and disseminating activities of reporters. The suggestion is that once journalistic freedom is qualified by a formal recognition of responsibilities, there is a danger that such responsibility will eventually be

more closely and concretely defined and possibly in such a way as to inhibit the freedom of journalists.

Finally, Haley objected to the resolution's provision for the Director-General being asked

> to undertake, without any guidance, studies for the estab-
> lishment of a new international information order. Also we
> believe that convening an international meeting of experts
> (which the resolution calls for) would be wasteful; in the first
> place, it would be costly; and in the second, there are no
> "experts" on this particular subject [U.S. Information Agency,
> 1980c: 5-6].

Other observers identified what was left out of the resolution as the essence of the West's failure and frustration at the conference. For instance, Britain's chief delegate, Lord Gordon-Lennox, complained that the resolution suffered as much from faults of omission as faults of commission. He said,

> How can we pretend to lay down guiding considerations which
> omit such fundamental principles as the right to freedom of
> thought, opinion and expression; the free circulation of infor-
> mation and ideas; the freedom of movement; freedom from
> censorship and arbitrary government controls and access to all
> sources of information, unofficial as well as official? [U.S.
> Information Agency, 1980c: 4].

He also regretted that the guiding principles of the resolution "concentrated too much on the rights or responsibilities of countries . . . and not enough on the rights of individuals" (U.S. Information Agency, 1980c: 5). Overall, Britain took a strong stand against many aspects of the NWICO but reluctantly supported the final resolution.

There are a number of theories addressing the question of why the West supposedly lost ground at the conference. Rosemary Righter argues that the developing world exercised its superior voting strength to push through a number of decisions that the West opposed such as the approval of a larger overall UNESCO budget, and a veto of

Western proposals to divert funds from UNESCO's research programme to practical assistance projects—the research seeks to advance several concepts which directly threaten the free press such as exploring the "social responsibility" of the media and pressing for international codes governing reporters; and the approval of a Soviet proposal to hold an international conference of experts on international communication issues mentioned above. But many key elements of the resolution which were objectionable to Western delegations were conceded more or less voluntarily, albeit grudgingly, by their delegates, a factor which occasioned many allegations from the Western media that the Western representatives compromised some of the cherished traditions and principles of a libertarian press and freedom of information. But tactical errors and miscalculations appear to have been more responsible than any possible lack of resolve or commitment on the part of Western delegates for what were perceived by many as setbacks to freedom of the press and information [1980: 10].

Righter further observed that "most Western countries had come to Belgrade in the naive belief that they had put to rest the irreconcilable conflict over the role of the press" (1980: 10). Although most of the extremist ideological rhetoric was down-played, at least in the early portion of the proceedings, the developing world was no less rigorous or insistent in its efforts to generate a stronger impetus for a NWICO and to further its establishment. It yielded little ground to the West.

As a result of what probably was a misreading of the general mood regarding a NWICO going into Belgrade, the West seems to have found itself backed into a position where it was forced to settle for trade-offs and sacrifices. For example, the West surrendered on the issue of association of development strategies with media uses, in order to accomplish what it really wanted—formal acceptance of the MacBride Report's affirmation of freedom of information and of the press. The West, particularly the U.S. delegation, justified its performance at the conference by balancing the importance of the formal acknowledgement of the principles of freedom of information and of the press against yielding on what it views as disturbing

measures such as the acceptance of the need to lay out principles for a new information order.

In fact, the West did not complain much over the principle of a NWICO and the need to work out some of its aims and guiding principles. Of course, the West may argue that what it consents to when it gives its blessings to a NWICO is not the LDCs' version, but basically the same order that now exists but with greater and freer flows of a wider diversity of information and with less onesidedness. In the absence of any complete, standard, and official definition of the NWICO, the equivocation and ambiguity of the resolution put forward was possible.

Indeed the West has applied this line of defense across the board. Paul Lewis remarked that the Western countries plan "to interpret ambiguous sections (of the resolution), which can be read as condoning state control of the press, in a liberal sense" (*New York Times,* 1980b: 14). By construing UNESCO language in ways that are consistent with its position and interests, the West could conceivably make the most glaring instances of measures favoring more control over the media appear to be victories. Though the West tried to soften the negative consequences of parts of the resolution by promising to evaluate them in a liberal vein, it was also honest and realistic about the resolution.

All was not bleak for the West, however. It did gain formal adoption of the MacBride Report and the principles of freedom of information and of the press and could count as fairly clear-cut victories (1) the rejection of a Soviet draft resolution that came down hard on Western transnational news agencies, (2) the rejection of Soviet and developing world proposals for "the policing of news and the control of international communications" (Righter, 1980: 10), and (3) protection of journalists, and favoritism toward noncommercial types of information and communication.

The launching at the General Assembly of the International Program for Development of Communications (IPDC) stirred up a great deal of controversy and suspicion, particularly in the West and, according to some critics, represented another

setback. The IPDC, according to Sarah Powers, a deputy assistant with the U.S. Office of International Organization Affairs, is an attempt to establish a "consultative mechanism in the field of communications and development," a sort of "clearing house for technical information" (U.S. Information Agency, 1980a: 6). It would, argued correspondent James Fuller, "seek to channel manpower, materials, technology and training for the development of communications in Third World countries"(U.S. Information Agency, 1980b: 2). Robin Chandler Duke, head of the U.S. delegation, asserted "The focus of the IPDC must be on concrete and practical measures relating to infrastructure, equipment and training" (U.S. Information Agency, 1980b: 3)

A 35-member intergovernmental council was to administer the program and set out priorities and policy. The LDCs would have considerable leverage within the IPDC because members were to be elected on a rotating basis with regard for regional representation. The IPDC was heralded as perhaps the most significant development of the conference.[8] (More detailed information about the shape and direction of the IPDC is available in Chapter 7.)

Elie Abel, the U.S. representative on the MacBride Commission, believes UNESCO is not the proper structure within which to establish the program. He correctly maintains that such a program should be coordinated jointly by all international organizations that deal with problems in international communication and development. The strongest fear in the West concerning the IPDC is that the Director-General will approve the IPDC director and secretariat and that it will be closely integrated with UNESCO's bureaucracy which, according to an article in *The Economist*, "has traditionally been hostile to market economies, multinational corporations and advertising in the media" (1980a: 39). There are voices in the West that worry about the IPDC becoming an institutional weapon within the UNESCO secretariat that will be used to antagonize Western ideas of a free press. Western governments are expected to closely monitor the program for "any moves to

use it for ideological ends that might encourage government interference in international news reporting" (*New York Times*, 1980a: 3).

Another focus of controversy concerning the program was funding. Many LDCs moved that an international fund be started within the UNESCO framework. The United States refused to make advanced pledges to such a fund and suggested that the money needed to initiate the program should be diverted from UNESCO's regular mass communication budget. M'Bow did commit $1.5 million of UNESCO's 1981-1983 budget to start-up administrative costs.

The UNESCO 1981-1983 general budget for mass communication was another contentious issue between the West and the LDCs. The West urged that UNESCO postpone controversial programs or divert funds to concrete projects aimed at improving communication technology, infrastructures, and training. However, the LDCs once again prevailed, and succeeded in pushing through several resolutions including the approval of studies on advertising in news media and assistance in finding methods for protecting, perhaps licensing, reporters, which the West strongly opposed.

Many observers in the West, particularly in the Western media, took a dramatic view of what happened in Belgrade. One article in *The Economist* announced, "Press freedom suffered a major defeat at the UNESCO conference which ended in Belgrade last weekend" (1980b: 18). In the final analysis, it appears the conference was indeed a humbling experience for the West. However, the extent of the impact of the conference's actions on the practical operations of freedom of the press and of information is easily exaggerated. Lewis, for instance, notes that some Western diplomats have argued that "the West does not recognize UNESCO's jurisdiction in this field and the organization has no means of enforcing its decision"(*New York Times*, 1980: 14). Moreover, the UNESCO secretariat has already been directed to continue studies of the NWICO and how far agreement on it is possible. So the principles, aims, and definitions expressed in the resolution,

and by the creation of the IPDC, mean that NWICO, particularly at future UNESCO General Assemblies, will be the major focus of debate and turmoil for the entire U.N. system.

Notes

1. While experts in some nations are talking about the electronic newspapers via satellites and videodisc systems, many other nations have low literacy or only a single, ill-equipped radio station on the air a few hours per day. In fact, informatics represents greater government control, via regulation, in the West, and the debate over "free speech" may become obsolete with advancing technologies. Indications are that the information environment of the West in the future may see considerable government involvement and a renewed interest in government regulation in the public interest. European tradition in this area is systematically distinct from the U.S. tradition (McPhail, 1980).

2. Frequently the beleaguered Salle de Presse staff would comment that the press loves to cover the press. Their half-dozen manual typewriters had never seen so much attention; in fact, sometimes there was a queue to get at them. Fortunately, the entire press corps was never there all at once. Some came only for a day, or a week. Others, like the wire service people, were there from start to finish. Most morning sessions began at 10:00 and evening sessions concluded around 11:00. It was a long session for the few who monitored the entire assembly.

It also became clear, in discussion with delegates from several nations, that there was resentment of the concentration of the press on the media declaration. Some subcommittees received little media attention, if any, despite their major proposals. Even the Associated Press correspondent lamented one day over coffee during the third week or so that he had started the assembly filing about six stories daily, was now down to four, and of those the editors were only using one or two at most, and that was the copy that referred to the media issue in either a plenary speech or in the Communication and Culture Subcommittee. Most other subcommittee meetings went totally ignored during the final weeks.

3. For similar reasons, the exclusion of Great Britain from the MacBride Commission is of considerable significance. Some argue the deck was stacked against the West from the beginning. Also, Great Britain took one of the strongest stands against the NWICO at Belgrade in 1980.

4. But in truth, that was a false face-saving spirit that whitewashed the strong divisions among member states. The MacBride group was a last-minute deal to avoid a showdown and, as we shall see, last-minute arrangements sill plagued the U.S. delegation in Paris despite the intervening two years when more adequate bilateral and multilateral agreements should have been worked out.

5. Before discussing the stand of the World Press Freedom Committee, a few background details are relevant. Beebe had early morning briefing sessions with his constant companions—Hector Armengal, of the Inter-American Association of Broadcasters representing private Latin American interests, and two or three others.

They always moved about the corridors as a group. The Tass correspondent was frequently bemused by their clustering antics.

At the Paris Hilton on a Saturday evening I noticed a fellow that I recalled seeing at U.S. Ambassador Reinhardt's press conference. Just as I was about to go over and introduce myself, a group came through the door, Beebe plus his followers, and they surrounded the other gentleman who proceeded to pull out his reporter's notebook and took notes. It would have made a great picture for the cover of Tim Crouse's book, *Boys on the Bus*—pack journalism incarnate. As I left I went over and introduced myself; the reporter looked as if he wanted to eat his notebook to get rid of it. He was from *Time*.

6. Manley, like some other social leaders, is interesting for another commonality. He holds a British Ph.D. I lost count at the General Assembly of the number of times that a Third World Ambassador or senior government minister upon addressing the plenary session would attack the West and demand a new economic and information order using the finest British accent and a multitude of polysyllabic phrases. The elite of the LDCs is leading the call for a new order on several fronts.

7. The MacBride Report is covered in detail in Chapter 8; some may prefer to read it at this time in that it was a major report discussed at the 21st General Assembly held in Belgrade. The spinoff of MacBride, a new International Program for Development of Communications, is discussed there also.

8. The IPDC did indeed become a major vehicle for technical assistance and its actions are detailed in later chapters. At Sofia, in 1985, for example, the IPDC took up almost half of the entire debate on communication issues.

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CHAPTER 5

THE MEDIUM:
International Telecommunications Union
and the World Administration
Radio Conference

The struggle between the West and the LDCs at the 1978 UNESCO General Assembly over the question of NWICO ended in a mood of uneasy compromise. The sense of release felt by the Western nations was short-lived. Observers anticipated that yet another arena, the World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC), would see another clash between the West and the LDCs. WARC meets once every 20 years, 1959, 1979, 1999, and so on, to assign worldwide frequencies from the usable electromagnetic spectrum available for broadcasting and communication services. (Some technical details are provided at the end of this chapter.)

Historically, these meetings attracted little attention as technicians and engineers from various nations around the world sat down and divided the spectrum with great concern for technical matters such as microwave interference between neighboring states, technical standards, and equipment protocol. When 152 nations began to plan for WARC meetings in Geneva in late 1979, the industrial nations once again assumed that merely a technical and engineering approach was required. Little attention was paid to social concerns. But the times had changed.

These general WARCs[1] (Howkins, 1979c) are convened and organized by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a specialized U.N. agency charged with coordinating international use of telecommunications systems worldwide. The nations represented at WARCs are members of the ITU. General WARCs review and amend the existing ITU International Radio Regulations. For instance, general WARCs are empowered to amend regulatory procedures for settling differences between nations and for notifying, coordinating, and registering radio frequency assignments. In addition WARCs are authorized to set new rules concerning technical and performance standards of telecommunication systems. Probably the most significant set of regulations that general WARCs have the scope to revise is the International Table of Frequency Allocation, therefore, WARC 79, as other general WARCs before it, had the power to alter any of the already extant uses of any part of the spectrum, from the lowest to the highest frequencies. This is one of the most powerful roles given an international body.

All general WARCs by virtue of the range of their authority are profoundly significant events. But, for a variety of reasons, WARC 79 was heralded during the buildup to the conference as potentially the most important ITU meeting ever held. The last WARC with a mandate equivalent to that of WARC 79 was held in 1959, although specialized WARCs, such as the 1971 satellite WARC and the 1974 maritime WARC for maritime radio services, had been held in the interim. During the years between WARC 59 and WARC 79, technological innovations such as satellite communications and methods for using more and more of the higher ranges of the spectrum, particularly microwave frequencies, had revolutionized telecommunications. Such new developments in communication now exercise so profound an influence on social, economic, and political organizations and have so radically transformed the way men live and interact with each other and their environment that the present era has come to be known as the "Information Age." According to John Howkins (1979a: 12):

The explosion of telecommunications in the second half of the twentieth century may be compared to the transition that humans made thousands of years ago from hunting to agriculture, or, more recently, from an agricultural society to an industrial society. The transition of industrial societies, via the limbo of the post-industrial society, into fully-fledged information societies—as we witness now—makes telecommunications the hallmark and defining characteristic of our society. It is the measure of a society's wealth or poverty, and a major factor in a society's capacity for change.

Two chief reasons that more attention and preparation were devoted to WARC 79 by the international community were the increase in the number of countries represented and the fact that the LDCs, which accounted for almost all that increase, had throughout the 1970s constituted a majority in the ITU. In 1959, 96 nations were members of the ITU. By 1979, ITU membership had grown to 154 nations, of which 142 sent delegates to WARC 79. The level of preparation and negotiating skill required to make a meeting of over 2300 delegates from 142 countries and some 40 independent organizations dealing with issues of unusual complexity in some way manageable was unprecedented in ITU history.

The majority status of the LDCs contributed to the conference's high profile because it was expected to be the source of a feature previously unheard of at WARCs—namely, the use of political and ideological criteria in arriving at decisions concerning spectrum management. Decisions at WARC are taken on a one-nation, one-vote basis. The West feared that if the LDCs acted in unison they would be able, by virtue of the majority they commanded, to push through measures relating to a NWICO and, thereby, guarantee access for the developing world to desired spectrum space and geostationary orbits for satellites, measures about which the West, particularly the United States, had grave reservations.

The West had some grounds for their fears. At a Non-Aligned Conference in Havana, Cuba, just two months before WARC 79, member nations drew up a "shopping list" of

demands related to NWICO for which they agreed to press, presumably in a concerted fashion, at the upcoming WARC. Moreover, two years earlier, at a specialized satellite WARC in 1977, there was discussion among the LDCs about reserving certain prime orbital slots for satellites on a nation-by-nation basis, regardless of a country's immediate need, ability, or desire to use such slots. Such a policy would ensure that the limited space for satellites would not be assigned before LDCs had advanced sufficiently to set up their own satellite systems.

As the more prominent issues associated with NWICO concern cultural imperialism, concentration of ownership, transnational control of mass media, and imbalances in news flow, the LDCs have been quick to point out imbalances in spectrum allocation. For instance, developed countries with only 10% of the world's population have control of 90% of the spectrum. LDCs also note that the first-come, first-served approach the ITU has traditionally taken toward spectrum management and allocation of satellite parking spaces has favored the West and the USSR, which had the satellite technology and launching rockets to stake early claims on orbital slots and prime spectrum space. For these reasons, WARC 79 was viewed by LDCs as an important forum in which to press once again the question of a new and more equitable distribution of information and communication resources of all kinds.

Before discussing WARC 79, a brief sketch of the history and structure of the ITU will illustrate the substantial shift in emphasis that has taken place within the specialized agencies of the United Nations. The introduction of the NIEO and the NWICO has moved the ideological direction and issues that surface, frequently as amendments, to declarations and proposals of an international nature.

History and Structure of the ITU

In 1865, the International Telegraph Union, the ITU's forerunner, was formed under the International Telegraph Con-

vention signed by 20 European states. This makes the ITU the oldest international organization surviving today. At that time the organization dealt exclusively with technical problems. The establishment of international standards for the Morse code was among its first endeavors.

The invention and implementation of wireless systems of communication (radio) complicated the process of setting international regulations. At the 1906 Berlin Conference, the first international conference to deal with radio and to set standards for equipment and technical uniformity, certain sections of the radio frequency spectrum were allocated to specific radio services, most notably the frequencies used by ships at sea. The International Radio Telegraph Conference of 1927 held in Washington, DC, was the site of the next major advance in radio and communication management. At this conference, the Table of Frequency Allocations was created.

Howkins (1979a: 14) points out the rather simple procedures involved in early activities.

> Users notified the union about the frequencies which they were already using or wished to use and the union registered these in its master list. Neither the union nor the user owned the frequency. What happened was that, through the union's processes of registration, the user had a squatter's right to a specific frequency. Furthermore, the union's recognition of a particular usage gave the user some protection in international law.

This simple squatter's right on a first-come, first-served basis did not, however, take into account the limited nature of the resource. Moreover, it has been largely responsible for the congestion in some popular frequency banks, a problem that today makes efficient allocation a difficult proposition requiring regional meetings.

Initially, spectrum usage was confined to maritime activities such as radio navigation and ship-to-shore communication. During the 1920s, due to technological advances that provided new means of utilizing higher frequencies, the types of services that the radio spectrum enjoyed multiplied rapidly. As new

services began to compete for spectrum space, fears grew that unless each new type of service was given a separate and distinct band within the spectrum, overcrowding and interference among the services would occur.

The ITU responded to this concern at the 1929 WARC. It was resolved that the various uses of the spectrum be coordinated by allocating a certain stretch or band of frequencies to each particular service. By the 1947 Atlantic City Conference, further advances in telecommunications capacity necessitated revision of procedures for registering and securing recognition of spectrum uses. More detailed plans for services were adopted for each of the three newly created regions: Region 1 for Europe and Africa, Region 2 for the Americas, and Region 3 for Asia and the South Pacific.

At the WARC in 1959, the ITU's approach to telecommunications management came under criticism. It was noted that huge areas of the spectrum, such as the high frequency bands, were unplanned. It was pointed out that the ITU stepped in to coordinate national assignments of frequencies only after congestion and conflicting uses had occurred. Generally the ITU gave priority to those nations that happened to have the luck or the economic and technological sophistication to occupy a frequency first. This was not necessarily the nation that needed the frequency most. The most fortunate nations were primarily from the West and relied on the "squatter's rights" tradition.

Misgivings about the basic machinery of the ITU and WARCs have both continued and escalated in the years since WARC 59. First, the regulations that the ITU originally adopted to make international telecommunications manageable are becoming either overextended or obsolete with the rapid introduction of new demands, such as frequency space for microwave ovens. Second, countless "footnotes," devices countries use to declare their intention to use a frequency for a purpose other than that stated in the international table of allocations, clutter the Regulations (Broadcasting, 1979b: 36). There are allocations in the Regulations to which as many as 40 countries have entered individual footnotes.

For instance, at WARC 79, the United States tried to enter a footnote stating that within its borders mobile and fixed services may be shared on a primary coequal basis with other uses. The footnote was required because the international table stipulated broadcasting as the primary use within those bands. When a nation cannot get a footnote approved or otherwise takes exception to any of the Regulations or decisions adopted by WARCs, it may register a "reservation"—an extreme measure by which a nation formally gives notice that it will not be bound by a WARC decision. The United States took such a step when it could not get approval of the above-mentioned footnote without the imposition of conditions with which it could not agree.

Structurally the ITU consists of four permanent bodies: the General Secretariat, the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB), the International Radio Consultative Committee, and the International Telegraph and Telephone Committee (CCIR and CCITT; the latter two are French acronyms). The IFRB "records all the frequency assignments made by individual countries and checks their conformity with the Radio Regulations and decisions made by administrative radio conferences. On this basis the assignments can be given formal recognition and protection—or be refused such recognition" (Howkins, 1979b: 22). However, the procedures for notifying and registering frequency uses have never been adequate. For instance, many frequency assignments on the IFRB's Master Registry have been abandoned and are thus available for new assignment, but the IFRB still has them recorded as occupied. (WARC 79 took measures to correct this situation.) As additional frequencies become registered, the IFRB finds it increasingly difficult to keep up.

The duties of the CCIR and CCITT are to "study technical, operating and tariff questions and to issue recommendations" (Howkins, 1979b: 22). As rapid advances in telecommunications make the problems WARCs address increasingly involved and unwieldy, many items that come up at such conferences are deferred and sent out, usually to the CCIR, for further study. As a result these bodies, especially the CCIR, are becoming overburdened.

To restate the original point, then, because the history of the ITU and the WARCs it has sponsored has been punctuated by difficult problems, and because doubts have been expressed about the efficiency of the structural framework of the ITU, both the problems and the doubts turn on questions that are essentially of a technical or administrative nature. One major reason for this technical orientation was given in a comment in *The Economist* (1979: 18) noting that "the ITU is full of engineers terrified of controversy and terrified of the press."

In recent years many critics of ITU and WARC have cautioned that, although this narrow technical focus may have been tolerable when decisions about telecommunications were of concern to only a limited circle of specialists within the industry, it is no longer adequate. In an age in which telecommunications has become highly politicized because of its profound effects on the complexion of national and international roles, the LDCs are not only concerned with which medium or frequency it is carried on but are also concerned with many nontechnical matters. (See, for example, the section on direct broadcast satellites in the following chapter.)

The ITU has received promptings from many quarters to generate some structural and administrative reforms designed to furnish mechanisms for recognizing and absorbing political inputs. Currently, the ITU has developed neither the ability to deal with political or ideological concerns nor the necessary administrative circuitry through which such conflicts could be channeled without crippling the ITU in its technical activities.

When many LDCs hinted prior to WARC 79 about turning the conference into an ideological and rhetorical contest, it triggered much speculation. With no experience in dealing with such a development, the talks could collapse before technical issues could be resolved. This would jeopardize spectrum management decisions and leave matters in an uncomfortable state of suspension. Of course, that was the last thing the West wanted, with billions invested in telecommunications systems and thus a keen interest in maintaining a manageable and predictable telecommunications environment.

Technology

THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM AND ITS USES

The motion of waves in a body of water provides a helpful, if somewhat crude, point of reference for visualizing electro-magnetic energy and its movement. Electromagnetic energy oscillates (moves in waves) in roughly the same manner as water in the ocean. Electromagnetic (radio) waves can be measured by the number of times they pass a given point per second (frequency) or by the distance from one wavecrest to the next (wavelength). There is a definite covariation between frequency and wavelength. One can arrive at the frequency of an electromagnetic wave by dividing the speed of the wave, which is always about 300,000 kilometers per second, by its wavelength. Wavelength is measured metrically and frequency is measured in terms of Hertz, after the German radio pioneer Heinrich Hertz. A frequency of one Hertz refers to electro-magnetic radiation that passes a given point at the rate of one wave (one cycle) per second. One kilohertz equals a thousand Hertz, one megahertz equals a million Hertz, and one gigahertz equals a billion Hertz.

The electromagnetic spectrum represents all the possible frequencies and wavelengths at which radio waves oscillate. The spectrum is arbitrarily divided into bands ranging from the very low frequency band to the extra high one (see Table 1). Any stretch of frequencies within any of these larger bands represented in Table 1 is also referred to as a band.

Information such as voice, music, video, and so on must be modulated into radio waves before it is transmitted. Thus the information that radio waves carry increases as the frequency shortens because this means that more waves are passing through a given point per second and the distance between their crests is smaller. John Howkins (1979c: 145) writes,

> The development of telecommunications can be seen as a constant push to use higher frequencies, since the higher the frequency the greater the capacity to transmit information. . . .

The capacities of the main regions of the spectrum can be compared in terms of the bandwidth necessary to operate a single color television channel, i.e., 6 MHz of spectrum. The whole of the VLF (very low frequency) band could transmit only a three hundredth of one TV channel, LF (low frequency) a twentieth, and MF (medium frequency) a half of one channel. The HF (high frequency) band, however, can accommodate the equivalent of four TV channels, VHF (very high frequency) 45 channels, UHF (ultra high frequency) 450 channels, SHF (super high frequency) 4500 channels, and the EHF (extra high frequency) as many as 34,000 channels.

Thus, different bands of frequencies are more appropriate for different uses. Some uses are amateur radio, television and radio broadcasting, fixed satellite (point-to-point), broadcast satellite, aeronautical, land, marine, and satellite mobile, radio navigation or radar, space research, earth exploration satellite (which includes remote sensing), and radio astronomy. Table 2 lists typical radio services for which each band of the spectrum is used.

TABLE 1

Wavelength	Frequency	Band
100 kilometres - 10 km	3 kilohertz - 30 kHz	(VLF) very low frequency
10 km - 1 km	30 kHz - 300 kHz	(LF) low frequency
1 km - 100 metres	300 kHz - 3 megahertz	(MF) medium frequency
100 m - 10 m	3 MHz - 30 MHz	(HF) high frequency
10 m - 1 m	30 MHz - 300 MHz	(VHF) very high frequency
1 m - 10 centimetres	300 MHz - 3 gigahertz	(UHF) ultra high frequency
10 cm - 1 cm	3 GHz - 30 GHz	(SHF) super high frequency
1 cm - 1 millimetre	30 GHz - 300 GHz	(EHF) extra high frequency

TABLE 2

Frequency Range	*Typical Service*
30 - 300 kHz (LF)	Navigation
300 - 30,000 kHz (MF)	Broadcast
3 - 30 MHz (HF)	Fixed
	Aero mobile
	Maritime mobile
	Amateur
30 - 300 MHz (VHF)	Broadcast
	Mobile
300 - 3,000 MHz (UHF)	Broadcast
	Land mobile
	Mobile satellite
3 - 30 GHz (SHF)	Fixed satellite
	Navigation radar
30 - 300 GHz (EHF)	Radio astronomy
	Earth exploration satellite

The ITU allocates certain stretches or bands of frequencies for a particular use or uses and may apply such allocations on a worldwide or regional level. Different radio services are often allocated the same stretch of frequencies. In such cases the ITU determines which services have priority by giving each service either "primary" status, "permitted" status, or "secondary" status. Primary status means the service shares equal rights to a band of frequencies with a "permitted" service but has prior choice of frequencies when frequency plans are made. Permitted status means the service has the same rights as a primary service and must not cause interference with them.

GEOSTATIONARY ORBITS

Generally the most effective positioning of a communication satellite is 22,300 miles above the equator in a geostationary or geosynchronous orbit. At such an altitude, the satellite completes one orbit of the earth in the same time as the earth revolves once around its axis, that is, once every 24 hours. Because the satellite is traveling at the same speed as the earth, it always appears to be hovering over the same area on earth and thus it can provide continuous communications service. Other satellites placed at lower altitudes such as 5,000 to 10,000 miles above the earth do not travel at the same speed as the

earth and disappear over the horizon. To provide continuous communications with such satellites, as one satellite disappears over the horizon, another one must simultaneously appear to replace it. This requires expensive and elaborate antennae or receivers that can track this new satellite as it enters view. Because synchronous satellites are always over the same spot on earth, simpler receivers or ground stations are able to pick up their signals. Moreover, because of the altitude of synchronous satellites, their beams cover much greater amounts of territory (footprint) than their lower altitude counterparts.

Unfortunately, there is limited space for satellites in the thin slice 22,300 miles above the equator in which such satellites can operate or park. This is why the question of allotting orbital slots on a country-by-country basis in advance has become such a pressing one for developing countries that trail far behind in satellite technology. If and when they catch up, there may not be sufficient usable parking spots remaining for additional geostationary satellites.

WARC 79: September 24-December 5, Geneva, Switzerland

As it turned out, the West had little to worry about despite a three-day delay in the opening of WARC 79, which occurred when the LDCs and the industrialized nations split over the appointment of a chairperson. Many nations from the non-aligned group insisted on a chairperson from an LDC. The dispute was finally resolved with the choice of Roberto Severini, a widely respected Argentinian delegate. This early episode seemed to confirm the worst fears of the developed countries, but the delegations concentrated on highly technical issues for the remainder of the talks, and the industrialized nations at WARC managed to defuse, at least for the time being, the explosive issues that were expected to divide the First and Third Worlds.

FREQUENCY RESERVATIONS

In the build-up to WARC 79 many LDCs made clear their intention to revise IFRB registration and notification pro-

cedures "which gave recognition and priority of use to those countries which first register frequency assignments with the ITU" (Robinson, 1979: 155). They proposed instead that frequency distribution and orbital space slots be alloted on a country-by-country basis. They wanted to replace the first-come, first-served criteria of spectrum management with a system whereby they could reserve, for future use, frequencies for themselves. This type of prior planning, LDCs argued, would facilitate fairer and more equal access to the radio spectrum and prime parking spots for their satellites, if and when they are in a position to launch or purchase satellites.

The first-come, first-served approach is often identified as the principal cause of present imbalances in spectrum assignments. Because the older, industrialized nations entered the field of radio telecommunications much earlier than the LDCs, they obtained squatter's rights on prime frequencies. In addition, their technical and scientific communities permitted them to keep at least one step ahead in the race to move into new, higher frequencies that technological developments brought within their reach. The LDCs now recognize that radio telecommunications are too important to their progress to rest their chances of meeting future spectrum requirements on the hope that other nations will not have moved first into the frequencies they may want or need. LDCs, in keeping with NWICO, want guarantees now about future costs.

The industrialized nations, particularly the United States, have traditionally shuddered at the prospect of a prior planning of frequency distribution or orbital slots by allotment, reservation, or otherwise. They claim it would leave many of the alloted frequencies and orbital slots lying fallow because many LDCs that would benefit from such allotments would not have the facilities, the money, or even the need to use them. Furthermore, scientists and engineers believe reservations could retard technological development in telecommunications, for there would no longer be the incentive to compete for assignments, or to pursue new methods of squeezing more use out of particular frequency bands (*Broadcasting,* 1979a: 38).

The Western nations also were able to point to a previous experience with prior planning systems to make their case. At a 1974 maritime WARC, several maritime frequencies were reserved for landlocked nations while some islands got nothing. The system was a nightmare from an engineering standpoint (*Business Week,* 1979: 48). Moreover, at the 1977 satellite WARC, many countries were alloted two, three, four, or five satellite channels independent of their need or ability to utilize them. Some very small nations such as the Republic of Cape Verde and Mali got as many or more channels than the United Kingdom (Howkins, 1979a: 14-15).

However, most of the fears and bitter controversy that surrounded the first-come, first-served issue and the prior planning issue gave way to compromise and accommodation once the talks were under way. A mutually satisfactory agreement between the West and the LDCs was worked out on the Radio Regulation articles dealing with procedures for notification and registration of frequency use that promoted a first-come, first-served orientation. The compromise managed to evade mention of prior planning or frequency reservations.

The essential elements of this compromise were: 1) removal of outdated HF assignments in the Master Frequency Register; 2) reclassification of remaining assignments according to needs and alternative means; 3) finding new frequencies for HF fixed assignments displaced by allocation changes (reaccommodation); 4) increased assistance by the IFRB to countries needing help in finding new frequencies, and in identifying interference; 5) revision of article N12 and related texts, to implement these procedures. The "package" also includes a new resolution to the effect that these provisions are intended essentially for use by the administrations of developing countries which should minimize their use of these provisions [IEEE Communications Magazine, 1980: 49].

The question of planning geostationary orbits and other important future space services was delayed and to some extent temporarily avoided. Instead some decisions about significant matters were postponed and scheduled to be taken up again at

a two-part space conference to be held in the mid 1980s. This
conference will search for ways to "guarantee in practice for all
countries equitable access to the geostationary orbit and fre-
quency bands allocated to space services." According to *Inter
Media:*

> The conference will "decide which space services and frequency
> bands should be planned" and then establish guidelines for such
> planning and related regulatory Procedures.
>
> The resolution reflects a remarkable compromise by the U.S.
> delegation. Hitherto, the USA has tended to reject the idea of
> planning under virtually any circumstances. It is arguable, of
> course, that the proposed conference could decide that no space
> services should be planned; but such a result seems unlikely.
> What is more recommendations do not take effect before 1990
> at the earliest; by which time brand-new technologies may
> enable the richer countries like the USA to move to even higher
> frequencies that are not affected by the WARC's proposal
> [1980: 4].

