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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

642-68

HISTORY

PART I: 1941-1947

by

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FBIS, 1942-1966

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Chapter 1 EARLY BEGINNINGS

A superficial examination might suggest that the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) of 1967 is a radically different organization from the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS) of 1941, or even from the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service that emerged from World War II. Today's FBIS is considerably larger, much more efficient, and it handles tasks such as the analysis of foreign documents that were not even considered in the earlier years. Yet in its fundamental organization and responsibilities, its basic operations and methods, the change is not great. FBIS took form during those six years before its adoption by the Central Intelligence Agency, and came to CIA almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it.

The basic operation of monitoring foreign broadcasts was learned and almost perfected prior to 1947. Monitoring is performed today very much as it was then, despite the vast improvements in technical equipment during the past 20 years. Methods of distributing FBIS products, and the extent of distribution, are very much the same today as

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they were in 1947. FBIS emerged then as the only recognized service organization trained and equipped to monitor and process foreign broadcasts for the benefit of all government agencies needing the service. It had thoroughly demonstrated by 1947 that the task of listening to foreign broadcasts and reporting to other government units was an essential task that could not be abandoned, and that the best way to meet the need was to assign the responsibility to one central organization. Worldwide coverage of the foreign radio to the extent it exists today was of course only a dream in 1947, but the goals already were established, and important first steps toward international cooperation to make possible the most efficient organization for worldwide coverage had been taken. The principle that large central monitoring units could do the work more efficiently, but needed to be supplemented by small monitoring posts for maximum coverage, had been tested and adopted. These practices still are followed by FBIS, though of course the number of primary and secondary stations has increased considerably. There should be little doubt, therefore, that the years 1941-47 were of basic importance in the history of FBIS. The organization took form then, and achieved actual, though somewhat uncertain, permanency. Effort during the

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intervening years has been concentrated largely on expansion and refinement.

Recognition of Need for Monitoring

Shortwave radio developed rapidly in the decade leading to the outbreak of World War II, and with the rise of competing ideologies in Europe and Asia, their sponsors seized upon this new and simple vehicle for breaching international boundaries to propagandize and subvert. European democracies quickly became aware of this new threat to their freedom, while in the United States the rapid spawning of shortwave propaganda broadcasts was watched with apprehension. France began a systematic monitoring of German broadcasts in 1935. The French Government also tried jamming the Berlin radio to keep Nazi messages from reaching the French people. Soon it became apparent that the French Government needed to know what Berlin was saying, so the programs were jammed in France--and monitored from Switzerland.

The British, like the Americans later, anticipated the vital need for monitoring and launched listening operations just ahead of the war machine. Sir Beresford Clark, Director of the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), is given credit for starting the service, while Malcolm Frost, head of the BBC Overseas Intelligence Department at the time, supplied the imagination and organizing

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ability that welded the infant activity into an effective organization. With the original aim of serving the News Department of BBC and the newly set up Ministry of Information (MOI) in the Foreign Office, Richard D'A. Marriott loaded about 60 linguists and technicians into a large British bus in the early summer of 1939, took them to Wood Norton Hall, Evesham, and quickly whipped them into a monitoring team that inundated the BBC offices in London with thousands of words of teletype copy that seemed of no value to anyone. Malcolm Frost took it from there and brought order out of chaos. By the time the war started, in September, the BBC was on top of German and other European broadcasts, and by the end of 1940 the BBC Monitoring Service was a going concern with a News Bureau and Editorial Department--corresponding roughly to the FBIS Wire Service and Daily Report Branch.\*

In the United States it was the privately owned news media that first attempted to make use of shortwave broadcasts from abroad. In the summer of 1939 at least three New York dailies--the TIMES, HERALD-TRIBUNE, and NEWS--set up listening centers, while both National and Columbia

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\* In the BULLETIN of the Association of Broadcasting Staff, No. 106 for August 1960, Marriott and other early officials of the Service wrote of the early days of BBC monitoring. A large part of the publication was given over to the Monitoring Service, marking its 21st year of operation.

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Broadcasting Companies began to monitor the shortwave radio a week before the European war started. The primary purpose of these efforts was to supplement the news -- to get information on current developments in Europe faster than they could be supplied by correspondents. The monitoring units were small, and depended largely on shortwave broadcasts in English, which, it eventually was realized, carried the very propaganda that the Nazis and fascists wanted Americans to hear. At the time more than 200 broadcasting stations in the United States carried programs in at least 20 foreign languages for the benefit of immigrant listeners. Of course it was possible for these broadcasters also to listen to foreign propaganda and relay its message to their American constituents.

What apparently was the first U.S. effort to study these foreign broadcasts -- to examine what they were saying and their intent in saying it -- was made by Princeton University. A project of the School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Listening Center was launched on 27 November 1939.\*

Stanford University very soon inaugurated a similar project. It apparently did not do such extensive

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\* Harold D. Graves, Jr., in a memorandum for a writer from Broadcasting Magazine on 24 February 1943, explained the Princeton aims as follows: "Unlike other American posts, the Listening Center interested itself in long-range political and psychological aspects of international broadcasts rather than their immediate news content." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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monitoring as did Princeton, perhaps because its location made it logical for Stanford to concentrate on Asian rather than European broadcasts, which were not so numerous nor so easily intercepted.

As the Nazi threat became more ominous, responsible figures both in and out of government began to worry about the propaganda broadcasts emanating hourly from Berlin and Rome and wonder if they might be poisoning the thought of the ordinary American citizen. Obviously, to find out, it was necessary first to get an accurate record of exactly what the broadcasts were saying. This was possible only through a systematic and continuous listening program, an extension of what already was being done at Princeton and Stanford. The State Department and the Department of Justice were especially concerned, and in these offices the feeling grew that the U.S. Government must not depend upon private interests to inform it of the content of foreign broadcasts.

Toward the end of 1940 the Secretary of State, in an informal discussion with President Roosevelt, suggested that a government unit should be established to monitor and analyze propaganda beamed to the United States. The President was receptive to the idea, and decided that the matter should come under the jurisdiction of the Defense Communications Board. Consequently, on 3 January 1941,

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Breckenridge Long, State Department representative on the Board, introduced a resolution calling upon the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to establish a monitoring service to listen to broadcasts from Europe. Board members representing the Navy Department and FCC took the resolution under study, expanded it to make clear that monitored broadcasts would not be limited to those from Europe, and in its next meeting, on 13 January 1941, the Defense Communications Board approved the resolution. On 21 January the Board approved a formal request to the President that money be transferred from his emergency fund, accompanied by a justification of the request. President Roosevelt acted favorably, and on 25 February 1941 allotted \$150,000 from his emergency fund to FCC for the purpose of monitoring foreign broadcasts. The money was transferred from the Treasury the following day, so the birth date of the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS) was 26 February 1941.\*

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\* The clearest and most succinct account of these developments is contained in the testimony of FBIS Director Robert D. Leigh before the Special Congressional Committee to investigate the FCC on 19 May 1944, starting on page 3439, Volume III, of the Committee Report, GPO 1944. The wording of the resolution, page 3451, shows that the President was asked for \$300,000, and the Defense Communications Board expected to get its support for 1942 also from the emergency fund. Instead, the President allotted \$150,000, and FCC requested and obtained a congressional appropriation to finance the new service through the 1941-42 fiscal year. Thus the organization quickly got Congressional as well as Executive sanction for its operations.

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Membership on the Defense Communications Board

included representatives from the Navy, State, War, and Treasury Departments and from FCC. Though State, Navy, and War were the departments most interested in information to be gleaned from monitoring of foreign broadcasts, there seems never to have been any question that the new assignment would go to FCC. The reason for this is obvious. It was the only group staffed and equipped to undertake the work. In addition to its regulatory activities, which required that FCC maintain a staff of radio engineers, it was assigned in 1940 the additional National Defense task of monitoring the airways for illicit operations. The Radio Intelligence Division (RID) of FCC received for the 1941-42 fiscal year a special defense appropriation of nearly two million dollars to carry on this work, and had set up primary monitoring posts in six states, Puerto Rico, Alaska, and Hawaii. In the fall of 1940, largely at the urging of the Department of Justice, it had started recording many foreign language broadcasts emanating from U.S. stations and had hired a staff of translators to supplement its engineers in the special defense work assigned to it. These operations, all financed from special defense appropriations, were called the National Defense Activities (NDA) of FCC. In its formal request to the President, the Defense Communications Board described its plan for the monitoring of foreign broadcasts as "a substantial expansion" in the current

monitoring activities of FCC.\*

After the \$150,000 was transferred from the President's fund, the Bureau of the Budget approved an additional transfer of \$85,000 from RID's special appropriation, giving the new service \$235,000 to launch operations. Late in 1941 Congress approved a supplemental appropriation of \$600,000, making a total available through 30 June 1942 of \$835,000.

#### Assembling a Staff

The new organization set up by FCC was named the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS), and headquarters were obtained in an old garage at 316 F Street Northeast. Getting started was essentially a pioneering operation. Looking about for a working model, FCC found none in existence in the United States, though the BBC monitoring post in England might have provided a suitable model had an FCC man been sent to study its setup. Like FCC, the BBC had been selected to handle the monitoring operation because it was the organization physically equipped to do so.

However, nearer at hand was the Princeton Listening

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\* The full statement reads: "Accordingly, the Defense Communications Board recommends a substantial expansion in monitoring activities of the Federal Communications Commission to include continuous recordings of foreign press and propaganda broadcasts which can be heard within the United States." Page 3773, Volume III, Report of Special Congressional Committee to Investigate the FCC, GPO 1944.

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Post, which had been operating for about 16 months and had attracted considerable attention. Though on a smaller scale than the governmental monitoring service envisioned by FCC and the Defense Communications Board, it offered a reasonable facsimile. Therefore FCC took a very logical first step. It hired Harold D. Graves, Jr., the young man who had been acting as director of the Princeton Listening Post since its inception, to help in organizing FBMS. Mr. Graves' first title was Senior Administrative Officer, and it was his duty to assemble a staff and help plan the next steps of the incipient organization. FCC officials set about to find a director with sufficient experience and prestige, and eventually chose Lloyd Free, editor of PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, also of Princeton. In addition to having worked with the Princeton Listening Post, Mr. Free also had spent some time in England and was familiar with monitoring methods of the BBC. Eventually the FBMS staff was augmented by the addition of Jerome S. Bruner, Bennett Ferrell Ellington, Arthur Mathieu, and Arthur Cantor, all of whom had worked with the Princeton Center, so the Princeton imprint on the new organization was quite noticeable during its early stages. Mr. Free also had spent some time at Stanford, and was familiar with monitoring operations there. In a letter to a Princeton faculty member after FBMS was well launched, Mr. Graves

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acknowledged the importance of the Princeton example.\*

Mr. Graves later was named Assistant Director, and served as Acting Director during several periods before joining the Navy in 1943. Mr. Free assumed office as Director on 16 June 1941.

Until the middle of the summer of 1941, activities of FBMS consisted largely of assembling a staff, though engineers at the RID station at Laurel, Maryland, regularly were tuning in foreign stations and recording programs. As translators were hired they were set to work translating from these records, and in a few months a sizeable collection of transcripts had been accumulated. Editors and analysts also were hired and immediately put to work. Prior to August 1941 the amount of useful material obtained from broadcasts and put into the hands of officials needing it was practically negligible, but the time was not wasted, for new employees were getting practice and experience.

Clerical help was easy to find at first, and a skeleton staff was quickly assembled. As soon as a sufficient number

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\* Writing to John B. Whitton, credited with starting the Princeton Listening Center, Graves said on 29 December 1941: "The work of the Center, it goes without saying, has been of great assistance to the Monitoring Service. First, the Center's contribution of trained personnel to this organization has been of considerable value; second, its reports of broadcasting have proved to be valuable; and third, of course, the techniques developed at the Center have served us in good stead." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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of editors and analysts were at work, FBMS began issuing spot bulletins summarizing specific Axis propoganda campaigns. One of the first ones, issued in July, made a study of German radio charges that the United States was a threat to the independence of Latin American states. This report was of sufficient interest to merit a small promotion campaign, with FCC Chairman Lawrence Fly sending copies to selected government officials along with a letter outlining the progress made by the growing FBMS staff.

Standards of capability set for FBMS editors and analysts were very high. In a letter to an applicant on 17 March 1941 Mr. Graves listed the minimum qualification for a report editor as a graduate degree in foreign affairs with three years of cable editing or two years as a foreign correspondent. A prospective wire editor was expected to have at least four years' experience in copy reading or newspaper desk work. In June Graves wrote that the most important requirement for FBMS editors was that they be well informed, "in a political sense," on various countries or geographical areas, and that "first-hand contact with foreign countries through residence" was highly desirable. He listed the sources from which FBMS had successfully obtained capable editors as organizations recently engaged in shortwave listening, foundations concerned with foreign studies, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, and voluntary

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applicants.\* Positions assigned to editors ranged up to CAF-11, paying \$3,800 a year. One of the first editors hired at this grade was Thomas A. Grandin, who had been CBS correspondent in Paris and was fired by CBS because he left Paris at the time of the German invasion without prior permission. Because of this mark on his record he was appointed conditionally, but soon was promoted and named Chief Editor, a position he held until he returned to work as a correspondent shortly before the Normandy invasion. Apparently editors who could meet the standards were not readily available, for in the autumn of 1941 Graves and Free were writing to such publications as the New York TIMES and EDITOR AND PUBLISHER outlining the agency's needs. On 17 October Free wrote EDITOR AND PUBLISHER correcting its news column statement that foreign experience was not required in FBMS editorial positions.\*\*

Standards were even higher for analysts. Both Free and Graves made clear in all correspondence that FBMS was interested only in candidates on the Ph.D. level who had

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\* Graves letter to the Civil Service Commission on 12 June 1941 explaining qualifications desired in FBMS editors and the apparent inability of the CSC to supply suitable candidates from its own register. FBIS Records, National Archives.

\*\* Free explained that the requirement was "extensive foreign experience or at least a sound knowledge of foreign conditions gained through specialized study." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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done outstanding work in social psychology or political science. It was readily apparent that analysts were counted upon to produce the documents that would demonstrate the value of the new unit.\* Prospective analysts were classified as high as P-6, starting at \$5,600, and it was with a real sense of accomplishment that Graves announced in October 1941 that Goodwin Watson, eminent social psychologist of Columbia University, would accept a P-6 and serve as head of the Analysis Section. Several other university professors with high credentials were enlisted, but here, too, standards had to be lowered somewhat. Quite a few Junior Professional Assistants

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\* A memorandum by Graves dated 1 May 1941 adequately outlines the lofty goals he held for accomplishments of the analysts: "An Analysis Section will conduct scientific studies of content, primarily from a psychological point of view, with the purpose of clearly delineating the methods and objectives of foreign efforts to influence the attitudes of various national publics toward the United States and toward war issues generally. Such a scientific study is particularly necessary because such methods and objectives for the most part do not appear on the surface of the material. In general, the possible importance of the careful surveillance of foreign radio broadcasts lies in the fact that such broadcasts provide a convenient medium in which to observe propaganda efforts which may be made in other media not so easy to follow: that is, by word of mouth, or on the public platform, in printed literature, and in motion pictures distributed by Germany, for example, in Europe and in Latin America. The new service will therefore be able, in a great measure, to observe foreign efforts to prejudice the legitimate interests and policies of the United States, either here or elsewhere, and to keep our country informed of the nature and objectives of these efforts." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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were hired at salaries of \$2,300 and \$2,600 and trainees were paid as low as \$1,800. By 8 October 1941 the new service had 12 analysts and 16 editors at work.

In hiring translators, only those capable in at least two foreign languages were at first considered, with the additional requirement that they have some experience in foreign affairs or had resided in foreign countries. A surprisingly large number of capable translators were found at salaries of \$2,300, but most applicants had to be rejected. FBMS translators had to work from recordings of broadcasts, often interspersed with static and various other distortions common in shortwave transmissions. A high proportion of applicants simply could not do the work. Another handicap also developed quite early. Many of the most promising translators were not American citizens, and regulations forbade hiring aliens. Japanese translators were especially difficult to find. A report on 30 July 1941 showed that FBMS had communicated with 38 prospective Japanese translators, with only 16 showing up for the language test. Ten of the 16 had passed, but three had declined appointment, the loyalty of one had been questioned, three had been hired, and three more might yet be considered. Of the 22 who had not been tested, eight had refused to take the test, 11 simply had failed to report, and only three remained as prospects. Yet in

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spite of the difficulties, Graves reported on 25 August 1941 that FBMS now had satisfactory language capability in Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, Italian, Swedish, Finnish, German, Lithuanian, Polish, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Croat, Russian, Japanese, Mandarin, Cantonese, and a few other Chinese dialects. For summaries and rough translations, the staff had additional limited capabilities in Danish, Norwegian, Czech, and Hungarian.

During October and November 1941, both Free and Graves devoted much of their time to answering letters from applicants. A majority were rejected because they were aliens, because they had not taken Civil Service examinations, or simply because they were not adjudged to have the proper credentials. Of those whose applications were received favorably, many later declined appointment. Yet, despite these many rejections, Graves reported in August 1941 that 220 persons had been hired.\*

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) seems to have provided the most formidable handicaps. Lloyd Free wrote on 31 July 1941 that matters had taken "a bad turn;" FBMS had been relatively free to hire personnel after conferences with CSC personnel, but now it seemed that CSC was

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\* Graves letter to Arthur Cantor, 11 August 1941. Graves said that the total staff would number 380, but they had been "plowing through heavy seas -- Congress on one side and the CSC on the other." FBIS Records, National Archives.

disallowing appointment of anyone not listed on a Civil Service register. Graves complained in a letter to a prospective employee that every day a new law or executive order placed more and more positions under Civil Service. "I do not know of a single agency, with the exception of the FBI, which is not now nailed to the Civil Service cross."\* In a memorandum written a few days earlier, Free accused CSC of refusing to understand personnel problems of FBMS, of offering for employment persons from "completely inappropriate" registers, of adopting an obstructive attitude, and of not giving the cooperation due a National Defense Agency\*\*

On 25 November 1941 Graves asked FCC to request that CSC make FBMS exempt from two regulations: That it be allowed to hire aliens, and that it be allowed to hire per diem consultants without regard to CSC registers. The first request was disallowed. Writing to CSC on

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\* Graves letter dated 11 August 1941, FBIS Records, National Archives.

\*\* Lloyd Free memorandum to Chairman Fly of FCC, 9 August 1941. Free said CSC had presented 300 names on its visual translator register, when the FBMS had specifically called for speech translators. In seeking a chief for the Translation Section he had asked for candidates with both language and administrative experience. CSC had presented 14 names, not one with language skills. In sending candidates for editorial positions, CSC had flatly disregarded FBMS specifications. Only one of the 14 candidates CSC recommended as analysts was acceptable, as the others were trained in such fields as psychological aptitude testing. IBID.