HIGH FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS

The West and the LDCs had less success in finding common
ground with respect to the problem of reallocation in the high
frequency (HF) bands. The HF bands are very popular among
the LDCs for fixed and mobile services. Fixed services, as
opposed to broadcasting, cover radio communication between
two or more fixed points. Fixed service communication in HF
bands may be worked inexpensively with low circuit capacity
and with equipment that is easy to maintain; thus it provides a
cheap means for laying out a society's basic communications
infrastructure and connecting remote parts of a country.
However, because of erratic propagation of HF signals, HF
bands are sometimes unreliable. Thus when new techniques
made more reliable and efficient microwave frequencies avail-
able, the industrialized nations moved their fixed services out
of the HF bands. Consequently, they have been requesting use
of HF bands for other purposes, particularly shortwave

broadcasting such as BBC's External Services, Radio Moscow, Voice of America, and Radio Peking. LDCs fear that concessions to HF broadcasting would have to be made at the expense of essential fixed services, because HF bands are so congested.

However, there is no consensus among developing nations about the HF issue. Many LDCs, including Iran, Pakistan, and many African states, also want to initiate some shortwave broadcasting in the HF bands in order to balance the influence of the international services of more powerful nations, though they prefer to take frequencies for broadcasting from mobile and amateur rather than fixed services. There have been proposals that the problem of competing services in the HF bands could be alleviated by taking measures to use HF bands more efficiently such as limiting transmitter power and implementing single sideband transmission. But many LDCs cannot, in the foreseeable future, afford to institute such expensive steps as single sideband transmission that requires special receivers. This problem of financing for LDCs entering into more adequate services is a recurring problem.

A number of nations such as the United States and Canada took out reservations declaring that, although they would attempt to operate within the HF broadcasting regulations decided on at WARC 79, they would nevertheless not hesitate to meet their shortwave broadcasting needs in HF bands even if it meant violating those regulations.[2]

Not only did the United States fail to attain shortwave broadcasting frequencies in HF bands but they also were unable to secure allocations for maritime mobile services on a primary basis, again due to the priority given at such frequencies to fixed services essential to LDCs. The United States felt strongly enough about the issue to take a reservation noting it would meet its maritime mobile needs in HF bands allocated to the mobile service on a primary basis.

U.S. defense requirements also proved to be a source of WARC conflict. In one case, the United States and a number of other nations obtained a footnote enabling them to operate

mobile satellites in bands normally allocated to terrestrial fixed and mobile services. However, LDCs relying on the fixed and mobile services imposed conditions on the special mobile satellite services in the band that would in effect, relegate such satellite services that the United States employs for Navy communication to a secondary use. The United States, together with 12 European countries, took a reservation on the issue.

The United States felt radiolocation (radar) services had also been downgraded to a secondary status in some bands or were forced to share primary status with other uses not compatible with radar. These other uses were incompatible not because they would interfere with radar but because it would be difficult, in the case of radar, to provide these other primary services the protection from interference guaranteed under the Radio Regulations. So the United States took yet another reservation.

Somewhat surprisingly, allocations for earth exploration satellite services did not develop into a controversial issue. NASA's Landsat and Seasat satellites are examples of earth exploration satellites. Such satellites, capable of remote sensing through active and passive sensors, are used to survey the earth's natural resources and provide information about climate, crops, fisheries management, water, and agricultural conditions. LDCs have expressed fear that they may be used as instruments of espionage and call them "spy satellites." Moreover, frequencies must be allocated to this type of service on an exclusive basis because any other telecommunications use at such frequencies would interfere with the highly sensitive passive satellite sensors. But, for whatever reasons, the LDCs gave the United States little argument on the 50 proposals it made regarding remote sensing. These and future remote sensing satellites may provide the West with more up-to-date information about LDCs (crops, roads, exploration, and so on) than the LDCs themselves have.

MOBILE RADIO

Ironically, although sharp ideological hostilities did not surface in a prominent way at WARC 79, a few of the most

stubborn issues involved differences between the United States and Canada, two countries that could hardly be more politically, economically, and ideologically akin. One of these issues involved mobile radio services that include maritime, aeronautical, and land services. Mobile radio, especially land mobile service, is a rapidly expanding component of modern telecommunications. Howkins (1979a: 16) points out that

> Mobile radio epitomises the widespread desire for a communication service that is two-way, personal and flexible, and usually cheap and lightweight. The range of services is very wide—Citizen's Band, bleepers for businessmen, doctors, etc.; two-way radios for taxis, delivery vehicles, the police, service engineers, etc.; temporary radio networks in disasters; car telephones; and much else.

While many LDCs, such as Afghanistan, Turkey, Uganda, and other African countries, oppose the extensive use of mobile radio because its use is so difficult to control, proposals for increased allocations for land mobile services did not emerge as an issue. Most of the proposed allocations for land mobile use of frequencies were in the UHF bands. UHF signals do not travel beyond line-of-sight distances. So, unlike HF signals which, at least at night, reflect off the ionosphere back to earth, back to the ionosphere, and so on, and can thereby travel thousands of miles, UHF signals can only cause interference in countries adjacent to them. So the United States, for instance, only has to deal with Canada and Mexico in coordinating use of land mobile services in the UHF band.

A TEMPORARY TRUCE

All in all, WARC 79 was judged at least a mild success by most of the parties involved (Bourie, 1984). The severe ideological pressure to which it was expected to succumb did not materialize in a decisive way. Industrialized nations managed to satisfy many of their most urgent demands, but the LDCs also achieved some success. First, the LDCs staved off

efforts by the advanced nations to increase shortwave broad-
casting allocations in the HF bands; second, they succeeded in
keeping the West alert to the issue of reserving parking spots
for satellites with the resolution it pushed through for a
significant conference in 1983 to plan geostationary orbits and
frequencies for space services; third, five resolutions adopted
to streamline notification and registration procedures also
answered some of the LDCs' criticisms concerning the ITU's
first-come, first-served orientation.

A number of factors discouraged the LDCs from pushing
the NWICO concept to its limit in Geneva. First, they realized
that there would be other forums sponsored by the ITU in the
1980s at which they could state their case and make gains in
their movement toward a fairer share of the radio spectrum
and orbital parking spaces. Second, many nations, such as the
United States and the USSR, applied pressure and collected on
debts to ensure that an orderly spectrum remained intact,
particularly for satellites. Third, almost all nations have some
type of domestic system, regardless of how rudimentary, and
want to see it continue operating without major adjustments.
Fourth, very divergent and often conflicting national interests
among the LDCs prevented the formation of a powerful,
united, and well-orchestrated voting bloc that may have
presented resolutions and amendments demanding radical
changes in the allocation of the spectrum.

Although the talks did not break down, WARC as an
institution for setting the ground rules for international radio
spectrum management itself showed serious signs of fatigue.
The sheer size of the conference and the complexity of the
issues resulted in incredible amounts of paperwork. In addition,
a tedious tempo with endless arguments in the plenary sessions
and often chaotic meetings of the subcommittees and their
spinoff working groups, which were set up to review various
national proposals and reports, resulted in much frustration.
Also, more footnotes and reservations were taken than at any
previous WARC and no fewer than nine specialized and
regional radio administrative conferences were proposed,

many of them to deal with issues that WARC 79 did not have the time or ability to resolve.

There is the uncomfortable suggestion behind all of this that WARC may be slipping into obsolescence as a forum for regulating radio telecommunications. Either these regional conferences will become more significant than the main WARC or else the idea of meeting every 20 years must be abandoned. With the pace of technical change accelerating on a daily basis, the wait to 1999 for the next worldwide WARC is untenable. Besides, the LDCs and the West alike realize that despite their philosophical and economic differences, ultimately the international telecommunications system must be both orderly and workable.

WARC in the Eighties: The Differences Continue

Given the pace of technological change and development, it soon became apparent that WARC 79 could not address all of the problems with which it was faced. The solution was to convene a series of meetings during which specific concerns identified during the main WARC could be addressed. Three of these specialized WARCs are discussed here.

WARC-MOB-1983

Five hundred delegates from 89 countries met in Geneva February 28-March 18, 1983, for the World Administrative Radio Conference on mobile services. In his opening address, Mr. R.E. Butler, the Secretary-General of the ITU, emphasized the comprehensive nature of this conference.

> Previous conferences have been convened to deal with particular services: maritime services, aeronautical services and space services as applied to mobile telecommunications generally.... The 1979 WARC foresaw the need to harmonize some provisions of the aeronautical, martime and land mobile services, particularly to improve the provisions related to distress and safety, and as a result of technological improve-

ments and the introduction of new telecommunications sys-
tems, to revise a number of provisions concerning the mobile
services (*Telecommunication Journal,* 1983: 167).

The conference agenda outlined two major activities. The
first involved review and revision of the provisions of the
Radio Regulations for the mobile and mobile satellite services.
Secondly, the delegates had to address a number of Resolu-
tions and Recommendations of WARC 79, solely from the
viewpoint of the mobile and mobile satellite services involved
without adverse impact on other radiocommunication ser-
vices. However, because of time limitations, the conference
focused its attention on the need to create a regulatory frame-
work for the further development of the Future Global Mari-
time Distress and Safety System (FGMDSS) to be imple-
mented in the 1990s in conjunction with the International
Maritime Organization (IMO). In addition, preparatory mate-
rial for WARC-MOB-1987 and several regional conferences
was provided.

Despite the introduction of 38 reservations by various states,
Mr. V.R.Y. Winkleman (1983: 354), chairman of the confer-
ence concluded, "The objectives of the Conference were
satisfactorily achieved, thanks to a very cooperative and
positive attitude taken by the 500 delegates."

WARC-HF-1984

Delegates from over 100 nations met in Geneva between
January 10 and February 11, 1984, in an attempt to reach some
decisions for the development of a more effective and equitable
system for apportioning the world's limited supply of those
frequencies that are best for broadcasting. Like many of the
problems that WARCs must address this one appeared, on the
surface, to be a technical one. However, any decision taken was
expected to have far-reaching political implications.

Two major issues faced the conference. With respect to
frequency allocation, the Third World countries, which form a
majority in the ITU, rejected the current system that allows for

the domination of the airwaves by the West and the Soviet Union. They argued in favor of a strict planning system that would ensure each country a fixed part of the high-frequency spectrum. Western nations opposed any such plan as unworkable and proposed a highly technical and very expensive solution known as single sidebar broadcasting.[3] Given that the ITU has no power to dislodge countries from the frequencies that they are using, Western and Soviet countries have a decided advantage over the others because they possess the sophisticated and powerful equipment that allows them to dominate the airwaves.

The second issue concerned the jamming of frequencies by Soviet and some Third World nations so as to prevent their citizens from hearing broadcasting from other nations. Not only does this practice complicate the task of organizing the airwaves, it also violates the Western belief in the basic human right to obtain information. In many cases, nations whose signals have been jammed have switched to other frequencies and upset the shared balance of frequency allocation.

A deadlock was avoided when the conference agreed on a three-part solution. First, a method of computerized frequency allocation was approved for two years of testing. It was believed that this system could permit the flexibility demanded by the West but at the same time ensure the Third World space on the spectrum. The plan will be reviewed and implemented following WARC 86. In addition, the delegates approved a 20-year timetable for the introduction of single sidebar broadcasting. Finally, the rights of members to attempt to overcome jamming was endorsed and the ITU was directed to undertake a survey of these practices and report on suggestions to prevent undue congestion of the airwaves caused by this practice.

According to Leonard H. Marks, head of the U.S. delegation, once the meetings got under way, the delegates concentrated on trying to find technological solutions to technological problems. However, on the last day of the conference, Cuba demanded that the U.S. cease its Spanish-language broadcasting to the island because it was intended to

destabilize it. Despite this incident, Marks concluded, "the ideological temperature was very low" (*New York Times,* 1984: 3).

WARC-ORB-85

At the 1979 WARC delegates unanimously passed a resolution to convene a specialized WARC in order to guarantee in practice equitable access to the geostationary satellite orbit (GSO) for all countries. Although the conference was supposed to determine technological solutions to a technical problem, many observers recognized that the agenda was much broader. According to Heather Hudson (1985: 23), "it concerns equitable access to the tools of the information revolution—the means of accessing, transmitting and sharing information that are the keys to social and economic development." Moreover, Mahindra Naraine (1985: 97) argued that the meetings are "likely to be contentious not simply because of the vested economic interests that would seek protection but because it is difficult to conceive of arrangements that would satisfy the interests of the major groupings at the conference."

WARC-ORB-85 was the first of two international meetings designed to resolve the conflict surrounding GSO and the radio frequencies used for these satellite links. The 1985 session was expected to determine which space services required planning and a subsequent session in 1988 will implement any plan devised.

The major issue was the limited nature of the geostationary orbit and how it may be shared in an equitable manner by all those who wish to use it. The solution had to reconcile the demands of both the North and South. During the three preparatory meetings held prior to WARC-ORB-85, two opposing solutions had been proposed. The first, favored by the Third World, was a system of a priori planning which would see the reservation of satellite parking spaces for all countries that may now or in the future want to utilize them.[4] This notion was completely unacceptable to the United States and some other Western nations. It was criticized as "wasteful,

inefficient and unnecessary" (*Broadcasting,* 1985: 84). These nations favored no plan at all and argued that technical solutions could increase the capacity of the GSO and each new request for a space in the orbit be addressed as it was presented.

Given the determined stance of the two sides prior to the first official meeting, many predicted that the five-week conference, scheduled to begin in Geneva on August 8, 1985, would be political, controversial, and difficult. It appears that these fears were well founded. Following its conclusion, the conference was described as divisive, frustrating, catastrophic, acrimonious, and even surrealistic in nature. The degree of disagreement was evidenced during one of the final plenaries when it took two votes to call for a coffee break.

U.S. Ambassador Diana Lady Dougan sharply attacked the manner in which the conference was conducted and stated that the work "was, in effect, held hostage by a handful of delegates who seemed prepared to jeopardize the interest of majority in pursuit of their own narrow ideological goals" (*Broadcasting,* 1985c: 71). One such delegate was Algeria's Noureddine Bouhired who was accused of using obstructionist tactics to dominate the discussion (*Broadcasting,* 1985b: 56).

Despite the difficult nature of the conference, absolute failure was avoided just three days before its conclusion when a consensus was achieved on the critical question of the bands in the fixed satellite service to be subjected to arc allotment planning. The consensus was reached when both sides agreed to compromise. The Third World did not achieve the strict guarantees that it had hoped for and the United States and its allies were obligated to accept a limited degree of a priori planning. Credit for achieving the consensus was given to Dr. Ilija Stojanovic, the Yugoslav chairman, who met with the contending delegations over a lunch break and urged compromise; but some delegates were critical of his failure to respond to the impasse much earlier than he had.

As for the American delegation, it was counting itself fortunate. Despite its failure to prevent the adoption of an a priori planning scheme, the final resolution was flexible enough for

the U.S. to accept. Ambassador Dean Burch concluded, "we'll go home with a package we can be proud of and live with, and won't be a burden on the government or the private sector" (*Broadcasting,* 1985a: 40).

A number of concerns still remain. Some are basically technical in nature. The scheme proposed at WARC-ORB-85 must yet be worked out for implementation following WARC-ORB-88. There is a worry that inadequate guidance has been provided for the technicians who must now develop the details of the scheme. Moreover, many fear that the ITU lacks the adequate financial resources to fund the necessary intersessional work.

Some of the concerns are less concrete in nature. WARC-ORB-85 will be "recalled as a session driven by politics and ideology" (*Broadcasting,* 1985c: 70). This trend is expected to continue because communications has become increasingly important to governments. However, for the Reagan administration, the politicization of the ITU is a regrettable development.

Conclusion

The U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO was not an isolated event; in fact, it reflected the widespread review of all multilateral agencies in which the U.S. plays a vital role. In addition to UNESCO where the anti-Western tone and projects, particularly with reference to NWICO, finally saw the U.S. leave, now the U.S. has expressed similar dissatisfaction toward the ITU. For example, in 1982 the U.S. Congress issued a report that discussed the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal. This was followed by a 1983 U.S. Commerce report that also discussed the failures of the ITU with reference to U.S. objectives. Given the tendentious debates surrounding both spectrum allocation and satellite orbit "parking spots," some consider the potential U.S. action with alarm. Charles Jonscher (1984), international telecommunication consultant, states,

U.S. withdrawal from the ITU would be a disaster for the long term development of national and international communica-

tions. The fact that one can place a call between almost any pair
of telephones in the world is no small feat of international
coordination, both technical and political: it represents one of
the most unambiguously constructive achievements of any UN
agency. The importance of international coordination is dem-
onstrated by the fact that in the one area where it has failed,
namely HF broadcasting, chaotic interference has ensued. It
has been suggested that the USA could continue to collaborate
with the technical committees on standards and on spectrum
competition. This ignores the politically charged nature of all
intergovernmental agencies; the ITU is no exception—WARC
conferences have been intensely political since as early as 1947.
U.S. non-participation in ITU at the Plenipotentiary level
would make it weak at the committee level [p. 2].

The concern that the U.S. may undertake some precipitous
action is not solely the view of isolated critics. Consider, for
example, the widely read column from the *New York Times* by
Flora Lewis (1982), referring to the ITU:

. . . it is the heart of the global communication network. The
U.S. could manage without it; the Third World risk having to
rely on smoke signals and tom-toms if the world's system broke
down for the lack of ITU regulation [p. A29].

In sum, the ITU is no longer the most private domain of
technicians and engineers dealing with communication tech-
nology from an international technical point of view. Now it is
part of the growing NWICO order that sees economic, social,
cultural, development, and political aspects being involved in
the ultimate decision-making process. This later change, of
course, has drawn sharp criticism for those who either used to
benefit or control the "clubby" atmosphere; in particular,
threats from the United States to withdraw from the ITU
should not be taken lightly given the heightened importance of
the ITU in dealing with international telecommunications
matters, as well as the crucial role that the United States plays
in the overall telecommunications world. Many downplay the
role of the ITU as well as its current changes but a proper

analysis indicates that the ITU is not only central to the future of international telecommunications, but, particularly with the Maitland Commission under its guidance, ITU's role will increase in terms of NWICO. Marvin Soroos (1982) summarizes the situation accurately.

> To the non specialist, the radio spectrum and geosyncronous orbit may appear, at first glance, to be technical and obscure subjects for international cooperation. Management of these resources is, however, a timely policy issue in its own right, given the crucial importance to the rapidly exchanging use of telecommunications, as the remarkable recent technological advances in the field are applied. International society is moving swiftly toward Marshall McLuhan's 'Global Village' [p. 676].

A "global village" without U.S. participation or a fractured ITU because of U.S. withdrawal would set the scene for potential chaotic, conflicting, and competing assignments of international frequencies from the electromagnetic spectrum. Even though such a situation would adversely affect the LDCs, this would pale in comparison to the turmoil and commercial losses that would be suffered by Western governments and information firms of all types.

Notes

1. In addition to general WARCs, specialized WARCs are held periodically to deal with specific services, such as satellites or in specific regions. These meetings are also increasing in frequency and importance.

2. This was only one of five reservations registered by the United States at WARC 79, more than that taken by any other country.

3. Single sidebar broadcasting can greatly increase the capacity of the present high-frequency radio spectrum by squeezing more stations into the same portion of the band. However, it requires the replacement of all the world's transmitters and receiving sets, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars.

4. The Americans were quite distressed to discover that Canada had drafted an a priori plan that its officials said was designed to accommodate the goals of both sides, and the United States made it very clear that Canada was expected to shelve its proposal.

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THE WIRE SERVICES, DBS, AND RELATED INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

The rather rapid development of NWICO and the previously untested strength of its advocates has created the potential for significant changes in international broadcasting and communication. Areas of additional impact outlined here are: (1) the major wire services, (2) direct broadcast satellites, (3) Latin American concerns, (4) aspects of U.S. information policy, and (5) TBDF and OECD.

The Major Wire Services: Perpetrators or Victims?

The Western media, according to LDC critics and even by their own admission, have not covered the NIEO debate and other pressing development issues adequately. Moreover, many critics claim that when they do direct their resources to dealing with such issues, the Western media betray their Western biases and their involvement in Western power structures. Parachute journalism is a frequently mentioned complaint put forward by the LDCs. Consequently, LDCs believe that they have no platform in the West and that their positions are hopelessly misrepresented.

Increasingly much of the blame for this situation is placed on the heads of the major international news agencies, which have been accused of exerting a monopolistic stranglehold over the flow of news, of distorting the news, or serving, whether

unconsciously or not, the political and economic interests of the West, and finally, of blocking the development of rival news services operated by non-Western agencies (Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the International Flow of News, 1978: 27). Some Third World spokesmen have gone so far as to allege that the major Western agencies ` deliberately distort the news from LDCs either because of subscriber demands for stories dealing with coups and catastrophes and other sensational and stereotyped depictions of the LDCs or because of some suspected overall complicity among the ideological, political, and economic establishments of the West.

Such accusations, especially those concerning international manipulation, cast doubt on the four major Western news agencies' adherence to the "sacred" values of objectivity and accuracy on which those agencies have long prided themselves. Given the numbers and diversity of these agencies' subscribers, accurate, value-free, and nonjudgmental reporting is regarded by those in the news agency business as essential if clients with conflicting ideologies and interests are to be kept in the fold.

The activities of the wire services have received much scrutiny in the NWICO debate. The four major Western agencies are the Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI) based in the United States, Reuter in the United Kingdom, and Agence France Press (AFP) in France. The "Big Four" Western agencies and Telegrafnoye Agentsivo Sovietskovo Soyuzo (TASS), the official news agency of the Soviet Union, collectively dwarf all other news agencies and news pools.

AP, based in New York, is generally held to be the largest of the five. Six New York newspaper publishers founded the agency in 1848 as a nonprofit cooperative that it still claims to be today. According to AP's Corporate Relations Office, AP's board now consists of 18 newspaper publishers and three broadcasting executives. Of the 1500 U.S. newspapers that subscribe to AP, 1300 are daily publications and compose the voting membership of the agency; the other 200 subscriptions

are weekly and college newspapers. Other subscribers to AP are 5700 U.S. radio and television stations, plus 8500 foreign newspapers and radio and television operations. AP distributes information to 116 countries. The agency has a full-time news and photo staff of about 1100 domestically and 500 abroad. Its 1985 operating budget was in the neighborhood of $207 million.

UPI, formed by E.W. Scripts in 1907, is a privately owned, New York-based company. It has 5000 subscribers to its news services; among these subscribers are about 729 U.S. newspapers, 2800 U.S. radio stations with 1000 stations affiliated with UPI radio network, 400 U.S. television stations and another 940 affiliated with U.S. television and cable operations; 720 foreign newspapers, 188 foreign news agencies and 90 foreign radio and television operations make up the balance.

UPI employs a full-time staff of 1500 journalists worldwide, 1200 of whom work in the United States. Of the rest, 300 are distributed through Latin America, Mexico, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and in Europe. The agency has an operating budget in the neighborhood of $900 million. It was put up for sale in 1980, but of late UPI has experienced considerable financial difficulty. This, in part, is brought about by the economic realities of bringing foreign news from various parts of the world to central locations, primarily New York, which had to bear the costs of rising labor, transportation, and telecommunication costs. As a result, in April 1985 UPI filed for protection from its creditors under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Federal Bankruptcy Code. As part of its reorganization, UPI attempted to sell its assets as an ongoing concern to major bidders. Although the initial short list of bidders appeared to be straightforward, the "star course" winner was a consortium led by Mario Vazquez Rana, a Mexican publishing magnate, and Joseph Russo, a Texas developer. But while the sale proceeded during the Fall of 1985, a competitive bid from *Financial News Network*, a California-based cable service, sought to bypass the Rano-Russo bid and, as a result, the latter

sought damages of $50 million against *Financial News Network*. Currently the UPI sale is unresolved with both bidding groups promising to invest substantial amounts to upgrade the international wire service. Any final sale of UPI will have to be ultimately approved by its creditors under Chapter 11 rules.

The United Kingdom's news agency, Reuter, is an exclusively international agency. It has 612 full-time correspondents' centres and links with over 100 national news agencies giving Reuter access to coverage by thousands of local journalists. News is distributed in 158 countries and territories either directly through Reuter or through national news agencies. The number of subscribers to Reuter's service is difficult to determine as the national news agencies that distributes Reuter are permitted to resell the service. Reuter's economic information service is the world's largest financial and business news service in the world; there are 120 offices in 74 countries. This news service supplies information on commodities, securities, finance, trade, and industry by computer, video display units, teleprinters, and mail according to subscribers' requests. In 1981 Reuter launched a money dealing service that enables banks in their separate countries to internationally deal in money on the video screen with delays of only a few seconds.

The French AFP has bureaus in 150 countries with 150 AFP foreign correspondents and 1300 stringers scattered over roughly 170 to 200 nations. Of these correspondents, 102 are stationed in the LDCs (22 in Latin America and Mexico and 80 in Africa and Asia). AFP's LDCs coverage is not a lucrative proposition but the agency's operations are subsidized by the income received from the many official government and embassy subscriptions. This income represents 60% of AFP's $100 million budget.

Because the French government makes such a significant contribution, it has three representatives on AFP's 16 member Board of Directors. The other 13 are designated from French press and radio. There are 7000 newspapers, 2500 radio stations and 400 television stations that subscribe to AFP.

TASS has 325 foreign subscribers and according to Uri Romantsov, chief of its New York bureau, fields about 200 correspondents abroad and covers about 120 countries. TASS and the four major Western agencies differ sharply in their perceptions of their roles. According to Anthony Smith (1980: 83):

It [TASS] exists to serve the interests of the Soviet state and was tutored from its earliest days in the Leninist art of polemic, the art of struggle. Unlike the other agencies, it proclaims that it exists to form public opinion, to orientate the people "correctly" and to do so with information which is topical and truthful, but "socially meaningful" at the same time. It is directly responsible to the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and, in a statement to UNESCO, defined its own role overseas as being "to systematically" explain to foreign readers the peaceloving foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government . . . disseminate information about the achievements of real socialism in economy, science and culture, publicize the Soviet way of life, expose the concoctions and slander of bourgeois ideology.

To the charge that these agencies, particularly the Western Big Four, monopolize international news flow, there is no convincing defense. No other news gathering and dissemination operation has the money, the manpower, or the technological means to provide anywhere near the extensiveness of world coverage that the Big Four and to some extent TASS offer. Thus, most LDCs, having very meager domestic or government resources for collecting news, must rely on the major agencies if they are to keep abreast of developments from around the world, including the activities of their next door neighbors, on which their interests, welfare, or security might vitally depend. Rosemary Righter (1978: 52) states,

It is not an adequate response to say that no agency, however powerful, can force a client to take its services; in most developed countries, the choice is between isolation and choosing among the Big Four (and/or TASS).

The grip that the Big Four and TASS have on the international news market has resulted in inequalities and one-sidedness in global news flow (Chu, 1985). LDCs are forced to look to the West for both reporting to and about them at the international level. Two complaints commonly crop up concerning the news that the Big Four report about the LDCs. For one, there simply is not enough of it. LDCs are swamped by news originating in the West but industrialized countries give relatively little play to stories originating elsewhere. For example, a background paper prepared for the MacBride Commission said,

> While there is a flood of news on the East-West axis between North America and Europe, as well as, albeit on a lower level, between Socialist and Western countries, the much lesser flow that exists between the North and South can hardly be called an exchange due to the imbalance [*World of News Agencies*, 1978: 16].

One reason for this is the high costs to the major Western agencies of setting up news gathering operations in the remote areas of the world where LDCs are generally located. Not only is it very expensive, over $100,000 to equip and send a single journalist to cover an LDC for a year; there is also very little demand, sometimes even among LDCs themselves, for news about the Third World. Moreover, Western journalists are increasingly encountering government hostility and intimidation around the world. The reporting of LDCs is in fact so unprofitable that most agencies must cross subsidize such coverage with profits from other services they provide.

The other criticism frequently leveled at the agencies is that what there is of it tends to be sensationalistic, insensitive to the goals and values of the LDCs, and distorted, usually by the application of Western stereotypes, biases, norms, cultural perspectives, and even ideological designs about the nations and materials being covered.[1] In general, the major Western wire services have, it is charged, focused their coverage on disasters, crime, violence, and drastic social upheavals such as

revolution. Their preoccupation is with the unusual or negative aspects of life. The Western media appear to be blind to more gradual, directed, yet richly significant developments and social changes in LDCs. Improvements in health care, education, transporation, cultural heritage, and so on might represent a breakthrough in an LDC's struggle for development and modernization. Yet such gains generally go unnoticed by the Western media, unattuned as they are to the development objectives and needs of such societies. Both the selection and content of the stories that the Big Four and the Western media in general carry about the Third World, the argument runs, reflect a Western capitalist orientation. The values, assumptions, and standards of industrialized liberal democratic societies as well as their criteria of newsworthiness are less acceptable to LDCs supporting NWICO.

Even if an agency reporter in an LDC could avoid distortion by neutralizing even unconscious Western habits of thought, perception, and evaluation, his or her material would still have to pass through a New York, London, or Paris desk where editors tailor the copy to meet market demands, Western expectations, and interests, or even their own individual assumptions about the subject of the story. Righter (1978: 62) states,

> It is alleged that stories originating in developing countries, if honestly and fairly written, go through editing in New York which twists them according to U.S. private or governmental interests before sending them bouncing back to the country of origin.

American coverage of the events surrounding the 1978 revolt in Iran that led to the ousting of the Shah has been cited as an example of the distortions and pro-establishment sentiment of the Western media.[2]

The agencies generally deny the accusations of both bias and distortion; yet Righter (1978: 57-58) comments:

> The agencies insist that they report from no country's viewpoint; most of the complaints, they say, come from govern-

ments who simply want a better public relations job done for their country. Yet all judgements as to what is news must have some anchor. And the agencies must work both in and for societies which differ—at least officially—in their criteria. It is possible to play neutral, to say that "we try to see countries and peoples as they see themselves." But when it comes to filing the report, which audience, which set of cultural criteria ultimately influence the selection of the story and the way it is written? The agencies face two simultaneous dilemmas: they must be sensitive to local values, yet meet the requirements of a consistent style to which their international claim to objectivity is based.

As a result of the bias and distortion that characterizes Western wire service coverage of the Third World, many LDCs feel they are misunderstood not only in the West but also in other developing countries that subscribe to these same Western wire services. Even development news about successful growth and aid projects in neighboring nations goes uncovered and thus potential models for LDC development are underutilized and not reported by the Western services.

Third World spokesmen apply the same charge of Western bias and distortion in agency news about LDCs to news that the agencies disseminate to them. They claim that incoming wire service news is written with little regard or respect for national traditions and values and is rarely characterized by local angles or geared to local needs and interests.

But most Westerners consider charges of deliberate distortion and intentional manipulation of news by the wire services as totally unfounded, or at least terribly exaggerated. Agency spokesmen continually reject claims by NWICO proponents about distortion.

More recent studies have tended to suggest that AP and UPI original wire services are not as delinquent in their coverage of LDCs as some critics have claimed. For example, there are more foreign news stories from LDCs than has been suggested by the wire services critics (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1981; Wilhoit and Weaver, 1983). Such positive results were also evident in the study by Kirat and Weaver (1985) reporting about AP and UPI.

The proportion of news dealing with conflict or crisis declined dramatically, especially in the news about the Third World, suggesting that criticisms of advocates of the New International Information Order in previous research may have had some impact on the news values of foreign correspondents and editors of AP and UPI. Along with this decrease came an increase in the amount of news from the Third World about social problems such as housing and literacy, and about legal and court proceedings [p. 45].

In the West, largely due to practical and economic reasons, the day has become the functional unit of time for most print media. As a result, discrete, self-contained stories that transpire within the space of 24 hours or that can be easily broken up into such time frames are at a premium. Western news structures are not particularly favorable to placing events carefully and thoughtfully in the context of an overall process that gives the events meaning and relates them to gradual trends and less obvious social conditions. Western news systems are far better adapted to dealing with exceptional or unusual events, such as revolution, and disasters that generally have a distinct beginning, middle, and end and can be quickly quantified in terms of lives lost or economic consequences. The 30-second clip or "inverted pyramid" dominate the newsgathering process. In addition, Anthony Smith (1980: 91, 93) notes:

The centre of the problem is really the definition of news itself. We have seen a little of how the agencies have followed the information demands of their client media, originally for business information, later extending to material suitable for the popular press. The average Western reporter, trained in London or Paris or New York, would probably argue or at least feel that an item of news had to be collected with care and had to be part of a comprehensive treatment of a subject, but that it would probably be of an unusual or exceptional nature in order to be "newsworthy." During the 1960s, the whole culture of journalism and the content of journalism education has been transformed with the arrival of the "new journalism" of the "investigative" journalism of the post-Watergate era. The

Western journalist has come to see his role more as a kind of institutionalized permanent opposition, always looking critically askance at the doings of all those who hold official positions of power.

Finally, a most important NWICO initiative has been the establishment in 1975 of the international Non-Aligned News Pool to encourage information exchanges among LDCs. Tanjug, the national news agency of Yugoslavia, acts as the principal coordinating body for the pool's activities. The pool has offered LDCs some hope of at least getting a foot in the door of a Western-controlled system of international newsgathering and dissemination that has been closed to them for all intents and purposes. Yet, as Rosenblum (1979: 207) notes, there is uncertainty about the value and future of this recent international news agency.

> In practice, technical difficulties have prevented the pool from expanding to any significant size. Many of the items offered are purely propaganda; and some of them are of no interest even to the most collective-minded editors in other developing nations.

Another initiative associated with the NWICO aims is Inter Press Service (IPS).

IPS, a growing international news agency that was founded in 1964, is an alternate source of information from the four large news services. Unlike the other news agencies, the objective of the IPS is to promote a horizontal flow of news on a cooperative base between developing countries and to distribute information about the Third World clients to industrialized countries. The difference between IPS and the other four agencies is that "IPS deals with in-depth accounts of news usually neglected by other agencies" (Jakubowicz, 1985: 87).