20 January 1942, Free said he was "glad to know" that CSC had established registers suitable for selection of FBMS personnel, but cited the "voluminous and burdensome" correspondence that his office had been forced to carry on with universities, the American Newspaper Guild, and the Foreign Press Correspondents Association during preceding months in an effort to find suitable candidates for FBMS positions.

#### Development of Plans and Methods

First actual monitoring was done at the RID monitoring post at Laurel, Maryland. FCC engineers stationed at Laurel were assigned to cruise for foreign shortwave programs, record them, and send the records to FBMS at 316 F St. As work progressed, more recordings were made, and were transported to headquarters more frequently. By the end of the summer of 1941 the station wagon used to haul records was making several trips a day, and fresh records were pouring into 316 F St. night and day. Some were translated immediately, with transcripts in the hands of editors and analysts in a few hours after the broadcasts appeared on the air. At first the engineers were entirely on their own in selecting stations, but as translators, editors, and analysts became familiar with the different programs the engineers were requested to record some of them regularly, while others were dropped. Gradually

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fixed schedules took shape, and monitoring achieved some semblance of order. The transporting of records soon was recognized as burdensome and inefficient. Engineers began to look for a site nearer Washington, and found a satisfactory one, including a building that required only some repairs, at Silver Hill, Maryland. FCC on 23 August approved use of the new site for FBMS monitoring, and Laurel was abandoned except for normal RID operations. As soon as arrangements could be made, telephone lines were run between Silver Hill and 316 F St., so translators could listen to the programs as they were being broadcast. By October this procedure was being followed. Now engineers tuned in the programs at Silver Hill, "piped" them by wire to receivers at FBMS headquarters, and the translator there listened to the program while it was being recorded. Actual monitoring, as distinguished from recording, translating, and reporting, seems to have been a pet project of Lloyd Free. From October 1941 he insisted that as many linguists as possible listen to the piped-in broadcasts with their typewriters before them, and attempt to provide immediate monitored summaries of broadcasts. This was Free's adaptation of the system already in use in the BBC.\*

Government officials first concerned about foreign broadcasts had in mind those programs beamed to the United

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\* Undated "History of FBIS" found in CIA Records Center, Job 54-27, Box 15.

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States and aimed at influencing the thoughts and attitudes of Americans. They wanted to detect the intent and techniques of foreign propagandists in order to counteract the propaganda. The system of monitoring envisioned by Harold Graves was based essentially on an analysis of foreign broadcasts. The aim at Princeton was to study foreign propaganda, and to Graves the heart of FBMS must be the Analysis Section. He outlined his conception rather clearly to an applicant on 26 May 1941.\* Lloyd Free, on the other hand, familiar with BBC monitoring operations as well as the Princeton and Stanford listening posts, attached as much -- perhaps more -- importance to direct reporting of what the foreign radio was saying as to analysis, and foresaw that FBMS must devote considerable attention to direct and rapid monitoring and reporting. This was a possibility that Graves considered very remote when he started to enlist a staff. After October 1941,

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\* Graves said: "This service, as you perhaps know, will receive, record, transcribe, and analyze broadcasts originating all over the world, with primary attention to transmissions directed to the Western Hemisphere. It is part of our intention to subject these programs to a careful classification and tabulation of references which will enable us to describe precisely the main stresses of foreign propaganda, to follow in some detail the trends and shifts which will develop, and to interpret these things carefully in relation to the intent of the various broadcasting nations. In connection with this work, we consider a knowledge of social psychology to be of prime importance." FBIS Records, National Archives.



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when telephone lines to Silver Hill were installed, the more highly skilled translators became monitors, listening to programs as they were being recorded and typing running summaries of the news broadcasts and commentaries. Translators who were able to do this satisfactorily, who could produce accurate and readable summaries immediately after the broadcasts ended, were no longer called translators; they were monitors, and commanded a higher CSC rating and higher pay.

Another early innovation of Lloyd Free was inauguration of a wire service to report quickly the contents of foreign broadcasts. He first approached William Langer of the office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) headed by Col. William Donovan, learned that the Washington and New York offices of COI would be enthusiastic about receiving promptly the summaries of monitored broadcasts -- in fact would be willing to pay the costs of teletyping the material from FBMS headquarters to their offices -- and had the service installed before the end of October 1941.\* In November 1941, following conversations of Free with officials of the State Department, a separate wire

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\* Langer wrote Chairman Fly as follows on 3 December 1941: "All of this material seems to me to be not only interesting, but important for our purposes, and I know that I am speaking for Colonel Donovan when I say that we, in this office, are eager to maintain the closest contact and cooperation with your agency." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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service to State was inaugurated, operating eight hours a day. The two wires were kept separate, as COI wanted monitored summaries, while State desired texts of significant items. The State circuit later was named the "A Wire," with that to COI called the "B Wire."

Free also must be credited with establishment of the Program Information Unit in September 1941 for use of monitors in keeping up with schedule changes. This unit did not start issuing a regular publication until March 1942, but new programs located by the engineers, program changes and revisions reported by the engineers and consultants, were forwarded to one employee, who organized them and made sure they were in the hands of all responsible personnel who could use the information.

In a letter written in March 1942 Graves stated that FBMS "did not begin full and formal operations until early in August." However, special publications on an experimental basis were being distributed several months before that. The first one, called "German Broadcasts to North America," was issued in March 1941 and was produced irregularly until June. In July, with facilities for mimeographing having been installed and adequately staffed, the "Spot Bulletins" began, each one treating a separate subject. On 11 August 1941 appeared a new format -- "Foreign Broadcasts: Highlights of 11 August." This consisted largely of a summarization of broadcasts. By September it had

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undergone another change. Now four separate publications were appearing: A Daily Digest of Broadcasts to North America; a Daily Digest of Broadcasts to Latin America; a Daily Analysis of Broadcasts to North and Latin America; and the Special Reports, published irregularly. On 18 November 1941 appeared the first "Daily Report of Foreign Radio Broadcasts." It carried both texts and summaries, and from that date remained the standard product of the Report Section. The Analysis Section continued to issue a daily analysis of foreign broadcasts, but before 6 December 1941 it was decided to abandon daily analyses and use the week as a time unit. The first weekly analysis, the "Weekly Review," appearing the day before Pearl Harbor, was of particular significance because it showed that the Japanese radio had dropped its tone of caution and was assuming a belligerent attitude.

FCC cooperated fully with FBMS in introducing monitoring products to various government offices. The primary method was for a publication to be mailed from the office of Chairman Lawrence Fly, with a covering letter signed by him to the department head of the recipient office. Such a letter went to President Roosevelt on 8 July 1941 along with a spot report showing the "German Attempt to Bewilder U.S. Public Opinion." Chairman Fly called the document "a special, preliminary report," and noted that FBMS was getting organized and

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soon would be providing daily reports. Similar letters at various times went to Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of State Hull, and many lesser department heads.\* Replies were received thanking Chairman Fly for the publications and asking that certain offices be placed on the mailing list. By the time the regular Daily Report was issued on 18 November 1941, the mailing list included 87 offices.

Harold Graves had wide contacts with universities and other non-governmental organizations as a result of his work at the Princeton Listening Post. Many of these were desirous of getting regularly FBMS publications and transcripts of radio broadcasts. Graves at first was inclined to honor such requests, but FCC ruled that distribution should be confined largely to U.S. Government offices. In addition, it was soon evident that the demand would soon overtax reproduction facilities of the infant organization. On 9 July 1941 Graves wrote the Institute

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\* A typical letter was that written to Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, on 30 August 1941. In it Fly said: "For the last few days you have been receiving copies of the spot bulletins describing the highlights of foreign shortwave broadcasts issued by FBMS. The monitoring service is still in its organizational phases, and will not be prepared to issue its regular complete daily reports until a week or ten days from now. Needless to say, you will receive them, and also weekly analyses of foreign shortwave broadcasts, as soon as the monitoring service begins to issue them." Of course these letters were prepared in FBMS to be mailed over Chairman Fly's signature. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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of Pacific Relations regretfully refusing its request for transcripts, explaining that the newly adopted policy supplied only Princeton and Stanford outside the government. Lloyd Free, in a letter on 29 September 1941 to Charles Rolo, who was preparing a book on shortwave broadcasting and monitoring, explained that "existing policy requires that the work of FBMS be veiled in considerable secrecy," with distribution only to government offices.

Occasionally this policy was relaxed. In a memorandum to Chairman Fly on 10 October 1941, Free inclosed a copy of an Army daily digest based on FBMS reports which was going to public subscribers, and recommended that FCC offer no objection to the practice. Yet Graves reported on 5 December 1941, in rejecting another request, that FBMS reporting was not being released "to any persons or organizations outside the government," and that "Lloyd is quite strict about this."

With the hiring of Lech Zychlinsky in December 1941, organization of the professional sections of FBMS was complete. Grandin headed the Report Section, Watson the Analysis Section, and Zychlinsky the Translation Section. Engineers remained under RID and were not considered a part of FBMS. Clerical work -- typing, mimeographing, mailing -- was organized into a number of units.

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Moves Toward Expansion

It was never anticipated that all monitoring would be handled in the F St. office of FBMS or that all recordings initially would be made at Laurel, Maryland, but the extent of dispersal seems to have been pretty much a question mark for a number of months. A news release by FCC on 19 March 1941 stated rather vaguely that "after being recorded in the field" the radio material would be "coordinated and studied in Washington." Wayne Mason, named by FCC to direct FCC National Defense Operations (NDO), the name given to the engineering division of NDA, wrote a memorandum on 7 March 1941 concerning the new broadcast recording operations and the NDO staff that would be required to carry it out. He listed RID stations that would take part in the program as Laurel; Grand Island, Nebraska; Millis, Massachusetts; Portland, Oregon; and San Juan, Puerto Rico. According to an undated account of the early plans found in FBIS records,\* engineering plans at first envisioned use of these five stations plus Kingsville, Texas. Laurel was to record programs from Latin America, Asiatic Russia, and the Far East; Portland, Asia and Latin America; Millis, Europe, the USSR, Africa, and Australia; San Juan, Europe and Central and South America; Kingsville, Central America and Mexico; Grand Island, Europe, Asia, and Latin

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\* f. History of FBIS, RC Job No. 54-27, Box 15, CIA Records Center.

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America. Millis and Grand Island soon were dropped to simplify communications, the account says, and a heavier load was assigned to Laurel. All of these posts were primary monitoring stations of RID. About all this preliminary planning demonstrates is the utter lack of knowledge concerning the practice of shortwave broadcast monitoring.

There is no evidence that Millis and Grand Island ever did any recording for FBMS, but the other four stations did from the beginning, or as soon as they could be staffed for it. Graves said in a letter to George E. Sterling, Chief of RID, on 6 May 1941 that "in about two weeks" NDA should start providing translations from Japanese. He estimated they would be able to place these translations in the hands of Hawaii military commanders in three or four days after the broadcasts. Graves wrote the Stanford Listening Center on 30 April 1941 that the Pacific Coast station had "now gone into preliminary operations," and on or about 1 June would be "recording trans-Pacific transmissions," including those being covered by Stanford. The programs he referred to were to be recorded at Portland. A New York TIMES article on 24 April 1941 described operations of the new monitoring agency, saying that eventually

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there would be eight listening posts.\*

It is apparent that the early plans underwent a rapid change, for on 1 April 1941 Wayne Mason wrote that "about 50 percent" of NDA work would be concentrated at Laurel; this would require 16 engineers, 16 radio receivers, 8 continuous recorders, and a new antenna system. Work proceeded on that basis, and in a progress report to FCC on 22 May 1941 Graves said that 20 of the assigned engineers were at work in four stations, that antenna had been installed at San Juan and soon would be in at the other three locations, and that all of the four stations had received half their assigned quota of recording equipment. He suggested that full operations might be possible by 15 July. In a letter on 24 July 1941 Graves explained that all except engineering operations were being conducted in Washington, but "as part of the new plan," translators, stenographers, and reporters would be sent to Portland and Puerto Rico "in order to make quick reports to Washington and avoid the necessity of waiting for mail shipments or recordings." Mention of the "new plan" suggests that originally there was no thought of dispersing the non-engineering staff

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\* The TIMES article explained: "The stations are units of the Commission's monitoring system which, for years, has been able to police the air and punish illegal transmissions and other violations of the rules of the ether. There are in all about 90 stations in the monitoring system, but the larger ones will undertake the principal work of receiving the broadcasts from other nations."

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outside Washington. No documents have been found outlining the processes by which this change came about. However, in a memorandum to the staff on 26 August 1941, Graves reported that the appropriation bill recently signed by the President provided for "decentralization" of FBMS, with posts to be established in Portland and Santurce, Puerto Rico, as soon as possible, modeled after the headquarters setup except for the absence of analysts. Employees, he said, would have a choice as to transfer "wherever practicable." This appropriation bill was of necessity prepared months before.

Of the three stations away from Washington, need for the Portland post was most apparent. Recordings of Japanese broadcasts began arriving in Washington about the middle of April, consisting first of three or four programs daily. By June the number had reached 20, and by August it was 25. By 13 September 1941 engineers were recording Japanese broadcasts 24 hours a day.\*\* The FBMS office was not equipped to process all the

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\* Graves' announcement was anticipated by a WASHINGTON POST article on 22 August 1941 which told of funds for decentralization and said that FBMS would send 49 employees to Portland and 46 to Puerto Rico, and would hire 105 new employees. A longer item in the DAILY NEWS the same day added that plans also called for a similar station at Kingsville, Texas.

\*\* "Report of FBMS Coverage of Tokyo up to Pearl Harbor," f. History of FBIS, RC Job No. 54-27, Box 15, CIA Records Center.

records from any station, and by August was merely attempting to sample them. Especially was it impossible for the tiny Japanese Translation Section to process all Japanese language records. At the time, Tokyo was broadcasting to 13 areas in 16 languages, a total of 41 hours a day. The demand for Japanese transcripts was growing rapidly, especially within the military. On 17 September 1941 Graves announced that 20 persons were being transferred to Portland to set up a new monitoring station. Included in the 20 were the three Japanese and one Chinese linguists currently on the Washington staff. Most of the group left by train for Portland on 27 September 1941, and were ready for operations about 1 October. They were stationed in a farmhouse 10 miles from Portland and two miles from the RID primary. William Carter was named Chief of the new post.

It was soon discovered that monitoring Japanese broadcasts from Portland was not easy. Carter wrote Grandin on 6 October 1941 that reception was "rotten" on the material beamed to China, that the engineers "have to fight" to get Tokyo broadcasts 24 hours a day. On 11 October he wrote that Tokyo seemed to have got its broadcast to Hawaii beamed "more accurately," and as a result it was impossible to pick it up, though they suspected that most of it was a repeat of other broadcasts.

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Communications problems also now appeared for the first time. The station at first sent its material in a night letter via Western Union -- one long telegram summarizing the day's broadcasts. Grandin complained in a letter to Carter on 9 October 1941 that the telegram was not arriving before 0930, and Western Union had been asked to investigate. Writing on 14 October 1941, Carter explained that his editors were trying to do an over-all job for both the Analysis and Reports Sections in Washington, and thus could not get the telegram to the Western Union office before 0200 Portland time. He added that the cost was running about \$10 a night, or between \$3,000 and \$4,000 a year. In another letter on 23 October Carter said the engineers were trying to bring in Russian stations, but found reception very uneven. The Japanese staff, he said, had "no sense of urgency" because of the "stereotyped quality" of the Japanese language broadcasts, which were largely repeats of the English, and because of the poor reception. He suggested that many of their troubles might be dissolved if engineers in Alaska were able to copy internal Japanese broadcasts and send the recordings to Portland for processing -- overlooking the fact that this would represent only a slight improvement over sending them to Washington for processing.

It was apparent that FBMS officials in Washington

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considered the daily telegram from Portland unsatisfactory -- at best a stop-gap arrangement. Graves in a letter to Carter on 24 October 1941 agreed that Western Union was preferable at present, but that "when the monitoring operation commences" copy would need to arrive in Washington sooner, and that the office was ready to hire a trained teletypist as soon as Portland was ready for it. (He also revealed that the original plan was for Portland to run its copy off on master sheets, ditto what was needed, and send the sheets to Washington for further processing. Apparently this plan already had been abandoned.) Writing on 30 November, Carter continued to complain of poor reception, but praised the two Chinese monitors and spoke of "seriously considering" a "monitoring operation in Chinese." Obviously, prior to Pearl Harbor the Portland staff had given little thought to the rapid processing of significant texts from Japanese broadcasts for immediate publication and distribution in Washington.

Setting up an FBMS office in London represented a radical departure from the original aims of the organization. First plans envisioned only the monitoring and analysis of broadcasts beamed to North and South America and the Caribbean -- shortwave broadcasts targeted on the Western Hemisphere. Establishment of a staff in London to make use of the product of BBC monitoring

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broadened this assignment considerably, as much of the BBC effort was devoted to coverage of long and medium wave broadcasts beamed to Europe. The Special Congressional Committee Investigating FCC later attempted to demonstrate that establishment of a bureau in London was illegal and unauthorized, but examination of the first appropriation act granting funds to FBMS, approved by Congress in the summer of 1941, showed the fallacy of this argument.\*

Being acquainted with BBC operations, Lloyd Free established contacts with BBC officials very soon after he assumed office with the idea of attaching a staff to BBC. A wire to Broadcasting House, London, on 19 August 1941 stated that FBMS was anxiously awaiting a reply to his proposal. On 26 August 1941 Free informed Gerald Cook, a representative of BBC in New York, that BBC had agreed to give an FBMS staff access to its monitored materials, and in return FBMS would supply BBC with materials broadcast from the Far East and Latin America.\*\* Free wrote to Lindsay Wellington, newly appointed BBC

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\* Page 3777 and following pages, Volume III, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate the FCC. GPO 1944.

\*\* The actual papers documenting this agreement, referred to in the Free letter, have not showed up in the FBIS Records, but this outlined exchange of services has always been considered as the basis for U.S. - British cooperation.

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representative in North America with headquarters in New York, on 10 September 1941 expressing pleasure that FBMS would be allowed to send a representative to London. The man had been selected, Free said, and after a brief period of preliminary training FBMS would be "ready to begin the cooperative arrangements discussed with you some time ago -- at any time you give the signal."

Tom Grandin had been considered to head the London office, but when it was decided that he should remain in Washington as Chief Editor, a 29-year-old Columbia graduate named Peter J. Rhodes, who had served five years as a foreign correspondent for the United Press, was selected. Writing Rhodes on 2 October 1941, Free said he hoped to have his appointment through by 16 October, and upon his arrival in Washington they would discuss conditions under which he would work in England. A letter from Chairman Fly to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on 19 October 1941 outlined plans for sending men to London, and the project was given formal State Department approval in a reply by Breckinridge Long dated 24 November. By that time both Rhodes and Free were on their way to London, having left by clipper on 21 November 1941. Two other editors, Bennett (Duke) Ellington and Vincent O. Anderson, left for London a few days later. Free's letters during this period of preparation indicated that material obtained from BBC would be telephoned to Washington.