IPS was founded in Rome by Roberto Savio and formed by Savio and 40 other journalists to be a nonpolitical "information bridge" between Latin America and Europe. The agency was set up as a cooperative in order to allow equal access to

information channels by people of different cultures and political affiliations who lacked access to such channels. In 1967 with the demands towards a NWICO, IPS aligned itself to the Third World position focusing on a horizontal flow of information regarding the process of development in LDCs and neglecting the traditional "spot" reporting. "IPS is indeed providing a different kind of news service from that of the traditional agencies. Its claim to be a new source of Third World news is justified. More than three quarters of the news carried on the two networks (English and Spanish) was from developing nations, and dealt with topics and actors of relevance to them" (Giffard, 1985: 23).

IPS is a nonprofit cooperative directed by an 11-member board with Savio as Chairman. Memberships of the cooperative in 1982 consisted of IPS staff (40%), former staff (20%), and colleagues (40%). There are bureaus in approximately 70 countries of which 24 are in Latin America and the Caribbean, 13 in Europe, 11 in Africa, 3 in the Middle East, 7 in Asia, and 5 in North America. Of the 63 bureaus, 45 maintain 450 full-time correspondents and 18 have stringers. Two-thirds of IPS's correspondents are located in LDCs and are nationals of the countries in which they work. About 20% of IPS's information emanates from its news exchange/distribution agreements with 30 Third World news agencies. IPS also provides translation and news services in 9 languages: Spanish, English, Arabic, Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, Portuguese, French, and German. The agency also provides special news services such as a Women's Feature Service, a World Press Summary, and weekly files of LDCs' economic, agricultural, technical, and mining issues. In 1985 the operating budget was over $6 million.

Direct Broadcast Satellites

Closely intertwined with both NWICO and the issues addressed by WARC is the controversy over broadcasting directly from satellites to home receivers. Questions of how

and to what extent such broadcasting should be controlled at an international level are complex and unresolved. Commencing in the 1960s, many LDCs, and some Western nations, began worrying about future uses of DBS. Psychologically, DBS came to represent to many the epitome of a foreign cultural invasion tool that could invade countries and broadcast propaganda without domestic or native content or control.

DBS, like prior planning or reservation of orbital slots that were discussed at WARC 79, is not only an involved technical issue but also one whose resolution could have, as Ithiel de Sola Pool (1979: 196) has noted, far-reaching political and ideological implications. These turn on the question of whether the use of the airwaves and of outer space should be conditioned by considerations of national sovereignty.

Although the matter of DBSs was not a major item on the agenda at WARC 79 itself, previously the ITU had attempted to confront the issue head on, particularly at the Space WARC in 1971 and the Broadcast Satellite WARC in 1977. But the ITU is not the only, nor even the most prominent, forum to which the debate over DBSs has been referred. The controversy has also found its way into UNESCO, the U.N. General Assembly, and the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) plus other agencies.

Direct-to-home-from-satellite broadcasting services are now available across most of North America. In fact, several nations are expected to have DBSs by the end of this decade. The chief obstacle to the implementation of a true DBS service in the past has been the need for large, powerful, and elaborate earth receiving stations to pick up signals from early communication satellites that were relatively weak in power. Now technical advances have made it possible to develop increasingly powerful satellites that can transmit strong signals receivable by increasingly smaller and more inexpensive dishes (Martin: 1985). Soon technology will be in place to operate satellites so powerful that they will feed small earth receivers cheap enough to be used on individual television sets. Receiving

dishes costing less than $500 and suitable for the average home
or community center will soon be a reality.

Almost from the day communication satellites arrived on
the scene, the possibility of using them for broadcasting was
heralded as holding great promise for facilitating the flow of
health and educational information and exchanges of cultural
programs between the nations of the world (Queeny, 1978: 45).
However, DBSs were also recognized as a potential threat to
the cultural integrity, national sovereignty, and security of
recipient nations. This has been the focal point of the heated
international arguments that surround DBSs. If direct broad-
casts from satellites could be directed only at audiences within
the transmitting country's boundaries and geared toward
serving domestic purposes as is more or less the case with
terrestrial television broadcasting, then the issue would not
have aroused such strong reaction. But because DBSs are to be
stationed in a geosynchronous orbit above the equator, their
footprints (the area that their broadcast signal covers) will
overlap various portions of other nations. In many cases, entire
nations would be covered. In Europe the spill-over problem
is dramatically reflected by the small nation Luxembourg
becoming involved with DBS.

Many nations, particularly LDCs, fear that DBS signals not
respecting national borders could be employed by foreign
countries to transmit unwanted, inconvenient, or harmful
messages to their own citizens. Paul Laskin and Abram Chayes
(1975: 32-33) have pointed out that such fears focus on three
types of messages. The first type of message that some
countries fear is the foreign commercial. Not only do com-
mercials adversely affect local producers, but the depiction
of high-consumption societies that they offer might distort
demand for consumer goods. The second type of message is
political propaganda that could subvert the recipient country's
political and social order. The third type of message is closely
related to propaganda though more subtle and probably more
profound in its ultimate effect. This includes messages that
often promote the values and cultural standards of the

transmitting society persistently and appealingly diminishing the receiving nation's attachment to, and identification with, its own native culture. The adoption of primarily American cultural tastes, habits, advertising, and other marketing characteristics, in nations in which mostly cheap American programming dominates broadcasting services, reflects the presence of this type of cultural penetration. This is what electronic colonialism is about. Laskin and Chayes (1975: 33) say:

> To some extent, the desire for some nations to have a degree of control over the content of direct satellite broadcasts reflects a judgement . . . that the staple fare of the American networks, while visually attractive, is in large part trivial, banal and violent. These nations fear a kind of Gresham's law in which bad American programs drive out or keep out the good.

These misgivings, that DBSs might be used for propaganda purposes, cultural intrusion, and commercialism, have added to the suspicions of the LDCs with respect to the Western free flow of information principle in general. The emerging LDCs maintain that the preservation of a unique and healthy cultural and national identity and their rights as autonomous, independent nations to pursue self-determined social, economic, political, and communication goals override the international principle of free flow of information. The free flow has in practical terms resulted in a stream of foreign mass media material consisting of junk, sex, trivia, and violence. Much of this may violate local values and morals plus further debase local initiatives and cultural sensibilities. The LDCs claim that the free flow has been a disguise for a one-way flow, mostly for Hollywood and New York, and some are petrified that DBSs will further exacerbate the situation.

These concerns about the possible dysfunctional effects of the free flow principle on national sovereignty and cultural integrity underline to a large extent the uneasiness among LDCs about the impact of DBSs. In addition they realize that only among the industrialized nations is the use of DBSs a realistic prospect in the foreseeable future. The LDCs, there-

fore, view DBSs as a potential major component in the drift toward electronic colonialization. Schiller (1976: 64-65) says this concern in the LDCs is "an outgrowth of the existing state of affairs, in which a handful of media conglomerates in the rich, industrialized, capitalist economies already dominate the international flow of news, films, magazines, TV programs, and other items." This places the DBS issue even more squarely in the context of the demand for a NWICO.

The most common response to the anticipated dangers of DBSs has been to suggest that some system of prior consent be established. This would mean that the consent of the recipient country would be required before another country transmitted into its territory by means of a DBS. Historically, the United States has been virtually alone in opposing any form of prior consent, arguing that prior consent is too restrictive a form of control that verges on censorship and violates international commitments expressed in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights to freedom of information. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression: this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." The United States, therefore, does have some grounds in international law for its position. But as Edward Ploman (1979: 162) notes, the concepts, phrases, and terms used in this and other articles of the declaration lack precision, are open to various interpretations, and only convey a statement of general principles. He continues, "In the absence of a formal definition of the terms and concepts of the article, it should be no surprise that interpretations can often be no more than 'subjective,' that is, in terms of national, cultural, or ideological assumptions" (p. 162). Thus the freedom of information article is of questionable weight in international law. Indeed, the definition and enforcement of several aspects of NWICO remain equally vague and will take years to sort out in international courts.

To support their position, prior consent advocates invoke the concept of "state sovereignty," which is enunciated in the

U.N. Charter and has a strong tradition in international law. Prior consent advocates argue that state sovereignty guarantees the right of national governments to control their domestic broadcasting systems and that this right has priority over the right under the freedom of information principle to transmit programs to a foreign country without its approval.

The question of whether freedom of information or state sovereignty is more consistent with the spirit of international law is yet to be resolved. Ploman (1979: 162) notes, "Neither of these concepts, state sovereignty and freedom of information, represents an absolute, static, indivisible reality." He suggests that both concepts should be toned down and modified to reflect real conditions such as the possibly harmful effects of a hardline free flow stance and the obsolescence of the concept of an international system of absolutely sovereign, equal, and independent states in the face of a system in which actors other than states strongly influence international behavior and in which interdependence among states is often a more significant factor than their sovereignty. DBS signals obviously know no national or geographic boundaries.

Further difficulties arise in trying to determine an appropriate legal regime to apply in the case of DBS disputes. Ploman (1979: 160) observes that some countries, such as the United States, take a common law approach according to which principles for regulating DBSs would evolve, if at all, only after DBS services had been initiated and would be adaptable to the shape those services assumed and the conditions they imposed. On the other hand, most countries, including the Soviet Union, have a civil law orientation according to which more rigid, binding legal principles would be established early to control the development of DBS services and prevent them from generating their own imperatives. The two international legal traditions are hard to reconcile.

The problem of evolving a consistent and coherent legal structure for dealing with DBSs is again compounded by the division of the task among several international organizations each working within different legal approaches and contexts. If

the Law of the Sea conferences are indications, then any set of
Law of Communication conferences in the future may be
equally tedious and perplexing. Yet future international con-
ferences dealing with broadcasting and communications issues
should be considered as a serious option.

The principal forum for thrashing out the issues involved in
DBSs has been the United Nations, mainly its outer space
committee, COPUOS. As early as 1958 the United Nations
addressed itself to international space issues when the General
Assembly adopted a resolution recognizing "the common
interest of mankind in outer space." About the same time, the
General Assembly set up COPUOS, which has a Legal and
Technical Subcommittee and which, as of 1961, has operated
according to a principle of consensus rather than through
voting. According to Ploman (1979: 157-158):

> The first substantial achievement of the Committee was the
> elaboration of a "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing
> the Activities of the States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
> Space," which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1963.
> These principles were then used almost intact for the Outer
> Space Treaty of 1967 which is the basic international instru-
> ment in the field.

Queeny (1978: 26) says of the treaty:

> Articles I and II have special relevance to direct broadcast
> satellites since these Articles affirm the sovereign equality of
> States to the free use of space and its exploration on an equal
> basis (Article I) and state that outer space is not the domain of
> any one nation but the province of all nations (Article II).

In 1968, the General Assembly adopted a recommendation
by Sweden and Canada, and instructed COPUOS to establish
a special Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites to
study the feasibility of DBSs and their possible social, cultural,
and legal implications. The Working Group met five times
between 1969 and 1974.

In 1972 the General Assembly voted resoundingly for a Soviet Resolution that had the effect of increasing the Working Group's mandate to include the elaboration of a set of principles requiring international agreement. On the surface the adoption of the Resolution appeared to be a victory for those countries favoring some restrictions, especially prior consent, on DBSs at an international level and a defeat for the United States, which did not favor the adoption of principles. The vote was 100 to 1, with the United States standing alone.

This elaboration of principles to govern direct broadcasting was reached at the fifth session of the Working Group and represented the culmination of its deliberations over five years. Integrated in the 14 principles that were recommended were the three major positions that had gradually emerged out of the Working Group's meetings. The Soviet position, which was contained in the Soviet Convention of August 1972 and modified slightly in its Declaration of Principles in 1974, would establish "a regime of strict control: a code of broadcasting conduct and a requirement of prior consent by a recipient country" (Laskin and Chayes, 1975: 34) as well as a list of prohibited categories of broadcasts. The U.S. position "would place no restraint upon the free flow of ideas and information, either by prescribing categories of broadcast consent or by 'prior consent'" (Queeney, 1978: 199). Canada and Sweden jointly developed a compromise position with a heavy stress on regional systems of DBSs in which prior consent is a requirement and participation in coverage of its territory is the right of consenting nations.

The 14 draft principles into which these positions were consolidated include the question of prior consent and participation, applicability of international law, program content, copyright, and illegality of programs specifically targeted for a foreign state without that state's consent. After the Working Group's fifth and final session, the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS was charged with getting states to agree unanimously on the draft principles. After arduous discussions the subcommittee managed to get consensus, at least in principle,

on all the major draft principles except the key one of prior consent, which is still outstanding.

UNESCO has also contributed to the DBS debate with its Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Exchange in 1972. According to de Sola Pool (1974: 37):

> The philosophy of the Declaration is strongly restrictive, stressing sovereignty, the requirement that news broadcasts be accurate, the right of each country to decide the contents of educational programs broadcast to it, the need for broadcasters to respect cultural distinctiveness and varied laws, and the requirement for prior consent especially regarding advertising.

Probably the key statement of the Declaration is Article IX, which declares that "it is necessary that States, taking into account the principle of freedom of information, *reach or promote agreements* [emphasis added] concerning direct satellite broadcasting to the population of countries other than the country of origin of the transmission."

At the WARC for Space Telecommunications in 1971 an item was adopted stating that spillover should be avoided unless another nation agrees to accept the footprint reaching its territory. This provision refers to the parts of a satellite broadcast beam that are either inadvertently or by design transmitted beyond the borders of the country for which the broadcast is intended. Most countries interpreted the provision's mention of a previously reached agreement as an affirmation of the principle of prior consent, giving the principle status in international telecommunications law. But the United States and a few other countries regarded the provision as an exclusively technical regulation dealing with the carrier and not the content of the information broadcast (Ploman, 1980).

The major international organizations, which are capable of adding to the body of international law relating to DBSs and of

determining legal principles whereby the implementation and use of this new technology could be properly directed, have been largely unsuccessful in coordinating their decisions and activities with each other and also in their individual efforts to clarify the issues. Their failure becomes more disturbing as advanced satellites become operational.

The DBS issue epitomizes the rapid development of a communication technology that defies the pace of either the international bureaucracy or the legal profession. Dealing with contemporary international broadcasting and telecommunications issues will continue to be a growing problem. The advocates of the NWICO generally fail to take account of the complexity and slowness of the international decision-making machinery available for rulemaking or enforcing any changes in broadcasting or communication services.

U.S. Activities

The promise of DBS as a commercially viable broadcasting option is still just that: a promise, largely unfulfilled. The major reason is financial rather than technical. There have been a number of false starts, some of early casualties.

In the early 1980s Rupert Murdock, well-known publishing magnate, planned to start the first DBS system, Skyband Incorporated, a nationwide, five-channel service, but in November 1983 he was forced to withdraw from the venture at considerable expense because it was estimated that he had to pay $12.7 (U.S.) million to void his multiyear contract with Satellite Business Systems (SBS).

In 1984 COMSAT's Satellite Television Corporation, after spending $140 million for a six-channel national service, abandoned its efforts. In addition, United States Communications Inc., which at least started a five-channel service in the northeastern states in late 1983, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in late 1984. Another venture, Hubbard Broadcasting's United States Satellite Broadcasting and Dominion Video Satellite, which were given DBS approval in 1982, are still trying to

launch their systems, perhaps meaning they are trying to assemble appropriate and sufficient financing. In 1985 alone, the FCC granted licenses to seven potential DBS operators.

In 1986 the FCC is calling for further action, but given the track record of casualties plus the number of potential new entrants in a high risk environment, the automatic success of any DBS system is far from assured.

The large number of recent licensees is a by-product of the general deregulatory trend in the United States, and, in particular, with the national regulator, the FCC. But Charles Helien (1986: 54), a Washington-based communication lawyer, makes the following point.

Had the policies of deregulation and the adherency to the principles of competition been less airtight, consideration of the obstacles a DBS system faced might have persuaded the FCC that only a single entity would have a chance, at least initially, to establish any kind of DBS service. The unforeseen result of deregulation in the case of DBS may well have been to actually prevent its earlier development and the introduction of viable competition between DBS and the existing media.

Once considered a broadcasting panacea, DBS has not turned out to be a threat to anyone, other than to the financial stability of some of the early alleged winners of licenses. Although there are certain financial difficulties yet to be overcome among the current list of potential DBS systems, the underlying fact remains that DBS will be operationalized soon and although it will be within the confines of the United States, it will be then only a matter of time before the same type of advanced technology will be utilized by other nations. Inevitably, this means that DBS footprints will start to cross geographic boundaries without regard to traditional political demarcations. Although both Canada and Mexico will likely experience some type of DBS spillover from the U.S. systems, this is a relatively minor matter compared to the potential complications for DBS systems that could be operating over

Europe, Africa, or Latin America before the end of this century.

Latin American Issues

It is worthwhile at this point to consider the nature, the role, and the effects of mass communication systems in a major developing region—Latin America. The Latin American experience with mass communication and more recently informatics illustrates in almost textbook fashion the classic pattern of problems associated with communication and development under the present international information, economic, and power order (Mattelart and Schmucler, 1985).

Perhaps one principal reason the Latin American experience is so illustrative is that Latin America, according to Alan Wells (1972: 7), is "the unofficial sphere of cultural, economic, and political influence for the world's richest nation, the United States." Latin America provides a case study of the phenomenon of cultural imperialism, a key issue in the debate over communication, development, and the NWICO.

Another possible reason is that variables such as urbanization and, more important, mass media exposure—which have been associated with the impetus toward modernization under Western models of development and communication—are more visibly present in Latin America than in most other underdeveloped regions. In any case the level of exposure in Latin America to all three mass media—radio, television, and print—in contrast to the lower levels in most other LDCs seems to be sufficient to enable one to draw at least tentative conclusions concerning the role of communication in development and to put to the test Western assumptions about that role.

A most significant feature of mass media systems, especially broadcasting, in Latin America is their commercial nature. Latin Americans generally follow the U.S. model of privately owned print and broadcast systems. There is little alterna-

tive, educational, or public broadcasting. Antonio Pasquali
(1975: 65) describes the commercialism of Latin American
broadcasting.

In radio, if we take the license (collecting by the State in
payment for the service offered) as a criteria for distinguishing
broadly between two main systems—the public and the pri-
vate—we find the following: in 1970, ninety-one countries (64
percent) were using a license system, and fifty-one countries (36
percent) were not. The first group unquestionably includes all
the countries possessing the best broadcasting services. The
second group (no license) includes: Monaco, Spain and Andorra
in Europe; a group of countries (almost all small) in Africa,
Asia and Oceania, in particular Egypt; North America and all
three Latin American countries. The American continent
therefore constitutes the only solid homogeneous and large-
scale group of countries in which the radio medium is mainly
controlled by private enterprise. . . . In Venezuela . . . the
antiquated Radio Regulations of 1941 are, perhaps, less
respected than any other laws; they contain a pompous
declaration to the effect that broadcasting is the exclusive
function of the State, which will only exceptionally grant
authoring action to private operators . . . (Article 2). The
exception, however, has become the rule: 128 licenses for
private broadcasting up to 1973 as opposed to a single state
station of 10 kw covering only a small part of the country.

Another problem Pasquali (p. 66) discusses is the prolifer-
ation in Latin America of small, commercial radio stations all
competing for the same urban audiences and all lacking the
financial and technical resources to serve the less profitable
markets in the peripheral areas of the countries in which they
operate. He says:

The fact that Latin America has eight inhabitants per square
kilometre, a jungle of diminutive stations, over 80 percent of
which have a capacity of less than 5 kw, and a radio receiving set
figure that is only 6 percent of the world total, means that 60

percent of Latin Americans (basically the urban population) receive a super-abundance of broadcast messages, while the other 40 percent (scattered throughout the pampas, the plains, the Andes and the jungle) cannot even receive radio programmes during the day.

The commercialism of the Latin American broadcasting industry applies to television as well. Wells (1972: 119) writes:

Unlike Europe in the early days of the medium, public television has not gained any substantial foothold in Latin America. Thus all of the countries have predominantly private and commercial forms of operation, even where the government has either been active in the past, or is still active in broadcasting.

Fred Fejes (1980) argues that, largely due to the influence of transnational advertising agencies on Latin American television, many of the images Latin Americans receive about themselves, their environment, and the outside world through that medium are inappropriate and even damaging in terms of their effects on cultural integrity and social, economic, and political development in the region. Programs and commercials are aired on the basis of their ability to continually attract large audiences and influence product sales. Commercial stations show little concern over whether the images conveyed by either programs or ads are socially useful or, on the other hand, encourage suitable values, lifestyles, and consumer habits appropriate for Latin Americans.

Research seems to indicate that television programming in Latin America follows a formula that U.S. television experience would suggest draws the most viewers, that is, a steady diet of soap operas, adventures, romances, situation comedies, programs depicting violence, and commercials, all usually reflecting the values of an affluent consumer society. Luis Ramiro Beltran (1978: 65) notes that a study of four Venezuela television channels finds

Jointly, violent fare constitutes 56 percent of their pro-
gramming. Another survey in Venezuela showed that 68
percent of television content in a typical week encouraged
physical, emotional, and moral violence; this figure climbed to
73 percent on Sundays and to 83 percent on Saturdays. . . .

Pasquali also pays attention to the "soap operas," finding that
they occupy the top place in the live programming, with 30.4
percent of the time devoted to this category. This he finds
combined with abundant commercials whose interjections in
the telenovelas (soap operas) amounts, at times, to a period
equal to that occupied by the episode itself.

Beltran contends that there is a definite character to the
images covered by such popular, commercial programming.
The images conveyed, Beltran suggests, support the capitalist
system and the status quo as the natural order as well as all the
attendant mental attitudes, values, and modes of organizing
social relationships necessary to prop up that order and
prevent it from collapsing in rebellion and discontent. It is only
natural that a television industry that is privately owned,
highly commercialized, and thus fixed into the capitalist
structure would favor, whether consciously or not, such
imagery.

Beltran (1978: 75) also identifies materialism as a dominant
strain of imagery in Latin American television programs; he
maintains that many shows induce an adherence to the belief
that the "main goals of human beings are the acquisition of
wealth, the accumulation of goods, the enjoyment of services,
and the achievement of general well being." This promotion of
materialism is also associated with the idea that material
satisfaction is to be enjoyed first and foremost by the individual.

Considering the vast influence U.S. interests have on it, it is
not surprising that Latin American television reflects the
ideology of the United States and its materialistic values of an
affluent, consumer-oriented middle class rather than Latin
American culture and values, economy, or social problems.

Wells (1972: 102-106) outlines U.S. investment in Latin
American television. The three big American networks, ABC,

NBC, and CBS, account for the bulk. Of the three, ABC is the largest investor in Latin America. In the 1960s, it invested in five Central American television stations that became known as the Central American TV Network (CATVN). ABC also created a similar network, The Latin American Television Network Organization (LATINO), which operates in six South American countries. Exact figures are difficult to determine, but most estimates of the percentage of Latin American programming originating in the United States and annual sales of television programs by the United States to Latin America are in the vicinity of 30% and $25 million, respectively.

Beltran (1978: 65) also describes how the United States exerts influence over Latin American television through advertising:

> U.S. advertising firms (mostly multinational corporations) and U.S. advertising agencies (especially McCann Erickson, Walter Thompson, and Young and Rubican) dominate the Latin American advertising business through all media. Specifically in television, for instance, the top five U.S. advertising agencies controlled in Argentina 35 percent of TV commercials, serving Standard Oil, Shell, Coca Cola, Ford, etc., and absorbing between 30 and 45 percent of all television advertising in the country. . . . And the first five advertising clients in Columbia are Colgate-Palmolive, Lever Bros., American Home Products, Lotteries and Raffles, and Miles Laboratories; over 50 percent of television advertising in this country is devoted to cosmetics, non-essential food stuffs and detergents, most of which are produced by U.S. multinational companies.

The hold of the United States on the Latin American television industry is further strengthened by Latin American dependence on U.S. technology and expertise. Luis P. Estrada and Daniel Hopen (1968: 6) made this point.

> In Latin America the United States has a monopoly of the supply of the new technology, the basic film material, the

technical experts and, of course, the large-scale capital needed
to increase the size of local investments.

So, in effect, the content and the commercial, entertainment,
and advertising-oriented structure of U.S. television has been
superimposed on Latin American broadcasting systems. This
position has been used, perhaps engineered, by the United
States to advance its general economic, political, cultural, and
ideological interests in its most important sphere of influence.

Much the same situation applies with respect to Latin
American print news media. As Fernando Reyes Matta (1979:
164-171) argues, a North American system of news selection,
gathering, and presentation, and of professionalism in jour-
nalism has been modeled in the Latin American press. This
North American model includes values such as objectivity,
currency, and accuracy and a preference for self-contained,
easily reported, usually sensational, stereotyped, and thus com-
mercially interesting stories about violence and catastrophe in
LDCs over lengthy balanced, probing, and interpretive analy-
sis. Latin American adoption of this news model is mainly due
to the dependence of Latin American print media on Western,
particularly U.S., transnational news agencies for a supply of
international, and to some extent even Latin American news.
Matta (1979: 165) says:

> The current status of the Latin American press manifests the
> continuing dominance of North American news values, as
> institutionalized in the transnational news agencies. The trans-
> national news agencies produce and process nearly 60 percent
> of the information published in Latin America. UPI and AP
> alone provide 30 percent and 21 percent of the information
> received by the principal Latin American dailies.

Latin American researcher Raquel Salinas-Bascur con-
ducted research consisting of interviews with 61 persons
including directors and owners of media institutions as well as
editors and journalists to determine what their impressions of
the possibilities of such a news agency were, what they felt was

wrong with the service provided under the present system, and the extent of their familiarity with UNESCO and the concept of NWICO. Among her findings were these:

> The main problems according to 40 percent of the interviewees (24 persons), arise from the analysis of regional situations from a perspective of industrial countries. While 40 percent attributed the problem to the predominance of a journalistic model associated with the sale of news or a mercantile type of news making. Many answers classified as "others" relate to these two alternatives, although they emphasize different aspects of these same questions. Thus, for instance, some stated that one of the most serious problems consists in the lack of an authentic Latin American service, and in the interference of interests corresponding to countries where transnational agencies are based [1980: 7].

These findings are fairly encouraging in that they seem to reflect an awareness that the concept and definition of news is the essence of the problem.[3]

What the Latin American experience with mass communication and informatics reveals is that foreign, particularly American, influence and control over domestic communication systems in developing nations not only fosters economic, cultural, and technical dependencies in almost all sectors of the dominated nations but also induces an acceptance of foreign communication models that for all practical purposes prevents developing societies from adopting or even knowing about alternatives, such as NWICO, which might be more appropriate to their needs. Latin America's communication scene manifests many of the concerns reflected by electronic colonialism.[4]

The Western, particularly American, concept of a free, privately owned, and market-oriented communication system linked with modernization may be a valid descriptive model of the role of communication for advanced industrial nations; yet, when this model is applied to LDCs, it seems to be inappropriate. The LDCs, many in Latin America, look to NWICO for more applicable models to emulate and pursue.

United States Information Policy

In discussing the U.S. position on both media and information policies, two major points should be kept in mind.[5] First, the U.S.'s international media and information policies are to a great extent a reflection or enlargement of their domestic media policies and practices. The premises underlying freedom of speech, free press, market forces, and corporate responsibility to shareholders are carried over to decision making in the international arena. (A clear exception arises where some groups have formed cartels for controlling foreign markets and prices where such cartels and price-fixing arrangements are illegal within its borders.)

Second, in sharp contrast with almost all other nations, U.S. media and communication activities take place in an open market place within a private enterprise environment. Radio and television networks, and computer and telecommunications companies, including satellites, are held by private corporations, many of which are also giant transnational conglomerates soon to be further involved in the NWICO debate. Benjamin Compaine (1979: 9) emphasizes the distinctiveness of the U.S. media empire this way:

> The mass communication industry in the United States is deeply rooted in the economic system. In this context, media technology and institutions have developed a mass communications system that is unique in the world for its independence from government control, direct or indirect. Businesses and individuals in private industry have been motivated to improve printing presses, invent typesetters and computer-driven laser composition devices, radio and television broadcasting, then color reception, two-way cable transmission communications satellites, video cassettes—the list goes on. Thousands of businesses and institutions are involved. In many ways, we are faced not with a problem of concentration but with a problem in being able to cope with the vast diversity of forms and content of the mass media.

This has produced a private sector orientation in both the applied and theoretical regulatory philosophy areas that favors the free enterprise system and allows the market forces and the laws of supply and demand to permeate media and information practices. There are exceptions to this, such as the "Fairness Doctrine" and telephone and cable monopolies, but the thrust of the private sector argument contrasts substantially with the public PTTs (government-owned posts, telephone, and telegraph) and various media and information systems elsewhere. The BBC is a classic example of a government-funded broadcasting corporation. Moreover, the Nora and Minc (1980) report is indicative of future trends in Europe. These two basic points not only underlie U.S. media practices but also extend to newer, computer-based information systems.

At a 1980 meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) located in Paris and consisting of 24 chiefly industrialized nations (members of OECD are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, The United Kingdom, and The United States), the U.S. government's submission to the High Level Conference on Information, Computer, and Communications Policy reports:

In the United States, as in other countries, there is not one grand information policy, no single national information policy, but rather a composite of policies, explicit and implicit, about information. In particular, aspects of the United States's domestic information policy can be divided into two broad categories: (1) the legal foundations of information dissemination and access; and (2) the economics and management of information [Bushkin and Yarow, 1980: 4].

The first category deals with the constitutional and statutory policies that impact upon the behavior of both industry and

government. The First and Fourth Amendments, The Freedom
of Information Act, the Sunshine Act, and libel laws are
examples. The second category deals with, primarily in the
private sector, the economic and management philosophy by
which decisions are made. The ultimate goal of much decision
making is to optimize profits. Much information in this
category is held and coveted privately by corporations because
it applies to their current market share and operations as well
as their long-range planning.

For the U.S. government some deliberate restrictions are
imposed, usually with legal sanctions. Three categories are:

— The government's effectiveness in protecting or promoting
   national security or the general welfare (e.g., military, strategic,
   foreign policy, law enforcement information).
— The protection of society from the influence of information that
   offends traditional social mores (e.g., pornography) or that is
   false or deceptive (e.g., false advertising or libel).
— Protection of personal privacy and of an individual's ability to
   control his own life to the maximum extent possible (e.g.,
   information about individuals, particularly where held in
   record systems or large organizations or institutions) [Bushkin
   and Yarow, 1980: 8].

All this reflects the fact that, as compared with other
nations, the average U.S. citizen has substantial protection
from both private and public (government) interference with
his or her media and information habits, preference, and tastes.

This brief review highlighting U.S. domestic policies points
to certain insights as to how Americans approach international
issues. First, the First Amendment is central to their philos-
ophy and practices; second, the government plays a signifi-
cant role, mainly through lawmaking, in access and owner-
ship issues. For example, the U.S. Freedom of Information
Act is a model that most LDCs and Socialist governments
would not tolerate. (Indeed, the U.S. Freedom of Information
Act reflects an openness to government information that is
almost unparalleled in the world.) Finally, as technology, such

as microprocessors and optic-fibres, makes available more choices, and deregulation becomes the regulatory mode, the role and control of media and communication in the United States both at home and abroad is an evolving issue that somehow must be meshed into the movement toward NWICO.

Transborder Data Flows (TBDF), OECD and NWICO

A new and growing issue that may ultimately come to dominate the NWICO debate deals with Transborder Data Flows (TBDF). Although these flows generally refer to information and computerized data of a commercial or intergovernmental nature, they are clearly being put into the same debate as the original free flow and mass media discussions.[6]

In terms of TBDF the major change is basically a techno-logical one. As satellites become more sophisticated and deal with digital codes, it does not matter whether that information originates as a broadcasting story or a balance sheet. Both are technically transferred into digital information that is carried via satellite and reconstructed on software systems of various types at the other end, frequently in another nation. Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish between the systems, that is, whether it is originating from a broadcasting outlet or a commercial outlet, for example, a bank or TNC; yet the question of the free flow of information, cultural sovereignty, and similar items related to the 1970s as contained in the MacBride Commission, find great similarity in terms of the debate now being discussed in other major fora, particularly at the OECD, about TBDF. There are now major interconti-nental and regional networks that provide machine readable data to subscribers. One certainly may foresee when it will be TBDF issues that, from an international perspective, will have greater impact on the future of information transfer and NWICO than the initial media debate that originated within the halls of UNESCO.

Although not detailed here, TBDF issues range from privacy to access, costs, regulation, codes of conduct, and data havens, frequently with regulations varying from nation to nation. Some nations may systematically avoid any regulations in order to encourage foreign companies to process their information/data bases either electronically or through hard copy facilities in foreign lands and thus become the data-havens of the 21st century.

Given the ramifications of TBDF and NWICO, surprisingly it is still a relatively underresearched area. Jean-Luc Renaud (1984: 128-129) speculates about the paucity of research.

This could be owing to several factors: (1) A constant recurring distortion in the various discussions in the identification of information and mass media with news and press. In the many declarations and resolutions, there is a strong emphasis on the press, the news and the journalists, as if they are the key actors in international communication. The crucial questions of control over economic, technological, and marketing structures in international flows of information are left untouched. (2) In many instances, there has been no relation between the development of media technology and communication policy, partly because discussion of these issues has taken place in different contexts and involved different groups. As a result, agreements may be reached at the level of lofty, abstract principles, but there is no hope that these will be implemented, because there is no control over technological infrastructures (e.g., no access to satellite frequencies). (3) It may also be the case that policy is formulated on the basis of the functional characteristics of media that have become obsolete as a result of rapid technological developments. Current policy often treats TDF and media flow as separate problems, when the two are merging into one process.

Yet despite the lack of systematic research, TBDF is on the continuing increase, estimated 20% a year, with on-line data bases available from a diverse range of information providers and processors, including governments, businesses, and research institutes. Not only are these data bases increasing in

actual numbers, but also the ability to move data electronically between systems in diverse nation states is increasing in parallel.

It is significant to note that in reference to TBDF, European states place greater importance on privacy and national sovereignty along with other sociocultural and noneconomic concerns. Solely economic and technical considerations are lower on the agenda for EEC nation states.

The concept of noneconomic concerns involving TBDF is reflected in the issue of protection of privacy; particularly concerning information about individuals that has been stored in or is accessible to foreign-based computer systems. Personal files may contain a wide range of information about an individual's financial, economic, educational, welfare, business, and insurance status, medical or criminal history, and political and religious beliefs. The increase and ease of TBDF heightens the concern that foreign governments, corporations, or persons, may have access to this personal information. Recipients of data may have the information before the ultimate users do. In many cases individuals may not be aware that information concerning them or their business is being accessed across national boundaries. Loss of control over the international transfer of information introduces new complexities regarding data security.

Brazil represents an interesting "case study" of a nation that has taken a strong stand against the free flow mentality with respect to TBDF, including both computerized hardware as well as software.

In Brazil, the government believes that it does not want to become a "computer colony" and this has led, over the last decade, to a complex network of regulations administered by the Brazilian Special Informatics Secretariat. Brazil sees independence in computer technology and software as a matter of sovereignty and national pride, plus the government has taken strong steps to ensure the development of a broadly based domestic informatics industry. Nationalism was in fact present at the birth of Brazil's computer industry when, in the

mid 1970s, the country's Naval Ministry demanded the security for its computer systems installed in its frigates and destroyers. As a result, the entire issue was taken up by the military government's National Security Council. In 1977 it sponsored the creation of a state computer company, Cobra, and two years later formed the Special Informatic Secretariat, headed mainly by army and navy engineers.

Since then, an alliance of military officers, local entrepreneurs, and leftist cultural nationalists has formed a coalition around the ideal of protecting and enlarging the emerging Brazilian informatics industry. As a result, foreign-owned subsidiaries, principally I.B.M.,[7] have decreased their total share of the market; in five years their share has fallen from 77% to 53%. Since 1979, domestic sales of Brazilian-made computers have gone from 200 million to almost 700 million (U.S.). Sales of imported computers have decreased from a high of almost 300 million in 1981 to less than 100 million in 1983. Brazil has passed the most stringent informatics laws affecting TBDF.

The OECD has been active in examining the legal, social, and economic aspects of informatics along with a wide range of communication-related activities and therefore it is no surprise that they produced a set of "Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data." The guidelines were adopted on September 23, 1980, and are of a voluntary nature. The four major recommendations of the Council of the OECD are:

(1) That Member countries take into account in their domestic legislation the principles concerning the protection of privacy and individual liberties set forth in the Guidelines contained in the Annex to this Recommendation which is an integral part thereof;

(2) That Member countries endeavour to remove or avoid creating, in the name of privacy protection, unjustified obstacles to transborder flows of personal data;

(3) That Member countries cooperate in the implementation of the Guidelines set forth in the Annex;

(4) That Member countries agree as soon as possible on specific procedures of consultation and cooperation for the application of these Guidelines [pp. 7-8].

In addition, a basic principle in terms of national application is described as follows:

An individual should have the right:
(a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him;
(b) to have communicated with him, data relating to him
  i)   within a reasonable time;
  ii) at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;
  iii) in a reasonable manner; and
  iv) in a form that is readily intelligible to him;
(c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and
(d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful, to have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended [p. 11].

In terms of international cooperation, a guiding recommendation is:

Member countries should, where requested, make known to other Member countries details of the observance of the principles set forth in these Guidelines. Member countries should also ensure that procedures for transborder flows of personal data and for the protection of privacy and individual liberties are simple and compatible with those of other Member countries which comply with these Guidelines.

Member countries should establish procedures to facilitate:
i) information exchange related to these Guidelines, and
ii) mutual assistance in the procedural and investigative matters involved.

Member countries should work towards the development of principles, domestic and international, to govern the applicable law in the case of transborder flows of personal data [p. 12].

And more recently:

> ministers of OECD member countries issued a "Declaration on
> transborder data flows" in April 1985. This declaration will
> provide the foundation for further work in developing policies
> to deal with specific issues raised by increasing TDF, and will
> likely form a basis for negotiations on trade in TC services. It
> puts emphasis on maintaining the relative ease with which data
> and information are now transferred across national borders,
> but at the same time recognizes that national policies affecting
> TDF reflect a range of social and economic goals that also
> require attention [Robinson, 1985: 314].

Other actions that have been taken internationally are
OECD's "Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
the Transborder Flow of Personal Data." The Council of
Europe adopted a "Convention for the Privacy of Individuals
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data." In
the case of nonpersonal TBDF, according to the center on
Transnational Corporation, about 60 countries have issued
some official statement.

In conclusion, the extension of the NWICO debate into
information areas that are broader in definition and scope than
the original broadcast and media initiatives reflects a systema-
tically different set of concerns. TBDF, given the sophisti-
cation of the technology and the escalation of computerized
data bases, has resulted in a plethora of new issues although
researchers have failed to systematically examine the impli-
cations of these changes. In terms of nation-states, the extreme
response to data appears to be Brazil and in terms of other
activities, many Western industrialized nations have taken
some action, motivated primarily by a concern for privacy
issues. In addition, European nations have been motivated by
national sovereignty concerns, but the net result is that there
are varying interpretations of the free flow of information
phenomena that was traditionally applied to the media but
now represents broader aspects of the approach to the TBDF
debate.

Initially LDCs and several Western nations feared cultural incursions from the media, yet now, as reflected in OECD activities, many nations are increasing their concerns about national sovereignty as affected by new information technologies.

Notes

1. The question of cultural bias is one deserving additional research attention. Kurt Lewin's classic "gatekeeper" concept requires reanalysis (Peterson, 1979). See also McQuail's (1976) *Review of Sociological Writings on the Press,* especially pp. 39-49 and Gans' (1979) *Deciding What's News.*

2. During the 1978 UNESCO General Assembly, the Shah of Iran was coming under daily attack and the U.S. delegation to UNESCO and their press corps were both stunned and upset. Eventually President Carter publicly chastised the head of the CIA for failing to provide an accurate assessment of the tidal wave of opposition and hatred towards the Shah and his Westernized ways.

Was the U.S. Government or public prepared for the fall? No. The wire services projected a favorable climate surrounding a strong pro-Western ally in the troubled Middle East. Even the Shah's frequent violations of human rights failed to deter or distract the U.S. press from painting a favorable picture. The wire services, the weekly newsmagazines, television networks, and individual correspondents sent dispatches that misread both the weakness of the Shah and the resolve of the Moslems. According to Dorman and Omeed:

"By and large the American news media routinely have characterized the Iranian conflicts as the work of turbaned religious zealots in league with opportunistic Marxists, rather than—as they might have—the reaction of peoples outraged by a repressive regime. By doing so the press has helped to misinform American public opinion and narrow the range of debate on this bell-weather foreign policy crisis.

"This is a harsh assessment of press performance, but is one arrived at after a careful study of U.S. wire service, newsmagazine, and major daily newspaper coverage appearing since the current crisis began in January 1978" (1979: 27).

3. Latin America has several news agencies and even a regional agency, LATIN. But none of them operates under a concept of news appreciably different from that of North American agencies. And, as Smith (1980: 71) points out: "They [Latin American news agencies] have never been able to muster the resources to commence a continental, still less an international service of their own. LATIN has recently come into existence and operates in a number of South American countries, but it has been created by Reuter's and obtains its material through Reuter's. . . . So deeply has the U.S. news culture established itself in the continent's press, it would only duplicate the services already provided from the North, and South American papers have come to share the same news values" (1980: 71).

4. Other nations and groups of nations are encountering similar patterns of media and communication technology transfer and domination. For example, Africa's situation is documented in Mytton (1983); a typical statement is "Africa's modern print and electronic media developed as the direct or indirect result of contact with Europe"

(p. 37). Hachten and Beil (1985) conclude: "This case study suggests that events in developing nations such as Ghana and Tanzania seem to have declined in newsworthiness, according to perceptions of editors of the Western press. It does not support the changes of Masmoudi and other proponents of a new order that the Western press reports only crisis events in these nations. Instead they suggest a tendency for the Western press to report crisis events only when journalists judge that they are important enough to risk possible expulsion.

"This tendency should be regarded as the real issue. It is far more serious and disturbing than the outdated polemics of Masmoudi and other proponents of a New World Information Order. Readers of elite Western newspapers, such as the *New York Times* and *The Times* of London, are not receiving adequate information regarding the severe economic crises and other problems facing the leaders of developing nations" (p. 629).

5. The items discussed here complement other areas where U.S. policy was discussed. In considering U.S. media policy, one must understand its central plank: the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."

6. It is somewhat ironic that the nation with the greatest investment in international communication affairs, the United States, is also the same nation that is doing its utmost to close down those international fora or associations that are most likely to aid it in its goals, whatever they be, whether it is free flow of information, TBDF, or rational and efficient use of the international spectrum space. Consider the following that points the accusing finger at the U.S. administration for manipulating U.S. policy and participation in international communication affairs in a deleterious, disruptive, and negative fashion.

"*U.S. Off Course* On the contrary, the U.S. is moving the reverse direction, abandoning or neutralizing a forum capable of accommodating a broad, varied membership and of accepting revised agendas and new perspectives. The U.S. proposes to leave the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), partly because of its attention to disputed international communication practices and conditions. The U.S. is pressing the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to confine itself to technical concerns. It is reducing its participation in the U.N. Committee on Information and in the legal and technical sub-committees for the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. It stands apart from the Intergovernmental Bureau on Informatics (IBI) and the U.N. Centre for Transnational Corporations, both of which exhibit deep interest in transborder data flow problems involving the Third World" (Chronicle of International Communication, April 1984: 7).

7. I.B.M. also has some domestic (U.S.) critics. "Moreover, given I.B.M.'s recently demonstrated litigiousness with its smaller opponents, would be competitors have experienced a deep chill, especially if they are former I.B.M. employees. The danger is that a class of 'technological serfs' is being created—those who once worked for I.B.M. and now forever subject to trade secret litigation. It is a disturbing paradox that, now freed from (U.S.) government litigation, I.B.M. is using elevation, especially in the main frame plug-compatible markets" (*New York Times*, May 13, 1984: 2F).

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THE MacBRIDE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AND IPDC

The origins and report of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (1979), also known as the MacBride Commission, are outlined here. In addition a potential successor organization to MacBride is detailed. The International Commission was created in direct response to Resolution 100 of the 19th General Assembly of UNESCO, which met in Nairobi in the fall of 1976. This resolution called for the Director-General of UNESCO, Mr. Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, to establish a commission to investigate international communication problems. It operated for two years and ended in the fall of 1979. One hundred background papers were produced, plus an Interim and Final Report.

The MacBride Commission had 16 members. The President was Sean MacBride (Ireland), barrister, politician, and journalist, President of the International Peace Bureau, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, founder and Chairman of Amnesty International, United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, holder of the Nobel and Lenin Peace Prizes. Around him were gathered the remaining 15 members.

(1) Elie Abel (United States), journalist and broadcasting expert, Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism, Colombia University

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(2) Hubert Beuve-Mery (France), journalist, founder of the newspaper *Le Monde*, resident of the Centre de formation et de perfectionnement des journalistes, Paris

(3) Elebe Ma Ekonzo (Zaire), journalist, Director-General of Agence Zaire-Presse

(4) Gabriel Garcia Marquez (Colombia), writer, novelist, and journalist

(5) Mochtar Lubis (Indonesia), journalist, President of the Press Foundation of Asia

(6) Mustapha Masmoudi (Tunisia), Secretary of State for Information, President of the Intergovernmental Coordinating Council for Information of the Non-Aligned Countries

(7) Marshall McLuhan (Canada), sociologist and communications expert (initially nominated to serve on the commission, he was obliged to withdraw and was replaced by Betty Zimmerman (Canada), broadcaster, Director of Radio Canada International, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation)

(8) Michio Nagai (Japan), journalist and sociologist, editorialist of the newspaper *Assahi Shimbun*

(9) Fred Isaac Akporuaro Omu (Nigeria), former head of the Department of Mass Communications, University of Lagos, commissioner for Information, Social Development, and Sport, Bendel State

(10) Bogdan Osolnik (Yugoslavia), journalist, politician, member of the National Assembly

(11) Gamal el Oteifi (Egypt), former Minister for Information and Culture, Honorary Professor, Cairo University, journalist, lawyer, and legal adviser, Deputy Speaker, Parliament

(12) Johannes Pietar Pronk (Netherlands), economist and politician, member of the National Assembly

(13) Juan Somavia (Chile), Executive Director, Institute Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales

(14) Boobli George Verghese (India), journalist

(15) Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamatin (U.S.S.R.), member of the Supreme Soviet, ambassador, journalist (Mr. Zamatin was replaced by Sergei Losev during the study)

Some critics have expressed surprise at the lack of a representative from Great Britain. Given Britain's role in developing press traditions for the Western world, its lack of

representation signifies the shift of power to the LDCs and the U.K.'s minimal influence in UNESCO even in the 1970s.

The UNESCO Secretariat also played a major role. The Secretariat was dominated by Asher Deleon from Yugoslavia. He was formerly with the Faure Commission of Education. He supported the NIEO and saw a need for a counterbalance to the Western press. Overall, the Secretariat accumulated power during the two years. Deleon was a powerful, skillful bureaucrat, had access to M'Bow, and continually maneuvered MacBride as the commission progressed.

The MacBride Commission was established to investigate: (1) the current state of communications; (2) the problems surrounding a free and balanced flow of information and how the needs of the developing countries link with the flow; (3) how, in light of the new international economic order, a new world information and communication order may be created; and (4) how media may become vehicles for enhancing public opinion about world problems.

Prior to the publication of the *Interim Report,* the commission had met three times. These meetings are reflected in the report, which also compromises aspects of several background documents. The *Interim Report* is highlighted here because it caused considerable controversy at the time of its release and it was the major document on the NWICO at the time of UNESCO's General Assembly in 1978.

The *Interim Report* was divided into six sections: (1) progress report; (2) the major issue; (3) communication structures and actors; (4) socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and sociocultural effects on communication; (5) problems today; and (6) tomorrow's trends, prospects, and ambitions. Although the report was written in UNESCOese, the message was evident.

In terms of the uneven flow of news, the *Interim Report* stated "the present imbalance is keenly felt and denounced by some developing countries and by the movement of the nonaligned countries, there are also in all parts of the world those that feel and recognize the need to change and improve

the situation speedily and substantially" (1978: 5). The LDCs believe that what is reported about them is the sensational, the negative, or the catastrophic, without coverage of the gains in the educational, social, or humanitarian aspects of their societies.

The report also came down heavily upon the neocolonialism perpetuated in LDCs when they import foreign news or video (both television and feature films) which upset domestic efforts at reflecting native values and culture. This was detailed with global statistics on various media consumption habits. For example, the *Interim Report* pointed out that the LDCs, with two-thirds of the planet's population, have less than half the newspapers. Daily circulation was one-sixth that of the industrialized states. Similar comparisons were made for books, films, broadcasting outlets, and so on. Included in the overview was the role of advertising agencies as an integral part of the "media imperialism" of the West. Transnational corporations (TNCs), exporting hardware or software, also came in for a negative appraisal. Representative of the comments was "one major influence of TNC imported media is that exerted on tastes and values, styles and patterns which, being adopted or copied, are largely alien in most countries of the world" (1978: 75).

The *Interim Report* concluded with 10 pages of suggestions made with an invitation to continue the dialogue before the final report was completed. Four areas were covered in the final section: (1) strengthening and expansion of national capacities; (2) redressing the qualitative balance; (3) democratizing communication; and (4) moving toward a New World Information Order.

In conclusion, the major factors addressed were: first, the alteration of the one-way, top down, and vertical flow of the media to a more responsive and broadly based access and participation model; second, an upgrading of journalistic codes of ethics, standards of the profession, and treatment by governments; and third, the question of balance. The *Interim Report* did not equivocate here:

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· It reflects the demand for more radical and complex changes. Its significance is first and foremost political. The ideas and suggestions expressed correspond to a diffuse but deep-rooted and probably irreversible aspiration to transform the models and structures inherited from past situations of hegemony or situations founded on dependence, injustice, inequality and alienation [1978: 140].

In sum, the *Interim Report* legitimized the movement toward NWICO. Rhetorically, it leveled charges of considerable shortcomings at the Western press, particularly the major wire services. It flirted with government involvement both to correct the imbalance in the news flow and to reflect the cultural aspirations of the LDCs. It was at this point that the concept of the traditional role of the Western press (that is, objective, free of government control, market oriented, independent, and so on) came into direct conflict with the missionary zeal of the new information order (in other words, promote social change, reflect indigenous cultures, balanced coverage, governmental responsibility for content, and so on).

Not much within the *Interim Report* caused surprise given its origins and UNESCO's previous involvement. But two paragraphs under a category labeled "Governmental Authorities" highlight Western concerns about the role of government in media activities. The *Interim Report* stated:

There is a trend for a continuously increasing involvement of public authorities in all fields of communication. Three major reasons are generally evoked: (i) ideological and political, since increased governmental responsibilities in all fields of public life cannot circumvent communication or at least some aspects of it; (ii) economic and financial, since the increased costs of communication often require public investments (in many cases the dilemma is not between privately-owned or publicly-owned media but between publicly-owned or no media at all); (iii) moral, since the impact of information, culture, education, and entertainment on the nation as a whole calls for attention by responsible authorities.

Government responsibilities are mostly dispensed through:
(a) inclusion of communication into overall planning; (b) regu-
lation of conditions for media ownership and communication
activities; (c) control of communication channels; (d) direct
public ownership of media and other means; (e) straight
involvement in various communication activities by national,
regional and local public bodies; (f) limitation of imported
contents and messages (e.g., in Canada for some media; it is
interesting to note that in many developing countries there are
fewer controls on outside cultural influences than in some
developed ones) [1978: 71].

Given the thrust of NWICO toward a significantly greater
role for governments in affecting press activities, particularly
print and the wire services, the West's dislike of the entire idea
of the MacBride Commission grew substantially and quickly.
This was in August 1978. In September 1978, the original draft
of the UNESCO Draft Declaration on the Mass Media Article
XI stated that "it is the duty of States to facilitate the
application of the present Declaration, and to ensure that the
mass media coming directly under their jurisdiction act in
conformity therewith" (UNESCO, 1978: 3). Some states,
particularly Western ones, were shocked at the thought of
government (states) enforcing rules designed by UNESCO on
any media activities. MacBride's *Interim Report* generated
hostile reaction because of the threat of a more active role of
government in the news process. But such a view at least
guaranteed close attention to the balance of the commission's
work.

Background Papers

The MacBride Commission generated a great deal of
international activity. One hundred background papers were
prepared for its use. The information, suggestions, and insights
they provided powerfully enriched the debate over a new infor-
mation order. Their influence on the work and findings of the

commission enhances their significance for the study of international communication problems.

The limited space and purpose of this study do not allow for a comprehensive treatment of these documents. Only the three most widely known of the papers, *The New World Information Order* (1979) by Mustapha Masmoudi,[1] *Communication for an Interdependent, Pluralistic World* (1979) by Elie Abel, and an unattributed paper entitled *The World of News Agencies* (1979) will be discussed. Aside from the attention they have attracted, the first two papers have been selected because they pull together and compress into a general overview all the major themes and issues associated with the call for a NWICO, whereas most of the other papers deal with narrow and specific issues. Moreover, the two papers represent two very different perspectives: Masmoudi's paper expressed the position of the developing world and Abel's expressed a moderate U.S. or Western position.

The third paper was selected because it deals with a number of serious issues that have come to characterize the NWICO debate, that is, concentration of ownership of the international communication industry in the West, imbalances of news flows between the developed and developing countries, and cultural penetration and imperialism. These converge most conspicuously around the question of the large transnational news agencies. The third paper may also serve to clarify Masmoudi's and Abel's papers in that the news agency question arises quite prominently in them and their authors adopt sharply opposing views on the matter.

Masmoudi begins his paper by remarking that while a great many developing nations achieved political emancipation after World War II, colonialism still thrives in the form of disparities, built into the international power system, between developed and developing countries in the economic, information, and virtually all other sectors. Masmoudi divides the imbalances in the present information system into three spheres: the political, the legal, and technical-financial.

In the political sphere, Masmoudi observes that there is a "great disparity between the volume of news and information emanating from the developed world and intended for the developing countries and the volume of the flow in the opposite direction" (1979: 3). This disparity, according to Masmoudi, reflects the West's "de facto hegemony and will to dominate" with respect to international information that reflects and complements its domination in international economic, technological, and other sectors.

The main agents of this Western control of news flow are the transnational news agencies. Masmoudi claims these agencies conceive of information as a commodity. They are indifferent to the problems, concerns, and aspirations of the developing world and are only interested in that world insofar as it is a source of salable news and its people, consumers in a market they corner. Unfortunately, Masmoudi notes, the only news from the developing world that the agencies seem to cover concerns disasters, coups, crime, violence, and so on—a state of affairs that does little good for the image of LDCs abroad. Moreover, because these transnational agencies are inextricably involved in, and in fact nourished by, the established political, economic and ideological order in the West (see section on wire services), the choice of what information they will carry or neglect generally reflects and supports the interests of that order. And because of their monopoly over news flows, these agencies can and do intentionally impose upon the developing world such information and the pro-Western establishment values, priorities, and biases it conveys. Often, says Masmoudi, this information is not only of no interest to those in developing countries but also, because of the Western perspectives it presents, it is inappropriate and damaging.

Turning to the legal sphere, Masmoudi complains that in international law as regards communication, prominence has been given to the rights of the individual over the rights of the group or community. Moreover, he notes that the doctrine of freedom of information has come to mean "freedom of the

informing agent" (1979: 6). The doctrine has become an "instrument of domination in the hands of those who control the media" (1979: 6). The right of access to information has come to mean the right of those who have the resources to obtain information. He is also disappointed by the ineffectiveness of the rights of states to have inaccurate, false, or misleading information about them corrected and the lack of regulations and a code of ethics to govern the profession of journalism. The legal structures that have evolved to deal with copyright, distribution, and coordination of the radio frequency spectrum, and the uses of telecommunications and satellites have failed to promote equality between developed and developing countries in these areas, adds Masmoudi.

In the technical-financial sphere, Masmoudi says, "The developed countries' technological lead and the tariff system which they have instituted have enabled them to benefit from monopoly situations and prerogatives both in fixing the rates for transport of publications and telecommunications and in the use of communication and information technology" (1979: 8). He notes existing international telecommunications links and infrastructures, largely inherited from the trade and communication patterns of the colonial past, favor a greater volume of traffic among developed countries and from developed to developing countries than among developing countries and from developing countries to developed countries. The tariff structure, too, disadvantages the type of small information outputs common to the developing world. Also in the technical-financial sphere Masmoudi notes that 90% of the radio frequency spectrum is controlled by 10% of the world's population in the developed countries.

Masmoudi argues that a new order entailing "a thoroughgoing readjustment" of existing international information structures is necessary. This new world order would be characterized, he says, by a relationship of equality among all partners in the information system and a free and balanced flow of information as called for by UNESCO. Among the steps the developing world should take to initiate this new order are the

formulation of national communication policies as necessary to development and the motivation of citizens on behalf of such policies, the development of information centers and networks by LDCs and exchanges of news programs among them, training of professionals in the values of the new order, greater research efforts, exchanges of journalists among developing countries and between developing and developed countries, and the encouragement of viable and strong national news agencies in developing states.

He suggests developed countries should attempt to heighten public awareness concerning the problems with the present information system and flow. He calls for action by the developing world with respect to reforms of the international system, plus pay more attention both to a larger variety of news concerning LDCs and information supplied by developing world news agencies, and treat, in their coverage of LDCs, the aspirations, concerns, and problems of those countries objectively respecting their values and cultures.

His main recommendations to international organizations such as UNESCO are to increase and diversify aid to developing countries, promote development of the media in LDCs, contribute to training, research, and technical assistance efforts and help coordinate such efforts, and devise a clear-cut policy on the use of satellite transmission systems, respecting in all cases the sovereign rights of the individual states.

On the legal front, Masmoudi calls for greater emphasis on the right to objective, balanced, and accurate news, and on the right of those about whom inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete information has been reported to have it rectified. He stresses the need to recognize the responsibilities as well as the rights of those transmitting information. He calls for "regulation of the right to information by preventing abusive uses of the right of access to information; definition of appropriate criteria to govern truly objective news selection; regulation of the collection, processing and transmission of news and data across national frontiers" (1979: 16). Furthermore, he perceives a need to establish regulations and a code of ethics

concerning the conduct of journalists, although he does not expressly state what principles such a deontology would include. He also notes the need to "set up effective machinery to protect journalists against undue pressure or improper demands on the part of their employers" (1979: 17). Masmoudi also wants the laws and regulations, specifically the ITU's Radio Regulations governing the distribution of frequencies and uses of satellites, to be adjusted to guarantee more equitable access to the developing world.

This point recurs in Masmoudi's discussion of steps to be taken toward a new information order at a technical-financial level. In the technical-financial sphere, he notes that the present international telecommunications and tariff structure must be rethought in order to help enable the developing countries to function on a more equal footing and to foster the establishment of nodes or centers of communication in developing countries, setting up direct links among them where possible. He advocates more favorable terms with respect to tariffs and air freight surtaxes that hamper the transport of publications to and from developing countries. Masmoudi is now considered the chief spokesperson for the NWICO and has M'Bow's support.

In his paper, which is in large part an answer to Masmoudi's, Elie Abel (1979) agrees that there are gross imbalances in the present information system. But he denies Masmoudi's contention that these imbalances are somehow purposefully perpetuated by the Western media in order to monopolize world information flows. Rather, he says, these imbalances stem from historical processes that left the world with an uneven spread of development. He states, "Talk of conspiracies to 'dominate' information and culture flows can yield no practical outcome, save increased polarization" (1979: 6).

Abel (1979: 3) also denies Masmoudi's allegation that the major Western transnational news agencies, by virtue of their control over international news flow, have, for all intents and purposes, "direct access to the eyes and ears of readers and listeners in developing countries" and, furthermore, use such

access to intentionally impose unsuitable Western values and
perspectives upon LDCs. Abel writes:

> In fact, most developing countries do not allow their news-
> papers and broadcasting stations to subscribe directly to
> foreign agency services. The subscriber in most cases is the
> government, or government-controlled agency. In short, the
> picture of passive millions awash in a tidal wave of alien
> information is somewhat fanciful [1979: 3].

But most strenuously of all, Abel denies Masmoudi's
suggestion that the rights of free circulation of information and
ideas and of access to information have been exploited by the
Western media for purposes of dominating international
information flows and that, therefore, the solution to imbal-
ances in the present communication order lies in placing
restraints on such rights. Abel (1979: 6) says, "The remedy does
not lie . . . in measures to restrict and control the voices now
being heard . . . nor can the answer be found in the adoption of
a single standard for the control of communication systems
throughout the world." There is, he says, a rich variety of
communication systems among nations, systems that reflect
the widely diverse and distinctive experiences and cultural,
political, economic, and social structures of those nations.
Applying the same standard of controls to communication
systems as far apart as those of the United States and the Soviet
Union would be futile and dangerous. Understanding and
respect within the information environment and the interna-
tional arena in general cannot be achieved, Abel suggests, by
pressuring all systems to comply with a uniform, UNESCO-
approved pattern of regulations. Rather, he says, under-
standing and respect will only come with greater and freer
flows and exchanges of a richer variety of information and
ideas among nations.

Abel does concede that Masmoudi and some other advo-
cates of a more rigidly regulated information order have
offered some valid proposals for concrete action aimed at
redressing some of the imbalances in the present system,

actions that Abel feels could meet with near unanimous approval. For instance, Masmoudi's suggestions concerning the reduction of shipping costs and rates affecting publications are appealing, says Abel. Present telecommunications tariff structures should be reformed with INTELSAT, an international satellite telecommunications services consortium, acting as the main forum for such reforms. Moves toward greater access to satellite services for LDCs should also be spearheaded by INTELSAT. Upgraded financial, technical, and training assistance are yet other suggestions Abel applauded.

But although Abel foresees the possibility of common ground with respect to the abovementioned reforms and proposals, he also recognizes that there are information issues of such a highly sensitive political nature that no unanimity concerning them is ever likely to emerge. For instance, on the right of circulation and access issue, Abel says that many countries, such as his own, would never accept the demands of Masmoudi and others in LDCs for internationally applied standards of objectivity that could lead to restrictions on press coverage. Abel also describes the practice of government licensing of journalists, noting that governments are not competent to properly choose who should gather and report news and that this practice negates the independence of the press by "subjecting it to influence or control by persons whose motives may have nothing to do with the pursuit of disinterested reporting, or truth" (1979: 12).

As to Masmoudi's insistence on the rights of states to correct misleading or inaccurate information concerning themselves and his insinuation that the media should be compelled to make retractions or corrections when they are in error, Abel says that would be "unthinkable" in many countries, including the United States. Abel proposes that states pursue other avenues of redress to rectify distortions about them in the media, avenues such as libel actions, letters to the editor, submissions to the op ed pages, and press councils and ombudsmen whose function it is to consider complaints about press performance and, if a complaint is upheld, use moral suasion

or possibly legal pressure to get the offending institution to make amends.

Finally, Abel agrees with Masmoudi that codes of ethics be drawn up for journalists, but considers it pointless and undesirable to attempt to apply one code of ethics for journalists on an international basis. Each culture has its own distinct model of journalism to which its code of journalistic ethics must be attuned. It is useless and wrong, says Abel, to hold an American and a Soviet journalist to the same code and expect them to conceive of their professional functions, duties, and moral obligations in a uniform way when their models of journalism are so diametrically opposed. Besides a code of ethics to which journalists would have to adhere, Abel notes that Masmoudi also calls for rules to protect journalists, particularly from the improper demands of their employers. "It strikes me as remarkable and somehow revealing," says Abel, "that nowhere . . . is there mention of a code to protect journalists . . . from the dead hand of government control" (1979: 14).

Whereas the first two papers clearly reflect the positions of their authors, the third paper is a fairly neutral consideration of the spectrum of opinion regarding one of the most dominant issues connected with the call for a new information order, that is, the performance of the major transnational news agencies. The first part of the paper is an account of the news agency picture in the various regions of the world. The second part details problems encountered, especially in LDCs, in the establishment and operation of news agencies.

The third part of the paper deals with the role of the large transnational news agencies in the imbalances in information flow between developed and developing countries. The paper notes that spokesmen for the LDCs usually charge that the news agencies give the developing world little coverage and the coverage they do give tends to be sensationalistic with its alleged concentration on violence, dramatic social and political upheavals, and disasters. They also claim, according to the paper, that the information flowing into LDCs from the

Western news agencies lacks relevance for such countries and conveys Western stereotypes, values, and perspectives in a way that induces a colonial relationship between the West and the LDCs at least at a cultural level. The news agencies, the paper says, counter that they have to provide all their customers, including those in LDCs, impartial, comprehensive, and reliable news in order to please subscribers of widely different political, ideological, cultural, and economic orientations.

Much of the debate over the role of the news agencies and how well or badly they fill it, the paper observes, can be traced to conflicting perceptions of news value and content. In the West, the model of journalism that stresses the importance of timely, "comprehensive, accurate, and objective reporting on phenomena and events of interest mainly and preferably of an unusual and exceptional nature" (World of News Agencies, 1979: 18) is still widely held. But in the developing world there is a growing feeling that journalists should focus their attention on process, long-term trends, social structure, and the complex problems of development, which are often difficult to accommodate within Western news reporting formulae. According to this model, journalists should be social analysts and educators concerned with advancing rather than obstructing the causes of development and progress.

The problem with this model,[2] the paper points out, is that there is a perilously thin line between (1) education and social analysis and (2) propaganda. On the other hand, according to the paper, the problem with the Western model has to do with journalistic responsibility; there being a fine line between (1) freedom of information and expression and (2) disregard for the responsibilities of reporting fairly and accurately and respecting the values and traditions of foreign peoples.

MacBride International Commission

The International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems produced a final report, 484 pages in length.[3] It contains five major sections that cover a very wide range of

issues and statistics.[4] The major section is Part Five: Commu-
nication Tomorrow.

Part Five of the final report is divided into two major
sections: Section A, Conclusions and Recommendations, and
Section B, Issues Requiring Further Study. The first section is
further subdivided into five sections.

   I.   *Strengthening Independence and Self-Reliance*
  II.   *Social Consequences and New Tasks*
 III.   *Professional Integrity and Standards*
  IV.   *Democratization of Communication*
   V.   *Fostering International Cooperation*

The conclusions and recommendations section commences
with a summary of main conclusions drawn from earlier
research:

   (1) Our review of communication the world over reveals a variety
       of solutions adopted in different countries—in accordance
       with diverse traditions, patterns of social, economic and
       cultural life, needs and possibilities.
   (2) The review has also shown that the utmost importance should
       be given to eliminating imbalances and disparaties in commu-
       nication and its structures, and particularly in information
       flows.
   (3) Our conclusions are founded on the firm conviction that
       communication is a basic individual right, as well as a
       collective one required by all communities and nations.
   (4) For these purposes, it is essential to develop comprehensive
       national communication policies linked to overall social,
       cultural and economic development objectives.
   (5) The basic considerations which are developed at length in the
       body of our Report are intended to provide a framework for
       the development of a new information and communication
       order [International Commission for the Study of Communi-
       cation Problems, 1979: 440-441].

This section ends with this paragraph.

Thus our call for reflection and action is addressed broadly to governments and international organizations, to policy-makers and planners, to the media and professional organizations, to researchers, communication practitioners, to organized social groups and the public at large [1979: 441].

The following summarizes the five main sections within the conclusion of the final report.