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Meantime, steps were continued for opening other field stations. Fly wrote FCC representatives in Puerto Rico on 24 September 1941 that Carroll Hauser from RID would arrive in San Juan on 12 October to make plans for opening a monitoring post there. Free, in a letter to Puerto Rico Commissioner Pagan, noted on 11 October 1941 that establishment of a bureau in Puerto Rico had proved to be "extraordinarily complicated," and it would be at least six weeks before even a start could be made. However, Graves notified George Sterling on 24 November that Edward B. Rand, who would be in charge of NDA work in Puerto Rico, would dock at San Juan on 1 December and would proceed to work with the engineers in setting up a monitoring post at Santurse, a suburb of San Juan. Hauser had selected the site on his earlier trip, and antenna already had been installed.

Technical changes were made in the primary RID station at Kingsville, Texas, early in 1941, and on 1 July the station started recording Latin American broadcasts and airmailing them to Washington. The Kingsville antenna built for monitoring Latin American broadcasts was considered exceptionally well constructed. In the early autumn George Chesnutt, a translator in the Washington office who formerly lived in Texas, was sent to Kingsville to sample broadcasts, advise on cruising, and take the first steps toward organizing a field station. With the

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aid of one additional translator, he was at work when the Pearl Harbor attack came and was sending a considerable amount of broadcast copy to Washington. Arrangements already had been made for installation of a teletype line between the two stations.

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Chapter 2 · IMPACT OF PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The FBMS station in Washington, with its Broadcast Recording Unit (BRU) at Silver Hill, was an operating organization on 7 December 1941. The Portland post also was operating, though it was not yet in any sense prepared to cope with the demands soon to be made upon it. Personnel had been sent to the other three field stations, but it could not be said that they were operating. Nothing had been filed from Puerto Rico. At Kingsville, George Chesnutt still was sampling Latin American broadcasts and mailing some of the more interesting transcripts to Washington. London was in a position to render immediate service, as the staff there had the entire output of the BBC monitoring operation from which to draw. However, the three editors in London, and Lloyd Free, still were attempting to complete arrangements with BBC and had done nothing toward establishing adequate communications with Washington. It must be said that when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor suddenly plunged the United States into war, FBMS was in position, but only partially prepared.

Increased Demand for Services

With Lloyd Free still in London, Harold Graves and Tom Grandin took over at 316 F St. on 7 December 1941 and

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tried to make the best use of the overwhelmed staff.\* The Wire Service was most immediately affected. State Department in the evening of 7 December requested that the wire continue filing throughout the night, and when this was successfully accomplished, asked that the service continue on a 24-hour basis. On Pearl Harbor Sunday, State was the only A Wire client, receiving copy 8 hours each day, but by the next Sunday six users were getting 24-hour service. By 6 January 1942 the service was going to 10 offices and several others were awaiting installation. Grandin wrote Rand on 28 February 1942 that the A Wire was then serving 18 defense offices, and carrying an average of 25,000 words a day.\*\* He added that the increased demand for the Daily Report paralleled that for the Wire Service, and that no one in the office had had time to consider the problem of assigning programs

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\* ON THE BEAM, the FBMS monthly house organ, in its issue for 24 December 1941, described the hectic scene: "Translators became monitors, Daily Report editors became wire editors -- and some of them did double duty. Typists became transcribers, and august officials of the service from the director's office down, took a hand at punching the teletype." FBIS Records, National Archives.

\*\* A request to CSC on 13 January 1942 asked that FBMS be furnished an available list of qualified candidates for a new class of editors to be called "Government Agency Correspondents." They were wanted for filing intelligence to government offices by wire, and must be "outstanding journalists or broadcasters" with "wide experience abroad and thoroughly familiar with international affairs." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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to Kingsville and Puerto Rico.

Goodwin Watson informed the Portland office on 23 March 1942 that Chinese and Russian copy being filed to Washington was nowhere near sufficient to give the analysts a firm basis for meeting the demands of their subscribers. One of the Portland editors, Bradford Coolidge, spent several days in Washington in March in an effort to obtain a clearer idea of what was needed. In a letter to Portland he asked that monitors make freer use of their own observations, for example, the amount of applause, or the absence of it, during a public address. He added that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of War Information (OWI) both reported that they were depending on the FBMS for most of their current intelligence.

In the weeks following the start of the war, most agencies commenting upon FBMS services wanted more information, but there also was praise. R. C. Tryon of COI wrote Free on 23 December 1941 that his staff regularly combed the Daily Report for information of value, and were all "greatly impressed by the increasingly wide scope of the coverage." Letters of commendation for FBMS efforts came from such officials as Nelson A. Rockefeller, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA); Milo Perkins of the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW); Col.

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W. W. Pettigrew of the War Department Military Intelligence Service; and J. O. Rennie of the British Information Service. Praise for FBMS information came from as far away as the Ambassador's office in Peru.

Of course all field stations tried in the days immediately following Pearl Harbor to supply the home office with all information possible, and the small staff in Washington was so hard pressed that Free wired Rhodes on 17 January 1942 to hold the file down to 2,000 words a day, as Washington simply was not staffed to handle any more. The strain of the first month of the war was beginning to tell on the overworked staff. Of course there also were some thrills along with the hard work. When Italy declared war on 9 December 1941, FBMS monitors and editors had the news on the A Wire ahead of the news agencies, and FBMS had registered its first important "scoop."

By the summer of 1942, letters of praise were common, but there also was developing a persistent demand for increased services. Elmer Davis, who had been named head of the new Office of War Information (OWI), replacing much of COI, wrote on 15 August 1942 that "without the service supplied by FBMS, OWI could not function," but added: "We feel that for our purposes a considerable increase of coverage would be very desirable."

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Charles B. Fahs of OSS said in a letter dated 13 August that his organization had found the services "indispensable in our work," but continued: "It would be of real assistance in our work if the service could be expanded." Ambassador John Winant in London praised FBMS activities there, but on 24 July 1942 asked that lateral services to the various American offices in London be provided. The London staff proceeded to meet this request as rapidly as possible, and by October 1942 Peter Rhodes was able to report that teletypes in the offices of OSS, Army and Navy attaches, Army and Navy Public Relations, and Army Intelligence were carrying to those offices simultaneously the information being filed to Washington. On 13 November 1942 Rhodes wrote that the British Political Warfare office, BBC, and the Ministry of Information (MOI), had now decided they wanted a daily wire from the United States summarizing Japanese and other Pacific Coast monitoring, as the material they had been getting from the Daily Report was too late in reaching them.

Changing Requirements

Harold Graves, in a statement for the Government Manual appearing in December 1941 but obviously prepared before Pearl Harbor, listed three main purposes of FBMS in performing its functions of recording, translating,

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reporting, and analyzing foreign broadcasts: 1. To keep abreast of propaganda pressures, both on this country and others in which the government has an interest; 2. In cooperation with other agencies to interpret present conditions in, and future policy of, countries whose broadcasts are analyzed; 3. To make available to the government news and information not available in media other than radio broadcasts. He stressed propaganda from foreign sources and interpretation of developments, listing the providing of broadcast information as a minor, somewhat incidental, by-product. In a message to the Silver Hill staff on 20 January 1942, Lloyd Free listed the three main purposes of FBMS as follows: 1. To supply the government with an up-to-the-minute complete news service on developments outside the country; 2. To furnish appropriate defense agencies with intelligence gleaned from broadcasts; 3. To give a picture of the general propaganda strategies employed by foreign governments, so that counter-measures, if necessary, can be taken immediately. This explanation was a virtual reversal of the purposes listed by Graves a month or two earlier, and this reversal, in general, portrayed the changing requirements levied upon foreign broadcast monitoring. Free also noted that Silver Hill engineers were supplying information to 250

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persons handling 400,000 words daily, with the Daily Report and the analytical Weekly Survey going to 460 officials regularly.

Emphasis now was upon speed, thoroughness, and volume. FBMS was expected to provide more information, to provide all the information available in certain categories, and to provide it faster. This change in emphasis affected all phases of FBMS work. Officials were under pressure to staff the Puerto Rico and Kingsville offices as rapidly as possible and establish regular schedules of coverage for them. The plan to send BBC-monitored dispatches through 5-minute telephone conversations at intervals during the day was discarded before it actually had been tried. Arrangements were made to use a Western Union cable, and Press Wireless was contacted in an effort to find a service that could handle a larger volume at lower cost. In an effort to get as much material from BBC monitoring as possible within the limitations of staff and communications, London editors were asked to prepare a roundup of 500 to 750 words a day, filed by cable.

The newly organized OWI increased its demands on FBMS. The OWI office in San Francisco wanted an expanded file from Portland, and the requirements it levied led the Portland staff to feel that to meet them it would be working for OWI alone. Grandin in a letter to Portland

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on 6 January 1942 reminded the staff that the A Wire needed news and intelligence, that propaganda was secondary, but that the OWI need for propaganda also must be met insofar as possible. Portland would simply have to make the fullest effort possible to meet both needs. Watson informed Free on 4 April 1942 that his conversations with OWI officials led to the conclusion that the BBC simply was not covering the required programs, and the only solution was FBMS monitoring in England to cover about 20 hours of broadcasts daily that apparently were of no interest to the British.

In April 1942 arrangements were made for an exclusive teletype line between Portland and Washington to be used 24 hours a day. Teletype service between the Portland office and the BRU station two miles away was installed to carry Domei code interceptions, which previously had been transported by car. In the summer of 1942 Portland was instructed to start handling the Russian and Chinese communiques; Japanese communiques were transmitted from the time of Pearl Harbor. Graves noted in a letter on 11 June 1942 that there had been practically no news from Japan since the outbreak of the war except by radio, which was an adequate testimonial to the importance of the work being done at

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the Portland station.\*

Specialists in the Analysis Section found themselves inundated by an avalanche of special requests. As explained in the "Manual of Information" issued in April 1942, the analysts were trained in research and had ready access to all broadcast transcripts. Very few of their clients, with other tasks to perform, had time to familiarize themselves with the numerous details carried in the broadcasts. They presented the FBMS analysts with questions, and were supplied with the answers, based on detailed study. Many of these requests were made by telephone and could be answered eventually in the same way. Others called for special reports, some quite lengthy. R. C. Tryon of COI wrote Free on 23 December 1941 praising the response of FBMS analysts to requests for radio references to Turkey, for trends in Japanese-language broadcasts, and for certain false claims made by the Axis radio. Far East analysts in May 1942 were able to correct a false impression prevalent in the United States to the effect

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\* In the letter Graves also noted that an official of BEW had told him that 95 percent of the economic information from Japan was coming through FBMS, and that many other agencies were equally as dependent on FBMS for current information. Because domestic Japanese programs were being heard -- a fact that should be kept secret -- FBMS was giving the government an insight into Japan's morale and national feeling. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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that Japanese agents in Hawaii were in constant touch with Japan through radio contacts. A serious volcanic eruption of Mauna Loa on the Island of Hawaii following Pearl Harbor was kept out of U. S. news columns through the military censorship clamped on the area. FBMS analysts were able to report that the Japanese radio had made no mention of the eruption, though Tokyo had reported with elation a minor eruption in the Philippines -- presented as evidence of divine displeasure at the acts of the Americans.

Perhaps the greatest change in the Analysis Section brought about by the war was the closer relationship with analysts of OWI. This organization, because of broadcasts to enemy nations, found it necessary to pay careful attention to broadcasts from those nations, especially propaganda, and depended greatly upon interpretations and studies of FBMS analysts. Largely because of the needs of OWI, Goodwin Watson and a German specialist, Nathan Leites, were sent to London in September 1942 to establish an analysis operation to work closely with OWI in London and supply Washington with reports based on transcripts never filed to Washington. Watson remained in London only a short time, but a two-man analysis staff remained throughout the war, in close cooperation with the OWI broadcasting staff. Chairman Fly pointed out in the

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fall of 1942 that FBMS analysts produced material used "in war, in diplomacy, and in counter propaganda."\*

Increased demands on FBMS and changed requirements also brought budget problems. In 1941 the Bureau of the Budget had approved an appropriation of \$674,414, but Congress cut this to an even \$600,000. After Pearl Harbor a supplemental request for \$209,000 was granted. The chief point made in justification of the request was that monitoring and processing had to be speeded up. This demanded larger expenditures for staff and communications. Immediately after the granting of this supplement, plans had to be made for the 1942-43 budget. Graves, in a report to FCC on 18 May 1942 declared that FBMS would need about twice as much money for 1942-43 as it had the previous year, but it was obvious that the Bureau of the Budget

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\* Fly address before the Detroit Athletic Club on 25 November 1942. He said: "We listen to the same people talking to their own nationals abroad, to neutral countries or to the world at large. This affords a rich field for the work of our analysts. All of them, social psychologists, are familiar with a particular country, its language, its native customs, its traditions, its economy, and the psychological pattern of its people. Fever charts of Axis propaganda lines are plotted. Trends of enemy diplomacy or military operations are often foreshadowed in clear outline." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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had in mind deep cuts in his estimates.\* FCC approved a request for \$1,400,000, but this was cut to \$838,000, making necessary another supplemental request in the fall of 1942 for \$404,000 and a second one in 1943 of \$415,000, making a total of \$1,658,000.

Growth and Revision

Among the changes provided for in the 1942-43 budget was formalization of the already existing News Service Section, which by the start of the new fiscal year was operating three wire services. The new one was the C Wire, serving CIAA, which numbered among its duties broadcasting to Latin America. The A Wire at the time was going to 20 offices. A new problem that began to plague FBMS in 1942 was interference from OWI and CIAA transmitters. If the broadcast frequency of one of these stations got too close to an important foreign program, monitors would have difficulty in

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- \* In his report, Graves made the following points:
1. FBMS was now a source of news and intelligence of first-rate importance because of the closing of much of the world;
  2. FBMS originally desired only information on propaganda, for which a sampling was sufficient, but as a source of information it must expand;
  3. The war had greatly increased in scope since the original budgetary requirements were formulated;
  4. New agencies and old ones expanded by the war had greatly increased the demand for monitoring.
- He added that FBMS was covering one-fourth of foreign broadcasts, and for a satisfactory job two-thirds would need to be covered.

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hearing the latter. Roger C. Legge, who handled the Program Information Unit, kept up with these frequencies, and if he notified the U.S. broadcasters he usually could get the beam changed slightly to eliminate interference. Legge started publication of "Program Schedules of Foreign Broadcasters" in March 1942. A revised edition came out in September. Several consultants in various localities were checked regularly for changes in broadcast schedules and for new programs. They regularly sent their findings to Legge for inclusion in his publication.

By January 1942 FBMS had outgrown its quarters. In April a move was made to 1424 K St., N.W., where four floors were assigned to FBMS. Lloyd Free tendered his resignation in April to accept a commission in the Army. During most of the war years he was military attache in the U.S. Embassy in Switzerland. Possible successors included James G. McDonald, recommended by Free, and Ralph Casey, director of the Journalism Department of the University of Minnesota. The man eventually chosen was Dr. Robert D. Leigh, for 14 years President of Bennington College and its organizing president, who also held several important government positions. He was paid \$1,000 more than the \$8,000 Free received, and to legalize this salary, provision

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had to be made in the appropriation bill. This item successfully negotiated, Leigh took over on 15 July 1942. During the intervening months Graves was Acting Director.

One of Leigh's first recommendations was that the name of FBMS be changed to the Broadcast Intelligence Service. His reasoning was that this name was less unwieldy and more accurately reflected the duties of the organization. FCC insisted upon keeping the word "foreign" in the name, so on 26 July 1942 FBMS became the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS). Later, in investigation of FCC, counsel for the Cox Committee charged that Leigh changed the name of the service to "dignify its activities," make it sound more like a war agency, and influence Congress to grant appropriations.\*

On 30 May 1942 FBMS had 430 employees, compared with 215 on 30 November 1941. This rapid staff increase naturally called for some reorganization. In January 1942 Ellis G. Porter, former editor of newspapers in Baltimore and Philadelphia, joined the staff to direct publication of the Daily Report. Grandin remained as Chief Editor, but his department became known as the News and Intelligence Division, with a Report Section and a Wire Service Section. Monitoring, which also had been under Grandin's

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\* Hearings of the Special Committee to Investigate the FCC, Volume I, pages 123-124. GPO, 1944.

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supervision, was combined with translation to form the Monitoring and Translation Division, with a Monitoring Section and a Translation Section. A Monitoring Executive was appointed to direct the monitors. He was administratively responsible to the Monitoring and Translation Division, but received operational direction from the News and Intelligence Division. The Analysis Section became the Analysis Division.

The rapid increase in demand for FBMS publications placed a heavy burden on the clerical staff, and an effort was made to limit distribution. It was pointed out on several occasions that FBMS was different from a commercial organization, interested in expanding its circulation for the purpose of profit. FBMS wanted to make sure that its publications were sent only to those who actually needed and used them. Consequently a questionnaire was sent to all subscribers in July 1942 asking them to appraise the value of FBMS Daily Reports. Each subscriber was asked to place himself in one of the following four classes: 1. Those who read for interest only, making no direct use of the material; 2. those who read for application but seldom found anything useful; 3. those who found that abandonment of the books would diminish their own effectiveness; 4. those who considered the books a major source of

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information and would be seriously handicapped by their loss. This questionnaire proved effective. Those who failed to reply or who placed themselves in Classes 1 or 2 were dropped, making it possible to cut circulation about 50 percent. Some of those dropped asked later to be restored to the circulation list, while new requests for books continued to come in. In about six months the circulation was up to what it had been before cuts were made. Use of this system has continued, serving at intervals to eliminate dead wood from subscription lists.

Official announcements by enemy governments, especially leader speeches, were obtainable only from radio broadcasts, and were in great demand. When such a speech or statement was broadcast, everyone wanted a full text immediately. Some officials also wanted it in the original language. OWI was responsible for public relations, but through an agreement between FBIS and OWI it became common practice for FBIS to process these documents as rapidly as possible and distribute them as special releases to government officials and the news media rather than incorporate them in the Daily Report. Dr. Leigh reported in October 1942 that techniques for handling leader speeches had been so perfected that a two-hour Hitler speech delivered during the night could be on the A Wire in full text in four to six hours, and special release copies could be on the desks of subscribers when their offices

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opening in the morning. The processing of speeches that had to be monitored in England did not progress so rapidly, as BBC was slow to adapt its practices; eventually, under FBIS encouragement, the time span was cut. During the war this speedy processing and distribution of leader speeches, from both enemy and allied countries, frequently served to correct faulty impressions resulting from earlier but fragmentary news reports.