I.   *Strengthening Independence and Self-Reliance:*

(a) *Communication Policies*

All individuals and people collectively have an inalienable right to a better life which, however conceived, must ensure a social minimum, nationally and globally. This calls for the strengthening of capabilities and the elimination of gross inequalities; such defects may threaten social harmony and even international peace. There must be a measured movement from disadvantages and dependence to self-reliance and the creation of more equal opportunities. Since communication is interwoven with every aspect of life, it is clearly of the utmost importance that the existing communication gap be rapidly narrowed and eventually eliminated [1979: 442].

(b) *Strengthening Capabilities*

Communication policies should offer a guide to the determination of information and media priorities and to the selection of appropriate technologies. This is required to plan the installation and development and adequate infrastructures to provide self-reliant communications capacity [1979: 443].

(c) *Basic Needs*

All nations have to make choices in investment priority. In choosing between possible alternatives and often conflicting interest, developing countries, in particular, must give priority to satisfying their people's essential needs. Communication is not only a system of public information but also an important part of education and development [1979: 445].

(d) *Particular Challenges*

We have focused on national efforts which must be made to lead to greater independence and self-reliance. But there are three major challenges to this goal that require concerted international action. Simply, these are paper, tariff structures and the electro-magnetic spectrum [1979: 446].

II.   *Social Consequences and New Tasks:*

(a) *Integrating Communication into Development*

Development strategies should incorporate communication policies as an integral part of the diagnosis of needs and in the design and implementation of selected priorities. In this respect communication should be considered a major development resource, a vehicle to ensure real political participation in decision-making, a central information base for defining policy options, and an instrument for creating awareness of national priorities [1979: 448].

(b) *Facing the Technological Challenge*

The technological explosion in communication has both great potential and great danger. The outcome depends on crucial decisions and on where and by whom they are taken. Thus, it is a priority to organize the decision-making process in a participatory manner as the basis of a full awareness of the social impact of different alternatives [1979: 449].

(c) *Strengthening Cultural Identity*

Promoting conditions for the preservation of the cultural identity of every society is necessary to enable it to enjoy a harmonious and creative inter-relationship with other cultures. It is equally necessary to modify situations in many developed and developing countries which suffer from cultural dominance [1979: 450].

(d) *Reducing the Commercialization of Communication*

The social effects of the commercialization of the mass media are a major concern in policy formulation and decision-making by private and public bodies [1979: 451].

(e) *Access to Technical Information*

The flow of technical information within nations and across national boundaries is a major resource for development. Access to such information, which countries need for technical decision-making at all levels, is as crucial as access to news sources. This type of information is generally not easily available and is most often concentrated in large techno-structures. Developed countries are not providing adequate information of this type to developing countries [1979: 452].

III. *Professional Integrity and Standards:*

(a) *Responsibility of Journalists*

For the journalist, freedom and responsibility are indivisible. Freedom without responsibility invites distortion and other abuses. But in the absence of freedom there can be no exercise of responsibility. The concept of freedom with responsibility necessarily includes a concern for professional ethics, demanding an equitable approach to events, situations or processes with the attention to their diverse aspects. This is not always the case today [1979: 454].

(b) *Towards Improved International Reporting*

The full and factual presentation of news about one country to others is a continuing problem. The reasons for this are manifold: principal among them are correspondents' working conditions, their skills and attitudes, varying conceptions of news and information values and government viewpoints. Remedies for the situation will require long-term, evolutionary actions towards improving the exchange of news around the world [1979: 456].

(c) *Protection of Journalists*

Daily reports from around the world attest to dangers that journalists are subject to in the exercise of their profession: harassment, threats, imprisonment, physical violence, assassination. Continual vigilance is required to focus the world's attention on such assaults to human rights [1979: 459].

IV.   *Democratization of Communication:*

    (a) *Human Rights*

Freedom of speech, of the press, of information and of assembly are vital for the realization of human rights. Extension of these communication freedoms to a broader individual and collective right to communicate is an evolving principle in the democratization process. Among the human rights to be emphasized are those of equality for women and between races. Defense of all human rights is one of the media's most vital tasks [1979: 460].

    (b) *Removal of Obstacles*

Communication, with its immense possibilities for influencing the minds and behaviour of people, can be a powerful means of promoting democratization of society and of widening public participation in the decision-making process. This depends on the structures and practices of the media and their management and to what extent they facilitate broader access and open the communication process to a free interchange of ideas, information and experience among equals, without dominance or discrimination [1979: 461].

    (c) *Diversity and Choice*

Diversity and choice in the content of communication are a precondition for democratic participation. Every individual and particular groups should be able to form judgments on the basis of a full range of information and a variety of messages and opinions and have the opportunity to share these ideas with others. The development of decentralized and diversified media should provide larger opportunities for a real direct involvement of the people in communication processes [1979: 463].

    (d) *Integration and Participation*

To be able to communicate in contemporary society, man must dispose of inappropriate communication tools. New technologies offer him many devices for individualized information and entertainment, but

often fail to provide appropriate tools for communication within his community or social or cultural group. Hence, alternative means of communication are often required [1979: 463].

V.   *Fostering International Co-operation:*

   (a) *Partners for Development*

   Inequalities in communication facilities, which exist everywhere, are due to economic discrepancies or to political and economic design, still others to cultural imposition or neglect. But whatever the source or reasons for them, gross inequalities should no longer be countenanced. They very notion of a new world information order and communication order presupposes fostering international co-operation, which includes two main areas: international assistance and contribution towards international understanding. The international dimensions of communication are today of such importance that it has become crucial to develop co-operation on a world-wide scale. It is for the international community to take the appropriate steps to replace dependence, dominance, and inequality by more fruitful and more open relations of interdependence and complementarity, based on mutual interest and the equal dignity of nations and peoples. Such co-operation requires a major international commitment to redress the present situation. This clear commitment is a need not only for developing countries but also for the international community as a whole. The tensions and disruptions that will come from lack of action are far greater than the problems posed by necessary changes [1979: 464-465].

   (b) *Strengthening Collective Self-Reliance*

   Developing countries have a primary responsibility for undertaking necessary changes to overcome their dependence in the field of communications. The actions needed begin at the national level, but must be complemented by forceful and decisive agreements at the bilateral, sub-regional, regional, and inter-regional levels. Collective self-reliance is the cornerstone of a

new world information and communication order
[1979: 466].

(c) *International Mechanisms*

Co-operation for the development of communication
is a global concern and therefore of importance to
international organizations, where all Member States
can fully debate the issues involved and decide upon
multinational action. Governments should therefore
attentively review the structures and programmes of
international agencies in the communications field
and point to changes required to meet evolving needs
[1979: 467].

(d) *Towards International Understanding*

The strengthening of peace, international security and
co-operation and the lessening of international ten-
sions are the common concern of all nations. The
mass media can make a substantial contribution
towards achieving these goals. The special session of
the United Nations General Assembly on disarma-
ment called for increased efforts by the mass media to
mobilize public opinion in favour of disarmament
and of ending the arms race. This declaration together
with the UNESCO Declaration on fundamental prin-
ciples concerning the contribution of the mass media
to strengthening peace and international under-
standing, to the promotion of human rights and to
countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war
should be the foundation of a new communication
policy to foster international understanding. A new
world information and communication order requires
and must become the instrument of peaceful co-
operation between nations [1979: 470].

B.   *Issues Requiring Further Study*

We have suggested some actions which may help lead
towards a new world information and communication
order. Some of them are for immediate undertaking;
others will take more time to prepare and implement. The
important thing is to start moving towards a change in the
present situation.

However, there are other issues that require examination, but the International Commission lacked time or sufficient data or expertise to deal with them. The proposals listed below have not been approved by the Commission; several were not, in fact, even discussed. Members felt free, nevertheless, to submit individual or group proposals which, in their judgement, called for study in the future. While these suggestions have not been endorsed by the Commission, they may still indicate some preliminary ideas about issues to be pursued, if and when they arouse interest [1979: 472].

Within this final section, several research studies are encouraged. The following areas are discussed in relation to the need for additional studies: increased interdependence, improved coordination, international standards and instruments, collection and dissemination of news, protection of journalists, greater attention to neglected areas (for example, rural studies), and more extensive financial resources. Part Five also contained 13 footnotes that were essentially disagreements with the thrust of the major points.

World Press Freedom Committee

A major interest group in the West is the World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC).[5] It was formed in May 1976 "to unify the free world media for major threats that develop" (*Media Crisis,* 1980: 107). It consists of a broad range of journalistic organizations, including the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA), AP, UPI, and the International Federation of Journalists. Both print and broadcast associations are represented.

George Beebe, executive director of the WPFC, highlights their response to the Final Report of MacBride Commission. The positive aspects of the study include:

- Censorship in all forms is condemned.
- The right of access applies to private as well as public sources of information.

- Journalists should have no special protection; they will be protected when the rights of all citizens are guaranteed.
- Licensing of journalists is requested because it would require stipulation by some authority as to who is eligible and on what basis.
- Employment of journalists by intelligence agencies of any country is condemned.

The negative aspects of the study include:

- A proposed International Centre for Study and Planning of Information and Communications to be established within UNESCO. This appears the most troublesome of proposals to the Western world, for the center not only would monitor and establish standards for the global media, but would serve as a training centre as well.
- A consistent advocacy of pressuring if not requiring news media (including "transnationals," or the international news agencies) to promote government-set "social, cultural, economic and political goals."
- A bias against private ownership of news media and communication facilities.
- A bias against "problems created in a society by advertising."
- A suggestion that transnationals might be "taxed for the benefit of developing countries."
- Unqualified criticism of concentration of media ownership without acknowledging this sometimes is inevitable and/or desirable in a free, private enterprise society [Media Crisis, 1980: viii-ix].

Another group seeking less government control is the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ, which has one basic principle—the promotion of a new world order of information is first and foremost the business of journalists and their trade unions and not of states, governments, or any pressure group of whatever kind (Media Crisis, 1980: 61).

At its 15th World Congress held in Athens, May 1980, the IFJ endorsed a series of wide ranging proposals. They were:

- Find the means for the organization of a seminar for anglophone African journalists, francophone African journalists and a third for journalists of the Mediterranean countries in Africa.
- Rouse initiatives in favor of training professional journalists from developing countries, both on the local and the international levels.
- Contribute to the creation of journalists' trade unions where they do not exist and to the functioning of existing ones.
- Undertake steps through affiliated organizations to promote the importance of news from developing countries.
- Endeavor to promote a more substantial participation of journalists from developing countries in world information networks.
- Examine with the International Telecommunications Agency the introduction of reduced or preferential charges for the press, both for transmissions to and from developing countries, and among developing countries themselves.
- Develop cooperation with the Federation of Arab Journalists, the Federation of African Journalists, and with other journalistic organizations in Latin America, and encourage all initiatives likely to bring about a more efficient solidarity and mutual understanding on problems in developing countries.
- Give publicity to journalists suffering from persecution, exile and banishing.
- Ensure the IFJ's representation at international and regional conferences to debate professional problems facing journalists and relating more particularly to the new world order of information.
- In the same spirit, demand that national delegations to conferences of UNESCO and of any other body debating press problems include professional journalists, representing journalists' unions, whether they be members of the IFJ or not, and not only civil servants, media owners and directors.
- Undertake steps with mass media in all countries to ensure that they should adhere to basic principles of equal opportunity and pay for their local correspondents in developing countries and end financial discrimination [*Media Crisis,* 1980: 63-64].

Both the WPFC and the IFJ, as major professional organizations for journalists and publishers, are monitoring the

activities of the MacBride Commission and its successor, the
International Program for Development of Communication
(IPDC).

MacBride's Successor—The IPDC

During the contentious 20th General Assembly of UNESCO,
U.S. Ambassador Reinhardt made a suggestion to convene a
conference to look at communication aid. M'Bow gladly
endorsed the idea and a preparatory meeting was held in
Washington, D.C., November 6-9, 1979. The purpose of this
meeting was to prepare the agenda and background material
for the major intergovernmental conference to be held at
UNESCO in Paris during April 1980. The April meeting is a
significant event in the movement toward NWICO.

The November meeting was labeled Preparatory Meeting of
Experts for the Intergovernmental Planning Conference to
Develop Institutional Arrangements for Systematic, Collabo-
rative Consultation on Communication Development Activ-
ities, Needs and Plans. At this meeting the ground work for the
IPDC was established. Moreover, sides were quickly drawn.
The chairman was Roland Homet (United States), chief of
International Communications Policy Staff of the U.S. Inter-
national Communication Agency, and the Vice-Chairman was
Mustapha Masmoudi (Tunisia), then permanent delegate to
UNESCO and a leading spokesman for the aims of NWICO.

A draft working paper was presented consisting of three
main sections. The first section dealt with the area of commu-
nication and development, technology transfer, and self-
reliance; the second section reviewed problems related to
technical and international cooperation; and the third section
discussed the potential mechanisms for implementing cooper-
ation. The document contained critical references to "tied" aid
and how research and projects in the Third World were
dominated by the economic interests of the West.

Debate about the draft paper shifted quickly to a debate
about two differing proposals for action. The one, by Homet,

dealt with a proposal for an International Communications Development Consultative Group and the other, by Masmoudi, dealing with multilateral projects for mass communication development. In addition there was considerable debate about the overall role of UNESCO in any new program dealing with future international communication research and development.

Most delegates sided with Masmoudi and granted UNESCO a central role in any new initiatives. The meeting also endorsed the view of looking at communication in a broader perspective, involving both mass media and telecommunications. The UNESCO Secretariat was assigned the task of developing a document for the April meeting in Paris, called the UNESCO Intergovernmental Conference For Co-operation on Activities, Needs and Programs For Communication Development. This intergovernmental conference was the result of the preliminary meeting held during November in Washington, D.C., under the auspices of the United States Delegation for UNESCO; both were convened in accordance with Resolution 4/9.4/9 of the 20th UNESCO General Assembly.

Before discussing the recommendations of the intergovernmental group, it is important to realize that the mechanisms for operationalizing the actions of the group followed differing lines:

(1) The United States initially wanted an independent body outside of UNESCO but shifted during the week to accept a UNESCO group.
(2) The LDCs were concerned with the amount and the ties and conditions of pledging from the Western donor nations.
(3) Issues of professionalism in terms of who would work on the council were raised.
(4) Interaction with other agencies, for example, the ITU, and associations with various intergovernmental councils that deal with communications were also discussed.

Much of the discussion surrounding the April meetings dealt with funding problems, and whether the council would be in or

out of a United Nations Secretariat. The common denominator or unifying force was basically beating the original U.S. stand, that is, keeping it outside the U.N.-UNESCO structure. Once again, this represents both a misanalysis by the United States in terms of not realizing the extent to which its particular stand was out of touch with the thrust and desires of the LDCs and, second, it provides another demonstration of the determination and antagonism toward the Western donor nations. Concern about tied-funding and foreign aid designed to meet objectives of the West rather than foreign aid designed to meet the objectives and priorities of LDCs was a consistent theme.

Indicative of the LDCs' stand is the preamble to the recommendations of the intergovernmental conference meeting. The preamble states:

> *Recalling* that the existing disparity in communication among different countries will not be eliminated by the mere material development of infrastructures and professional resources and by the transfer of know-how and technologies, but the solution depends also on the elimination of all political, ideological, psychological, economic and technical obstacles, which run counter to the development of independent national communication systems and to a freer, wider and more balanced circulation of information [UNESCO, 1980: 4].

The recommendations to member states of UNESCO then proceeded to touch on traditional topics such as promotion of national and regional communication, development policies, research to identify priorities, including telecommunications and informatics, plus the main objective of establishing an international program for development of communication. It is with the main objective that 14 subobjectives were included in dealing with aiding LDCs in their attempts to gain control over their communication and information environment.

The International Program for the Development of Communication, now known as the IPDC, was to be coordinated by a main intergovernmental council composed of representatives from 35 member states elected by the General

Conference of UNESCO on the basis of seeking a fair geographical distribution. This would ensure LDCs a substantial share of the council seats. Such a council would elevate both their influence within the United Nations system and perhaps remove a very contentious problem from UNESCO's day-to-day activities. The hostility toward the NWICO and particularly government control of the press would be set aside in the council for the 1980s. The recommendation concluded with the following:

> *Expresses* the conviction that the gradual implementation of these recommendations constitutes an essential stage on the way to the establishment of a new, more just and more effective world information and communication order [UNESCO, 1980: 8].

Masmoudi (1980: 8), addressing the International Institute of Communications conference in September 1980, stated:

> The objectives of this UNESCO agency would be to mobilize resources in order to assist developing countries; to advise developing countries on how to gain access to modern technology in the field of information and communication; and to provide the links with regional bodies whose gradual creation should be planned in order to complement and facilitate the performance of the central agency.

> This agency, whose creation was unanimously recommended by the Conference participants, could be a providential instrument that would contribute greatly to shaping a new world information order by enabling countries to obtain the technical assistance and funds they need to meet their unlimited needs.

But even more controversial were the potential revenues for the new agency. Speaking for the NWICO, Masmoudi continued:

> Some members felt it was necessary to find new resources to benefit developing countries—for example, excess profits from

the exploitation of raw materials; an international levy on the use of the electro-magnetic spectrum and of the geo-stationary satellite; or an international deduction on the profits of the multinationals [1980: 8].

It is interesting to note that these new revenue sources were also examined from time to time by the MacBride Commission.

MEETINGS OF THE IPDC

Following its establishment in 1980, the First Session of the Intergovernmental Council of the International Programme for the Development of Communication was held in Paris in June 1981. The council elected Dr. Gunnar Garbo of Norway as its first and only chair to date. The session was exploratory in nature and aimed at evolving a basic philosophy that would guide the activities of the Council. It established broad program objectives that stressed the operational nature of the program.

The second session was held in Acapulco during January 1982. The essential task of this meeting was to operationalize the objectives established in Paris in 1981. Of the 54 projects proposed only 24 regional and 3 interregional programs were approved; of those only 14 received direct funding and many received far less than had been requested. The major projects undertaken were the establishment of a 50-nation Pan-African News Agency, and an Asia-Pacific News Network. Because the United States feared that both of these projects would restrict the free flow of information, it refused to contribute directly to the IPDC fund. However, it did agree to finance specific projects where this was not a factor. Moreover, the American private sector also was expected to make an important contribution. This decision did not please many of the members of the Council. India's representative, Majarah Krishna Rasgotra, asked:

How can we explain the continuing indifference and reluctance of some countries to contribute their share to a program that they helped bring into existence? [*New York Times,* 1982: 3:1].

Although the United States had worked to create the IPDC in an effort to channel the debate over NWICO away from efforts at press control towards projects involving the training of journalists and the provision of equipment, it announced its unwillingness to finance a program controlled by the governments of the Third World. Leonard Sussman (1981-1982: 214) explained how American concerns over the IPDC arose.

> Though the nonideological nature of the IPDC was specifically agreed between the U.S. negotiators and a UNESCO attorney before the structure of the IPDC was cast in statutes, significant changes have since been made in the IPDC formula. Some projects would affect content rather than provide solely infrastructure. The director of the program will not be as independent of the director-general of UNESCO as has been promised. And decisions in the intergovernmental council may be by majority vote instead of consensus as had been agreed. To be sure, the funding of the IPDC will be on a voluntary basis. Unless the contribution system is made more flexible, enabling the donor to choose one or more projects from a list of possible proposals, some major donors—nongovernmental agencies as well as governments—may be reluctant to assist.

The third session, held in Paris in December 1982, examined the implementation of projects initiated in Acapulco. Despite the acknowledged shortage of funds, 22 new projects were approved. Much of the meeting was taken up by discussions of the means to increase the funding for the IPDC. It was recognized "that the expectations of substantial contributions from the industrialized nations to the Special Account of IPDC have not materialized" (Intergovernmental Council, 1983: 8) and all member states of UNESCO were encouraged to renew their efforts in order to generate additional revenue for the program so that "the IPDC could become a vehicle for transformation of the communications capacities of the developing world" (Intergovernmental Council, 1983: 8).

According to William Harley, communications consultant for the U.S. State Department, the fourth session of the Intergovernmental Council of the IPDC held in Tashkent,

USSR, September 1983, began under a cloud. The Korean airliner tragedy occurred on the eve of the meeting and strained U.S.-Soviet relations throughout. Moreover,

> The opening ceremonies were highly politicized; the Soviets exploited their role as host by arranging to make the entire Council, under the guise of welcoming remarks, listen to an hour of Soviet propaganda, lauding Soviet peace efforts, castigating the U.S. for its failure to negotiate arms control, and blaming the multinational corporations for dominating inter-national communications at Third World expense [1983: 1].

Despite the hostility evident throughout the session,[6] the free-press delegates did gain approval for the projects to which they were most committed and postponement of those that made them uneasy. Twenty-eight projects were endorsed. They ranged from proposals to establish training centers for jour-nalists and broadcasters to assisting national news agencies and audio-visual centers. Moreover, despite Soviet threats to veto the project, the United States was successful in gaining IPDC endorsement for the first private enterprise project: support for an independent newspaper, *The Examiner of Botswana.*

In commenting on the fifth governmental Council Session of the IPDC, Paris, May 1984, William Harley (1984:1) con-cluded, "This Fifth Session was more productive than the four previous ones." Eighty-two projects were considered requiring an expenditure of $10 million (U.S.) but only 42 were recommended for the $2 million (U.S.) available funding. In addition, the Council adopted a series of procedures for proposal preparation, screening, documentation, and evalu-ation for both new and ongoing projects.

According to Harley (1984:1-2):

> This marked inclination to be responsive to the U.S./ Western suggestions for procedural changes is a reflection of the new awareness of the stark reality that confronts IPDC: $10 million

in project requests this time and under $2 million with which to meet them.

The IPDC responsiveness to need for improvement was also due to the impact of the U.S. announced withdrawal from UNESCO and the concomitant efforts underway by the Information Group of Western ambassadors to UNESCO to document needed changes in UNESCO, of which IPDC is a part.

At this meeting 3 trends were noticed. The number of requests submitted to the IPDC Council for consideration were increasing rapidly, as were the number of projects being submitted by other U.N. organizations. Moreover, a move away from supporting news agencies towards funding training programs was evident.

The funding decisions show a trend toward more radio broadcasting, satellite development, and audio-visual educational projects. Three-quarters of the projects have an educational component.

Although a critic of IPDC operations in the past, the U.S. was "generally satisfied" with the results of these sessions [*Presstime*, 1984: 3].

The United States did not participate in the sixth session of the Intergovernmental Council of the IPDC held in Paris in March 1985 because it had withdrawn from UNESCO. During the meetings 39 projects were approved, ranging from telecommunications infrastructures to the training of journalists. The Pan-African News Agency, the Latin American Special Information Services, and the Asia-Pacific News Exchange Network continued to receive funding. In addition, training institutes in Tunisia and India were among the new projects approved. However, the major problem continued to be the lack of adequate funding for the projects the IPDC wished to undertake. In its reports to the 23rd General Assembly of UNESCO, the Council concluded on a familiar note.

While the achievements of the IPDC have been thus recognized
this report must emphasize that the resources placed at the
disposal of the IPDC are far from adequate in the context of the
demands upon it. A renewed appeal is therefore made to the
international community to give substance to its pledge to
make the IPDC a means of transforming the communication
capacities of the developing world [Intergovernmental Council,
1985: 10].

In his oral report to the 23rd General Assembly, Dr. Gunnar
Garbo, Chairman of the Council, recognized the shortcomings
of the IPDC after its four years of operation. He enumerated
four: the need to improve and firmly establish evaluation
procedures; the need to promote equal participation of women
in the information order; the preference of some member states
for offering aid in kind or funds-in-trust as opposed to
contributing to the Special Account, which limits the ability of
the Council to carry out its approved projects; and the lack of a
satisfactory basis for performing its functions of coordination
and information in the field of communication development.
However, he argued, the IPDC had built a record worthy of
attention.

- It has shown that multilateral initiatives can succeed.
- All contributions to the Special Account are allocated in full to
  communication projects. No funds are dispersed to cover
  overhead.
- The program is governed by elected representatives of member
  states.
- The Council operates in a practical way and has not developed
  into a body for political confrontation.
- The IPDC is not a centralized agency but rather contracts out
  project execution to media institutions and organizations in
  recipient countries [Garbo, 1985: 7-9].

The seventh session of the Intergovernmental Council of the
IPDC was held in Paris in January 1986. Discussion revolved
around the U.K. withdrawal, the list of new projects for

consideration and the large number of journalism scholarships and bursaries now awarded by the IPDC.

IPDC: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

To date, the IPDC has not played a major role in funding LDCs' communication projects because the money pledged to the program has consistently fallen short of what has been required. Initially the IPDC like its parent body, UNESCO, was seen as another forum for continuing the ideological debate on the NWICO. At the first session a resolution to censure Israel was put forward and the second session debated a clause advanced by Yugoslavia that would have made "social participation" of the media a criterion for IPDC grant approval. Western nations, which support the free press philosophy, were not willing to fund ideologically distasteful projects and entered instead into bilateral arrangements with individual countries that proposed projects consistent with that philosophy.

However, by the third session many of these problems seem to have been resolved. The bitter ideological wrangles were absent and the IPDC has since attempted to concentrate on pragmatic solutions to the problems of underdevelopment. But the budget problem continues to plague the organization. The United States has not contributed funds to match its initial promises and without American support it is unlikely that the IPDC's financial problems will soon be overcome.

The role of the IPDC by the time of the Sofia General Assembly had increased significantly. It received considerable praise and attention. So much attention that, at times, the UNESCO Secretariat appeared uncomfortable because the blame for communication problems was laid on its doorstep while the praise for projects designed to overcome these problems was directed singularly towards the IPDC. In addition, a resolution submitted by The Netherlands during discussions on the IPDC directly linked three major actors in the communication field.

Having seen the report of the Independent Commission for World-wide Telecommunications Development (Maitland Commission, ITU), . . .

Considering that telecommunications infrastructures are an essential element of communications generally, and can greatly contribute to social, economic and cultural progress; . . . *stresses* the importance of close cooperation and coordination between ITU and UNESCO, in particular IPDC, and of a clear delimitation of responsibilities, regarding the establishment of telecommunications infrastructures and training programs for developing countries [The Netherlands, D.R., 1985].

This illustrates that telecommunications development is now moving in different fora and with different interests. However, the three groups, that is, IPDC, UNESCO, and ITU, are all competing for the limited financial resources available to continue activities that promote infrastructure development and applied training programs and education. In light of the Maitland Commission's report, many activities now undertaken by the IPDC could be shifted to the new program, the Centre for Telecommunications Development, under the auspices of the ITU, and thereby relieve the IPDC of some of the financial strain it currently suffers.

Notes

1. There is no one universally accepted definition of the NWICO; but one of the leading spokespersons for the order is M. Masmoudi. At the International Institute for Communication's 1980 Conference he stated a very broad definition:

On the basis of the many studies that have tried to define this new order, particularly the Commission's report, what appears to be involved is the establishment of a new, open-ended conceptual framework leading to a freer more efficient, more equitable, better balanced international communication system, one founded on democratic principles and favoring equality in the relations between sovereign states.

Moreover, it is important to put an end to disparities and inequalities between developed and developing countries in the area of communication. The new order would also be the ideal framework for promoting freedom of information and communication as an individual and collective right that must be

guaranteed at all levels. There are no grounds for thinking that this would limit freedom of information or hamper the dissemination of information.

It would, above all, allow individuals, communities and nations to make known their aspirations, their concerns and their problems in struggling to shape a better future. This new order would help the cause of liberty and justice, just as it would help to prevent rabble-rousing, end racism, do away with intellectual and ideological hegemony and maintain peace in the world.

The new order must preserve cultural identity and the values of each culture, while promoting knowledge of other cultures and balanced exchanges in the sphere of culture.

To this end, two objectives must be aimed at—the cultural development of peoples and the mutual respect and appreciation of culture in the broadest sense (language, history, cultural heritage, oral traditions, etc.)—since we know that intellectual and cultural dependence has as negative an effect as economic dependence [Masmoudi, 1980: 2-3].

2. Other aspects of examining and reforming the Big Four (Western) news agencies are discussed by Oliver Boyd-Barrett (1980). John Merrill (1979) elaborates upon the divergent ethical views underlying the free flow mystique.

3. It is important to realize that the perception of the MacBride Commission held by the few Westerners aware of it is negative. It has been reported by the daily press, that is, by the very wire services—AP, UPI, and others—that are harshly attacked by LDC critics, as having a distinct bias.

Also there has been very little, if any, coverage of the MacBride Commission by the electronic media. As a result it is fair to say that the MacBride Commission has received bad press in the West. This is a result of earlier initiatives and speculation that some type of government control of the media, which is abhorred, particularly by the printed press, would be forthcoming. The final report shows that this is not the case. In general both the quantity and quality of coverage about both UNESCO and MacBride, particularly in the United States, has been poor. For example, Elie Abel, commenting on the coverage of the Belgrade General Assembly, states, "The press has not covered itself with glory on this one. The coverage was poor" (*Broadcasting,* 1980: 28).

4. An indication of the enlarging split between MacBride and Deleon was evidenced by the prior circulation for comment of two drafts of the Final Report. One was drafted by the UNESCO Secretariat and the other by MacBride. The bulk of the official Final Report bears Deleon's stamp.

5. Another significant investigation of the NWICO, completed before the Final Report of MacBride, was a task force of international experts. A series of basic principles and practical proposals was put forward by the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the International Flow of News (1978).

6. During the opening plenary the head of the U.S. delegation, Ambassador Diana Lady Dougan, expressed grave concern over the shooting down of the Korean airliner with the loss of more than 250 lives. Others followed her lead. Moreover, the U.S. led the Western Group and Japan in a boycott of all Soviet-sponsored social events.

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POST-MacBRIDE AND ITU'S
MAITLAND COMMISSION

Voices of Freedom Conference: 1981

In Paris, in February 1981, UNESCO sponsored a meeting to discuss the establishment of a Commission for the Protection of Journalists. The Commission would function to issue identification cards to journalists, judge complaints of their alleged misconduct, and revoke the ID cards, if necessary. Originally, Western journalists were excluded from the meetings to which only Soviet bloc representatives and LDC delegates had been invited. Last minute pressure from Western groups gained them admittance to the conference where they vehemently opposed the plan.

> Western spokesmen remained firm in their opposition to any plan that would involve a greater degree of government interference in the activities of journalists. They declared opposition to the development of an international set of norms and regulations for the press. The Western representatives, however, received severe criticism for being too outspoken and unaccommodating of other views and needs during their defense of the liberal view of press freedom [Pabst and Picard, 1981].

Later, at the 1981 meeting of the Newspaper Guild, a resolution called "The UNESCO Proposals: Time to Stand Firm" was unanimously adopted. The resolution stated in part, "It is time to recognize the ceaseless cascade of proposals for a

'new information order' pouring forth from UNESCO for what they are: the choreography for a dance of death for freedom of the press" (Perlik, 1982: 91).

The UNESCO conference held in February, and the adoption of the MacBride Report in Belgrade in October 1980, both reinforced Western suspicions that UNESCO might promote programs restricting press freedoms. In response, the World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC) decided to sponsor a conference that would allow for the advocacy of the "free press" principles. That meeting was held in Talloires, France, on May 15-17, 1981 and was entitled "Voices of Freedom, A World Conference of Independent News Media." Sixty-three delegates from 21 countries, representing print and broadcast organizations including the four major Western wire services, came together to organize opposition to UNESCO's plans and to promote press freedom.

The essays in *The Media Crisis ... A Continuing Challenge*, a publication of the WPFC, underscore the fundamental differences between the Western and Third World positions on press freedom. Whereas many LDCs feel that governments should control the media in order to reach development objectives, those in the West feel a free press promotes development. As Dana Bullen (1982: 35) argues:

> The available evidence indicates that more, faster, and better development is much more likely where there is a free press than where the press is controlled by governments. . . . While there are exceptions, studies of 165 countries conducted by Freedom House that make possible such comparisons, show freedom, a free press, more successful economic development and a better life tend to run together.

He cites a number of specific examples to back up his claim and explains how a free press promotes development—it exposes problems so that they can be corrected. He concludes:

> According to annual Freedom House surveys, governments in two-thirds to three-fourths of the nations of the world have a

significant or dominant voice in determining what does or does not appear in the media.

And in about two-thirds to three-fourths of the nations of the world—a great many of them precisely the same countries—there is a serious lack of development.

One might well reflect on this coincidence [Bullen, 1982: 38].

Given the ideological commitment of the Western press delegates, the debate became very heated at times. UNESCO's Director-General, Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, was guest speaker at the conference. The confrontation that developed between the delegates and M'Bow was so explosive "that his interpreter was unable to keep up with the angry exchanges" (*Time,* 1981: 65). The delegates argued that the NWICO would transform the press into an agent of government. M'Bow denied that he wanted to muzzle the press but insisted that he was bound to proceed with the program that had been passed by the majority of delegates to UNESCO's last General Conference.

Some of the conferees wanted to pass a resolution urging governments to withdraw support for UNESCO if the agency continued to pursue the NWICO proposals. This motion was defeated by the majority of delegates, who agreed with *Los Angeles Times* editor Anthony Day, who argued that "the West does better to stay in for now and fight. It just has got to be tougher" (*Los Angeles Times*, 1981: 65).

The conference concluded with the passage of a declaration that spelled out the principles to which a free press subscribes. The "Declaration of Talloires" reaffirmed the delegates' commitment to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers." It also urged UNESCO to abandon attempts to regulate global information and to strive instead for practical solutions to the communication problems of the LDCs.

The delegates in asserting, "Press freedom is a basic human right. We pledge ourselves to concerted action to uphold this right" (WPFC, 1981: 3), affirmed their commitment to a number of principles designed to foster the freer flow and wider dissemination of information. They opposed any restraints on the movement of news and information, any attempts by governments to constrain or discourage the dissemination of embarrassing or damaging news, any form of censorship, any restrictions hampering access to sources, any attempts to develop an international journalist code of ethics, any restriction on any person's freedom to practice journalism, and any licensing of journalists by national or international bodies.

On the other hand, they supported the free flow of information and ideas, the universal human right to be informed, the free access to all sources of information, the financial independence of the media provided by advertising support, the existence of a variety of independent media, and the full protection of journalists under the law as it applies to all persons. Moreover, the Declaration recognized that the new technologies have facilitated the international flow of information but that many countries have not benefited from this progress. The delegates pledged to support efforts to correct this imbalance and to promote the global advancement of the journalistic profession. Finally, the prime objective of the delegates was emphasized, "Ours is a joint dedication to the freest, most accurate and impartial information that it is within our professional capability to produce and distribute" (WPFC, 1981: 3).

TALLOIRES II: 1983

Two years later, from September 30 to October 2, 1983, a second conference was held at Talloires just three weeks before the 22nd UNESCO General Assembly to be held in Paris. This time 39 other media groups joined with the WPFC to cosponsor the event. Ninety delegates from 25 countries attended, including representatives of 15 LDCs.

It was emphasized at the meeting that the Western press must not view the Third World as one bloc of nations. . . . at the recent UNESCO roundtable at Innsbruck representatives of the press from Malaysia and Oman spoke strongly in favor of press freedom. Cushrow Irani, editor in chief of *The Statesman* in Calcutta, India, stated that UNESCO is biased in favor of governments of the Third World and not the Third World itself—"there is a difference." Ken Gordon, managing director of the *Trinidad Express,* stated "if the press in developing nations can be made strong, its freedom will be assured" [*Editor & Publisher*, October 8, 1983: 8].

Walter Cronkite gave the keynote address and suggested that the West should do more "to help developing nations establish the technological base for modern communications networks" (*Editor & Publisher*, October 8, 1983: 12). He noted that journalists should be more sensitive in their coverage of the developing world but they must also stand firm on the principles of the free press.

Two major documents came out of the conference. The first was "The List of Talloires," a cross-indexed listing of more than 300 programs in 70 countries[1] designed to equip journalists in developing countries with more professional skills. The list demonstrated that much is being done by free press advocates to improve the current imbalances.

The second document, "The Talloires II Report," reemphasized the principles in the "Declaration of Talloires." It welcomed the initiatives being taken by the independent press to help the media in developing countries. After condemning many of the same practices it did in the original declaration,

The conference welcomed the statement in the resolution adopted by UNESCO's Extraordinary General Conference in December 1982 that "the mass media could make an important contribution in scrutinizing all actions which might lead to abuses of power." This was considered an important step forward by the international community in recognizing the positive contribution that the independent press can make to safeguarding individual liberties and strengthening a free society [*Editor & Publisher,* October 8, 1983: 13].

The Fourth Extraordinary Session of UNESCO: 1982

During the course of the 21st General Assembly, it was decided that the Fourth Extraordinary Session would be convened in Paris for the purpose of approving the Draft Second Medium-Term Plan for 1984-1989. The task of preparing the draft plan was assigned to Director-General M'Bow who was directed to follow the "planning by objectives" approach endorsed by a resolution of the 17th General Assembly. Briefly, the resolution requires that the problems facing the world be analyzed, that UNESCO's role in contributing to their solution be identified, and that UNESCO's working methods in fulfilling this role be described in terms of programs and budgets. Moreover, strategies should be future oriented and interdisciplinary in approach.

The Fourth Extraordinary Session met from November 23 to December 3, 1982, and the Draft Second Medium-Term Plan consisted of four elements.

(a) An analysis of global problems and the general thrust of UNESCO's planned action
(b) A description of the major programs of action
(c) A description of program support activity
(d) An indication of resource allocation

The draft plan contended that the world was beset by three major interrelated problems. The first is the rise of globalization. As the world becomes "smaller," its peoples face growing tensions due to the vulnerability created by increasing interdependence. This interdependence, however, is very disparate. The gaps between the "haves" and the "have-nots" are widening. Moreover, the threat of nuclear war, the present international economic system, and the exploitation of the environment create uncertainty and fear. Finally, as globalization progresses, a growing trend toward standardization occurs. In reaction, there has been a renewed claim to uniqueness. People feel an increased need to assert their cultural identity.

In response to these problems, UNESCO identified five areas of responsibility within its field of competence.

(a) Continuing study of world problems to create a greater awareness of the common destiny of individuals so as to encourage cooperation in solving them

(b) Establishing conditions that would allow the broadest participation of individuals and groups in the life of their societies and the world community

(c) Contributing to the capacity of all nations to tackle problems by improving their knowledge and know-how and encouraging greater equity among individuals and peoples in the assimilation of knowledge and its application

(d) Encouraging integrated development processes that encompass local cultural values and focus on the impact of such development upon the societies concerned

(e) Encouraging a renewal of values within the context of genuine understanding among peoples, thereby advancing the cause of peace and human rights

Within each sector identified above a number of major programs were enumerated and their role in the resolution of the problems was described. There was some discussion at the conference that indicated concern with UNESCO's plans.

Jean S. Gerard of the United States cautioned UNESCO against branching out into such fields as disarmament and maintenance of peace and security, which are the responsibility of the United Nations political bodies [*New York Times,* 1982a: 6].

Major Program III, Communication in the Service of Man, dealt with the continuing development of a new world information and communication order. Its aims included the elimination of inequalities in communication by encouraging a free and balanced flow of information. It proposed a number of activities to improve communication capacity in less developed countries. It also stressed that the freedom enjoyed by journalists and media personnel entailed a need for

responsible reporting, respectful of the rights and cultural identity of others.

This program was bitterly debated by the delegates in a private session. Comments were dichotomized along two lines. One group, including the Soviet bloc and most LDCs, argued that the program was not strong enough. They continued to object to the biased coverage by Western news agencies with a monopoly on gathering and distributing information.

> The core of the third world view was stated by Christopher A. Nascimento, former Information Minister of Guyana. "The power to inform," he said, "is one of the keys to power as such."
>
> "The communications industry, the development of 'transnational' news agencies, the evolution of electronic information systems, the billions expended on pioneering the advancement of space and computer technology, all serve as a means of political, commercial, social and cultural dominance of the world by the developed nations," Mr. Nascimento declared [*New York Times,* 1982b: 3].

His comments were echoed by others who linked the NWICO to the NIEO by alluding to the relationship between information and economic power. Others accused the West of hypocrisy in its demand for a free flow. T.S. Kaul, an Indian delegate, argued,

> "Nowhere in the world, west or east, north or south, is the flow of information absolutely free." In some countries, he said, it is influenced by "lobbies and special interests," in some by government, in others by both [*New York Times,* 1982b: 3].

The Western industrialized nations, however, were determined to preserve the position of the media. They recognized the imbalance in technological capabilities but feared that any attempt to redress the imbalance would lead to press restrictions. James Daniel Phillips, speaking on behalf of the United States, argued that "with all its real and alleged faults, a free

press is infinitely better than any alternative" (*New York Times,* 1982b: 3).

A compromise was worked out and two resolutions were passed. The first recognized that "the mass media could make an important contribution in scrutinizing all actions that might lead to abuses of power" and the second acknowledged that "the international community cannot ignore the problem of messages and what they say, which are potentially of the gravest significance for the future of development of all mankind" (*New York Times,* 1982c: 3). The program was adopted on December 3, 1982, the last day of debate.

Despite the last minute compromise, the United States announced its intention to withdraw from the organization should it continue to follow the present course of action with respect to NWICO. The American Congress threatened to cut off funding support for UNESCO if press freedoms were limited by any of the proposals of the organization. It also noted that it would not support undisciplined growth of UNESCO's budget nor any specific program that would undercut press freedom.

In addition to Major Program III, twelve other programs were introduced and debated. These other programs dominated the discussions at the Fourth Extraordinary Session, both in terms of the time spent on them and the proportion of the budget related to them. The debate on the issue of collective rights of peoples as distinct from individual human rights was also characterized by sharp exchanges. However, the vast majority of the media coverage of the event dealt with the NWICO debates to the exclusion of the other areas of concern. In addition, the general tone of the coverage was negative in that little attention was paid to other positive development issues.[2]

The Maitland Commission Report

At the 1982 meeting of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in Nairobi, "the fundamental importance

of communications infrastructures as an essential element in the economic and social development of all countries" (*Report,* 1985: 1) was officially recognized for the first time. In response the ITU decided to set up an Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development to recommend ways in which the expansion of telecommunications across the world could be stimulated. The Commission was established in May 1983 and met for the first time in Geneva in October of that year. Seventeen representatives from different regions of the world and representing a variety of disciplines were appointed to the Commission,[3] which was chaired by Sir Donald Maitland of the United Kingdom. After two years of study, the Commission, frequently referred to as the Maitland Commission, submitted its report to the ITU in January 1985.

The report addressed the stark contrast between the distribution of telecommunications systems in the industrialized and developing worlds. It looked, for example, at telephone penetration levels and made some startling comparisons.[4] Three-quarters of the world's population live in countries with fewer than 10 telephones per 100 population, and more than one-half of the globe has access to less than one telephone per 100. In the Western industrialized world, however, there exists more than one telephone per two people. In the United States the ratio is 78.74/ 100. The Commission concluded that this imbalance could no longer be tolerated.

> It cannot be right that in the latter part of the twentieth century a minority of the human race should enjoy the benefits of the new technology while a majority live in comparative isolation [*Report,* 1985: 31].

Moreover, the Commission highlighted the benefits to be gained by the entire world if the disparities were to be removed.

> Given the vital role telecommunications play not only in such obvious fields as emergency, health, and other social services, administration, and commerce, but also in stimulating economic growth and enhancing the quality of life, creating

effective networks world wide will bring immense benefits. An increase in international traffic will generate funds which could be devoted to the further improvement and development of telecommunications services. The increased flow of trade and information will contribute to better international relationships. The process of creating effective networks world wide will provide new markets for the high technology and other industries, some of which are already suffering the effects of surplus productive capacity. The interest industrialized and developing countries share in the world-wide development of telecommunications is as great as in the exploitation of new sources of energy. And yet it is far less appreciated [*Report*, 1985: 65].

The Commission argues that although telecommunications systems were once considered a luxury, they are now viewed as essential components of development. Indeed, one may argue that a telecommunications infrastructure is a prerequisite to any type of social or economic development in LDCs. For example, the benefits of telecommunications include increased economic, commercial, and administrative efficiency, improved social and emergency services, and more equitable distribution of the social, cultural, and economic benefits of development. In addition, "The absence of a system which enables timely information to be sent and received engenders a sense of isolation and frustration, and so raises a barrier between different sections of the population. This cannot but undermine the process of development" (*Report*, 1985: 7-8).

The Maitland Commission concluded that the best way to redress the imbalance and enhance the telecommunications ability of the developing world was through the expansion of telephone networks. Although acknowledging the value of broadcasting, the mass media, and private networks, the Commission believed that expanding the basic telephone system would bring the greatest good to the greatest number of people. In addition, once established, such a system could be upgraded to allow for the communication of data, facsimile, and a growing multitude of other services.

The report identifies and describes four key elements required to achieve the Commission's objective. To this end, it offered a series of practical recommendations designed to narrow the gap and which, if effected, will put "all mankind within easy reach of a telephone by the early part of the next century" (*Report,* 1985: 5). However, the Commission noted that the recommendations call for action at the highest political levels and require the cooperation and assistance of industrialized and developing nations, including financial backing.

The first requirement acknowledged the need for governments and assistance agencies to give higher priority to investment in telecommunications. In the past, many developing countries have emphasized agriculture, health, education, population control, roads, and so on in their development plans. Although this emphasis is understandable, the Commission believes that many countries have failed to consider the direct and indirect benefits of telecommunications development (*Report,* 1985: 19). Their recommendations regarding this point include

(a) developing countries review their development plans to ensure that sufficient priority is given to investment in telecommunications;

(b) developing countries make appropriate provision for telecommunications in all projects for economic or social advance and include in their submissions a checklist showing that such provision is being made;

(c) countries and international agencies with development assistance programmes ensure that specific provision is made for appropriate telecommunications facilities in development assistance projects;

(d) contributers to and beneficiaries of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reconsider the importance they attach to the telecommunications sector, and provide appropriate resources for its growth [*Report,* 1985: 66].

Secondly, the Commission noted the need for the existing networks in developing countries to become more effective and more self-reliant. The new technologies should be exploited to the full extent that they are appropriate for the countries' requirements. To this end, the Commission recommended that:

(a) telecommunications operators in developing countries review their training needs and resources, and prepare systematic training plans;

(b) developing countries use the resources available through the IPDC;

(c) industrialized countries organize seminars to improve the qualifications of experts from developing countries;

(d) the ITU supplement the catalogue of training opportunities with information about training opportunities in the private sector;

(e) operators and manufacturers consider how they can enhance the training opportunities they offer to developing countries;

(f) the major regional and sub-regional political and economic organizations consider as soon as possible how best research and development institutes might be established;

(g) the research and development institutes proposed be developed as a source of higher technological, supervisory and managerial training and as coordinating agencies for external training opportunities;

(h) developing countries consider pooling their purchases of appropriate equipment including terminals and components;

(i) when purchasing equipment, developing countries ensure that the contract includes commitments on the supply of spare parts, training, commissioning, post-installation and maintenance;

(j) manufacturers and operators be encouraged to develop systems which will enable the needs of the more remote areas of developing countries to be met at lower cost;

(k) the ITU, in conjunction with manufacturers of telecommunications equipment and components, consider com-

piling a comprehensive catalogue of telecommunications
suppliers and systems currently in use;
(l) developing countries review the possibilities for local or
regional manufacture;
(m) manufacturers in industrialized countries consider the
scope for cooperation with developing countries in local or
regional manufacture [*Report,* 1986: 66-67].

The Commission also recommended that the ITU establish a
major Centre for Telecommunications Development. This
center should have three components: a development policy
unit, a telecommunications development unit, and an opera-
tions support group. This step would provide immediate
assistance to developing countries in the expansion of their
telecommunications systems.

The third focus of the Commission concerned the financing
of telecommunications projects. Although this consistently
resurfaces as a major problem, the Commission emphasized
the profitability of such systems and their contributions to the
economic welfare of the developing nations. "An effective
telecommunications system which meets demand not only is
inherently profitable but also generates wealth" (*Report,* 1985:
57). However, to reduce the financial problems associated with
the large start up and expansion costs, including the scarcity of
foreign exchange in many countries, the Commission recom-
mended that:

(a) countries and international agencies with development
assistance programmes give higher priority to telecommu-
nications;
(b) those who provide international satellite systems study
urgently the feasibility of establishing funds to finance the
earth segment and terrestrial facilities in developing
countries;
(c) industrialized countries extend export/import financing
and insurance coverage to suppliers of telecommunications
equipment;
(d) the IBRD consider including telecommunications in its
proposal for multilateral guarantees against non-commer-
cial risks;

(e) where projects are financed in part by IBRD loans, finance agencies consider cross-default arrangements as a form of insurance;

(f) member states of the ITU consider setting aside a small proportion of revenues from calls between developing countries and industrialized countries to be devoted to telecommunications in developing countries, for example to fund pre-investmant costs [*Report,* 1985: 68].

In addition to the above six recommendations, three others were put forward. This group was more long term in view and included a restructuring of financial institutions and instruments in industrialized countries, the establishment by the ITU of a revolving fund and telecommunications trusts, and the creation of an organization by the ITU to coordinate the development of telecommunications worldwide (WORLDTEL).

The final set of recommendations involved the role of the ITU and how it might be strengthened. The Commission reasserted the need for a higher priority to be given to telecommunications development. It charged the Secretary-General of the ITU to monitor the implementation of the recommendations offered in the report, report on the progress made and stimulate further progress where necessary (*Report,* 1985: 68-69).

The report concluded,

> There is no single remedy. A range of actions over a wide front and at different levels is required. Progress will be made only in stages. But, if the effort is sustained, the situation world wide could be transformed in twenty years. All mankind could be brought within easy reach of a telephone by the early part of next century and our objective achieved [*Report,* 1985: 69].

On November 21, 1985, the first constitutional meeting of the Advisory Board of the Centre for Telecommunications Development met in Geneva. The Advisory Board consists of members from the public and private sectors.[5] At future meetings the Board is to establish working procedures for The Board of the Centre. The ability to attract the necessary

voluntary external funding will become a major preoccupation of the Board.

INITIAL OBSERVATIONS

The Maitland Commission did several things. First, it radically altered the traditional role of ITU from being a straight technical and engineering group to a more activist, prodevelopment organization. Second, it attempted to identify telecommunications infrastructures as a fundamental necessity for LDC development, much in the same line as food, energy, and housing. Third, it put the burden of making Maitland work on approximately 20 advanced nations that control the telecommunications research, manufacturing capability, and financial resources. Fourth, it requested the industrialized nations to be the donors for up to 140 other nations that to varying degrees would be recipients of the telecommunications technology transfer. Fifth, Maitland basically called for a New World Telecommunications Order (NWTO).

This major development report is not without controversy given that many of its recommendations are to be dealt with prior to the next major ITU Plenipotentiary Conference to be held at the end of this decade. A U.K. telecommunications expert, Jonathan Solomon (1985: 91), states with reference to Maitland that:

> it produces a cascade of recommendations at all levels— political, financial, institutional and operational. But perhaps a real masterstroke of the Commission was to set a timetable for the implementation of its array of recommendations starting with the most radical most immediately and ending with the most difficult before the next Plenipotentiary.

He continues to argue that the Maitland Commission is a "hot potato" because it ties the ITU to an activist, prodevelopment stance that essentially goes against the technical traditions of this Geneva-based organization. But, despite many who would prefer to return ITU to the good old days when it was dominated solely by engineers, the new era is

reflected in almost all meetings at the ITU. Although WARC '85 is covered elsewhere, its meetings also reflect the new ideological thrust of the ITU.

In the U.S. . . ., impressions left by the recently concluded first session Space WARC have grown no brighter with the passing of time. It is recalled as a session driven by politics and ideology. Conflicts that emerged in Geneva seemed at least as sharp six weeks later. What's more, there is no little confusion as to what was actually accomplished . . . [*Broadcasting*, November 4, 1985: 70].

Although Maitland represents a politicization of certain aspects of the ITU, the American representative on Maitland, William Ellinghaus, former President of AT&T, points to one of the highly technical aspects of the report.

The Telecommunications Development Service, . . . will provide developing countries with badly needed disinterested advice and guidance on creating and operating an effective telecommunications system. This advice will be offered at the pre-investment stage in areas such as organization and structure, planning, system maintenance, training and personnel policy, procurement policy, tariff policy, integration of telecommunications with general development policies, and the financing of investment. The Telecommunications Development Service will consist of a number of highly qualified international teams, each made up of specialists from the fields of telecommunications management, economics, technology and finance [Solomon, 1985: 91].

Given that nearly two-thirds of the world have either no telecommunications system or the most antiquated of services existing in only a few urban centers, one can see that the Telecommunications Development Service unit, which is to be part of the larger Centre for Telecommunications Development, is of vital importance. Yet the critical question remains: Where is the financial support for the Centre and its activities? The proposals that the operating funds come from indus-

trialized countries and from manufacturers and suppliers of telecommunications services and equipment have yet to be dealt with or implemented. Also some of the suggestions put forward by Third World nations such as a surtax on either the electromagnetic spectrum or on satellite parking spots have yet to be assessed. Ironically the suggestion has been made that the United States could readily provide funds made available by its withdrawal from UNESCO and that these equivalent funds should be redirected to the Centre for Telecommunications Development.

Once again in the field of international communication, the proposals stand little likelihood of success unless there is both cooperation and financial support from the United States. As the U.S. Maitland representative stated,

> There exists here in the United States all of the ingredients of what can be described as an extraordinary opportunity to change the trend of telecommunications development in the regions of the world where it is needed the most. We have ample proof that telecommunications can enhance, if not actually drive, economic and social development [*Broadcasting,* 1985: 70].

Yet as described elsewhere, the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO, its threats made to other areas of the ITU, as well as its withdrawal from the World Court and occasional threats to the United Nations certainly does not bode well for the United States taking the necessary leadership position and role or for using public funds for support of Maitland. Given that Maitland is going to be a critical component of the ITU's activities at the next major ITU conference, the situation does not look optimistic either for development communication or the ITU.

Notes

1. The list includes training, educational, exchange, intern, and fellowship programs available in developed and developing countries. It does not include programs in the Socialist bloc countries.

2. Following the adoption of the resolution on Major Program III, Director-General M'Bow declared that UNESCO could not remain indifferent to the media coverage of its activities and he proposed to undertake a study of the media coverage of the Fourth Extraordinary Session to determine to what degree it is accurate, and if necessary, to demonstrate to the public the existence of a "tendentious campaign against UNESCO." The author was requested to undertake a content analysis of the Canadian press coverage and the conclusions of that study can be found in McPhail (1983).

3. The members of the Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development were:

Professor Dr. Sukhamoy Chakravarty, India
Mr. William Ellinghaus, United States
Mr. Abdul Rahman K. Al-Ghunaim, Kuwait
Dr. Koji Kobayashi, Japan
Dr. Volkmar Koehler, Federal Republic of Germany
His Excellency Mr. Mohand Laenser, Morocco
Mr. Louis-Joseph Libois, France
Sir Donald Maitland, GCMB, OBE, United Kingdom
His Excellency Mr. John S. Malecela, MP, Tanzania
Dr. Manuel Perez Guerrero, Venezuela
His Excellency Mr. Jean Ping, Gabon
His Excellency Mr. Alioune Sene, Senegal
Professor Dr. Alexandru Spataru, Romania
His Excellency Mr. Achmad Tahir, Indonesia
Professor Dr. Leonid E. Varakin, USSR
His Excellency Mr. Armando Vargas Araya, Costa Rica
His Excellency Dr. Faisal Zaidan, Saudi Arabia

4. These comparisons were based upon the information from three sources: The World's Telephones (AT&T), 1982: The Yearbook of Common Carrier Telecommunication Statistics, 11th edition, 1984; and The World Development Report, 1984. The comparisions may be found on pages 13-15 of the Maitland Commission's report or in Appendix III, pages 103-105.

5. At the initial constitutional meeting of the Advisory Board, Mr. J. C. Delorme, from Canada, was elected Chairman and Mr. A. D. Ntagazwa, of Tanzania, was elected Vice-Chairman.

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THE MESSAGE CONTINUES:
The 22nd and 23rd
General Assemblies of UNESCO

The 22nd General Assembly: 1983

The 22nd General Assembly of UNESCO convened in Paris on October 25, 1983. One hundred sixty-one countries participated in the five week conference, which turned out to be a critical one in the history of the organization. Just a few weeks after the close of the General Assembly, U.S. State Department dissatisfaction with a number of UNESCO-related issues led to the announcement of the American intention to withdraw from UNESCO at the end of 1984 unless U.S. demands for substantial change were met.

The Draft Programme and Budget for 1984-1985 was prepared by the UNESCO Secretariat on the basis of the consensus reached by the delegates to the Fourth Extraordinary Session of UNESCO in 1982. A description of Major Programme III, Communication in the Service of Man, follows.

Programme III.1 *Studies on communication:*
(i)   to stimulate the development of research, especially concerning the socio-cultural impact of new communication technologies, the democratization of communication and the future of books and reading;

(ii)   to further elaborate the concepts of "the right to commu-
        nicate" and access to and participation in communi-
        cation, and to continue to study the idea of the respon-
        sibility of communicators;
(iii)   to continue the study of methods for planning, pro-
        gramming and financing of communication, with special
        reference to the communication industries.

Programme III.2 *Free flow and wider and better balanced
dissemination of information; increased exchanges of news and
programmes:*
(i)   to help eliminate the obstacles to the flow of and
        exchanges of books, news and programmes, to examine
        the situation of cultural paper in the world and to study
        ways and means of improving the working conditions and
        professional practices of communicators;
(ii)   to continue strengthening mechanisms for the exchange
        of news and programmes and for international co-
        operation between public and private bodies, and to
        stimulate international exchanges;
(iii)   to seek the media's assistance in improving international
        understanding and respect for human rights, furthering
        the elucidation of major world problems and the strength-
        ening of peace and contributing to the promotion of
        equality between men and women;

Programme III.3 *The development of communication:*
(i)   to continue activities relating to the formulation of
        communication policies and, in particular, to convene an
        intergovernmental conference on communication pol-
        icies in the Arab states (ARABCOM) during the biennium;
(ii)   to provide secretariat services for the intergovernmental
        Council of the International Programme for the Devel-
        opment of Communication (IPDC) and to implement the
        projects approved by that Council;
(iii)   to co-operate with Member States, at their request, in
        identifying their needs, making inventories of available
        resources and formulating policies for the development of
        communication; in establishing appropriate infrastruc-
        tures and facilities; in providing training for communi-
        cation personnel; in stimulating the production of endog-
        enous printed material, programmes and messages;

(iv)   to pay particular attention to the promotion of books and reading and to the development of the cinema, photography and the audio-visual media;

(v)   to study methods of educating communication users, and to disseminate the findings of such studies [UNESCO, 1983: 2].

The programme continued by encouraging the reduction of current international communication imbalances through the development of a plurality of information sources, and through cooperation and collaboration. It acknowledged that the activities listed above would "facilitate a detailed examination of a new information and communication order, with a view to promoting its establishment" (UNESCO, 1983: 3). The proposed budget for the three major programs listed above was almost $29 million, an increase of more than 33% over the 1982-1983 budget.

It had been hoped that the press freedom issue, which had divided UNESCO for over a decade, might be only a minor one at this assembly. However, on the first day of debate, two serious and contentious issues arose. The first was the more than 30% increase in the budget for communications, and the second was the Soviet Union's proposed draft resolution calling for curbs on press freedom as part of the NWICO.

The draft urges UNESCO to draw up a list of "mass media organs" whose reporting has violated guidelines that the organization laid down in a 1978 declaration and that most Western governments criticized as hostile to Western concepts of freedom of the press.

Underlining the "special responsibility" of the press for promoting "peace and the progress of peoples," the draft asks member countries to "ban the mass media for building up world tension and disseminating tendentious and slanderous messages that sow the seeds of alienation and enmity" [New York Times, 1983a: 11].

However, by the end of the General Assembly, Western delegates reported that the attacks on the freedom of the press appeared to be cooling (*New York Times,* 1983b: 17). Indeed, Dana Bullen of the WPFC said,

> If anyone is looking for an assault on the media at this conference serious enough to justify United States withdrawal, they won't find it [*New York Times,* 1983b: 17].

The Soviets had been forced to withdraw their draft resolution requiring UNESCO to blacklist media outlets that violated the 1978 reporting guidelines. Moreover, the delegates rejected many of the principles of the NWICO agreed upon at previous conferences in favor of resolution 3.1, which described NWICO as "an evolving and continuous process"[1] (*Inter Media,* 1984: 5). The IPDC was praised for its efforts but no new funds were allocated to the agency. Whereas some Third World delegates had demanded a panel to study an international code for journalists, a compromise program was worked out that consisted of a study to determine the impact of news organizations on international relations and on developing countries.

> Leonard R. Sussman, a United States delegate involved in the lengthy negotiations on the communication program, said that for the first time since 1974 "the giant bureaucracy and the member states were seen to move ever so slightly in our direction" [*New York Times,* 1983c: 6].

However, it appeared that not all reports of the events were compatible. An article in an issue of *Editor & Publisher* that appeared shortly after the assembly highlighted the confusion.

> A news report Nov. 16 says that Britain was successful with a resolution that weakens UNESCO's commitment to create a new world information order saying that UN body is merely "charged with exploring" the idea and no longer "striving to bring about this order" as previous resolutions stated.

And yet, a news release from the press section of the United Nations in New York City dated Nov. 10 contains a dispatch from Paris which follows: "A new communication order will be born whether we want it or not . . ." Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, Director-General of UNESCO, said here today after analyzing the debates on the draft program and budget of the organization for 1984 and 1985. He was addressing the 22nd session of UNESCO's General Conference [*Editor & Publisher,* 1983: 4].

The second major issue at the 22nd General Assembly was the size of the budget. The United States was the only one of the 161 nations to vote against the $374.4 million budget. On the final vote, 10 other countries abstained after asking for a budgetary freeze. The final budget adopted was about $12 million less than Director-General M'Bow had first proposed but the cuts did not go deep enough for the United States, which contributed about 25% of the total budget and had been seeking "zero-growth" in all international agencies. According to Edmund P. Hennelly, leader of the U.S. delegation,

The negative American vote was thus "in no way an attempt to undermine the effectiveness of UNESCO," . . . . He said the United States wanted to see the United Nations body become more "streamlined and cost-effective" in its work [*New York Times,* 1983b: 17].

Although the United States failed to achieve everything it wanted at the 22nd General Assembly, it certainly was more successful than it had been in the past decade. It had curbed the development of the NWICO and seen a shift towards the Western perspective on press matters. The final budget was only 2.5% higher than the previous one. Therefore, despite the fact that the United States had been seeking to maintain the status quo, it had substantially reduced the initial budget increase of more than 6%. What, therefore, prompted the U.S. decision to pull out of the organization less than one month later?

THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO

Shortly after the close of the 22nd General Assembly, stories began appearing in the American press about a possible U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO. According to a *New York Times* report, the proposal was being considered in the State Department and a decision was expected soon (*New York Times,* 1983d: 1). Gregory J. Newell, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, said that his office had conducted a study of the performance of some 90 organizations and noted that there were problems of politicization within many of these agencies, in addition to problems of mismanagement and lack of budgetary restraint.

> Mr. Newell said that the studies had shown what the Administration viewed as improvement in many of the multilateral agencies, but that Unesco had responded inadequately.
>
> "We did see some change, we did see some improvement," he said. "And we were pleased by that. Unesco has not responded as the others have. Consequently we have undertaken the review"[*New York Times,* 1983d: 8].

Opponents of the withdrawal pointed to the successes made at the 22nd General Assembly and feared that withdrawal would leave the organization vulnerable to those who oppose U.S. interests. Moreover, the United States Commission for UNESCO, although acknowledging the problems, voted by an overwhelming majority that "continued U.S. membership is in the national interest" (*New York Times,* 1983e: 3). But Newell warned, "Our concern is that it (UNESCO) has gone so far adrift that it can't be brought back to the course" (*New York Times,* 1983e: 3).

The State Department made its decision and recommended to President Reagan on December 21, 1983, that the United States file notice of its intention to leave UNESCO on January 1, 1985. The decision had to be made by December 31st, but the United States would have one year in which to reassess the

situation. The recommendation was supported by Jean Gerard, an American delegate to UNESCO. "I think the place is so skewed, so radical-political, that it is not serving the purpose it is supposed to be serving, which is development" (*New York Times,* 1983g: 1).

Reagan sent a formal letter to UNESCO Director-General M'Bow on December 29, 1983, but made clear that the departure was temporary and the United States retained the right to rejoin. According to a State Department spokesman the decision was made because

Unesco has extraneously politicized virtually every subject it deals with, has exhibited hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press, and has demonstrated unrestrained budgetary expansion [*New York Times,* 1983h: 4].[2]

At the same time, Secretary of State George P. Schultz reassured U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar that the U.S. decision did not "presage any wider disengagement from the United Nations or its other specialized agencies" (*New York Times,* 1983h: 1). Moreover, he added, "This year will give UNESCO a potential opportunity to respond to the serious concerns that have caused our withdrawal. We remain open to indications of significant improvement" (p. 4).

Mr. Newell, however, was not so charitable. He claimed that the decision to withdraw was based on the assumption the UNESCO would not improve enough to satisfy American demands for change.

"Unesco policies for several years have served anti-U.S. political ends," he said. "The Reagan Administration has frequently advised Unesco of the limits of U.S. toleration: for its misguided policies, its tendentious programs, and its extravagant budgetary mismanagement.

"For nearly three years now, the Administration has applied to Unesco the same priorities that guide our relations to all

multilateral organizations—but Unesco alone, among the major U.N. system organizations, has not responded" [*New York Times,* 1983h: 4].

The State Department officially based its decision to withdraw from UNESCO on three major reasons: (1) the politicization of issues; (2) the promulgation of statist concepts; and (3) budget and management issues. A number of examples of each are enumerated below.

(1) the politicization of issues
  ● Delegates, especially from the Middle East and Soviet bloc, attempt to deny Israel the right to participate. "It (UNESCO) is consistently hostile to Israel and provides political and financial support to the Palestinian Liberation Organization" (*New York Times,* 1983f: 27).
  ● The issue of apartheid in South Africa is consistently raised as a political issue.
  ● Disarmament issues are included in the programs on education and science. "It increasingly orients its educational activities towards such purposes as 'peace and disarmament,' not as they are legitimately sought after by many peoples, but as they are promoted and distorted in Soviet propaganda. In science, . . . politics has also begun to make itself felt here, with the injection of such concepts as 'scientists for peace' and 'scientists for disarmament'" (Harley, 1984: 89).
  ● UNESCO funds have been used to support projects in Palestine. "The U.S. is unhappy over Unesco's concern for Palestinian science, culture, and education" (*IPI Report,* 1984d: 9).
  ● A significant East/West rift has developed. "Unesco is a thoroughly politicized institution dedicated to attacking fundamental Western values, interests and institutions" (*New York Times,* 1983f: 27).

(2) the promulgation of statist concepts
  ● The development of a new world information and communication order is encouraged. "It attacks and seeks to circumscribe the Western free press" (*New York Times,* 1983f: 27).

- The new economic order "attacks the free-market economy and multi-national corporations" (*New York Times,* 1983f: 27).
- The programs dealing with the rights of peoples "downgrade individual human rights in favour of nebulous and proliferating 'rights of peoples,' thus helping tryannical states to impose their orthodoxies on their subjects" (*New York Times,* 1983f: 27).
- An anti-Western bias is evident in all the activities of UNESCO. "The Americans are worried that Unesco wants to envelop the world in a socialist, utopian, anti-liberal, welfare-state plan to be financed by the rich nations, especially the US" (Mertineit, 1984: 11).