As soon as FBIS administrators could find time and line up personnel, an effort was made to staff adequately Puerto Rico and Kingsville. Both stations had to depend largely upon local hiring for translators and clerical staff, and Puerto Rico even recruited its own editorial staff. One editor hired in Puerto Rico in February 1942, Gordon Goodnow, was later head of the Report Division and still is with the organization in 1967. In March 1942 Puerto Rico got its telefax transmission equipment in operation, so by the spring of 1942 all four field stations had 24-hour direct communications with Washington. Originally, field station chiefs corresponded directly with any Washington executive. They were instructed in December 1941 to confine correspondence with Grandin to editorial matters, to write Free in regard to policy decisions, and to send correspondence regarding administration and personnel jointly to Free and Thompson Moore, Senior

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Administrative Officer. The confusion resulting from this arrangement led to new instructions from Free in January 1942 that all field correspondence should be funnelled through Grandin. Graves reported on 24 March 1942 that FBMS was then listening daily to 600,000 words in Washington, 300,000 in the three domestic field offices, and London editors had access to three-fourths of the approximately one million words monitored by BBC.

Puerto Rico was expected to monitor broadcasts from Africa and the Mediterranean area, while Kingsville was to cover only Latin America. By the summer of 1942, however, it was apparent that reception at Puerto Rico was disappointing, and more attention was given to expansion of Kingsville. In the fall of 1942 Elliot Tarbell was sent to Kingsville as chief, with Chesnutt remaining as an editor. At that time the entire staff did not number more than a dozen. Portland coverage was particularly vital with the start of the war, so immediate steps were taken to strengthen its staff. Spencer Williams, a foreign correspondent for years in the Soviet Union, was hired as Portland chief, and Carter was transferred to the Analysis Section. This move obviously was a shock to Carter, and was interpreted by the Portland staff as a reflection on their work. Graves assured the staff that Carter had been sent to Portland temporarily, and that with the new situation it was considered that his talents could be used to better

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advantage in Washington.\* Shortly after his return to Washington Carter transferred to OWI.

The most important development--important both from the standpoint of foreign broadcast coverage and increased FBIS prestige--came in the summer of 1942. OWI was not satisfied with FBIS coverage, especially on the West Coast, and indicated that it might start monitoring on its own. FBIS was anxious that other government agencies stay out of monitoring, that it be recognized as the sole unit with that responsibility. In a report to an examiner of the Bureau of the Budget on 20 May 1942, Graves noted that four other offices were reported to have engaged in monitoring, but only that done by OWI in New York and San Francisco could be considered duplication of FBMS work.\*\* Actually FBIS was not worried

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\* The Portland staff wired Washington protesting Carter's transfer. In his reply on 17 December Graves attempted to mollify the personnel. He stressed the importance of Portland's work, noting that a speech by the Japanese Navy Minister texted in Portland was the first news concerning the speech to reach the desk of Secretary Knox. Williams already was in Portland, so in a separate letter to him Graves explained the reason for sending the message to the staff rather than to him. FBIS Records, National Archives.

\*\* Graves said some Embassies had monitored abroad and reported on the information they obtained; the Navy had done some small-scale listening to Japanese broadcasts in Hawaii; and the FBI was reported to have done some monitoring for its own purposes, but had not reported its results. These he did not consider to be duplicating FBMS efforts. IBID.

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about the monitoring in New York, but it was concerned over OWI efforts in San Francisco. At Woodside, near San Francisco, CBS had established a small listening post on property leased by a radio enthusiast named Mason Shaw, who was placed in charge of engineering for the activity. OWI in San Francisco had made an agreement with CBS to supply part of the monitoring staff and share in the output of the station. Copy received from Woodside was used to supplement FBIS copy from Portland. The Bureau of the Budget agreed with Graves' thesis that OWI was duplicating FBIS efforts, and refused to approve funds for OWI to continue monitoring. CBS had already decided to abandon the post on 1 August 1942, so OWI formally requested that FBIS take it over. With a promise from the Bureau of the Budget that it would support an FBIS request for supplementary funds to operate the station, FCC approved transfer to FBIS. Mason Shaw remained at the station for several months, on the FCC payroll but under supervision of an engineer sent down from Portland. Spencer Williams was named chief of the new station as well as Portland, and some staff members soon were transferred from Portland to San Francisco to direct the new operation. FBIS also transferred to its payroll the six monitors working for CBS and OWI. One of them, Herman Litwin, became a key staff member in FBIS

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and was still with the agency in 1967. Another, John Chi-chong Holt, worked later at Hawaii and Guam and was a top FBIS Chinese monitor until 1950. Holt also was one of the first aliens allowed to remain on the FBIS payroll.

The San Francisco monitoring station was an important link in the FBIS chain of monitoring posts for more than three years, but the circumstances of its transfer were more important because it established FBIS as the only government organization authorized to monitor foreign broadcasts within the limits of the United States. OWI made no further effort to invade this field.

Changes in the Analysis Division as a result of the war were varied. The sudden increase in volume of copy, and the desire of analysts to give defense agencies every bit of assistance possible, led to such a rapid increase in the size of the Weekly Survey that by summer of 1942 it had become unwieldy. Changes had to be made. By August the Weekly Survey had been divided into four books, each one covering a separate European area. A more brief and general publication was called the Weekly Review. Daily analyses for Latin America were issued to meet a request from CIAA, and the Radio Report on the Far East became a bi-weekly. In March 1942 the table of organization of the Analysis Division called for 37 analysts,

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assistants, and trainees, but with only 17 of the positions filled. In approving a supplemental appropriation in the fall of 1942, the Bureau of the Budget disallowed funds for expansion of the Analysis Division; so the planned table of organization was never reached. Goodwin Watson wrote in a memorandum to Graves on 27 April 1942 that he believed lack of acquaintance with those using the service was the greatest weakness of the Division, and he launched a series of interviews with subscribers to the Surveys. One result of these meetings was Watson's trip to London in the fall of 1942 to organize an analysis function there. In a memorandum written from London, Watson called the BBC monitoring system inadequate, as British and U.S. interests were often at variance. He recommended steps to place FBIS staff members at many points throughout the world, including Cairo, New Delhi, Melbourne, Chungking, Vladivostok, Stockholm, Gibraltar, and Istanbul, with analysts at those places roughly paralleling the number of editors. Nothing came of this recommendation, but plans for FBIS expansion abroad already were being developed.\* A group was in

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\* In a memorandum to Leigh on 17 November 1942, Graves pointed out that plans were being considered to send representatives to some of the places Watson mentioned, but his recommendation was "not feasible." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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North Africa before the end of 1942; Leigh reported on 13 February 1943 that Anderson would soon go to Stockholm to explore monitoring possibilities; and other sites being considered were Cairo, Teheran, New Delhi, Simla, and Chungking.\*

#### Manpower Problems

When FBMS was started, applicants for clerical jobs were plentiful. Although most linguists applying could not meet the requirements, a satisfactory staff of capable translators was found in a short time. Editors and analysts who would meet the original qualifications were scarce, but with standards lowered slightly it was possible to find suitable candidates. After Pearl Harbor it was different. Demands for manpower doubled overnight. Competition was intense. In addition to demands from industry and the military, new wartime government agencies began to bid for personnel. FBMS pay was in accord with CSC standards, but working conditions were unsatisfactory for many employees. Much work had to be done at night, and there was no extra pay for night work. Pressures of deadlines and mounting demands were damaging to the health

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\* Leigh also said that Rhodes considered the monitoring of German Hellschreiber urgent, but FBIS would not undertake this unless BBC definitely refused. What FBIS must do at once, he added, was start coverage of Morse in U.S. stations. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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of some persons. Up to the end of December 1941 there had been 45 resignations--about 20 percent--which was not considered excessive. In the six months ending 31 December 1942, the turnover had jumped to 64 percent, considerably above the government average. What was more startling, among the various clerical groups the turnover in the six months ranged from a low of 92 percent to a high in one group of 228 percent.

Using the argument of difficult working conditions as a lever, FBIS officials repeatedly tried to persuade CSC to reclassify their clerical employees. Dr. Leigh reported on 7 January 1943 that he had some months before asked CSC to make CAF-3 rather than CAF-2 the basic grade for the great bulk of FBIS clericals. CAF-3 then paid a starting salary of \$1,620. Leigh said his request had been backed with voluminous justification, and that his initial talks with CSC officials were encouraging, but the request finally was rejected. The fight continued, and eventually some of the positions were reclassified. In a letter to the FCC personnel director in November 1942, Leigh suggested the upgrading of 172 positions, including 120 clericals at CAF-4 or lower. The list also included 25 monitoring and translating positions. In another memorandum to FCC on 28 November 1942, Leigh placed FBIS needs at 158 new

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employees at once, and 260 within the coming year, but offered little hope that the needs could be met.\* As early as October 1942, FCC was being asked to assign more radio engineers to field stations.

Graves reported in a memorandum on 6 August 1943 that of 169 editorial applicants presented to FBIS by CSC prior to 15 May 1943, only 14 had been hired.

Spencer Williams in a message to Washington on 18 August 1942 complained that Portland was badly in need of more editors, with staffing of the new San Francisco station coming up. Grandin had informed Williams in February that editors could be hired locally, but they must come from CSC registers. In January 1943 Leigh and Graves held another meeting with CSC officials and gained a tacit admission that CSC registers had failed to supply translators qualified for FBIS work. With this CSC admission, a vigorous campaign was launched to recruit monitors and translators.

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\* Leigh placed 35 editors, 23 translators, and 26 monitors in the urgent list, but no analysts. He explained: "These positions have no parallel in the United States, either in or out of government service. They are skills developed in this service without benefit of previous standards of comparison." He said the Civil Service rolls were "totally inadequate," and yet CSC had been reluctant to approve candidates found by FBIS. "It is clear that recruitment presents novel problems, and application of existing categories and peacetime procedures is inefficient and destructive of the purpose which FBIS serves." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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The greatest recruitment problem was in building up a Japanese language staff. To the three original Japanese translators sent to Portland, three more finally were added after nearly a year of recruiting. Williams complained in a letter to Grandin on 22 February 1942 that with OWI insistence on monitoring summaries, the Japanese staff was having to spend practically all of its time monitoring, making it impossible to process important texts in time. He urgently requested three more Japanese. However, a new problem had arisen. The West Coast command, under General DeWitt, had banished all Japanese, American citizens as well as aliens, from the West Coast. The six Japanese in Portland were excepted and supplied with special badges testifying that they were doing national defense work, but the threat that they too would be removed to relocation camps hung over the staff for months. Repeated requests that the number allowed in Portland be increased got no response, and expansion of Japanese language coverage was stymied. Rumors that the Japanese still would be removed from Portland continued, and as late as September 1942 Williams wrote Washington that the second in command on the West Coast had informed him that unless General DeWitt ordered otherwise soon, the Japanese would have to leave. Chairman Fly took the matter up directly with General DeWitt on

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17 September 1942, but it was not until 19 December that Graves was able to notify the Portland office that the Japanese definitely would be permitted to remain, and that a "limited number" of new monitors could be hired, provided their loyalty was "beyond question." There never was any possibility of sending Japanese to San Francisco, so Japanese language coverage had to be confined to Portland.\*

The difficulty in getting an adequate Japanese staff in Portland led to consideration of a new monitoring post outside the West Coast Command. In January 1943 the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) asked FBIS to place a staff in Denver, and suggested BEW might bear part of the expense. Graves mentioned this possibility in a letter to Portland in December 1942, saying that the new staff might concentrate on translating Japanese code transcripts airmailed from Portland. In March 1943 Williams was notified that he could hire three more Japanese in Portland, so the Denver move was delayed for a time, but at the end of April 1943 an initial staff of

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\* A letter from Spencer Williams to Edward Hullinger on 19 November 1943 reminded him that the number of Japanese linguists in Portland was limited to eight under "DeWitt's reluctant promise to Fly." He suggested that General Emmons might be induced to raise this, but he was doubtful. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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three Japanese translators started work in Denver, in close coordination with BEW and OWI offices there. The Denver staff was expanded, largely as a result of intensive recruitment among the war relocation camps, and eventually was moved to Washington. It devoted all its efforts to translation of Romaji code copied in Portland, sent first by airmail and later by wire.

From the beginning FBIS was careful in ascertaining the loyalty of prospective employees, specifically urging character references to state their honest opinions on this subject. Soon after the war started the FBIS was asked to check all FBIS employees for loyalty. In a letter to Fly on 2 June 1942, J. Edgar Hoover declined to make such a check, but agreed to carry out investigations in cases of "suspicion." When Dr. Frederick L. Schumann, who later figured in a Dies Committee attack on FBIS employees, was hired in May 1942 he was asked pointedly if he would have any objection to an FBI investigation. It was repeatedly made clear that FBIS wanted only employees of "unimpeachable loyalty." Yet problems did occasionally arise. In October 1943 a Japanese who had been working in Denver for some time without pay pending approval of his appointment was dropped because "one of the investigatory agencies of the government" had reported unfavorably, despite the good recommendations previously

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received. In July 1942 CSC reported that "new information" cast doubt on the loyalty of two of the first three Japanese translators hired. In this case the two translators, who had worked for more than a year and were the most experienced Japanese linguists in Portland, were not dismissed.\*

FBIS also was hesitant about hiring aliens, though CSC ruled that they could be used in special cases where it was difficult to find Americans with the necessary skills. Norman Paige, in helping to organize a staff in San Francisco, wrote Washington on 18 August 1942 asking an urgent ruling on the hiring of aliens, as several candidates capable in such languages as Thai and Burmese were available. The problem was discussed at length in Washington. On 30 September 1942 Graves reported that there were now seven aliens on the FBIS payroll. Five were clerical employees in London, and two were monitors in San Francisco. A new ruling was issued on 15 October 1942, which actually did not change the current practice.\*\*

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\* Fly wrote CSC on 14 January 1943 asking that the matter be reconsidered, as it had been impossible to find satisfactory replacements. Apparently the case was dropped. FBIS Records, National Archives.

\*\* Administrative Memorandum Number 3A, 15 October 1942: "No appointments of non-citizens shall be made where they are not absolutely indispensable or irreplaceable. All such suggested appointments shall be discussed with Mr. Leigh." IBID.

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The military draft also began to claim FBIS employees early in the war. In March 1942 Chairman Fly wrote the draft board of Lloyd Free giving his reasons for a requested deferment. Peter Rhodes was another key employee whose deferment was asked.

On 17 November 1942 President Roosevelt laid down the policy that young men should not be deferred from the draft because of federal employment, at the same time acknowledging that certain men, because of high skills, technical and scientific ability, or unique experience, would not be easily replaceable. He requested that heads of government agencies having men in such categories send letters giving full details. On 1 December 1942 Fly wrote such a letter, asking that all FCC engineers, analysts, editors, monitors, and translators be placed in the scarce category. A reply from Presidential Assistant William H. McReynolds on 10 December approved Fly's request. Nevertheless, as the war progressed, FCC was forced to tighten its qualifications for deferment. Many employees, including some translators in rather scarce categories, were lost to the armed services. A memorandum dated 8 April 1943 specified that further deferments would be sought only for administrators in CAF-12 or above; editors, correspondents and analysts in CAF-9 and above; and foreign language translators earning \$2,000 or more.

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Deferments would be asked for employees in these groups only after it was ascertained that their work was satisfactory and in the best interests of the war effort.\*

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\* Job 49-24, CIA Records Center. The memorandum also listed total employment of FBIS as 434, of which 212 were males, 133 of them between the ages of 18 and 37. It stated that 31 men had been deferred after requests were made to draft boards, and 37 former employees were serving in the armed services. (Obviously there was already apparent a sensitivity to criticism of federal agencies asking deferments for employees. From 1943 FBIS seldom asked deferment, but merely instructed the draft board concerning the work a man was doing, leaving the decision to the board.)

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Chapter 3 NEW SERVICE'S PLACE IN FCC

Unlike later sponsors of FBIS--War Department and CIA--FCC was never a primary user of the FBIS product. For FBIS this had certain advantages, but also certain marked disadvantages. The primary advantage was that FCC did not seek to shape development of the new service to serve its own purposes. This was of special significance in the formative years. Experience during the war showed rather conclusively that if foreign broadcast monitoring had been under the direction of OWI it would have concentrated on propaganda broadcasts needed by OWI in establishing policy and directing its international broadcast program. Under OWI direction much of the information that provided valuable intelligence to such agencies as the War, Navy, and State Departments, and BEW, would have been slighted. FBIS would have become merely an arm of OWI. An even better illustration is the monitoring done under direction of the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) in the field. FBIS trained the first men who set up a monitoring post under PWB and even continued to pay salaries of some of the men, but when actual direction of operations passed out of the hands of FBIS, the monitoring became virtually valueless to the FBIS headquarters office in Washington. It served PWB and PWB alone.

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Under FCC sponsorship FBIS was not subjected to this one-sided growth. It was given freedom to discover where its services were most useful and so shape its activities as to give the greatest benefits to all government agencies. It actually was independent subject only to general FCC administration. When a policy or operation had been decided upon within the confines of the FBIS administrative office, there was very little likelihood that FCC would offer any objections, though its formal approval was required for every change made in FBIS. On the rare occasion when an FBIS recommendation was turned down by FCC, it usually was because in some way it affected the other branches of the Commission. A good example is recorded in August 1943. Tom Grandin, on a trip to the West Coast, became convinced that immediate steps should be taken to investigate the advantages of locating a monitoring post in Hawaii. He asked permission to go on to Hawaii, and his petition was backed up by a letter from Owen Lattimore, in charge of OWI work on the West Coast. Graves reported to Leigh on 5 August 1943, after taking the matter up with Chairman Fly, that the request had been "emphatically rejected." The main reason given was that Grandin could learn no more in Hawaii than RID engineers already there could learn.

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The primary disadvantage to FBIS of having as sponsor an office with no direct interest in its product became painfully apparent in the fall of 1945. When Congress rescinded more than half of the remaining fiscal year's appropriation for FCC National Defense Activities, FCC decided that the money must go to RID, which was "an integral part of the FCC regulatory activity," and FBIS must be abandoned.\*

#### Shortcomings in FCC Support

Dr. Leigh praised Chairman Fly as an able man who "devoted himself primarily to his regulative and administrative duties rather than to the Commission's relations with Congress,"\*\* and there is no doubt that he and other FCC personnel who had direct contact with FBIS did their best to give the

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\* The FCC statement to the Senate Finance Committee on 26 October 1945 further explained: "The monitoring of foreign broadcasts, however, is an activity that FCC took on just prior to the war as a service to the operating agencies of the government. No use has been made of this monitoring by the Commission, and now that the war is over it believes that the activity should be transferred to the State Department, which is the principal agency interested in the contents of broadcasts intercepted. The Commission recognizes that foreign broadcast monitoring is an important part of the government's intelligence program, and would like to continue FBIS until an orderly transfer can be made to the State Department." FBIS Records, National Archives.

\*\* "Politicians versus Bureaucrats," article by Robert D. Leigh in HARPERS MAGAZINE for January 1945.

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service adequate support. However, there were noticeable shortcomings, most of them traceable to the nature of FCC. The organization had an efficient legal department that was meticulous in seeing that every expenditure was within the law as it affected FCC. Many new war agencies, in the legislation setting them up and in their appropriations, were free from old restrictions that applied to established government units. These new agencies frequently could spend money for benefits denied to FBIS. Leigh in a memorandum to FCC on 28 September 1942 expressed "shock" at learning that FBIS was likely to be denied an AP or UP ticker, and that money spent for newspapers had to be limited to \$50 a month. Graves in another memorandum for FCC on 27 March 1943 noted that apparent discrepancies between FCC appropriations and some others were arousing "embarrassing questions" among FBIS employees, such as why OWI was allowed to pay living allowance and per diem concurrently, and why OSS and OWI could buy uniforms for their employees stationed with the armed forces while FBIS could not.

FCC had very small staffs located outside Washington, with personnel transferring back and forth frequently. All supplies were handled through a central office, and FCC administrative officials kept careful check. With wartime transportation difficulties and field office

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personnel inexperienced and unable to anticipate their needs long in advance, there was considerable delay in getting needed supplies and much dissatisfaction with FCC.\* At first all hiring had to be done in Washington. This caused delay in getting urgently needed personnel at work. Leigh wrote to Williams on 27 August 1942 saying that RID and FBIS combined had finally persuaded FCC to except appointment of minor employees, so in the future chauffeurs, custodians, guards, messengers, mimeograph operators, clerks, stenographers, and typists could be appointed in the field with only the approval of Leigh and the FCC secretary, which could be obtained within 24 hours. Thompson Moore also wrote on 10 February 1943 that FCC finally had been convinced that it was losing money by not allowing purchase of paper and supplies in the field, and was acting to make this possible.

In London, problems were greater and more varied. FCC previously had no staff abroad, was not familiar with problems facing overseas employees, and was not legally entitled to grant certain benefits possible in such departments as State. The first problem was in the

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\* Edward Rand wrote to Thompson Moore on 28 February 1943: "I never cease to be astonished at what appears to be the absolute indifference of those at FCC (not FBIS necessarily) to the needs of this bureau in the way of supplies, equipment, and so forth. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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method of paying the London staff. Finally arrangements were made through State, and the Embassy in London advised the three London editors that they were entitled to per diem, which they accepted. On 13 April 1942 Free wired Rhodes that their per diem was illegal and would have to be refunded. Each of the men had to repay about \$540 over the following year.\* Living expenses in London were high, and FBIS employees felt keenly the fact that they were not treated as well as most other Americans in London. Rhodes wrote on 17 February 1942 that the Embassy had informed him that, with the exception of FBIS men, all Americans in London working for the U.S. Government were getting \$6 per day per diem except employees of COI, who had a special living allowance.\*\* Letters from London continued to complain of the relative penury FBIS employees were forced to accept. Finally in September 1942 the London staff was notified that FCC

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\* Replying to the Free wire, Rhodes the next month sent one-quarter of the repayment and discussed terms for repaying the balance on installments. Rhodes stated rather bitterly that he expected something like this to happen, as "FCC did not seem to understand the problems involved in members of its staff working abroad." FBIS Records, National Archives.

\*\* Writing on 28 June 1942, Rhodes listed payments for a number of Americans in London. Salaries ranged up to \$9,000 a year, all were getting \$6 to \$10 per diem, and one COI employee was allowed \$200 a year for entertainment. IBID.

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had found it possible legally to pay a living allowance to overseas employees. The amount approved was \$750 a year. In 1944 this was raised to \$1,500 for a married man and \$1,000 for a single employee. When Charles Hyneman, the third director of FBIS, visited London early in 1945, he was surprised to learn that FBIS employees still were far below other Americans in living allowances, and succeeded on 1 July 1945 in obtaining for them the standard allowances. He insisted that the full amount be paid, despite the difficult financial situation FBIS faced at the time.

FCC shortcomings in another area also were revealed early in 1945, with one FBIS official, Ben Hall, needling Hyneman to seek improvement. In a memorandum to Hyneman on 25 May 1945, Hall pointed out that his own promised promotion to a CAF-13 had been held up for months in FCC, along with Porter's promised CAF-14. What was worse, Hall said, many monitors who were entitled to promotions had not received them, job descriptions submitted to FCC in January still had not been forwarded to CSC and monitors were growing restless and threatening to resign.\*

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\* Hall urged: "Seriously, I think it is about time that we approach some one pretty high in the Commission on the slow service we have been receiving. ...As division chief I dislike the idea of having to force my people to continue handling jobs with higher classifications at their lower grades." Job 49-19, CIA Records Center.

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The London staff also had early problems in hiring personnel. As late as 18 March 1942 Rhodes was seeking permission to hire teletype operators, and in April his request that an American editor in London be employed was rejected. Each local employee had to be approved by FCC, and the delay in recruiting a staff was maddening. In the spring of 1942 Rhodes hired two teletypists, after receiving FCC permission, at the British pay rate of \$750 a year. When the papers finally came through from Washington the employees were listed as CAF-3 with pay at \$1,620, the standard pay for teletypists in Washington. It was not until August 1942 that Rhodes finally got authorization to hire the clerical staff needed, at British pay rates, without prior approval on each individual.\*

Two weeks after U.S. forces landed in North Africa in 1942, a letter from General Eisenhower's headquarters asked U.S. and British monitoring units in London to send

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\* A Moore memorandum for FCC dated 18 August 1943 patiently explained that an office like London could not operate efficiently unless a certifying officer were given authority to administer routine requirements. He asked that the London Bureau Chief be authorized to accept bids in the name of FCC for routine supplies, equipment, and contractual arrangements; to issue travel orders; and to appoint local employees at local salary rates; and that money be transferred through State from time to time to meet these expenses. Moore also wrote Rhodes telling him that an effort was being made to get this authority for him. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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a qualified man to Algiers to explore possibilities of setting up a monitoring post under direction of PWB. After London conferences it was decided that FBIS should undertake the survey. Peter Rhodes returned to Washington for conferences, and upon his return to London proceeded immediately to Algiers, arriving there 19 December 1942. After Rhodes submitted plans, the military requested two more editors from London. "Duke" Ellington, one of the original London editors, and James A. Jones arrived in Algiers on 7 January 1943, and two monitors from Washington were sent to Africa two weeks later. By the end of January, FBIS had a staff of five in Algiers, including Rhodes, who had been there six weeks. They already were monitoring and recruiting additional personnel.

On 5 February 1943 FCC received an urgent cable from Eisenhower's headquarters saying that the FBIS staff in North Africa was badly in need of funds and suggesting steps to ameliorate the situation.\* This delay in getting

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\* The message, signed by Col. R. C. Jacobs, had the following paragraph: "No funds have been provided by FCC for monitoring group which is performing essential work under Rhodes in an excellent manner. Reference our frequent messages, it is requested that you cable immediately for credit American Consul Algiers authorization for \$10,000 to be drawn upon by Hazeltine. To date obligations for personnel and equipment have been met by personal loans and by borrowing from other funds." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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funds to North Africa was not altogether the fault of FCC, for efforts had been made, but an organization with more overseas experience probably could have unraveled the snarl sooner. Another wire addressed to Leigh on 12 February threatened to place FBIS employees under OWI or some other agency unless unvouchered funds were placed in Colonel Hazeltine's hands immediately. With the help of Army Finance, funds soon were made available, but FBIS employees in North Africa experienced other support problems. As civilians working with an Army detachment, all the FBIS personnel had to be in uniform. After repeated requests that they be authorized to buy uniforms with FCC funds allotted to Colonel Hazeltine, the FBIS staff finally was informed near the end of February that FCC had no legal authority to spend money for military uniforms. FCC had asked for a ruling from the Comptroller General on this question, and the ruling, dated 20 February 1943, stated that "in the absence of specific statutory authority therefor," FCC could not spend money for military uniforms. No specific statutory authority could be found, so the men in North Africa had to buy their own uniforms. OWI and OSS both had employees in the area, all of them civilians and

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some of them working with the FBIS staff. They were entitled to free uniforms.\*

Domestic Foreign Language Program

Because of its position as a working branch of FCC, FBIS was for nearly a year engaged in work other than monitoring of foreign broadcasts. It was made responsible for policing domestic foreign language broadcasts. This work was started by FCC in September 1940, a year and half before FBMS was launched. At the time there were more than 200 U.S. broadcasting stations with programs in foreign languages, and with the war in Europe these programs continually came under suspicion. Following a growing flood of complaints, FCC decided to monitor all foreign-language broadcasts. Under the direction of Eric Dawson, a Foreign Language Broadcast and Translation Section was set up. At one time it employed 24 translators and a sizeable staff of typists to process the recordings delivered by FCC engineers. FCC announced on 29 July 1942 that the entire section had been transferred to FBIS.

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\* As late as 7 November 1945, more than a year and a half after Rhodes had been transferred to OWI, he reported that he had never received any living allowance under FCC. He placed his claim at \$5,175, pointing out that he had been overseas since 1 December 1941, was transferred to OWI on 15 March 1944. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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At the time of the transfer, approved by FCC following a recommendation by RID Chief George E. Sterling, Harold Graves, and Chief of Counsel for FCC, the staff included Eric Dawson, eight translators, and a half dozen stenographers and typists.\*

By the time FBIS took over this work, the number of foreign language programs had dropped considerably, with 140 on the air and only 56 of those considered sufficiently important to bear watching. Two FBIS analysts were assigned to analyze the programs processed, with David Truman in charge. In a report to Dr. Leigh on 13 February 1943, Truman outlined work accomplished by his unit. He said the original plan was to monitor each of the programs at least once before the end of the year, but that experience showed it was not worth while to spend time monitoring unless there was reason to believe a particular station was not operating correctly. Therefore, before the end of 1942 there had been 12 analytical reports prepared, but the unit had adopted the practice of fully processing and analyzing only when the legal division of FCC or the Office of

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\* The most complete description of domestic foreign language broadcast monitoring is found in the testimony of Robert D. Leigh before the Special Congressional Committee Investigating FCC, starting on page 3022, Volume III of the Committee Report, GPO 1944.

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Censorship suggested it. George Sterling was informed on 24 May 1943 that FBIS had abandoned the processing and analysis of domestic broadcasts. Remaining translators and clerical employees were transferred to other work inside FBIS. Leigh made clear to FCC that if the Legal Department of FCC were to present individual cases to questionable domestic foreign language broadcasts, either on its own initiative or on that of Justice or some other department, FBIS would perform the desired work with its regular staff.

There was one development in intra-governmental relationship worth recording in connection with FBIS handling of domestic foreign language broadcasts. Wartime operations of the Office of Censorship encompassed possible action against domestic radio stations broadcasting improper material, and it was assumed that foreign language programs were most likely to contain such material. Office of Censorship announced on 22 August 1942 that it would institute monitoring and analysis of these programs to "establish a clearer understanding" with broadcasters concerning their wartime responsibilities. Leigh wrote J. H. Ryan, Assistant Director of the Office of Censorship, on 25 August 1942 noting these plans, and calling such an operation "needless duplication," as FBIS was staffed and equipped to do such monitoring and analysis, and could supply

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Censorship with all the information needed. The response from the Office of Censorship was not considered satisfactory, so on 21 September 1942 Leigh wrote the Bureau of the Budget citing the needless duplication envisioned by Office of Censorship. The result was a meeting on 16 October 1942 with representatives from the Bureau of the Budget, Office of Censorship, FBIS, and OWI present. OWI later withdrew, but FBIS and Censorship reached agreement with approval of the Bureau of the Budget. Leigh outlined terms of the agreement to FCC in a report dated 19 October 1942. All monitoring of domestic foreign language programs would be the responsibility of FBIS, with no duplication by Censorship. The Office of Censorship would be responsible for removing all violators from the air, and in completing its case against any broadcaster it would call upon FBIS to provide information contained in broadcasts.

This marked the second successful attempt by Director Leigh in three months to prevent other government agencies from duplicating the work of FBIS, and to reserve FBIS responsibility for broadcast monitoring. The Bureau of the Budget had taken OWI out of foreign broadcast monitoring in July, and in October induced the Office of Censorship to leave domestic foreign

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language monitoring to FBIS.

Problem of Divided Authority

Insofar as operation of FBIS was concerned, there was never any question regarding the chain of command. Final authority was vested in FCC itself; which delegated to the Director of FBIS the day-by-day running of the monitoring service. Any action involving expenditure of funds, any change in policy which affected the product of FBIS or its relations with other government departments, had to have FCC approval. Once he had that approval, the FBIS Director could depend on the full support of all divisions of FCC. FBIS field chiefs were directly responsible to the Director for operations outside headquarters. Disputes regarding authority, and frictions arising from divided interests, invariably arose at a level below the office of the Director of FBIS and involved relations between employees of FBIS and of RID.

FBIS, in a way, was an offshoot of RID, which provided the technical equipment and recorded foreign broadcasts even before FBMS was organized to continue the monitoring operation. A smoothly operating engineering establishment was essential to any monitoring operation, and it might well be that those in control of the engineering activity tended to feel a certain sense of

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ownership, a pride of preexistence, if not of superiority. During 1941 all phases of monitoring were referred to as part of the National Defense Activities (NDA), with the stationery used in all correspondence bearing that heading. RID was the heart of NDA, and FBMS still had a rather doubtful identity. William Carter from Portland wrote on 24 October 1941 that he had never yet got clear in his mind whether his organization was FBMS or NDA. It was not until 6 July 1942 that Harold Graves clarified this nomenclature in a memorandum which specified that use of NDA was to be abandoned. In the future the entire service would be called FBMS, with the RID staff assigned to FBMS designated as the Broadcast Recording Unit (BRU).

FBMS now was recognized as one of the five divisions of FCC. RID was a coordinate division. George E. Sterling, head of RID, was expected to give needed support to FBMS in the same way that the Legal Division, or the Administrative Division, gave support. The major difference -- and it was an important one -- was that RID support consisted largely of assigning RID personnel to work with FBMS. Engineers were assigned to BRU, but they still were in RID responsible to Sterling or someone designated by him as supervisor. At the same time these engineers were expected to provide services demanded by

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officials in FBMS, and that introduced the problem of divided authority. Cooperation between Sterling and the FBMS Director's office seems to have been smooth. FBMS needs at the various stations were presented to Sterling and he tried to supply them to the best of his division's ability. Sterling began to delegate his authority very early, announcing on 25 September 1941 that David Cooper had been named as "Acting Monitoring Officer in Charge" at Silver Hill and was authorized to sign all correspondence related to operations of the station. In administration of the station, supervision of personnel, care of equipment, and so forth, Cooper was responsible to Sterling. In actual operations related to monitoring foreign broadcasts, he was to follow instructions issued by the FBMS office in Washington. Similar instructions were issued by the RID chief to every Monitoring Officer in Charge assigned to an FBMS monitoring station.

Serving two masters is never easy, and confusion was bound to arise. One of the first operations causing conflict was the keeping of accurate records of frequencies, schedules, and programs. Originally this was entirely the responsibility of the engineers, but as FBMS began to gain experience it was apparent that monitors in Washington, Wire Service and publications

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personnel, were more vitally interested in keeping up with this information than were the engineers. Early in 1942 an attempt was made to transfer the task of keeping these records and publishing them to the monitoring office. Yet much of the work had to be done by the engineers, so after a few months the responsibility was transferred back to RID. Finally, in 1943, a well organized Program Information Unit got underway, was transferred definitely and finally to FBMS, and the engineers followed a regular routine of reporting to the Unit. Misunderstandings and friction still existed, for the Program Information Unit was forced to ask engineers for a great deal of special information, though the Unit itself in time performed much of the cruising. Eventually cruising became part of the regular work of the engineering staff, and major stations had "cruising monitors" assigned, but by that time the problem of divided authority already had been resolved. According to early Sterling instructions, the engineers were expected to devote their "free time" to cruising. The difficulty was that most of them never found any free time.

Friction between monitors and engineers arose early. Inter-office memoranda between Harold Graves and David Cooper in 1941 revealed short tempers and confusion, with

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engineers convinced that monitors and analysts failed to understand the problems of recording broadcasts, and monitors insisted that engineers were negligent. One common complaint of engineers was that after being instructed to record certain programs indefinitely, they would learn that only samples of a few days had been used. On 29 December 1942, Graves in a memorandum to Leigh described a meeting he had held with key personnel from the engineering staff and the monitoring room, and expressed a belief that the "unnecessary conflict" between the two units had been eliminated. He was overly optimistic.\* On 26 June 1943 Graves wrote another report: Alluding to continued monitors' complaints, he expressed the opinion that in addition to a severe personnel shortage at Silver Hill, the site was bad, and that an effort should be made to find a better monitoring location, perhaps in New York.\*\*

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\* Graves reported that John Quinn, Cooper's assistant, had paid an unheralded visit to the monitoring room, inspecting lines being monitored. He explained that Silver Hill suspected that certain lines being fed were not monitored. Percy Noel, in charge of the monitoring room, angrily resented this action, accusing Quinn of "spying." FBIS Records, National Archives

\*\* The idea of relocating the monitoring site on Long Island was discussed at intervals over a period of several years, but evidently never got beyond the talking stage. IBID

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In field stations, with smaller staffs, engineers worked much closer with editors and monitors, sometimes in the same building. Normal frictions, enhanced by divided authority, were further exaggerated by personality conflicts. This situation soon was evident in Puerto Rico. In a letter to Free on 18 January 1942, Edward Rand complained that RID Chief Archibald would not send routine administrative messages for him over the RID Primary transmitter. This remained a sore point with Rand, and after the station had its own telefax system installed in March 1942, the engineer assigned to BRU, Paul A. Girard, still would not send such messages unless permission were received from Sterling. Permission eventually was granted, but Rand found other reasons to resent the RID position. After the two buildings to house Puerto Rican operations were completed, Rand requested another small one to store equipment and supplies. The buildings were the property of RID, and the RID staff could not construct the third building without Sterling's approval, which he refused. A report on construction progress made by Girard on 19 January 1942 shows that the engineers also had found flaws in Rand.\* Frictions continued to develop, and on

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\* The report contained this paragraph: "Mr. Rand, it was noted very early, had no knowledge of NDA/FBMS operations, nor the methods involved, procedure in handling requisitions, invoices, bills of lading, and so forth. I have taken over most of this instruction work in order to relieve Mr. Archibald as much as possible. FBIS Records, National Archives."

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26 May 1942 Archibald reported to Sterling his version of a disagreement with Rand over the phoning of a message received through the Naval Radio Station.\* Girard and Archibald eventually were transferred, but friction with Archibald's successor, Newcomb, was even worse. Rand complained in a letter to Grandin on 8 July 1943 that "Newcomb, in our first conversations, seems to have the idea that not only BRU, but FBIS as well, in all its details, editorial and otherwise, is within his jurisdiction, lock, stock, and barrel. More of this if it should get out of hand, which I hope it will not." On 4 October 1943 Rand informed Grandin that one of his problems was that Newcomb would not permit new BRU engineers to work longer than eight hours, though they were willing. Newcomb had a short time before, on 23 September 1943, reported to Sterling that BRU engineer Coston wanted a transfer, adding that difficulty could be expected for anyone "assigned here to work with Rand."