(3) budget and management issues
  - A large extravagant and wasteful bureaucracy exists which spends 80% of the budget in the headquarters in Paris and only 20% in the developing countries.
  - The bureaucracy is supposed to be geographically representative but this has affected the competency of the Secretariat. "A recent poll of members of the Secretariat showed that only 3% of those polled considered that Unesco recruited high quality people or promoted on the basis of professional efficiency" (*New York Times,* 1983f: 27).
  - Unsound management practices are rampant. "Basic features of good management, such as effective evaluation of programmes, comprehensible information about the budget, the effective allocation of resources, and adherence to proper procedures at meetings are conspicuous by their absence" (*IPI Report,* 1984c: 13).
  - The Director-General uses his position as an instrument of power for his own benefit. "Since his re-election M'Bow has lost all sense of proportion," says a senior Unesco official. "With dreams of succeeding Kurt Waldheim, at the UN Secretariat, M'Bow has begun to court the world, particularly the U.S.S.R" (Dumoulin and Stein, 1984: 11).
  - UNESCO supports programs beyond the scope of its competence. "In Washington's judgment, Unesco funds have been spent on activities beyond its commission and

> have been exploited by dictatorial regimes" (Caretto, 1984: 8).

In addition to these complaints, the United States is dissatisfied with the manner in which UNESCO operates generally. As a democratic institution, each member has one vote on all issues. "In part, the organization suffers from being so democratic" (*Inter Media,* 1984: 5). The Americans, who donated about one-quarter of the organization's funds, believed that each state should have power according to its contribution.

> The U.S. contributes the largest share of Unesco's budget, but this "generosity" is founded on the organization's statutes, which base each member state's contribution on economic, geographic, and demographic considerations. In contrast to UNESCO's founding principle, Washington believes the influence of each member should depend on its financial contribution. . . . Washington no longer sees any advantage in continuing to subsidize an organization whose machinery it no longer controls [*IPI Report,* 1984d: 10].

Ironically, many of these arguments have been refuted by the United States National Commission for UNESCO (USNC),[3] which argues that the quality of U.S. participation in UNESCO has declined over the past decade. The USNC believes that too many delegates have been selected for political reward rather than for their competence in the areas under consideration (USNC, 1984: 22). Lawrence Finkelstein has commented:

> The United States has not used well the leadership capabilities it still has, even in the changing world environment. In UNESCO, for example, the U.S. essentially stopped trying to be an effective leader about 30 years ago. The result was that others took over and it was only belatedly and somewhat suddenly that we discovered about ten years ago that being on the losing side could hurt on matters of importance" [USNC, 1984: 23].

This opinion has been reiterated by others, including Leonard Sussman, Executive Director of Freedom House. He believes that the United States shares some of the responsibility for the problems of UNESCO.

"Things went from bad to worse in UNESCO" during a period when the United States was an "inactive, apathetic presence," said Sussman, whose organization monitors freedom throughout the world [*Presstime,* 1984: 32].

Moreover, the USNC pointed to all the benefits of UNESCO in the fields of education, science, and culture. It argued that for over 10 years the press coverage had concentrated on the controversial debates to the exclusion of the positive activities of the organization and it quoted the National News Council, an independent press-monitoring group sponsored by some U.S. media, to support its position.

Not one story emanating from the six-week conference (the 1980 General Assembly) dealt with any of the reports, speeches or resolutions on UNESCO's basic activities in combating illiteracy, developing alternative energy sources, protecting historic monuments, broadening educational programs for scientists and engineers, sponsoring basic research in food production and oceanic sciences, and scores of other fields [USNC, 1984: 2].

In addition to the support for remaining in UNESCO that emanated from the National Commission, a State Department report of its review of UNESCO's activities was basically uncommitted to withdrawal. It concluded that its findings "do not provide a clear, unequivocal answer to the question of whether or not the U.S. should withdraw" (Radolf, 1984a: 7). The report was encouraged by the progress made at the 22nd General Assembly, and by the thrust of several UNESCO-based programs despite their administration which, it noted, "detract from, but do not nullify, the overall effectiveness of

the field projects" (Radolf, 1984a: 30). Although the report was very critical of the NWICO debate, it found that "UNESCO had not actually engaged in such practices and that, in fact, some of the controversy had receded in recent years" (Radolf, 1984a: 30).

Why, then, did the United States decide, at that time, that withdrawal was its best option? It appears that key personnel engaged in selective misrepresentation in order to promote a hostile viewpoint towards international agencies but this clearly crystallized into an anti-UNESCO campaign. Gregory Newell, Assistant Secretary of State, decided to recommend withdrawal despite the recommendations of the State Department review. Moreover, he claimed that the decision was supported by the findings of that review.

> Yet, Newell, in his memorandum, said that "careful and thorough policy review confirmed" the view that the United States "receives few benefits" from its membership in UNESCO and that our membership in the organization "damages and distorts views, values and interests of the United States. . . . The UNESCO environment is hostile to our ideals, and this environment is unlikely to change, whatever reasonable effort we bring to bear," he said [Radolf, 1984a: 30].

On what Newell based his comments is not quite clear. The USNC claims that Newell "ignored recommendations from 83 American diplomatic missions abroad and 13 Government departments, none of which advocated an American withdrawal from the organization" (*New York Times,* 1984e: 1). Nor is it clear what arguments he used to convince others that his was the correct decision. It is known that Secretary of State Schultz, and Under-Secretary for Political Affairs Eagleburger, both originally opposed the recommendation. Both believed that the United States could more effectively lobby for change from within the organization where it could have significant bargaining power if it decided to withhold funds (*IPI Report,* 1983a: 12).

What is clear, however, is that Newell used his position to engineer the U.S. withdrawal. The purpose of the State Department review was supposedly "to secure improvements in UNESCO's behaviour, not to pave the way for a withdrawal" (USNC, 1984: 1). Although the review did not confirm Newell's decision, he claimed that it did. Moreover, despite the wishes of President Reagan,[4] who was "prepared to review the decision to withdraw should concrete changes materialize" (USNC, 1984: 10), Newell announced just one month later that the U.S. decision to pull out was "final" (Radolf, 1984a: 30). Again, the reason for Newell's pronouncement, which was directly contrary to that of the president, is unknown. It merely confirms suspicions that the U.S. withdrawal was not a well-reasoned strategy of action on the part of the administration, but rather part of an unknown agenda devised by some senior administration officials.

REACTION TO THE U.S. DECISION

Reaction to the American decision to withdraw from UNESCO was mixed. The following section is intended to provide only an overview of the comments addressed to the subject. It is divided into two sections; one looks at reactions within the United States, while the other reviews those expressed outside. It also considers the reaction of Director-General M'Bow and UNESCO itself.

Reaction within the U.S. Editorial reaction to the American pullout was mixed. Barbara Tuchman, in the *New York Times,* insisted "the United States was right in announcing its intention to leave Unesco." She based her decision on the NWICO debates. James Traub, also in the *New York Times*, argued, however, that the United States should stay. After all, "America has approved virtually every Unesco project that critics now attack. . . . Does America want to tell the world that it will not play a game that it cannot dominate?"

The American Press also was divided on its reaction to the decision, but all representatives were convinced that whether

the United States withdrew or not, they would need to continue their monitoring of the NWICO debates. K. Prescott Low, chairman of the American Newspaper Association's Government Affairs Committee, said "it is best for us to pull out at the end of 1984 than to continue to be affiliated with an organization whose ideals have been debased from what its charter intends" (*Presstime,* 1984: 32). Leonard Sussman, on the other hand, believed that UNESCO "is too valuable to scuttle or to yield to the press controllers or the totalitarians of the right or left" (*Editor & Publisher,* 1984: 11).

The scientific community, however, was concerned about the benefits it stood to lose by the U.S. withdrawal, including a leading role in UNESCO's global research projects. Professor Walter Rosenblith, foreign secretary of the National Academy of Sciences, argued that "there did not exist an overall alternative to UNESCO's coordinating activities" (*International Herald Tribune,* 1984b: 44). "The surest way to lose influence is to quit," was the reaction of Warren Nystrom, a representative of the Association of American Geographers (*New York Times,* 1983e: 3).

Reactions outside the U.S. Here reaction to the American decision was also mixed. Many countries expressed grave concern over the U.S. move and urged President Reagan to reconsider, to work for reform from within. Others, like Britain, Holland, and Singapore, were considering similar moves. The Soviet Union denounced the decision, calling it an attempt by the United States to be the world's "self-styled ruler"(*IPI Report,* 1984b: 12). A Soviet delegate to UNESCO, Yuri Khilchevsky, criticized the United States for its attempt "to use financial and economic levers to compel developing countries to follow in the wake of United States' foreign policy" (*New York Times,* 1984b: 26).

M'Bow's Reaction. Although Director-General M'Bow regretted the decision of the United States to withdraw from UNESCO, he refuted most of the reasons that were advanced. In an interview with Andrew Radolf, M'Bow charged that there was "a deliberate move to play up the conflictual side" of

the NWICO debate. He also criticized the coverage of the budget issue and rejected the rumors that only his resignation would pacify the Americans (Radolf, 1984b: 7, 15). In general, M'Bow appeared optimistic about the future of UNESCO, with or without U.S. participation. The loss of the American contribution would be made up by seeking additional funds from others or by scaling back the programs UNESCO sponsored.

M'Bow also conceded that UNESCO "is not perfect" but reform could be achieved only through open discussion. In his opinion, UNESCO should be "a forum for international cooperation, dialogue, mutual interests and mutual respect. . . . Unesco is not a battlefield" (*New York Times,* 1984a: 10).

THE FINAL DECISION

A number of initiatives were undertaken in an attempt to reform the operations at UNESCO before the deadline for the American withdrawal.[5] Flora Lewis believed that these activities were having a positive effect on the organization (*New York Times,* 1984c: 1). Even Gregory Newell was impressed, but not convinced.

> "The fact that they are talking at all about doing things differently is remarkable," he said. "And that's encouraging. But encouragement doesn't deliver the goods. . . . This Administration will no longer pay what I call political tribute money to these organizations," he added [*New York Times,* 1984d: 3].

It appears, however, that these efforts were insufficient to satisfy the United States. In fact,

> Official American relations with the agency got even worse recently. The State Department official most identified with pulling the United States out, Gregory Newell, accused the UNESCO Secretariat of being "disdainful" of American sensibilities on key free-press issues, and charged Mr. M'Bow with a

"breach of promises" he had made to Washington on that score
[*International Herald Tribune,* 1984a: 6].

The United States announced on December 19, 1984 that it
would proceed with its planned withdrawal from UNESCO on
January 1, 1985.

The 23rd UNESCO General Assembly: 1985

The 23rd Session of the UNESCO General Conference was
held from October 8-November 12, 1985. The selection of
Sofia, Bulgaria, as the site of the meetings was in itself a
contentious issue. For financial reasons, it made more sense to
hold the conference at UNESCO headquarters in Paris. In
Sofia, 1000 UNESCO employees had to be housed and fed for
six weeks, not an inconsequential expenditure. However, when
added to the more than 3000 delegates attending the confer-
ence, the significant boost to both the economy and image of
Bulgaria should not be underestimated.

Moreover, two factors threatened to dominate the confer-
ence: the threatened pullout of the United Kingdom, and the
absence of the United States from the discussion tables,
although the U.S. delegation was given observer status.[6] The
Socialist bloc was anxious to put its own stamp on the
meetings. By convening in Bulgaria, Socialist countries believed
that the opportunities to express their points of view would be
enhanced.

The most sensitive issue during the General Assembly, once
again, was the discussion of NWICO. NWICO is now viewed
as a continuing and evolving concept that relates to the varying
roles, international themes, and infrastructures of print, elec-
tronic media, and information systems. It emphasizes their
disparities and suggests means, sometimes contradictory and
contentious, for reaching a new order and balance in terms of
international information and communication flows.

NWICO in itself is a relatively modest concept still in its
infancy but it is systematically perceived as being structurally

different by two major groups of nation-states. Western and industrialized nations see NWICO as troublesome, vague, and potentially harmful (for instance, press censorship, legitimizing a government role, or licensing journalists). However, the socialist bloc and some LDCs and nonaligned nations view NWICO as a practical and theoretical concept to facilitate and legitimize a more activist indigenous production capacity, a controlled and balanced domestic medium. Moreover, it is perceived to be a paradigm to facilitate infrastructure (telecommunications) development along contemporary lines.

What reinforced the cleavage and dramatically forced the issue over NWICO, particularly at this stage in its evolution, was one single act—the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO in January 1985. The U.S. withdrawal has had several effects. The major implications were:

(1) UNESCO was thrown into fiscal turmoil because the United States had supplied about 25% of its budget

(2) Other U.N. agencies began to view the U.S.-UNESCO feud as symbolic of the U.S. relationship with all multilateral organizations

(3) The profile of NWICO escalated rapidly

(4) Items relating to NWICO were hotly contested

(5) Western nations began to reflect upon the concept of the freedom of the press and act to protect it from erosion or attack

(6) Developing and nonaligned nations became defensive and began to document with greater haste and depth the disparities and actions of media and information-related systems, particularly those of the West

(7) Government actions with reference to the media, because they were accepted and encouraged by several nations under the philosophical umbrella of a NWICO, became more suspect by the larger, industrial nations of the West

(8) Smaller nations, such as Denmark, Canada, Sweden, and The Netherlands were forced to lead the debate against NWICO within UNESCO

However, the overall debate about NWICO has been useful. It has required a stock-taking and reaffirmation of values. Moreover, it has accentuated the need for planning data and practical strategies ranging from technical personnel training to equipment. NWICO will never be established by date or decree. Rather, it shall continue to evolve in its search for practical and applied measures aimed at redressing media imbalances with some greater concern for cultural sensitivities.

THE ROLE OF THE U.S.

Because the United States no longer had official status, it played a different and difficult role at the 23rd General Assembly. Several members, including a number from the Third World, wanted the United States to return quickly to UNESCO. Others of a more radical and contentious bent, such as Algeria, were even opposed to allowing the United States observer status. In addition, the United States informally was seeking surrogates from the Western group of nations to present American points of view. For a number of reasons the major role of reflecting the U.S. concerns and viewpoint fell to the United Kingdom. Although the United Kingdom had its own agenda, which was harsh relative to other moderate Western states, it aligned itself closest to the U.S. position, particularly prior to its withdrawal.[7]

In a related series of administrative sessions during the Plenary, two major items related directly to the United States. The one was a legal question: whether the United States should have to pay its dues for the second half of the biennium, given its withdrawal during the first half. Strong arguments were made for sending this item to the International World Court in The Hague. Many hoped to embarrass the United States and hopefully compel it to pay the outstanding balance. The second item was the layoff policy necessitated by UNESCO's reduced budget. The staff at the Paris Headquarters would need to be reduced. Some radical nations wanted all American employees to be dismissed first regardless of seniority or expertise. By implication British subjects would comprise the second wave of

layoffs. The Western nations argued that UNESCO employees were international civil servants and should not be subject to discrimination on the basis of nationality. In the end both items were dropped but the latter one, because layoffs are inevitable, will resurface continually as UNESCO has to accommodate a 30% reduction in funding.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom also played an interesting role at the 23rd General Assembly. Basically in a difficult position, having given notice in December 1984 that they intended to leave at the end of 1985, the British found themselves diplomatic eunuchs. Essentially they had lost all power within UNESCO since they had announced their intention to withdraw from the organization. Others saw no reason to consider their views, complaints, or objectives. Given this rather difficult situation, their attempts in Sofia to exert influence became somewhat melodramatic. In essence, many nations, including their Western allies and Commonwealth members, realized that they were playing a difficult game trying to force UNESCO into a situation that would ultimately legitimate their decision to leave as of January 1986.

Events in one sector, COM IV, demonstrated the British position. The intervention made in COM IV on behalf of Mr. Eggan, M.P., British Parliamentary under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, clearly expressed the British attitude.

The press in my country is frankly at best sceptical about UNESCO: and in many cases deeply hostile to it. They see it not as a body which will improve the international environment in which they work: but as an organization determined to dictate to them what they should publish or write, who should be allowed to read or hear it and what practices they should follow in going about their business. Since the beginning of this Conference the *Times of London* has published two leaders highly critical of UNESCO and Britain's continued membership. In

another leader the *British Daily Telegraph* has stressed that UNESCO has not reduced its anti-Western bias and argued that any belief that UNESCO can be changed is no more than an illusion. It is ironic, Mr. Chairman, that UNESCO should have generated such attitudes among the people who actually work in the communications field. But the attitude of our press is a fact of political life. The British Government cannot shut its eyes and ears to this fact [1985: 3].

What is particularly striking is the concession of a British Cabinet member that British foreign policy is, to some extent, set to appease the vicissitudes of the British press, even when foreign owned.

THE COM IV MEETINGS

Although frequent references to NWICO were made during the General Plenary sessions, it was really in the subcommittee, COM IV, where the action occurred and the alliances were made.

Within the total 160 nations present at these meetings, an informal group called the Western Group[8] has consistently emerged. Traditionally dominated by the United States, the leadership vacuum at Sofia was filled by West Germany, Canada, and Denmark. Designed to counteract the Eastern Socialist Group, which is dominated totally by the USSR, the Western Group meetings allow Western nations to caucus and develop a united position.

At first, the general debate in COM IV proceeded with relatively little animosity, but three distinct points of view were evident. The Socialist bloc was in favor of enlarging NWICO.[9] The Western Group wanted to dampen NWICO in the hope that it could motivate the eventual return of the United States to UNESCO. The third group consisted of the LDCs and some of the nonaligned nations. This group benefited from the research and the technical assistance provisions within the overall COM IV budget that were provided as NWICO initiatives and continued to support the program.

UNESCO procedures provide an opportunity for individual nations to propose amendments or draft resolutions (DRs) to the overall communication budget previously approved by the Executive Board of UNESCO in Paris.[10] In order that the Western nations might adopt a unified stance on the more than 40 proposed DRs, they caucused continuously throughout the week set aside for COM IV. However, on Wednesday, October 23, a major change took place. The West German representative relinquished the chair of the Western Group and a bright young Canadian was installed as the new chair for the specific purpose of leading the debate through the entire set of DRs to create a unified and consistent Western position. The aim was threefold: first, to hold the consensus and not undermine free press traditions; second, to satisfy U.K. concerns; and third, to create a favorable climate concerning NWICO so that the United States would eventually return to UNESCO with U.S. press support.

The first draft resolution discussed by the Western caucus was a Chinese proposal requesting support for a technical workshop for journalists in Beijing. This was agreed upon by the Group and as a group they voted in favor of it in COM IV. The second DR was Mongolian in origin and proposed enlarging the scope of NWICO. Not only did it go against the group's initial consensus on the subject, but it was feared that passage would further alienate the United States and other Western nations. Each of the DRs was dealt with in a similar fashion by the caucus. The group endorsed or opposed each DR as a bloc and agreed to vote along similar lines.

When the COM IV debate on the DRs began the Canadian chairman was responsible for presenting the Western point of view and providing Mongolia, which clearly represented the USSR's point of view, with its initial setback. Next, a series of draft resolutions proposed by socialist countries were introduced. According to its preordained strategy, the Western group rejected each DR and requested that it be submitted to a COM IV working group for further consideration. It was hoped that within the working group these DRs would be

rejected completely or at least modified to make them less objectionable.

After a time, perhaps one hour, the USSR objected to these procedures and when a few additional DRs were submitted to the working group, the Soviet Union formally moved to close the debate, claiming that the COM IV session had turned into a circus. The chair responded by permitting two delegates to speak against the motion. Without any prompting, Uganda and Kenya rose to oppose the USSR's motion. This move was significant because developing nations were opposing the stand taken by the Socialist bloc, that is, indirectly the LDCs were now supporting the Western stand on NWICO.

Following these interventions an Australian delegate rose on a point of order and asked about the consequences of the proposed vote. A legal opinion was given from the Chair, at which time the USSR spoke to the point concerning COM IV activities. The atmosphere was extremely tense and everyone realized that this was not only a major confrontation between the USSR and the West, but also among the USSR, the Secretariat and the LDCs. At this point a Jamaican delegate spoke complaining that the mover had now spoken twice and pointed out the irony of the USSR's position, which was basically a motion to close communication in a meeting on communication. The chair then called for an immediate vote on the original motion because the session was becoming unruly.

As happened with the vote taken during the intense Saturday morning meeting, which dealt with the 1978 Draft Declaration on the Media, this vote, too, indicated the strengths of the two major power blocs. The results: those in favor of the USSR motion to close debate—13, those opposed—53, abstentions—13. The USSR had made a major tactical error. It had unwittingly forced the LDCs to support the West in order to keep open debate in COM IV, which would allow for discussion on their draft resolutions, mostly technical aid projects, yet to be tabled. The Socialist countries had forced a vote and had come up very short. More

important, however, the incident had provided the West with
ample demonstration that the LDCs were more likely to agree
with the Western position on NWICO as opposed to the
Socialist one.[11]

Throughout this debate the Western alliance was dominated
by the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands,
West Germany, and Japan. France was notably silent. Fol-
lowing the extensive and somewhat contentious afternoon
session, Western delegates charged that France had sat on its
hands and had not put forward a single motion to reject a
Soviet-inspired resolution.

Following the Wednesday afternoon session, the Western
caucus, once again led by the Canadian, discussed tactics for
the subcommittee or working group that included three
representatives from each of the five regions. The Western
Group was represented by the United kingdom, France, and
Denmark. The United Kingdom once again took a very hard
and difficult line, claiming they wanted to extend the debate as
long as possible. Such a position would force the Soviets at
some point to say, "No. We will not be pushed around. We will
stand by a certain number of our DRs and if the United
Kingdom does not like it, then it can leave." This would have,
of course, legitimated the U.K.'s withdrawal. It could defend
its position on the basis of the intolerable Soviet stand.
Although this move would be applauded in the press at home,
it created a very awkward situation for the entire Western
delegation. The West had no intention of compromising on the
free press issue but the British position left little room for any
negotiation, even on aid and training items.

COM IV WORKING GROUP

The meetings of the Working Group began at a late session
Thursday morning, October 24, with 15 representatives, three
from each of the five geographical regions. In addition, four
members of the Secretariat attended as representatives of the
Director-General. This was highly unusual. Given that nor-
mally only one or occasionally two Secretariat officials are

present, it reflected accurately UNESCO's concern over the NWICO issues.

In terms of the working group, the United Kingdom maintained a strong position but the representative from Denmark, Toben Krough, clearly was the most articulate and effective spokesperson for the West. Fortunately, the USSR was playing a fairer and moderate role and the delegates from Hungary and Poland were relatively ineffective. Thus, it was possible to achieve some type of movement and consensus within the subcommittee.

The Group began going through the DRs one by one. Debate was lengthy and a Sri Lankan aid proposal took up a considerable amount of time. As a result, the group met until 9:00 p.m. Thursday, resumed Friday at 9:30 a.m., and met again on Saturday. Given the relatively slow progress on the first day, the group decided first thing Friday to divide the more than 30 DRs into groupings with a thematic concentration.

The first DR was from Poland and this, once again, provided an opportunity to provide the Western counterpoint. A senior representative of UNESCO suggested that the word *solidarity* be added to the resolution to see what outcome it had then and how committed the Polish delegate would be to the revised DR.

The working group continued to meet until Monday evening, October 28. The meetings ended on a positive note for the Western delegations. The Eastern bloc originally had insisted on the inclusion of a list of the rights and responsibilities of journalists, but this aspect did not make the final draft.

Conclusion

Although the UNESCO General Assembly has always discussed 13 major programs since Nairobi, its meetings have been dominated by one single program, communication (COM IV), almost to the total exclusion of others. Like a lightning rod, NWICO has been the focus of attention. It has

polarized the parties and in some cases forced them to either reevaluate their position or leave UNESCO, as in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom. It has caused enormous problems regarding the perception of UNESCO, as well as its internal workings and financial stability.

Although there is little doubt among those familiar with UNESCO that it does excellent work in several areas ranging from literacy and environmental concerns to scientific and educational topics, these efforts receive scant attention in terms of both the overall general conference and the media coverage. The media concentrate almost solely on the communication debate. This disparity is illuminated when one realizes that the communication sector in UNESCO receives less than 10% of the budget, but clearly receives over 90% of the media coverage. The problem is further complicated because, in the Western nations, 90% of that coverage is negative. It is difficult, therefore, for either concerned individuals or governments to be supportive of UNESCO when the public at large is not favorably impressed, and when the uninitiated think that all UNESCO does is debate communication, and in that particular case deals with it in a negative and anti-Western fashion.

An interesting example of this problem became evident during the 1985 General Assembly. A British cabinet minister assigned to Sofia for Major Programme 13 (human rights) requested a briefing on the events in COM IV. Both the British representative and Toben Krough, the Danish journalist, met with the Minister and explained that the final communique would reflect a pro-Western stance. The Minister was surprised because the *London Times* and other British media had demonstrated their hostility to UNESCO and what was allegedly occurring in Sofia. In reality, the United Kingdom had little to complain about and, indeed, a lot to be grateful for in terms of the results at Sophia.

All in all, UNESCO's 23rd General Assembly ended on a successful note. Essentially the consensus developed by the Executive Board held despite several attempts to reopen

debate on major budget revisions. In the end, the Organization's $398 million budget for 1985 and 1986 was cut by 25%, reflecting the loss of the U.S. financial contribution. In addition, "throughout the closing stages of the Conference, the Soviet Union and its Third World allies took a generally conciliatory line, appearing eager to avoid provoking Britain and other Western members and determined to ensure the meeting concluded on a relatively harmonious note" (Lewis, 1985: 13).

Although the closing days of debate went well, in fact the General Assembly concluded three days earlier than expected (on November 9 instead of November 12), a new series of issues began to receive considerable attention and concern. Major Programme 13, dealing with human rights and apartheid, is becoming increasingly contentious. Just when UNESCO appears to be accepting the reality of the fate of NWICO in Programme 3, it may be finding itself in equal difficulty with Programme 13 at future meetings. Only time will tell.

Even the Associated Press wire service copy from Sofia complemented UNESCO and the delegates for their activities during the General Assembly. "Speaking at the Closing Session, Mahtar M'bow, (sic) the controversial Senegalese director-general, who headed UNESCO for eleven years, said the meeting may mark a decisive date in the agency's history" (*Globe and Mail,* November 11, 1985: 10). According to the report, M'Bow spoke of the clarity, frankness, and realism characterizing the meeting that he said demonstrated the vitality and renewal of the Organization. "'At a time when some are forecasting the Organization's imminent death,' Mr. M'bow (sic) said, 'the agreements reached demonstrate that UNESCO is alive and well'" (p. 10).

Despite the consensus and the reforms undertaken both during the year as well as at the General Assembly, British delegates declined to commit themselves to remaining in UNESCO. They were also not overly optimistic concerning the overall progress of UNESCO. The loss of Britain's 5% contribution to UNESCO's budget is not the major problem in terms of its withdrawal, rather it is more a symbolic gesture

that may lead other Western nations to once again reevaluate
their position in UNESCO despite the gains made at Sofia.
Even the British press, in order to create an atmosphere
conducive to the U.K. pullout, frequently alluded to other
nations questioning both the activities of UNESCO and their
possible withdrawal.

> The Reagan administration has been conveniently branded as
> a manifestation of right-wing hostility to multi-national
> co-operation.
>
> Britain is in a different category. Britain's diplomats at
> UNESCO, in association with those of other Western nations,
> had hours of mind-numbing discussion about ways to improve
> the Organization before the Sofia meeting. They put their faith
> in patient diplomacy rather than confrontation. If Britain now
> decides that the small steps along this road so far agreed upon
> do not add up to a convincing argument to stay, other Western
> European countries will review their attitude toward the Body.
> Japan, the second largest contributor, is making no secret of the
> importance it attaches to reform as it considers its own future in
> the Organization [*The Economist,* 1985: 40].[12]

United Kingdom Withdrawal

In 1984 at the same time the United States was withdrawing
from UNESCO, the government of the United Kingdom gave
notice on November 22, 1984, of its intention to withdraw at
the close of 1985. Working through the Minister for Overseas
Development, Mr. T. Raison, the British government called
for positive and vigorous efforts by UNESCO to undertake
essential reforms during the year 1985 or else it would leave. A
wide-scale inquiry was commenced by the U.K. government
and opinions were sought from a number of individuals and
organizations. In addition, a House of Commons committee,
namely, the Foreign Affairs Committee, headed by Sir Anthony
Kershaw, undertook a systematic examination of the United
Kingdom's relationship with UNESCO. After their extensive
review the Foreign Affairs Committee strongly endorsed con-

tinuing membership for the United Kingdom within UNESCO. The timely and well-documented proceedings were published by the House of Commons on July 24, 1985 and the following are highlights of the report, titled Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Early in the report the significant point was made that any withdrawal by the United Kingdom would be considered a breach of faith by the international community, in particular Commonwealth countries; the Commonwealth countries had given a considerable amount of time and attention to satisfying the original reform requests made by the Minister for Overseas Development. Also, many of the Commonwealth countries are the same LDCs that benefit extensively from development activities of UNESCO and they openly stated that any U.K. decision to withdraw would just simply confirm to them the intellectual bankruptcy of the U.K. government on international matters. The government's report also refers to the United States withdrawal.

> If anything, the United Kingdom's contribution to UNESCO is more fully appreciated in UNESCO than it is in the United Kingdom, and the universally-expressed regret following a UK withdrawal would be, in our view, entirely genuine. Whereas the withdrawal of the United States was regarded largely as an inconvenience, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom would be genuinely regarded as a serious and substantive loss to the Organization, particularly by the United Kingdom's Commonwealth allies [p. xix].

The Committee also made the valid point, referred to at Sofia, that:

> Withdrawal would be likely to be counter-productive because, in particular, it would preclude continued Western influence in the development of the Organization and would therefore be likely to encourage the transfer of effective leadership of UNESCO into the hands of the Soviet Union and its allies [p. xix].

This last point will likely come back to haunt the U.K. government and the U.K. press. The report continues:

We have concluded
(i) that continued membership of UNESCO is an objective which should be pursued in the interests of British scientific, cultural and educational interests;
(ii) that the withdrawal of U.K. membership of UNESCO is likely to have detrimental effects on the United Kingdom's relations with other friendly countries, particularly in the Commonwealth;
(iii) that the withdrawal of U.K. membership of UNESCO is likely to advance Soviet-bloc interests in the Third World; and
(iv) that a breach by the United Kingdom of the principle of universality in the United Nations and its Agencies could have long-term, and damaging, consequences for those organizations, and not merely for UNESCO alone.

On the basis of the most recent evidence submitted by the Overseas Development Administration, we believe that UNESCO is moving towards acceptance of the main themes of the U.K. Government's demands for institutional and programme reform. This must be regarded as a great success for HM Government, so long as the progress so far achieved is endorsed by the Organization's General Conference. We therefore recommend that HM Government should not implement its present notice of withdrawal from the Organization unless the Twenty-Third General Conference in Sofia decides either to overturn the recommendations of the Executive Board or decides to adopt new policy directives which would seriously challenge the United Kingdom's interest and the new consensus which appears to have been achieved [pp. xxi-xxii].

In light of the United Kingdom's ultimate decision to withdraw made personally by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and delivered to the House of Commons in mid-December 1985, it is clear that such a decision was taken without appropriate attention to the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee or to the gains at Sofia.

The stinging rebuke of the Foreign Affairs Committee by Prime Minister Thatcher and the ambiguity that the British

delegation to the Sofia General Assembly experienced provides a sad commentary on the state of British international politics.[13] Because, at Sofia the senior people with the British delegation openly conceded that UNESCO was making substantial reforms but that did not really matter in that the ultimate decision was to be made in the Prime Minister's office. This is what made the decision so difficult for British allies to either understand or respect. That is, many nations pushed UNESCO for reform during the crucial year 1985 and substantial reforms and changes were obtained; yet for what end result in terms of the U.K. decision? Nothing. Obviously Prime Minister Thatcher had another political agenda to promote and UNESCO became a victim of her own agenda rather than reflecting the lengthy deliberations of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the exact issue that she would ultimately decide and decide in diametric opposition to the findings of the Parliamentary Committee, plus a considerable number of British academics and citizens at large.

Notes

1. A major roundtable on NWICO was jointly organized and sponsored by both the United Nations and UNESCO in 1983. It was held at the Igles Conference Centre from September 14-19, 1983, in Innsbruck, Austria. Twenty-six experts from an identical number of countries took part in the discussions. The roundtable dealt with imbalances with current media flows, technical aspects of evolving systems, as well as the international news agencies and standards of coverage. Yet the major contribution of the Igles Conference was to move NWICO from its appearance as a fixed set of principles or resolutions to "an evolving and continuous process." Such a fundamental change in the concept of NWICO provided not only delegates to the Igles meeting but also to other Western observers, the latitude and scope needed to proceed with further research and dialogue related to NWICO. Now viewed as an evolving concept, it appeared more realistic given the evolution of the communication technology that, in many ways, had fueled the call for an understanding and examination of NWICO. For further details about this turning point in the history of NWICO see: UNESCO (1983) 27c/96 Add. (Item 61.) November 5, 1983. Paris: Author.

2. An interesting footnote to the State Department's comments on UNESCO's failure to support a press free from government control surfaced shortly after the U.S. decision to withdraw from UNESCO was made. In an article in *Editor & Publisher,* Andrew Radolf describes attempts made by the State Department and specifically,

Gregory Newell, to manipulate the press in order to generate public support for its recommendation to withdraw from UNESCO. The story quotes a memorandum that Newell sent to Secretary of State Schultz and his deputy, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, in which Newell expressed his concern that the "media were not rallying to the government's side in the UNESCO issue." For more information, see Radolf (1984a).