Puerto Rico was not the only field station where friction was apparent. On 15 April 1942 the RID office

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\* Archibald explained that he thought the message too sensitive to telephone, but Rand, angered at the delay in receiving it, ordered that in the future such messages be phoned to him immediately. Archibald implied that he would follow these instructions, but was not happy about it. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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answered a query from Rawls, head of BRU in Kingsville, explaining his responsibility. Rawls was told that he and FBMS personnel were expected "to cooperate fully in all matters, inasmuch as a strict demarcation of every duty and line of authority can hardly be made, considering the nature of the work."\* On the other side, Grandin wrote Kingsville chief Elliot Tarbell on 16 November 1942 calling his attention to the fact that Kingsville engineers belong to a different branch of FCC, were not under his administration, "but simply cooperate with you." Grandin also tried to explain the divided responsibility, though without much success.

One more example of the effects of divided authority should be sufficient. In the winter of 1943-44 Norman Paige was sent to Honolulu to take charge of monitoring there for FBIS. He was given use of RID facilities at the Punchbowl in Honolulu. There was no question of authority over these facilities; it was strictly an RID station and Paige had nothing but praise for RID

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\* The text of Rawls' letter is not available, but in it obviously he was questioning the authority of the FBMS station head, for the memorandum went into great detail to explain that Rawls was responsible for "technical decisions," for instance, that a program was unmonitored, but that the FBMS editor had the authority to tell him exactly what programs he wanted covered. After all, the memorandum said, "NDA and FBMS personnel are the same thing," as both are paid from NDA funds. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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cooperation. In February 1944 Waldemar Klima, following a period of training at Silver Hill, was sent to Hawaii to take charge of BRU for the new FBIS monitoring station outside the Punchbowl. Then the "old bugaboo" arose, as Paige put it in a letter on 24 July 1944. Paige said he had asked for clarification of the BRU-FBIS line of authority before going to Hawaii, but had not got it, with the result that one development was "almost a disaster." Klima, Paige explained, had been instructed by RID to investigate teletype and other possible communications to Kauai. He had gone to the Signal Corps, "stepping all over the plans I had been trying carefully to lay out for an over-all communications tieup that would include not only Kauai but all posts established out farther." Paige insisted that communications certainly were not within the RID realm of authority.\* Edward Hullinger, Assistant Director of FBIS, replied that Klima "did a good job in nailing down the Kauai

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\* Klima also had his version of the dispute. In a memorandum to Cooper on 12 September 1944 he explained that in preparing the technical facilities for a new joint BRU-FBIS station the BRU head was responsible only to BRU, and naturally wanted "to make the determinations himself, or at least be consulted on them." Klima also mentioned a joint memorandum of 20 June 1944 on BRU administration signed by Hullinger and Sterling. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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communications," and suggested that Paige and Klima "live a goldfish bowl existence" in the future to avoid difficulty in BRU-FBIS cooperation.

Elliot Tarbell, sent to the West Coast to succeed Spencer Williams, wrote Hullinger on 23 May 1944 asking if anything had been done regarding the "exact status of BRU under FBIS." Noting that the matter had been discussed when he was in Washington, Tarbell expressed a desire to see the question of divided authority settled once and for all.\* It was settled, and on 1 July 1944 BRU was transferred from RID and made an integral part of FBIS.\*\* David Cooper was named Chief, Broadcast Receiving Division, of FBIS. In a letter on 17 August 1944 Cooper explained that he had not been promoted, that his duties remained the same, but that "In the reorganization BRU is considered a division of FBIS."\*\*\*

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\* In a memorandum to Shepherd on 16 June 1944, Tarbell again urged that the question of divided authority be resolved. He reported that in discussing Washington decisions with BRU Chief Rudesill "he ran into the same thing" he had to contend with at Kingsville. Rudesill complained that FBIS was "trying to tear his staff up," and insisted that any request for change would have to come from Sterling before he would accept it. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

\*\* This date is given in an undated write-up of FBIS found in f. History of FBIS, RC Job No. 54-27, CIA Records Center. There seems to be no reason to doubt its accuracy.

\*\*\* Earlier, on 20 January 1944, an administrative memorandum informed that Cooper had been named "Technical Supervisor of BRU." He still was attached to RID and would confer with Sterling on matters of policy, but also would act as a divisional chief in FBIS, reporting to the Director of FBIS as well as to Sterling. Apparently this effort to bridge the gap had been of little help. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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#### Chapter 4 CONTACTS WITH THE PUBLIC

Exactly what relationship should FBMS have with the American public? That was one of the early policy decisions that had to be made by the new service and approved by FCC. Actually, two somewhat independent questions had to be answered in deciding upon a policy: Should the public be informed concerning the purposes and methods of FBMS? Should final products of the organization be released to the public? The second of the two questions was more easily answered, as practical limitations on production soon made a negative reply inevitable. Finding an answer to the first question proved more complicated.

#### The Press and Commentators

Early reasoning was that there was no legitimate reason for hiding operations of FBMS. There was nothing to prevent any American from listening to foreign broadcasts if he had a shortwave radio, and such radios could be purchased freely in any city or village. FBMS was merely recording, translating, processing, and analyzing these broadcasts for the benefit of U.S. government agencies. Why try to make a secret of the activity or the reasons for it? FCC itself sought at first to inform the public concerning the new operation. On 19 March 1941 the FCC information office prepared a release for the

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press describing plans for the new service. Nothing was held back. The story placed the probable number of employees at 350 and listed the categories of skills that would be required. The sites selected for monitoring were not revealed, but it was said that recording would be done at primary listening posts throughout the United States and its possessions, and the material would be coordinated in a central Washington office. The FCC information office continued to issue such press releases, and on 25 August 1941 reported that the new service was at work and recording 600,000 to 900,000 words daily, with translators and analysts working 24 hours a day. This time the four listening posts already being utilized were identified, and the "beltline process" used in handling copy was described in considerable detail. One item concerning the relationship to the public was added this time. The story said that, "for obvious reasons, the reports and other findings of FBMS are confidential," but went on to explain that "public interest in the national defense invites some explanation of the general scope and work."

Of course news reporters were not satisfied to accept releases from the FCC information office. FBMS officials were queried and requests for more information began to pour in. On 9 July 1941 Harold Graves wrote a

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memorandum for Lloyd Free commenting upon his "embarrassment" at inaccuracies in the accompanying BALTIMORE SUN article, especially the "dragging in" of the Princeton Listening Post and the claim that FBIS was a joint project of FCC, Princeton, and the Rockefeller Foundation -- the "brain child" of Prof. John B. Whitton of Princeton. On 8 September 1941 FBMS officials were equally embarrassed by a syndicated article by Eleanor Ragsdale, who said that FBMS was "inaugurated and pushed through by Chairman Fly of FCC." It now was obvious that foreign broadcast monitoring was an activity that had some public appeal. There would be no problem in getting publicity. The problem now was to guide that publicity to make sure it did not mislead.

On 14 November 1941 the editor of the PORTLAND OREGONIAN wrote the Washington office asking permission to write up FBMS, with photos taken at the Portland bureau. William Carter had been contacted, but referred the paper to headquarters. Graves wrote Carter on 21 November 1941 outlining the first ground rules for such publicity. Undoubtedly his letter was written only after conference and discussion, for instructions to Carter were specific.\* On 14 January 1942 FCC notified FBMS that no

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\* The letter noted that George Sterling had agreed that photos could be taken of monitoring operations. It would be all right to say that broadcasts from the Far East were being monitored, but quality and frequency of the broadcasts were not to be mentioned. The fact that checks were made daily on foreign efforts to influence U.S. opinion could be revealed, but specific instances were out. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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more photos of operations were to be authorized. Free wrote a report to FCC on 16 January 1942 explaining that the practice of FBMS had been to release information on methods and operations, but not on contents of reports and analyses. He defended this policy.\* Other requests for information were pending, including one from a publication in Puerto Rico, so Free suggested a meeting with the FCC Chairman to work out a new war-time policy. Apparently this discussion resulted in some changes. On 4 February 1942 Free wrote the PORTLAND OREGONIAN apologizing for the long delay in answering its request and explaining that since the start of the war a "strict policy" had been adopted of allowing no further publicity. Yet on 10 March 1942 he wrote the editor of RADIO MAGAZINE that FBMS policy was to freely answer queries concerning "the mechanics of radio monitoring operations," but to maintain "absolute secrecy" concerning contents of broadcasts. A similar letter went the same day to the Milwaukee JOURNAL. It would seem that the strict policy of not releasing anything

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\* Free said that most of the information concerning methods and operations were obtainable in Congressional reports anyway, and he thought public information of FBMS activities was a morale builder, showing that democracy was not always slow and bumbling. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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was relaxed very quickly.

Fly himself released a considerable amount of information for READERS DIGEST in the summer of 1942. Writing to the editor in answer to a request on 23 July, Fly listed a number of incidents demonstrating the value of FBIS intercepts, including the big play given by the Tokyo radio to a minor eruption in the Philippines and its failure to report the Mauna Loa eruption, thus demonstrating the fallacy of reports that illicit radios in Hawaii were passing information to the Japanese.\* A SATURDAY EVENING POST article by David G. Wittels was written after the writer interviewed Robert D. Leigh and visited FBIS operations.\*\* The manuscript was presented to Leigh before it was published, and he objected strenuously to parts of the article, in correspondence with both Wittels and the editor of the magazine. However, his objections were not to any revelations of FBIS operations, but to the false

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\* Other examples listed by Fly were interception of the Mexican President's speech declaring war on the Axis, making an immediate relay to Latin America by CIAA possible; conviction of Kansas publisher Court Archer on testimony provided by FBMS intercepts; accurate predictions based on FBMS material that Germany would launch a submarine war in the Atlantic and Rommel would not attack Cairo and Suez; and discovery through a Japanese admiral's speech that the Japanese were mistreating U.S. prisoners of war. FBIS Records, National Archives.

\*\* "Hitler's Shortwave Rumor Factory," SATURDAY EVENING POST for 21 November 1942.

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impressions he felt the article gave the public concerning influence of the German radio. No effort was made to censor the article. FBIS officials spent some time later in correspondence with interested readers attempting to correct the false impressions Leigh had foreseen.

Newspaper and magazine writers continued to prepare articles giving information regarding FBIS, or based on material processed by FBIS, and frequently were given full cooperation. Graves, suggesting revisions in a BALTIMORE SUN article that he had been allowed to examine before publication, noted on 10 April 1943 that the article referred to "Japanese-born" employees of FBIS. He explained that there were no such employees, as all Japanese monitors in FBIS were American citizens, and Japanese could not be naturalized. Leigh promised a writer of FORTUNE on 2 February 1943 that he would read the article submitted to him and point out "anything of a confidential nature." Russell M. Shepherd, fourth FBIS Director, wrote the BALTIMORE SUN on 8 January 1946 thanking the writer of an article concerning FBIS, which he considered accurate and appropriate. Not all press material about the organization was that well received. An article by Peter Edson in the CHICAGO TRIBUNE on 31 July 1942 questioned the wisdom of recording and distributing "foreign radio lies," which Edson claimed would

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get little attention if they were not so widely distributed by FBIS. He also criticized adversely a Daily Report which he had got hold of. Chairman Fly wrote to the Washington EVENING STAR on 31 December 1943 protesting a syndicated column by Helen Lombard which "attempted to smear" FBIS by charging that it prevented members of Congress from seeing its publications.

Public Use of Monitored Product

In the early months of the war, with approval of FCC, certain well known news commentators were supplied with some copies of the Daily Report as an experiment. Among those selected were Raymond Gram Swing, H. V. Kaltenborn, and Dorothy Thompson. This led to requests from other commentators, and some embarrassment for FBIS, but in most cases the net result was considered advantageous for FBIS. Swing continued to get the Daily Report, even after FBIS releases normally were funnelled through OWI. There was considerable correspondence with Miss Thompson and on 27 July 1942 she wrote: "I greatly admire the work that the monitoring service has done for us. I am greatly indebted for the only complete and intelligent original scripts of notable public addresses made abroad, for instance, those of Adolf Hitler." Later in

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1945 copies of the Daily Report were again released directly to some commentators, and then this practice was halted. On 21 February 1946 Walter Lippman wrote FBIS protesting refusal to supply him with a copy. Later, following another change in policy, he was put on the mailing list.

In the earliest days of FBMS, when emphasis was on radio propaganda analysis, it was not considered that the news media would have any interest in the product of foreign broadcast monitoring, though universities and certain educational organizations would. When war came, with new emphasis on news and intelligence from enemy countries and the closing of much of the world to U.S. newsmen, the picture changed quickly. FBIS was the source of much material suitable for use by newspapers and radio broadcasters. It still was considered inappropriate for FBIS to release its material to the news media, as plans were being worked out to centralize distribution of government information to the public.

The Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), under the direction of Archibald McLeish, was first set up for this purpose and various discussions were held concerning the best way for OFF to make use of FBIS material. On 18 March 1942 Chairman Fly wrote McLeish agreeing to an

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earlier suggestion that he place two liaison men in the FBIS office to sort out information to release to the public. McLeish wrote Free several times describing the categories of material his office desired and methods for handling it. He promised FBIS would be publicly credited for any information used by the press or radio. It soon was apparent that OFF still was thinking in terms of propaganda analysis, and had no conception of the value of FBIS material as a current news source.

OFF did not last long, and in a few months its function of funneling material to the news media was taken over by the Foreign Service Division of OWI, with Matthew Gordon in charge. Gordon advised FBIS that he wished to set up a news ticker service, based to a large extent on the FBIS A Wire, to serve private news media. On 11 September 1942 Leigh reported to FCC that he had come to a "definite understanding" with Gordon. His office would get FBIS publications, in addition to the A Wire. FBIS would refer all public requests to OWI and would revert strictly to the function of providing information to government units. Later it was agreed that in certain instances material would be distributed directly from FBIS with prior OWI approval. This practice applied in handling leader speeches,

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received directly from FBIS, and in providing Daily Reports to a few commentators, such as Swing, who previously had been getting the material. Because of the greater accuracy of FBIS speech releases, OWI attempted to get all news agencies and the press to use FBIS versions rather than some others available, and so informed Fly in a letter dated 23 October 1942.

This arrangement proved quite satisfactory to FBIS. On 9 November 1942 NBC requested regular Axis propaganda material from FBIS for daily broadcasts. Leigh did not approve of the nature of the series planned by NBC, but he was saved the unpleasant task of refusing the materials by referring the request to OWI. Leigh was so well satisfied with the system that on 2 January 1943 he wrote Nelson Rockefeller suggesting that CIAA set up a similar system for release of information concerning Latin America.

Of course, as the practice became established, certain officials in FBIS did find flaws. The original agreement was that material from FBIS going out on the OWI ticker would be accredited to either FBIS or FCC. Many news purveyors, feeling that FBIS was a competitor while OWI was assisting the press, preferred to credit all material to OWI. Leigh in a memorandum on 21 January 1943 assured Grandin that the news media rather than

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OWI were responsible for the incorrect accreditation, and suggested that he confer with Gordon concerning ways to pressure news handlers. Edward Rand from Puerto Rico on 9 August 1943 sent some clippings with items monitored in Puerto Rico but attributed to OWI, and expressed surprise to learn that OWI was "duplicating" FBIS monitoring. Williams from San Francisco wrote to Edward Hullinger on 23 February 1944 complaining that an article in BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, based on FBIS monitoring, failed to mention FBIS. A later check showed that the false attribution was the work of the magazine, not OWI. FCC officials noted the slights, but Leigh in a memorandum to Commissioner Minderman on 1 May 1944 argued that it was better to let the matter ride, as FBIS considered that furnishing material to the newspapers was only an incidental part of its job, and did not wish to exploit the conception that this was its major function. This did not mollify the complainants, but on 14 July 1944 Fly wrote Matt Gordon that he was "happy to know" that under the new contract OWI would "oblige" users of FBIS material to give proper accreditation to either FBIS or FCC.

The FBIS contribution to the news media was great all during the war years, even though much of the material was attributed to OWI. An office study

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reported on 15 January 1945 showed that one-fourth of the material going out on the A Wire and through the Daily Report had been getting into the press. In January 1944 the Associated Press in San Francisco formally requested that it have direct access to the wire file sent from West Coast monitoring posts to Washington. The request was referred to OWI. Gordon wrote Charles Hyneman on 21 October 1944 that the four major U.S. news agencies -- AP, UP, INS, and Transradio Press -- had made daily use of FBIS monitoring received through OWI, and were highly appreciative of the service they got.\*

Among requests for FBIS services were many from universities and educational organizations. Princeton and Stanford Universities, both of which halted their monitoring operations when FBIS was launched, got its publications from the start. On 20 June 1941 Graves received a request from the Institute of Pacific Relations, with the explanation that it had been served by Stanford until its listening operations were halted

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\* The letter contained the following passages: "And as the letters from these organizations testify, this has been an important service both to the news gathering media and to the American people. Since these agencies have been kind enough to express these things to me on various occasions, I thought that you would like to have this letter, since your organization has furnished the major part of the monitoring material which has made our work effective." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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"in favor of FBMS." Later, Matt Gordon approved release of publications to the organization. Harold Graves showed a tendency to honor requests from institutions, but he was overruled. During the war a number of universities wanted FBIS publications for use by the Army Specialized Training Program and the Civil Affairs Training Schools on their campuses. These requests were granted, with the understanding that the publications would be protected as confidential documents by the university libraries until the end of the war. After the war some of these libraries sought to get missing copies in order to complete their files, and in a few instances their desires were met. After the war new requests also continued to come in, and they were honored whenever possible until 10 June 1946. Then the War Department decided that for reasons of economy the publications would have to be restricted to government offices.\*

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\* General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, head of CIG, wrote on 8 January 1947 that his organization, having assumed responsibility for FBIS, hoped to rescind the 10 June 1946 War Department order and make FBIS materials available to "the American press and radio for use in the public interest," but for the time being, because of budgetary limitations, would continue the War Department policy. His letter did not mention university libraries. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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### Amateur Radio Fans

Perhaps the single group of Americans most enthusiastic concerning establishment of FBMS in early 1941 was the growing fraternity of amateur radio fans. These individuals, many of them teenaged youths with a goodly sprinkling of physically handicapped, were familiar with the vibrant activity of the air waves. Next to the FCC engineers, they probably knew more about what was being broadcast for American ears than did any other group in the United States. Several magazines already were published to serve them, and they had a national organization. Many also were highly skilled in radio techniques, with not a few having built their own receiving sets. As soon as the first news releases on FBMS were published, the office at 316 F Street began to hear from these radio fans. Some wanted fulltime jobs with the new organization. Some wanted information on methods to be used by FBMS. Quite a few wanted to aid the infant listening post by contributing information on frequencies and programs.

FBMS was able to make use of quite a number of these amateurs. One of the first regular consultants hired following CSC approval of such employment was Charles A. Morrison of Normal, Illinois. He was editor

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of GLOBE CIRCLER, one of the magazines for ham radio operators. Graves wrote Morrison on 25 November 1941 telling him his appointment had been approved and outlining the contract terms. He was to provide FBMS with all information he could assemble on foreign broadcasts and file weekly reports when he had sufficient material. His pay was to be \$25 a day, but not more than \$100 in any one month. He agreed to keep his position confidential and to use FBMS stationery only in corresponding with FBMS.

Mr. Morrison worked for FBIS several years, but was only one of several such consultants. Another was Thomas Jones, a 19-year old invalid of St. Petersburg, Florida. He received a contract in 1943 and continued to work until his death long after the war. In addition to reporting on radio frequencies and new programs, Jones also frequently recorded broadcasts not heard in regular FBIS stations and mailed in the records for processing. On 20 May 1944 Dr. Leigh wrote a "to whom it may concern" letter testifying to Jones' status as an FBIS shortwave consultant. Jones had requested the letter so that he could get priority for purchase of a new receiver.

The section of FBIS that benefited most directly from reports of consultants, amateur fans who wrote voluntarily, and the radio magazines, was the Program

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Information Unit. By 1945 "Program Schedules of Foreign Broadcasters" was being published regularly twice a year and had wide circulation. The value some quarters placed on this publication is attested to by Loring B. Andrews of the Planning Division of OWI in a letter to Graves on 2 July 1943. Mr. Andrews was "distressed" to learn that Roger C. Legge, head of the Program Information Unit, was about to be drafted into the armed forces. The writer said he was "amazed at the magnificent job" Legge had been doing with only two assistants, thought he was the right man in the right place, and hoped he could stay there. He described Legge as a "ham" of ten years' experience, "living, breathing, and eating shortwave every day."

Legge was only the first of several amateur radio fans whose services were of value to FBIS in this position. Another was James G. Wedewer, who though physically handicapped, became a capable radio engineer and took part in several of the surveys leading to establishment of radio monitoring posts in the islands of the Pacific. During the last of his nearly 20 years with FBIS he was head of the much larger Broadcast Information Service (BIS), successor to the Program Information Unit. A writer for one of the amateur fan magazines who visited Silver Hill in later 1944 was

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impressed with Wedewer.\* Before the end of the war, capable radio technicians were hard to find, and the ranks of amateur fans supplied many able FBIS engineers and cruising monitors.

Prisoner of War Information

Amateur radio listeners also indirectly influenced another facet of FBIS contact with the public. Tokyo started broadcasting names of prisoners of war held by the Japanese in January 1942. By summer Berlin was transmitting such information and Rome soon followed. By the spring of 1943 the programs from the three transmitters carrying names of prisoners sometimes ran as high as 20 a day. Some of the broadcasts merely gave names, addresses, next of kin, and identification numbers of prisoners. Others actually carried statements supposedly made by the men. FBIS began processing these broadcasts as soon as they started, but it was June 1943 before the practice of keeping a card file of all such names was started. At first the broadcasts were handled as any others, but on 2 June 1943,

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\* The magazine was QST. In its edition for January 1945 it described the visit to Silver Hill and had the following passage: "This fellow James Wedewer mentioned above can give you the location of any listed shortwave or broadcast station throughout the world. We had quite a talk with this lad and picked call letters out of the 'blue sky' to test his ability to recognize the station. His quick identification was amazing."

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following discussions with the War Department, a special wire was installed to carry only names of prisoners of war and prisoners' messages. It was called the E Wire, and went to the office of the Provost Marshal General. If the broadcasts carried other material of news or intelligence value, they also went on the A Wire. On 10 September 1943 the E Wire was abandoned, with all prisoner information funneled through the A Wire, which also went to the office of the Provost Marshal General.

Needless to say, enemy broadcasts of prisoners' names and messages got immediate and widespread attention. The Provost Marshal General wrote FBIS on 13 November 1942 asking that all such broadcasts be mailed to him as soon as possible, saying their interception was especially significant because of Japanese failure to report to the International Red Cross. Dr. Leigh replied on 18 November, informing the Provost Marshal General that all FBIS stations had been instructed to record and process every intercepted broadcast carrying a prisoner's name.

The broadcasts also were heard by amateur radio listeners, and their reports aroused a wave of public interest. Amateurs began to write or phone the next of kin mentioned in a message and inform him of the news. Some tried to profit from the situation, notifying the next of kin that information would be given after payment

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of a fee. FBIS reported on 4 March 1943 that it heard of one California couple that had received 50 phone calls and 80 letters telling that their son was held prisoner by the Japanese. Government officials felt that further action was imperative. A meeting was held in the Office of Censorship on 3 May 1943, attended by two representatives from FBIS. It was decided that as little public attention should be called to the situation as possible, but that an effort should be made to discourage the amateur practice of notifying the next of kin. Censorship preferred not to attempt any legal action, but to resort to persuasion. Stories were released informing the public that POW broadcasts were for the purpose of enemy propaganda, and could not be accepted as accurate. It was following this meeting that the E Wire was started, so that information could get to the Office of the Provost Marshal General sooner and next of kin notified officially.

Discontinuance of the E Wire followed an unexplained request from the Provost Marshal General on 9 September 1943. A query to his office elicited the information that Office of Censorship had asked that the service be discontinued. Mystified, FBIS officials sought an explanation from Censorship and learned that the FBIS service "was no longer needed," as the work of monitoring

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POW broadcasts and notifying the next of kin had been assigned to the Women's Auxiliary Volunteer Service (WAVS), a private group organized in Los Angeles. When pressed for a further explanation, Byron Price, chief of Censorship, explained that the system followed by FBIS had not eliminated the black market. He acknowledged that FBIS service was prompt, reports often reaching the Provost Marshal General in as little as 15 minutes, but it took three or four days to get the information out to the next of kin. Besides, Price explained, he thought it was bad to have a U.S. government agency "distributing enemy propaganda."

At the time of this Censorship decision FBIS was averaging 50 names of prisoners daily and processing 4,000 words of prisoner broadcasts. The work continued, as the Army and Navy wanted the information, as did the Canadian and Netherlands missions. Dr. Leigh continued the discussion with Censorship, pointing out that a group of amateurs had been encouraged to duplicate the work of a professional and official monitoring system.\* Price

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\* Leigh disposed of Price's argument that a government agency should not distribute enemy propaganda by pointing out that the Women's Auxiliary Volunteer Service included on each telegram to a next of kin the following wording: "This message has been received and transcribed by the official listening post of the WAVS, authorized by the U.S. Government to act in its behalf." In other words, the Government was officially authorizing amateurs to "distribute enemy propaganda."

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consented to a meeting with Elmer Davis, Chairman Fly, and the Provost Marshal General, where it was decided that FBIS itself should send telegrams to the next of kin as soon as a prisoner broadcast was prepared for the Provost Marshal General. A format for the telegrams to be sent out was decided upon. Also on 10 November 1943 FBIS wire editors again started filing prisoner information to the Provost Marshal General on a special wire, this time called the PM Wire. Fly wrote to Congressman Clifton A. Woodrun telling him of the new service, as the cost of sending the telegrams was not provided for in the FBIS appropriation. Woodrun approved the project before it was started. It was decided that each telegram should warn the recipient that the broadcast was enemy propaganda.\*

In addition to the expense, this service absorbed a great amount of time. About 2,700 telegrams a month were sent, and many of them elicited replies, often with requests for more information. Leigh's staff in the following six months was forced to spend a great deal of its time in answering such letters. The WAVS did not

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\* Each telegram read as follows: "The name of John Doe has been mentioned in an enemy broadcast as a POW in Japanese (German) hands. The purpose of such broadcasts is to gain listeners for the enemy propaganda which they contain. But the Army (Navy) is checking the accuracy of this information and will advise you as soon as possible. FBIS of FCC." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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receive with good grace the notification that its services were no longer needed. The women pleaded for authorization to continue the work, arguing that it was of value despite the duplication of FBIS activities.

The new system was not entirely successful, for amateur listeners continued to notify the next of kin. Many recipients of telegrams wrote thanking FBIS, but adding that the same information had been obtained from several other sources. Many sincere amateurs wrote asking if there was anything wrong with their continuing to listen to the broadcasts and to notify the next of kin. Leigh patiently replied to each one, explaining that there was nothing illegal about listening to the broadcasts, though it was illegal to repeat enemy propaganda, and at any rate the amateur listeners were merely duplicating FBIS activities. Many touching letters were received from persons who had heard of the service but had not received telegrams. Their husbands or sons were reported missing in action, or they had not heard from them for a long period, and they wondered if FBIS had any information. These letters, too, received careful answers. Most of those who received telegrams were deeply appreciative, and some high in their praise of FBIS. One woman wrote on 25 February 1944: "It is a pleasure to come across a

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government bureau doing the very good work you are doing."\* Many newspapers carried stories telling of the FBIS service, and the net result was much good will for FBIS. A Philadelphia reporter who was preparing a critical story on notification of next of kin called FBIS and got a full account of the way the service was handled. She still wrote the critical story, but centered her wrath on the Provost Marshal General for slowness in following up FBIS notifications.

When Charles Hyneman became Director of FBIS in 1944 a long second look was given the system. It had become obvious that many amateur listeners still were reporting POW broadcasts. Correspondence with relatives of prisoners was taking an inordinate amount of time, though Hyneman was careful to handle all such correspondence. As late as 13 January 1945 a memorandum to his staff cited delay in answering some queries from next of kin and declared that "no business in FBIS is more important than giving prompt answers to such queries."

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\* Not all were that appreciative. A man wrote from Corpus Christi, Texas, on 30 March 1944 denouncing FBIS for "wasting the government's money" by sending "such unimportant messages by wire." He said his mother, who had a weak heart, was called to the telephone in the middle of the night to take the message and had a heart attack and almost died. "And all this," he finished, "for a message that didn't amount to a tinker's dam," for it told nothing they did not already know. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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Assistant Director Edward Hullinger reported to Hyneman on 5 July 1944 that he had discussed the telegrams with Byron Price, who was of the opinion that under the circumstances it was hardly worthwhile to continue them. At any rate, Axis propaganda had greatly deteriorated and the government was no longer concerned about the size of its listening audience. Hullinger also talked with the Provost Marshal General, who agreed that the service could be dropped. The primary consideration for FBIS was the cost. The prisoner broadcast service was costing \$60,000 a year, and FBIS was having serious budgetary problems.

The Provost Marshal General formally agreed to discontinuance of the service on 4 August 1944, and telegrams to next of kin were stopped immediately. The PM Wire, paid for by the War Department, was continued until September 1945, after the surrender of Japan. No similar service was undertaken during the Korean war, and none has been offered during the Vietnamese war, though the FBIS Wire Service has continued to run broadcast information concerning prisoners of war.

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Chapter 5 INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Because of the nature of its work as a service agency, FBIS at various times made contacts with most government offices. Some of these contacts were casual and infrequent. For instance, direct contact was made with the White House only during extremely important developments, though A Wire editors were startled a few times to learn that President Roosevelt was listening in during a telephone conversation, and one time Winston Churchill was on the line asking questions. Some government agencies received the A Wire or the Daily Report, affirmed when queried that they wanted the service to continue, but made no other contacts with FBIS. Still others, such as the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), depended a great deal on information furnished by FBIS, but as they had no concern with FBIS methods, they took their information, offered their appreciation, and that was the extent of the relationship.

But there was one important government office that was concerned primarily with the gathering and distribution of information. This was OWI. As FBIS also was engaged solely in the gathering and distribution of information, its fortunes were closely linked to those of OWI. The relationship had to be close, and friction was inevitable. COI already was operating when FBIS was

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organized. Col. William (Wild Bill) Donovan was the Coordinator of Information, with his office frequently referred to as "The Donovan Committee." COI was the first office to get FBIS service on a regular and extensive basis, through a special wire installed to carry broadcast transcripts to its Washington and New York offices in October 1941. This was first referred to as the "COI Wire," or the "Donovan Wire," but later became the B Wire. A few months after the war started, COI was reorganized by executive order. Many of its activities were taken over by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under Donovan, and others by the Office of War Information (OWI) under Elmer Davis. FBIS continued to serve Donovan's unit, but it was with OWI that it had the closest relations.

#### Relationships at Headquarters

As was true with RID, contacts at the top usually were proper, cordial, and cooperative between FBIS and OWI. Chairman Fly and Dr. Leigh on the one hand, and Elmer Davis and Milton Eisenhower, Assistant Chief of OWI, on the other, always recognized the mutual interdependence of the two offices, sought to avoid controversy and dispute, and worked to make mutual relations smooth and efficient. On operational levels, where contacts were more functional, cooperation was not always smooth.

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Distrust and suspicion sometimes arose, and issues had to be settled at a higher level. It is a tribute to the leadership of the two organizations that at the end of the war OWI and FBIS were working together more smoothly than they had been at any earlier time, with their mutual activities functioning more effectively.

Misunderstandings arose from time to time in the Washington and New York offices, but it was in the more remote stations that most conflicts were recorded. The type of material desired on the B Wire was understood by FBIS staff members, and the only early complaint was that OWI continually asked for more. At first, as FBIS did not have trained teletypists, COI sent its own teletypists to the FBIS office. This arrangement apparently gave OWI an attitude which FBIS personnel interpreted as a feeling of ownership, so on 14 August 1942 Leigh suggested to OWI that the teletypists be transferred to the FBIS payroll; OWI agreed. Then on 30 September Leigh wrote Robert Sherwood of OWI, cautioning him that the steady increase of material ordered by the New York office would demand an increase in FBIS staff. He explained that as a service agency FBIS would supply the material requested, but wished first to make sure that it actually was needed. In

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December 1942 there was an exchange of letters between Leigh and OWI officials concerning the need for closer liaison between the two offices. Eisenhower suggested regular meetings between OWI and FBIS personnel at the working level, and FBIS personnel were invited to visit operations in the New York office.

In July 1943 Stewart Hensley, chief of the Wire Service Section, made a trip to New York to learn more about OWI operations there and discuss needs of the service. He reported later that by altering methods used on the B Wire, primarily by filing more textual material, he had got OWI to accept a considerably lower volume of copy. He issued instructions to B Wire editors explaining the most vital needs of the New York office, and apparently both offices were pleased with the changes. There never were any serious problems between Matthew Gordon's office and the A Wire, though wire editors sometimes were miffed at frequent calls for what seemed to them superfluous demands for clarification or explanation.

Two developments late in 1943 illustrate the extent of mutual understanding between the headquarters offices of FBIS and OWI. In October OWI asked that Tom Grandin be assigned temporarily to OWI to make a survey of monitoring activities and needs in the Middle East and

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Mediterranean area. A letter from Fly on 19 October 1943 approved the arrangement. FBIS was to continue to pay Grandin's salary, with OWI bearing all travel costs.\* In preparing his statement to be given before the Cox Committee in November 1943, Dr. Leigh elicited the testimony of Milton Eisenhower, who stated emphatically for the record that OWI never wanted to take over FBIS, for that would destroy its essential character as a service organization.\*\*

Relations between OWI and the FBIS Analysis Division took a somewhat different turn. FBIS analysts felt that one of the greatest services they could render to OWI employees would be to make quickly available to them effective counter propaganda to use in international broadcasts. They attempted to do this,

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\* Rhodes on 6 September 1943 sent Leigh a seven-page single-spaced letter in which he discussed at length the need for Grandin to make the trip, pointing to advantages for both FBIS and OWI. In his opinion Grandin should spend two weeks in Algiers, and then considerable time organizing the Cairo office. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

\*\* Page 3660, Volume III, Report of the Special Committee Investigating the FCC, GPO, 1944. The Committee counsel had argued that FBIS should be taken from the FCC and put under OWI, a move that no doubt would have pleased some lesser OWI officials. Eisenhower, who apparently had a better grasp of OWI-FBIS relations, argued that since OWI was not a service agency, it would monopolize the services of FBIS and destroy its usefulness to other departments of government.

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but with their limited staff and the need to analyze developments for other government agencies they were never quite able to satisfy OWI. It set up its own analysis branch, with the result that there was considerable duplication. This bothered Leigh, who had a special aversion to duplication in government activities. He wrote O. N. Riegel of OWI on 7 September 1942 expressing a hope that in coming months the two services could "mesh their analysis efforts" so that efforts and talents of the people could be applied more usefully. Weekly meetings between OWI and FBIS analysts were arranged, but were not considered a great success. On 22 December 1942, in another letter to an OWI official, Leigh mentioned the "regrettable lack of any well conceived plan" for closer and better cooperation between OWI and FBIS analysts.

Goodwin Watson, head of the Analysis Division, came up with a new idea. Writing on 30 December 1942 to Ralph Casey, who was studying relations between OWI and FBIS, Watson suggested the possibility of distributing FBIS analysts among other offices, bringing them "closer to the people who use our findings." He said many offices felt that they would be better served if they obtained the raw materials from FBIS and "controlled the full process of the analysis." It was

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evident that such an idea would not appeal to all analysts. Some admitted that they were not on very good terms with their OWI counterparts.\* Nevertheless, Leigh announced on 19 April 1943 that an agreement had been reached whereby the Bureau of Research and Analysis of the Overseas Branch of OWI would use the FBIS Analysis Division exclusively for reporting and analyzing radio broadcasts, and "to promote good working arrangements and to conserve space," the Analysis Division would be moved to the Social Security Building, where OWI was housed. Graves, explaining the move on 13 May 1943, said the Division would "function as an integral part of OWI," at the same time "continuing its other duties." The head of this OWI division, Eugene Katz, said in a letter to Leigh on 18 June 1943: "Our relations with the FBIS Analysis Division are so friendly that we can think of nothing now which warrants a formal reappraisal of the agreement." Part of the agreement was that in June the arrangement would be reappraised.

FBIS-OWI West Coast Cooperation

Joint operations to avoid duplication of FBIS and

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\* Theodore Newcomb, who was second only to Watson in the Analysis Division, wrote on 15 February 1943: "Unfortunately -- and off the record -- our relations with them (OWI analysts) are far from the best. There is only one person from whom I guarantee you would get a friendly ear, Otto Klineberg. He used to be with us and is now with them." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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OWI analytical effort was not the only agreement, nor even the first one, to be worked out by the two offices at top level. The first formal agreement concerned West Coast operations. OWI early established an office in San Francisco, which broadcast to the Far East and was a counterpart of the New York office. It depended heavily on FBIS broadcast transcripts and assumed somewhat of a proprietary attitude toward the Portland station. Edd Johnson of the San Francisco OWI office wrote Lloyd Free on 4 February 1942 informing him that a bottleneck was developing at Portland because the station there had no professional teletype operators. At that time B Wire machines were manned by OWI teletypists, a fact of which Spencer Williams was not aware until so informed by OWI in San Francisco. He wrote Grandin on 16 February, no doubt at Johnson's suggestion, asking if it would be satisfactory for OWI in San Francisco to send teletypists to Portland to operate FBIS machines. Washington turned down the proposal.