3. The arguments presented by the USNC to refute those of the administration are presented in *What Are the Issues Concerning the Decision of the United States to Withdraw from UNESCO?*

4. Reagan's wishes with respect to UNESCO are contained within a memorandum sent by National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane to Secretary of State Schultz on December 23, 1983, establishing a monitoring panel to advise the Secretary of State on changes occurring within UNESCO.

5. The reform initiatives included an investigation of the management and budgetary practices of UNESCO by a panel appointed by the American Administration and a meeting of UNESCO at which 24 countries asked for specific reform. In addition, UNESCO itself hired an American public relations firm in an attempt to polish its own image.

6. The United States had a large observer delegation, numbering over 30 during the course of the six weeks, and including some high-profile Republicans, such as Mrs. Edwin Meese. However, because the United States was officially out of UNESCO, American media coverage fell dramatically. AP and UPI provided little copy. Even AFP did not have a full-time reporter in Sofia. Reuters also had no one there full-time.

7. To keep the issues in perspective it should be recalled that while the NWICO debate raged during the 1980s and each camp took more strident positions, the two nations most opposed to both NWICO and government media intervention were the United States and the United Kingdom. However, both have systematically demonstrated, in isolated events, how governments may effectively control the press. Details are not provided here but the reader is directed to review the U.S. restriction of all press coverage, domestic and foreign, of the invasion of Grenada; the United Kingdom's clever control of the press during the Falklands War (see, for example, Ponting, 1985), and the mishandled state censorship of the BBC by the British government in 1985 that resulted in much hostility and an unprecedented one-day media strike.

8. The Western Group consisted of West Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Japan, the Nordic Nations, Switzerland, and so on, mostly the OECD nations.

9. The Socialist draft resolutions had five thrusts.

(a) Contribution to peace and other code wording.

(b) Censorship.

(c) Rights or codes of conduct.

(d) Previous NWICO framework enlarged.

(e) Emphasis on research or seminars to promote NWICO or investigate ownership of Western media systems.

10. The UNESCO Secretariat, including Director-General M'Bow, basically disallowed 80%-90% of the original DRs, the bulk of which were supplied by Eastern countries. Many were frivolous, whereas others put the Secretariat in an untenable

position because acceptance of the DRs would have broken the hard fought consensus on the overall budget.

11. COM IV debate is essentially centered around North-South issues concerning development. The Soviet motion created an East-West confrontation that all had hoped to avoid. However, the debate evolved into a "saw-off" between the USSR and the United Kingdom, each representing diametrically opposed positions on several crucial aspects of NWICO.

12. The United Kingdom and Japan also share another commonality at UNESCO. They, along with France, are the only nations that are net benefactors of membership in UNESCO. More of UNESCO's budget is spent in Japan and Britain than their respective countries donate to UNESCO's overall budget. The reason for this is quite simple. UNESCO's many field projects are dominated not only by Japanese trucks but also by its technologies. The United Kingdom benefits enormously from the engineering and academic research that is supported by UNESCO. Other Western nations are in a net deficit position. Their contributions far exceed any type of domestic return, whether it be with reference to UNESCO-sponsored symposiums or purchases of either hardware or software from these other nations.

13. At the close of 1985 the British heir to the throne, Prince Charles, lamented that the United Kingdom, without progress, would become a fourth-rate nation.

Within UNESCO, and indeed in the eyes of many Commonwealth members, it already has, particularly in terms of international intellectual leadership.

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom is symbolically a major event within the framework of electronic colonialism. Historically the United Kingdom colonized many parts of the world. The vestiges of that system are now reflected in the membership to the Commonwealth countries. Recently the Commonwealth countries, many of them LDCs, had been willing to work for economic cooperation, in other areas, to better their overall positions; as such, within the international Commonwealth community, the United Kingdom had been looked to for leadership. Now, at the very time when these same LDCs are looking for technical assistance and training projects through the mechanism of UNESCO, the LDCs find that it is the United Kingdom that is attempting to exacerbate UNESCO's problems by its withdrawal. Therefore, the United Kingdom, rather than assisting its former colonies, appears bent on making their position even worse on the international scene by diminishing the stature and financial ability of the major LDC international agency, UNESCO, in terms of being able to come to their assistance. Further Commonwealth meetings should be extremely interesting, particularly in terms of the embarrassed and diminished role that the United Kingdom delegation will play as it sits opposite several LDC delegates who will have a number of questions for their former colonial masters regarding their defection from UNESCO, the most important U.N. agency in the LDCs' eyes.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The debate about NWICO has just begun. Resolutions or solutions are still premature; it will take time to evolve a new international order of any type; this is the case for economic, political, cultural, as well as information orders. Now the NWICO debate will take place in several international agencies and organizations. It also has more research supporting it and more articulate advocates. The foregoing has set the stage for the major actors in the evolving discussion over priorities in the international communication and information fields. What has emerged are several points, some of which will probably exacerbate the tension in the debate over electronic colonialism.[1]

NWICO is slowly growing in influence, despite UNESCO's current crippled role. Telecommunications and transnational data flows are now part of the issues being discussed under the umbrella of "the new world information and communication order." What started as a vague concept in the late 1960s will be a broadly based, well-researched and influential concept by the end of this century. Very few media systems or communication firms will escape being affected by its outcome. What the general public learns or, more important, does not learn about LDCs will be influenced by NWICO.

Summary

Before outlining some of the major points and implications of NWICO, it is important to recall that the issue of foreign

news gathering is critical to both national awareness and international concerns. The world is a "global village"; more extensive and accurate coverage is mandatory for the vital issues societies face in the 1990s. But the broadcasting and communication environment of the future is being decided now; it is meetings in Paris, Geneva, Sofia, New York, and elsewhere that are setting the ground rules and goals for NWICO.

Some type of new order will evolve, and the following deals with the major issues to date.

1. There is a major paradox. Technology is providing more choice. Fibre optics, lasers, minicomputers, cable, DBS, video discs, VCRs, and a host of other innovations could make the world of information available at one's fingertips. Yet people in both the West and in LDCs may have less accurate foreign international information in the future rather than more.

2. For the LDCs, illiteracy is growing, thus making even the newspaper a distant dream for many. Costs are keeping other media options at a meager level of penetration as well.

3. In the West, high costs are reducing the numbers of foreign correspondents; in addition, the costs of labor and newsprint will force significant price rises in the future, thus reducing for the print medium both circulation and foreign coverage.

4. A further introspective mood has editors allocating less space and priority for international items in the daily press. Light, breezy, trendy, humorous items are the diet of the day. Dennis Schroeder (1980: 3-4) makes the point well:

> Nowhere is the prevailing introspective mood reflected more clearly than in the news media which, rather than using the new communication technologies to cover the Global Village more comprehensively, appear to be concentrating increasingly on their own familiar "neighbourhoods" within the village.
>
> Such an attitude can only lead to future misunderstandings and tension. It is absolutely impossible to comprehend major domestic, social, political or economic developments adequately unless they are out into the global context. Nor is it

possible, in an increasingly interconnected world, to respond intelligently to developments elsewhere in the world unless we are well informed. The Third World, in particular, is assuming increasing importance to global affairs. Decisions made there strongly influence world prices of oil and other essential commodities; political unrest in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere affect people elsewhere. The flow of news from other parts of the world can be turned off with the flick of a dial, but the flow—and the impact—of events cannot.

The potential for more is there but the editorial will is lacking; or foreign affairs is not perceived as significant in terms of contributing to the bottom line.

5. There are two fundamentally different philosophies and outlooks in the West and LDCs. They are irreconcilable on many points and this may as well be accepted from the outset. Any future solution will involve a domestic communication policy being separate and distinct from an international communication policy. In terms of the international communication policy, the problem will then become agreement and enforcement. Moral force carries little weight given the economic and political realities of the substantial actors in both the public and private sectors. A Law of Communications Conference similar to the Law of Sea activities should be considered. The major ITU-WARC meeting once over 20 years is unrealistic in the Information Age, so a new timetable should be contemplated for this Geneva-based agency now replacing UNESCO as a major force for NWICO.

6. Many U.S. and some EEC firms are in the transition period of making more profits outside their domestic markets than at home. In the future this reliance on foreign markets will continually emphasize the need to develop markets in LDCs. In order to develop these markets, there is some need to develop a consumption mentality that is fostered by advertising and Hollywood.

7. Many LDCs lack domestic training, production facilities, and, in some cases, markets for their own products. As a

result, this provides the United States and other Western nations with a significant advantage because they have a sufficiently large domestic market to cover the costs of research and production and, therefore, exports are becoming the only real challenge. With their television, movie, and computer industries most Western societies have covered initial costs and their takeoff point puts them in a position to dominate markets in other areas of the world. The LDCs, on the other hand, frequently lack either the infrastructure or markets to build domestic, cultural, or computer industries. The question of LDCs exporting their limited software to the West is another frustrating issue. For example, U.S. commercial television or movie theaters import very little from outside. For high tech, competing against the likes of IBM or ATT is simply out of the question.

8. LDCs want the right to control their own destinies, particularly their communication and information systems; yet at the same time, they want to be part of the international scene and play a larger role with considerable decision-making influence. This forces them to take part in international affairs. On the one hand they want complete avoidance of foreign cultural influences, but at the same time they want to be part of the larger world, which involves a substantial amount of interaction with other nations, particularly with the West, which conveys certain financial, political, and cultural values.

9. A major problem is the global economic system where there are fewer dollars available for foreign aid. At the same time, LDCs are calling for less tied foreign aid. It is safe to predict that for the West fewer foreign aid dollars will garner closer scrutiny and as a result there will be greater ties attached to aid rather than less. Only projects that meet the approval of donor nations will survive.

10. Information is the basis of culture. The greater the foreign information, the greater the threat to a native or domestic culture in the future. More national concern about foreign, mainly American, cultural intrusions will occur in both industrialized and LDCs alike. The television show

Dallas [2] or films like *Rocky* do represent the international pervasiveness of U.S. media fare.

11. The question of electronic colonialism ranges from a single printed page to sophisticated computerized data transferred via satellite and stored on remote video discs. To develop an information policy at the international level dealing with this enormous range of technologies is an almost impossible task, yet at the same time there needs to be some recognition and resolution of the disparities in information traffic. Western nations are concerned with information age issues such as new technologies like video discs, satellites, and VCRs, which are blurring traditional distinctions like the separation of carrier and content or the vital issue of privacy, while LDCs are worried about basic literacy or imported comic books. All these concerns are related to NWICO but demonstrate the broad range of issues involved.

12. Resolution of the debate about NWICO has significant implications for foreign policy. The West's concept of the LDCs is mediated by information they receive via newspapers, radio, television, and other media. If coverage of the LDCs shifts substantially, then the perception and public support of the voters may shift also. The propensity of media systems, particularly television, to follow only coups and earthquakes diminishes the potential for television to create a more enlightened audience in terms of foreign affairs.

13. The LDCs' newspapers are becoming more difficult to maintain. High illiteracy, escalating costs of newsprint, plus the growing costs of transportation make increases in print-oriented products difficult. Transistor radio appears to be the best medium for LDCs. Yet the ITU will have to allocate more and better frequencies for radio transmission in many areas; this may require cutting back on existing, overly powerful high transmitters in both North America and Europe. Radio, and not color television, has much to offer as a preferred medium to aid media development.

14. Basically, we are talking about elites on both sides of the NWICO issue. In terms of the Western press we are talking

about either academic elites or owners-publishers who repre-
sent, in many cases, either large chains or giant transnational
corporations. Critics from LDCs are also either academic
elites, many educated in the West, or bureaucratic and
government elites whether in home nations or as represen-
tatives within international organizations. The average person
on the street, whether in the West or in an LDC, is totally
unaware of the NWICO debate; indeed, even if he or she was
aware, he or she probably would not care a great deal about it
unless they were to lose their sports, popular game shows, soap
operas, or Hollywood feature films.

15. The MacBride Commission performed no original
research. In essence it pulled together existing information
from studies and statistics on both international as well as
national information systems. It is unfortunate that no original
research was undertaken given both the need for it as well as
implications of what the overall investigation sought to
establish. It turned out that there was little cooperation
between the Secretariat of UNESCO, headed by Asher Deleon,
and Sean MacBride. In addition there was considerable
tension among the members of the Commission. But at least it
represents a good basic document in international communi-
cation. The IPDC is now conducting follow-up research.

16. There should be more field and applied training in
LDCs. Much training (both academic and technical) takes
place in the West. This involves sophisticated hardware and the
latest in multimedia equipment. But these learning environ-
ments often leave foreign students with little realistic and
applicable skills in terms of what they will confront upon
returning home.

In addition, there is a related issue. When Western nations
send a team of experts to LDCs in connection with various
development projects, one of their goals should be to include
training a local successor rather than being replaced by other
Western experts or evaluators. Each Western development
project should include a time frame for its own conclusion.
This would avoid some of the self-serving aid projects that

assist Western donors to a greater extent than the recipient nations. Aid projects that perpetuate themselves at the expense of excluding local assistance or leadership should be phased out. Paternalistic media aid is not a solution; in fact, it is a major colonial trait that drives many to the NWICO camp.

17. Some type of tax on the spectrum, or a tax on international data or advertising traffic (Hamelink, 1983), will likely emerge as a potential source of revenue for NWICO, OECD, IPDC, or Maitland projects. This is a sensitive area, but again it illustrates the lack of political finesse by many Western nations in dealing with LDCs. Indeed, the West thinks it is winning the debate. This is not the case. The LDCs are committed to activities that will alter free press media systems and ultimately such changes will have significant effects on the four Western wire services. This is in spite of gains, as Mort Rosenblum (1979: 13) states:

> Many editors, sensitized by the confrontation, have decided to take a more positive approach toward developing countries. Reporters are cautioned to avoid gratuitous sidelights which might be taken as slurs and to seek balancing "good points" when reporting on development setbacks. And they are asked to see things from the point of view of the society they are covering. But a deep-seated conflict remains, not only over how stories should be written but also over what subjects should be broached at all. Western newsmen contend that slight improvement over status quo is not news; violent change is. Coups, upheavals and economic failures, therefore, must be reported fully. Stories on peaceful development must take their place with other world stories in the selection process. Third World leaders argue that for them violent change has been status quo; their slight improvement is news. By harping on discord, they say, reporters are failing to note their hard won progress.

> Whether justified or not, frustrated governments have imposed a dazzling array of restrictive measures to hinder reporting. Border after border was closed to Western newsmen in the 1970s, and there have been expulsions of some type in almost every part of the Third World. Censorship has been developed to a high art. As a result, correspondents have no access at all to

many countries, and in others they can gather news only with difficulty.

South Africa's press rules and censorship are but the latest example of difficulties confronting proper and safe access to major international media events.

18. With the withdrawal of the United Kingdom and United States from UNESCO and a reduction of 30% in UNESCO's budget, this will see a major vacuum created in terms of Western influence in the halls, assemblies, and research performed by UNESCO. As a result, the LDCs and Soviets, along with their client states, will have ample opportunity to promote NWICO issues and research for a number of years; it is likely that the consequences of this vacuum will come back to haunt the very nations that fostered it.

19. UNESCO is now a relatively minor player in the NWICO debate; but the evolving goals of NWICO have been passed to other organizations that are potentially more powerful and influential on the international scene. In particular, OECD, with its concerns about TBDF, the ITU, particularly through its Maitland Commission Report, and the IPDC all have the potential for moving the aims of NWICO to a higher plain with more far-reaching consequences for the day-to-day activities of international broadcasting and communication activities; the relatively modest influence of UNESCO could never have achieved some of the potential changes in the international communication environment that NWICO will herald with the enlarged movement.

20. The debate within UNESCO and the attempt to protect free press and free flow traditions now falls, particularly in UNESCO, upon relatively smaller states such as Canada, Australia, Japan, The Netherlands, Switzerland, and Denmark. These countries do not have the resources, or traditions in some cases, in international media that even come close to the United Kingdom and the United States. As a result, over time, these middle-powered communication nations will likely not be able to sustain the onslaught against free press

traditions, which the USSR and its client states are likely to promote in UNESCO and elsewhere; they will promote the authoritarian media philosophy in order to demonstrate to both the United States and the United Kingdom the folly and crucial error they committed in withdrawing from UNESCO.

21. Because there has been excessive rhetoric and polemical charges made by all sides in the NWICO debate, there is a genuine need for rational empirical research to sort out the various charges of deficiencies and inadequacy. In particular, research is needed to further refine the case of whether it is not so much a reporting of only negative news from LDCs, but whether there is adequate coverage of any type of news from LDCs at all, that is becoming an important issue. New research initiatives should receive high priority from funding agencies and academics alike.

Conclusion

The positioning and expansion of international media and communication activities is now being altered by highly political and vocal forces seeking to further NWICO. Based upon a series of grievances against Western transnational information industries, particularly the wire services, a coalition of LDCs and socialist nations is providing alternative conceptions and rules for international communication and media practices.

The theory of development journalism is an alternative to the traditional free press theoretical orientation of the West. Concerns about the effects of becoming an electronic colony of the West have heightened the awareness of many about the consequences of continued and expanding acceptance of foreign media practices and products. In addition, smaller Western nations are also becoming concerned about their becoming electronic colonies of more powerful Western nations, namely the United States and Japan (Swiss National Commission for UNESCO: 1985).

NWICO issues are not going to be solved or disappear. Media questions will continue to dominate UNESCO, WARC meetings, North-South meetings, the International Programme for Development of Communication, and Maitland. Information technology and international trade concerns will increase within the OECD. These meetings will further define the concept of NWICO as well as operationalize both technical and theoretical research projects aimed at altering the historical ways of dealing with transnational information flows of all types.

Western press and transnational information industries have the most to lose, yet many appear unaware of the potential negative consequences of NWICO.[3] While national daily newspapers transmitted via satellite directly to home videotext systems are being planned by progressive information providers, at the same time, less and less news from around the world may be the reality of the future if government control and restrictive measures are sanctioned as part of NWICO.

But others will argue that NWICO will create a better international information picture, with greater sensitivity, more of a two-way flow, and meaningful pieces on development projects and issues, to the benefit of all concerned.

In sum, the review and analysis of the events leading to the emergence of NWICO and the several organizations and issues impinging upon international communication have been detailed in the previous chapters. Although some commentators either wish that NWICO would go away or openly seek its destruction, a sophisticated analysis and attention to detail indicates otherwise. NWICO is alive and well; its philosophical rationale, particularly as exemplified by development journalism and its aims, has been picked up by other international organizations. As nations embark upon communication infrastructures for the 21st century there is a parallel growing commitment and concern about the cultural, economic, and political aspects of the same highly sophisticated delivery systems. Given the rapid advances in satellite technology,

particularly with digital transmission on the international satellite front or with the greatly expanded capacity of many national systems as a result of fibre optics, there will soon be a plethora of channels and considerable potential for excess capacity. Such a vacuum will likely be filled by international software brokers who will package media fare that could have considerable impact on both indigeneous production in almost all LDCs as well as in several industrialized nations. As a result, the debate surrounding international communication is no longer limited solely to a North-South phenomenon, but indeed cuts across several dimensions involving both East-West as well as North-South concerns. The phrase, "the Dallasization of the electronic world" is a penetrating short-hand comment on the pervasiveness of contemporary media concerns.

Yet, one of the ironies as pointed out in this book is that the United States has the greatest vested interest in the overall international communication debate from both hardware and software perspectives; yet, particularly as represented by its government in international organizations, the United States has sought to make the debate concerning NWICO more emotional than rational or else has sought to withdraw, or in other cases, threatened to withdraw from the same interna-tional agencies that play such a crucial role in terms of coordinating orderly international communication. One would have suspected that the Americans would have provided both the leadership and sophisticated analysis necessary for the public policy discussions and decisions to be made consistent with their international objectives, but that has not been the case. Yet the debate and movement toward NWICO goes on without the U.S. voice in many cases, or with the U.S. voice being isolated even from its usual industrialized allies. In both the United States and United Kingdom there is a lack of a proper understanding of many of the dimensions as well as the commitment to NWICO as exemplified by LDCs embracing a free and balanced flow plus the inclusion of social and cultural

issues within the overall policy debates about international broadcasting and communication.

The activities of IPDC, OECD, ITU, particularly the Maitland Commission, along with questions of transborder data flow and direct broadcast satellites all find themselves interrelated under the umbrella of NWICO; it is the overall international scheme being called for with greater force and certainty as more and more nations, including OECD members, begin to examine the consequences of international communication trade, research, and trends.

In conclusion, those students of international communication who refer to NWICO as a moribund movement of publishers and editors who are openly hostile and adamant in their determination to ignore NWICO, represent a major public policy problem for a serious evaluation of what is an enlarged NWICO as described previously. Hostile rhetoric will not solve or deter what the LDCs seek through NWICO. It is Western nations, of which certainly the United States and the United Kingdom are prime examples, that not only have a fine record in terms of international media services, but they also have a vested interest in maintaining instantaneous connections for both media and commercial information undertakings with the rest of the world. Yet, through their failure to appreciate or participate in debates about an enlarged NWICO and the growth and commitment to several aspects of it, this may mean that in the 21st century there may be greater problems for major Western nations rather than less. Those who are stating that NWICO is dead are not doing themselves or others any favors. It is in fact misleading to portray NWICO as anything other than a major international movement, despite the setbacks within UNESCO. NWICO now will be furthered and enlarged at more and more international meetings that set standards for both hardware and software transfer across national boundaries.

A final word about development journalism. In terms of development journalism or development communication, this, in essence, is the underlying rationale for all media and

communication systems whether they be the Western free press
model, the Socialist model as evidenced by TASS, or develop-
ment journalism as applied to LDCs. In terms of the West, they
lay claim to both a free flow of information model as well as
freedom of the press traditions; yet, an analysis over time
clearly demonstrates that both the free flow and free press are
designed in such a way as to continue and enhance the
economic benefits that are derived by the owners and organi-
zations who staunchly defend such claims and traditions. If
one controls circulation, or the distribution and the bulk of
computerized protocols and information, then it clearly makes
sense to promote activities that will enlarge one's market share
or favor new international commercial opportunities. By doing
so, one is really engaged in development communication on
behalf of a commercial media or communication enterprise.
The commercial enterprise itself, over time, is therefore
developed into an ever larger conglomerate whether it be
Gannett, ATT, Capital Cities, or IBM. They have been
involved with development—their own—for decades.

In terms of the Socialist theories of the press, of course, they
seek to develop and reflect the central party line; they not only
seek to do it within their own borders but also for their client
states such as Cuba or Warsaw Pact countries, plus in other
areas, particularly in some select LDCs. So it also is a
development journalism model but with a strong authoritarian
dimension.

In terms of the LDCs themselves, what they want is a select
application of new media and communication technologies
that will serve their objectives rather than what they perceive to
be the more narrow economic objectives of the Western tech-
nology or software suppliers. And this does not only apply to
the access to technology, but it also applies in a greater sense to
the content to be carried by the communication systems. The
concern over foreign software, whether it be television or
financial data, or the concern about the ability of domestic
productions or computerized systems to receive a fair market
share within LDCs, has become a major goal within the

philosophical NWICO umbrella of development journalism and communication.

This goes to the heart of the NWICO debate. Basically there are two solitudes: Western government officials, media owners, journalists and commercial elites are promoting and advocating communication ideas that have little relevance and little empirical validation for counterpart leaders within LDCs. The leaders of the LDCs do not see, over past decades, any substantial economic change or benefits within their own nation-states as a result of Western media and communication technology being available; nor do they see any future likelihood that substantial change will occur without the LDCs themselves gaining greater control over the media and communication systems. That is why LDC spokespersons are inclined to support development journalism, even if it is only a modest short-run hope for effecting domestic change and encouraging indigenous production. They hope that new software initiatives will be based upon a criterion that is generated within their own nation-states and not imposed on them from without, whether that be by Western wire-services, transnational communication conglomerates, software media brokers, or tied Western media assistance.

Notes

1. Just as in 1493 Pope Alexander VI divided the unexplored mercantile world between Spain and Portugal, so also many LDCs are concerned than that in the 21st century, the untapped electronic markets may be divided by major transnational communication corporations without either LDC participation or knowledge of the decision.

2. The pervasiveness of *Dallas* is reflected in both bedrooms and boardrooms. For example, in the United Kingdom, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has been showing *Dallas* to an average weekly audience of 14 million people since 1978. That is until the competing network, Thames Television, on air as ITV, purchased the *Dallas* rights in 1985, much to the dismay of BBC's management. In fact, BBC went so far as to threaten to cancel their showing of the remainder of the episodes of *Dallas* in order that viewers would be left without a complete season of productions. The audience in the United Kingdom, for example, for the 19th episode of *Dallas* in which

JR was shot, attracted over 27 million viewers—more than half the British population. That, in part, is why Thames Television was willing to pay more than $61,000 (U.S.) per episode whereas the BBC had been paying only $32,000 (U.S.). As a result the BBC lost one of their major rating successes and this event also severely strained the normally peaceful relationship between the two major British television broadcasting systems. BBC executives did not appreciate the unfaithfulness of ITV in outbidding them for the No. 1 U.K. show.

3. The debate about MacBride, the NIEO and NWICO, the IPDC, Maitland, and various international meetings has received scant attention in the daily Western press. This is in spite of the considerable consequences that various aspects of a new order will have on their profession and business. Even when considerable copy is dispatched from UNESCO General Assemblies to various newsrooms via the wire services, little priority is assigned to such items. The following item, "UN quietly enters UNESCO communication fray," from *Presstime* illustrates the above all too well:

> The international debate on how to build a "new world information order" surfaced in the United Nations in December when the General Assembly passed a resolution expressing satisfaction with UNESCO's actions on communications issues in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, last fall [December, 1980: 26].
>
> The resolution specifically mentioned the MacBride Report, a document whose recommendations trouble many Western journalists [Presstime, June 1980: 14]. Yet the American press was anything but alert to this latest development, and no press reports on it appeared for about a month [Presstime, February 1981: 18].

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APPENDIX A

Alignments of the Nonaligned

The nonaligned movement encompasses nearly every shade of political opinion. But on most issues, the members fall into three broad groups. The radicals generally lean toward Russia or China. The conservatives usually tilt toward the West. And the independents stick to the original pupose of their movement: nonalignment with any superpower. *Newsweek* (1979). September 17, p. 50.

Radical

Afghanistan
Algeria
Angola
Cambodia
Congo
Cuba
Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau

Iraq
Laos
Libya
Mauritania
Mozambique
North Korea
Palestine Liberation
   Organization

Patriotic Front of
   Zimbabwe
P.D.R. Yemen
Sao Tomé and Principe
S.W. Africa People's
   Organization
Syria
Vietnam

Conservative

Argentina
Bahrain
Bolivia
Central African Republic
Cyprus
Djibouti
Egypt
Gabon
Indonesia

Ivory Coast
Kenya
Liberia
Malawi
Malaysia
Malta
Morocco
Oman
Qatar

Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Singapore
Togo
United Arab Emirates
Yemen Arab Republic
Zaire

Independent

Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Botswana
Burma
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde Islands
Chad
Comoros
Equatorial Guinea
Gambia
Ghana
Grenada
Guinea
Guyana

India
Iran
Jamaica
Jordan
Lebanon
Lesotho
Madagascar
Maldives
Mali
Mauritius
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Panama

Peru
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Surinam
Swaziland
Tanzania
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Uganda
Upper Volta
Yugoslavia
Zambia

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Appendix B

DRAFT DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE MASS MEDIA TO STRENGTHENING PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING, THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TO COUNTERING RACIALISM, APARTHEID AND INCITEMENT TO WAR

Article I

The strengthening of peace and international understanding, and promotion of human rights and the countering of racialism, apartheid and incitement to war demand a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information. To this end, the mass media have a leading contribution to make. This contribution will be the more effective to the extent that the information reflects the different aspects of the subject dealt with.

Article II

1. The exercise of freedom of opinion, expression and information, recognized as an integral part of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is a vital factor in the strengthening of peace and international understanding.

2. Access by the public to information should be guaranteed by the diversity of the sources and means of information available to it, thus enabling each individual to check the accuracy of facts and to appraise events objectively. To this end, journalists must have freedom to report and the fullest possible facilities of access to information. Similarly, it is important that the mass media be responsive to concerns of peoples and individuals, thus promoting the participation of the public in the elaboration of information.

3. With a view to the strengthening of peace and international understanding, to promoting human rights and to countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war, the mass media throughout the world, by reason of their role, contribute effectively to promoting human rights, in particular by giving expression to oppressed peoples who struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism,

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foreign occupation and all forms of racial discrimination and oppression and who are unable to make their voices heard within their own territories.

4. If the mass media are to be in a position to promote the principles of this Declaration in their activities, it is essential that journalists and other agents of the mass media, in their own country or abroad, be assured of protection guaranteeing them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession.

Article III

1. The mass media have an important contribution to make to the strengthening of peace and international understanding and in countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war.

2. In countering aggressive war, racialism, apartheid and other violations of human rights which are *inter alia* spawned by prejudice and ignorance, the mass media, by disseminating information on the aims, aspirations, cultures and needs of all people, contribute to eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between peoples, to make nationals of a country sensitive to the needs and desires of others, to ensure the respect of the rights and dignity of all nations, all peoples and all individuals without distinction of race, sex, language, religion or nationality and to draw attention to the great evils which afflict humanity, such as poverty, malnutrition and diseases, thereby promoting the formulation by States of policies best able to promote the reduction of international tension and the peaceful and the equitable settlement of international disputes.

Article IV

The mass media have an essential part to play in the education of young people in a spirit of peace, justice, freedom, mutual respect and understanding, in order to promote human rights, equality or rights as between all human beings and all nations, and economic and social progress. Equally they have an important role to play in making known the views and aspirations of the younger generation.

Article V

In order to respect freedom of opinion, expression and informa-tion and in order that information may reflect all points of view, it is

important that the points of view presented by those who consider that the information published or disseminated about them has seriously prejudiced their effort to strengthen peace and international understanding, to promote human rights or to counter racialism, apartheid and incitement to war be disseminated.

Article VI

For the establishment of a new equilibrium and great reciprocity in the flow of information, which will be conducive of the institution of a just and lasting peace and to the economic and political independence of the developing countries, it is necessary to correct the inequalities in the flow of information to and from developing countries, and between those countries. To this end, it is essential that their mass media should have conditions and resources enabling them to gain strength and expand, and to cooperate both among themselves and with the mass media in developed countries.

Article VII

By disseminating more widely all of the information concerning the objectives and principles universally accepted which are the bases of the resolutions adopted by the different organs of the United Nations, the mass media contribute effectively to the strengthening of peace and international understanding, to the promotion of human rights, as well as to the establishment of a more just and equitable international economic order.

Article VIII

Professional organizations, and people who participate in the professional training of journalists and other agents of the mass media and who assist them in performing their functions in a responsible manner, should attach special importance to the principles of this Declaration when drawing up and ensuring application of their codes of ethics.

Article IX

In the spirit of this Declaration, it is for the international community to contribute to the creation of the conditions for a free

flow and wider and more balanced dissemination of information, and the conditions for the protection, in the exercise of their functions, of journalists and other agents of the mass media. UNESCO is well placed to make a valuable contribution in this respect.

Article X

1. With due respect for constitutional provisions designed to guarantee freedom of information and for the applicable international instruments and agreements, it is indispensable to create and maintain throughout the world the conditions which make it possible for the organizations and persons professionally involved in the dissemination of information to achieve the objectives of this Declaration.

2. It is important that a free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information be encouraged.

3. To this end, it is necessary that States should facilitate the procurement, by the mass media in the developing countries, of adequate conditions and resources enabling them to gain strength and expand, and that they should support cooperation by the latter both among themselves and with the mass media in developed countries.

4. Similarly, on a basis of equality of rights, mutual advantage, and respect for the diversity of cultures which go to make up the common heritage of mankind, it is essential that bilateral and multilateral exchanges of information among all States, and in particular between those which have different economic and social systems be encouraged and developed.

Article XI

For this Declaration to be fully effective it is necessary, with due respect for the legislative and administrative provisions and other obligations of Member States, to guarantee the existence of favourable conditions for the operation of the mass media, in conformity with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the corresponding principles proclaimed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966.

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NOTES

Of Related Interest . . .

THE MYTH OF THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION

Social and Ethical Implications of Communication Technology

edited by MICHAEL TRABER, *WACC, London*

Over the past fifteen years much of the discussion surrounding the new "information revolution" has come primarily from a European and North American perspective. Approaching this discussion from a Third World point of view, **The Myth of the Information Revolution** analyzes the economic, political, and developmental contexts of Third World countries on the basis of genuine communication needs rather than technological wants.

The contributors, five of whom are scholars from the Third World, agree that access to economic data is a long-term necessity; that mass media must reorganize and reconceptualize in order to serve development needs; and that grassroot organizations using small media must be encouraged. The authors, moreover, stress the direct relationship between communication development and the realities of Third World economic necessities. What is referred to in the western world as the "information revolution" has as yet had little impact in the Third World; nor will it, the authors argue, until the popular sectors in developing nations assume both economic and communication power.

The Myth of the Information Revolution presents unique material on the debate over the new communication technologies. It will be of interest to scholars working in the fields of development, sociology, communication, and political science. Its level of language and its focus on issues also make it accessible to communication practitioners.

CONTENTS: Foreword S. MacBRIDE / Introduction M. TRABER / 1. The Myth of the Information Revolution C.J. HAMELINK / 2. The Erosion of National Sovereignty by the World Business System H.I. SCHILLER / 3. Communication Satellites and the Third World D.A. DEMAC / 4. The Social Implications of Technological Innovations in Communication J.D. HALLORAN / 5. The Struggle for Rights and Values in Communication P.A.V. ANSAH / 6. Leapfrogging the Industrial Revolution U.V. REDDI / 7. Communication as if People Matter: The Challenge of Alternative Communication M.M. RAMIREZ / 8. Alterna Women's Movements in Latin America M. VIEZZER / Religion in the Technological Era W.F. FORE / Index

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