FBIS officials already were concerned that OWI, in conjunction with the CBS, was monitoring in San Francisco, partially duplicating the Portland effort. Graves reported the situation to the Bureau of the Budget on 20 May 1942, which ruled that OWI could not engage in monitoring. One suggested solution was that

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the San Francisco staff and monitoring operation be transferred to Portland. OWI officials at San Francisco vigorously opposed this. In a letter to Grandin on 24 July 1942, Warren H. Pierce of the San Francisco OWI argued that only four of the 13 employees of the CBS-OWI post could be transferred, that its reception was much superior to that of Portland, and that OWI needed the operation close to its San Francisco office. OWI employees in San Francisco even had told the office of the British Ministry of Information (MOI) in that city that Portland was badly understaffed and MOI should depend upon OWI rather than FBIS for its daily wire on Far East broadcasts. This advice was reported to Rhodes in London, who passed it on to Washington.

The final result was that Leigh reached agreement with OWI officials in Washington. OWI formally requested that FBIS take over the San Francisco station and operate it. Leigh announced terms of the agreement on 29 July 1942. American citizens at the station were to be transferred to FBIS. OWI was to pay the alien employees, but they also would be under FBIS supervision. OWI would maintain communications facilities with the San Francisco office, and Portland would send a senior editor to San Francisco at once to direct the monitoring operation. OWI also agreed to transfer \$44,000 to FBIS

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to maintain the new station until FBIS funds were available, though it later found this was illegal and the Bureau of the Budget approved an addition to the FBIS supplemental appropriation for that amount.

This settlement did not end friction between OWI and FBIS employees on the West Coast. Reporting on a trip to the Coast, Graves said on 3 September 1942 that he had learned a lot of things he could not learn any other way, especially about the "seething confusion of OWI." Norman Paige, in a letter to Grandin on 30 September 1942, noted that "On relations with OWI, the pixie parade of the analysts is again starting."\* Graves, in a memorandum to FCC on 10 July 1943, devoted three pages to an analysis of OWI West Coast complaints. Though he agreed that the OWI demand for more thorough coverage of the Far East radio was justified, he mentioned other considerations. For one thing, FBIS owed just as great an obligation to the Army, Navy, and BEW as it did to OWI, and their needs were not always coordinate. He also expressed a belief that one of the

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\* Paige further said: "Their particular beef this time is that Portland does not furnish text fast enough for their appetites. Their secondary squawk comes to open wonder as to why the Portland staff has not arrived here, and why fabulous new additions have not been made. FYI, somehow they have added considerably to their own staff, which takes on the general appearance of a board meeting each afternoon, symbolic of a Walt Disney conference." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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complainants, Vincent Mahoney, might have a grudge against FBIS because his position as head of the San Francisco monitoring post had been taken away from him by Bureau of the Budget action.

The continuing demand of the San Francisco OWI for more copy was partially met on 27 September 1943 with inauguration of the X Wire. It carried to OWI San Francisco all Far East material monitored in London, Washington, Kingsville, and Puerto Rico. Soon this wire was moving 3,000 words a day. Instead of having a separate staff, like the B Wire, the X Wire was handled by the A Wire staff. Leigh wrote Vincent Mahoney on 20 November 1943 explaining that the 3,000 words was only about half of that available, but if OWI wanted the remainder a duplex system would need to be installed at a cost of about \$2,500 a month. This could be done, provided OWI bore the expense.

Another move was made to placate the San Francisco OWI staff. Brad Coolidge was informed through a letter from Goodwin Watson on 5 November 1943 that following conferences involving Mahoney; Owen Lattimore, newly named head of the West Coast OWI; Leigh; and Audrey Menefee, chief of FBIS Far East analysis in Washington, it had been decided to develop analysis in the San Francisco FBIS bureau. Coolidge was to be freed from the news desk to devote all his time to liaison with

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OWI, making studies that OWI seemed to need. Spencer Williams was not enthusiastic about the plan.\* After a visit to the West Coast, Stewart Hensley said in a report for Leigh on 3 March 1944 that "FBIS-OWI relations in San Francisco are not good generally." He described Mahoney and others in OWI as "particularly emphatic" in their indictment of certain FBIS editors, and gave as his judgment that they were probably justified.

FBIS Headquarters continued to make what it considered an honest effort to meet the needs of the San Francisco OWI without destroying its service to other agencies. On 1 March 1944 Hensley wired Williams that starting the following day, Washington would try to move on the X Wire the entire take of Romaji copy being translated in Washington. An illustration of OWI demands that seemed excessive to many FBIS personnel was its insistence that BBC broadcasts be covered thoroughly, as they were needed by OWI broadcasting units. In August 1944,

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\* After his opinion was requested, Williams wrote to Leigh on 27 October 1943: "Brad takes his work with OWI very seriously, but I have not seen any evidence that OWI does, although Vincent Mahoney, who is devious and does not always say what he thinks, has said some non-committally polite things. As far as I am personally concerned, there is nothing in this work that I regard as indispensable and on occasions some of it gets in my way. This arises, of course, from the fact that the nature of what Brad is supposed to do with OWI has never been strictly defined." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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after FBIS had been forced to make severe cuts in its Washington staff, it was monitoring daily 268 broadcast programs, of which 93, nearly 35 percent, were from the BBC. These were for the most part of little value to anyone but OWI.\*

When plans were being made to establish the Denver post, more rough spots in FBIS-OWI relations cropped up. Brad Coolidge, who was sent to Denver to open the operation, reported to Leigh on 30 April 1943 that he had held a conference with OWI official Clayton Osborne, who was "not receptive" to OWI-FBIS cooperation in Denver. He quoted Osborne as saying that OWI "discourages its Orientals" from contacts with other groups. Coolidge added that he wished he could send Leigh a recording of the entire conversation, so Leigh "could savor its full flavor." As usual, Leigh took the issue to officials in OWI with more authority than Osborne, and the Denver project was not later marked by any notable FBIS-OWI feud. Leigh informed OWI officials that the Denver FBIS office was "placed next door to OWI by design." This was no doubt true, but it was BEW rather than OWI that was in greatest need of the monitored product processed in Denver.

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\* Undated History of FBIS, Job 54-27, Box 15, CIA Records Center.

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FBIS-OWI Problems in London

It was in London that the sharpest clashes between FBIS and OWI arose; yet it was here that eventually cooperation between the two groups was the most sanguine. But this smooth London operation did not develop until after the conflict reached a crisis and difficulties were ironed out by a formal agreement between heads of the two offices.

COI sent two men to London early in 1942 to arrange for use of BBC monitored material, planning a file from London to New York via RCA. Peter Rhodes informed Lloyd Free of this fact in March, and was authorized in April to confer with BBC monitoring officials at Evesham to see what they jointly could do to meet COI needs. Free admonished Rhodes to establish close liaison with COI representatives. Free also wrote Thomas Early of COI on 11 April 1942 asking a clarification of his agency's needs in London, explaining that there had been "considerable confusion" because of differing opinions enunciated by COI officials. One thing was clear; COI wanted more copy. Rhodes wrote Tom Grandin on 19 June 1942 that he had accepted a COI offer to supply an additional teletypist to facilitate movement of FBIS copy, but did not believe the arrangement should be permanent.

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By mid-summer of 1942 evidence of a brewing OWI-FBIS feud in London was apparent. When the British Ministry of Information (MOI) received an offer through its representative in San Francisco of a daily OWI file on the Far East superior to that furnished by FBIS, it went immediately to Rhodes. Rhodes wired Grandin on 25 July 1942 saying that MOI demanded a clarification of the status of U.S. monitoring. Was OWI or FBIS responsible? It was apparent that British monitoring officials favored FBIS, for the OWI offer of a Far East file was rejected and such a file requested from FBIS. Rhodes also was asked by the British to sit in on all meetings of BBC and MOI with monitoring officials of other allied nations. Chairman Fly wrote the State Department on 1 August 1942 recalling that FBIS had been established in London with State Department approval, and asked that MOI and BBC be informed of the official responsibility of FBIS. Even before this letter was written, MOI had informed all its offices that any question concerning U.S. monitoring should be cleared through FBIS. Rhodes so informed Washington in a wire dated 28 July 1942.

These developments failed to dampen the enthusiasm of some OWI officials. Representatives in London insisted on discussing with the BBC the possibility of a teletype

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line from Evesham to the OWI London office, and as the BBC would not discuss the matter unless FBIS also were involved, Rhodes accompanied an OWI representative to Evesham to negotiate jointly with the BBC. Because of certain technical offers made by OWI, the request for a second line from Evesham to London, supplementing the one FBIS already had been assigned, was received favorably. Rhodes informed Grandin of this development on 3 August 1942. Then on 14 August Rhodes wrote again, alerting Washington to the fact that Edd Johnson, now in charge of the New York OWI office, had written Harry Lerner in London saying that OWI must have more copy, was planning to send three or four editors and four teletypists to Evesham immediately to set up its own service, and operations would start by 5 September. Rhodes' primary worry was that OWI would carry out this plan and be in operation before FBIS had sufficient staff to properly man the Evesham office and make use of the new line granted by the BBC. In the meantime, OWI had launched plans for a second wire, to be used exclusively by OWI. Rhodes realized that close OWI-FBIS cooperation in London was necessary, but expressed a strong view that the monitoring operation should be controlled by FBIS and warned that friction would become serious unless agreement were reached. Rhodes wired

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Washington on 27 August 1942 saying that plans were complete for an FBIS staff of editors to start working in Evesham on 5 September, but that OWI was making plans for a full duplication of the FBIS effort. The BBC, he said, was perplexed by these plans, but was attempting to give the Americans the services they wanted. Rhodes also revealed some bitterness as a result of the apparent affluence of OWI, in contrast to the tight budgetary restrictions placed on FBIS.

Meantime, Dr. Leigh was working through the top command of OWI. Grandin cabled Rhodes on 29 August 1942 to inform him that Milton Eisenhower had cancelled the OWI request for a second London-Evesham teleprinter line, had removed Evesham monitoring editors from the OWI budget, and had instructed OWI to transfer to the FBIS payroll the staff being assembled at Evesham. Obviously this information was at fault, for on 14 September 1942 Rhodes informed Grandin by wire that the OWI London office had been informed by OWI officials that they had no knowledge of such Eisenhower action. However, OWI in London delayed further moves to await developments. Leigh again took the matter up with Eisenhower. In a letter dated 24 September 1942 he agreed that OWI needed more copy, but argued that it could be supplied best by an expanded FBIS operation in England. Apparently Eisenhower was having difficulty

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getting a meeting of the minds in his own organization; for at least two months the situation remained static, to the satisfaction of no one.

On 17 November 1942 Leigh wrote Philip Hamblett of OWI London, presumably with the approval of Eisenhower, explaining the situation as he saw it. He pointed out that the BBC recognized FBIS as the U. S. monitoring authority, and added that he saw no reason why operations in England should be different from those at domestic stations. The problem arose largely, he believed, from failure of OWI to inform FBIS of its needs in sufficient time for FBIS to obtain and allocate funds. He suggested a second wire and expansion of the London editorial staff at OWI expense, but with the operation remaining under FBIS direction.

Peter Rhodes was in Washington and New York briefly in November, and held informal discussions with OWI officials in both cities. Upon his return to London, Rhodes wired Grandin and Leigh on 26 November 1942 asking that they inform Milton Eisenhower that Edd Johnson in New York, following their "inconclusive conference," had notified Max Lerner in London that FCC had agreed to an immediate increase of the OWI staff, and instructed him to make arrangements with the BBC for their arrival. Rhodes protested vigorously this Johnson action, calling

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it "unauthorized." There followed a series of acrimonious messages between Rhodes and Lerner. The latter charged that Rhodes had intentionally misrepresented Johnson's position and protested his effort to "put Edd on the spot." Both men were careful to see that their home offices got all copies of this debate, and if the feud did nothing else, it demonstrated to London staffs of both organizations that they would get nowhere by squabbling, but must learn to cooperate.

The controversy finally was settled in Washington. Leigh wired FBIS in London on 9 December 1942 and followed this with a letter giving full details on 11 December. It was agreed that OWI would have its own editors at Evesham, but under administrative supervision of FBIS. FBIS and OWI each would maintain a wire service from Evesham, with both wires going to both organizations in London and in the United States. The chief gain for FBIS was that it would get at Headquarters the entire output of the OWI staff in England, thus doubling its volume, and at no extra cost to FBIS.

There was considerable skepticism concerning the workability of this arrangement. It was recognized that FBIS and OWI editors at Evesham would have to cooperate closely if duplication were to be avoided. All editors would have to familiarize themselves regularly with two

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separate files. Because of space limitations at the BBC monitoring post, the two editorial staffs were at first physically separated, but it was agreed that this should be changed as soon as practicable, and the change actually came about rather quickly, before 7 March 1943. In reply to a letter from Leigh asking about application of the new agreement, Vincent O. Anderson, new acting chief in London, wrote on 20 January 1943 that there had been problems, but operations were on the whole surprisingly smooth, and were likely to remain so as long as Lerner was in charge of the OWI London staff.

The record shows no further OWI-FBIS clashes in London, and there was no further change in working methods until May 1944. Leigh wrote on 8 May 1944 that Hamblett and Lerner had agreed with FBIS officials that OWI should cease filing BBC monitored material and limit its output to about 6,000 words a day of analytical information for use of international broadcasters. A letter from Julian Behrstock, then chief of the London office, on 17 May 1944 noted the end of "this dual functioning," which he said had been "tolerable" but only because the FBIS and OWI

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staffs "got along together especially well."\* Two OWI editors were transferred to FBIS, though initially their salaries continued to come from OWI funds. OWI-FBIS financial arrangements got pretty well snarled. The FBIS administrative officer in London tried unsuccessfully on 16 June 1944 to give Washington an accounting.\*\*

#### Problems of Overseas Monitoring

Peter Rhodes was plagued by other OWI plans in addition to those at the BBC monitoring post. While he was in Washington for conferences preparatory to going to North Africa, Vincent Anderson notified him from London that FBIS should move fast, as OWI already was sending broadcasting teams to Casablanca, Rabat, and Algiers and would be needing monitoring services very soon. Back in London, Rhodes found his departure for Algiers unexplainably delayed. Writing on

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\* Behrstock further added that this "OWI duplication" apparently "was strictly an Edd Johnson idea," and with his departure from OWI it was ceasing. Indication that the BBC was never quite happy about the arrangement is seen in an exchange of letters between Behrstock and BBC monitoring director Robert Burns in January 1944. Burns agreed reluctantly to Behrstock's request that OWI editors be allowed to treat directly with the BBC on matters affecting OWI copy alone. FBIS Records, National Archives.

\*\* In a letter to Behrstock on 24 May 1944, Shepherd had described FBIS-OWI financial relations as "a mystery" to him, and asked if a clarification were possible. The London administrative office attempted to show an accounting for the past year and came up with a figure of \$7,000 owed by OWI. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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2 December 1942, he complained that "Someone is tangling up our efforts to get into the field and do a job. Who and why I don't know." He clearly was suspicious that it was OWI. Writing to Leigh on 4 December 1942, he expressed puzzlement as to why OWI had reportedly sent a cable to London saying he should not proceed to Algiers. He thought it had been established that he would be part of the same team as OWI, under PWB, but now he suspected that OWI was planning to send its own monitoring team to North Africa. Writing again to Leigh from Algiers on 22 December 1942, Rhodes reported that Milton Eisenhower, upon a visit to North Africa, had assured him that FBIS should handle the monitoring there, "naturally working as part of the psychological warfare team under Colonel Hazeltine." He believed -- and was probably correct -- that some OWI officials had sought to block his trip to North Africa so that OWI could independently establish monitoring, but were overruled in their own organization.

There was no more trouble with OWI in North Africa, but other forces eventually induced FBIS to give up its control of monitoring there and turn the operation over to OWI. In the meantime FBIS officials in Washington learned that OWI was placing other monitoring teams

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abroad. In March 1943 a special request concerning broadcasts from the Middle East was referred to London, and BBC efforts to get the answer revealed that OWI was monitoring in Istanbul. A query to Elmer Davis through the office of Chairman Fly verified this fact. Fly noted in a letter to Davis on 2 April 1943 that FBIS, though charged with responsibility for monitoring, had discovered by accident the OWI operation in Istanbul as well as earlier OWI monitoring in New York and San Francisco. This ignorance of what other government agencies were doing to duplicate FBIS efforts led to waste and inefficiency. "Joint planning and distribution through FBIS" would seem to be necessary attributes of a proper solution to the problem. Fly agreed that OWI was prepared to monitor in Istanbul and FBIS was not, and acknowledged that it might be proper for OWI or some other service to monitor in other locations, but there should be a mutual exchange of information, to say the least. There were other exchanges. Elmer Davis assured Fly on 9 April 1943 that OWI wanted to cooperate to the fullest extent, and was ready to draw up new plans and agreements. Fly reiterated on 1 May that there was no objection to Istanbul monitoring, but FBIS should have the monitored information for distribution to its clients.

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This problem of FBIS relations with the OWI overseas was of deep concern to Dr. Leigh. He continued to study the problem, gather information on actions of OWI, and keep Fly informed. He counted heavily upon the study being made by Ralph Casey. In September 1942 he and Milton Eisenhower had agreed that someone independent of both offices should make a thorough study of OWI-FBIS relations and recommend changes. They had agreed upon Casey, and he had accepted the task, after approval by the Bureau of the Budget. Actually, the study was intended for the Bureau of the Budget, to aid in resolving instances of OWI-FBIS duplication. Leigh had suggested Casey, and was confident that his final report would please FBIS, but cautioned Theodore Newcomb of the Analysis Division on 18 December 1942 that Casey's discussions with OWI were "delicate," and FBIS staff members should take care to avoid giving the impression that they considered Casey "our man." Leigh wrote Casey on 23 January 1943 suggesting a visit to Washington for conferences with him and Milton Eisenhower, as the question of "cooperative allocation of functions" was delaying important services. MOI, he said, had consulted FBIS regarding OWI plans to set up a monitoring operation in New Delhi, for MOI recognized FBIS as the responsible U.S. monitoring agency.

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Chairman Fly, Leigh further explained, would not accept the thesis that getting the job done was more important than FBIS, and had considered taking the matter to the President. Leigh again wired Casey on 31 March 1943 informing him that his report was urgently needed.

Casey had helped to work out the OWI-FBIS agreement on analysis work, but on the question of overseas monitoring he was noncommittal. Leigh, disappointed, wrote Fly on 5 April 1943 that he had hoped Casey would "deal directly with the problem," but he merely noted the duplication, so it was up to FCC and OWI to settle their problems.

The final decisive force was the FBIS money shortage. Fly wrote Elmer Davis on 20 April 1943 that FCC would be glad for OWI to undertake work in Australia, as FBIS did not have the necessary funds. The same argument applied in New Delhi. Leigh continued negotiations with OWI officials, primarily with Hamblett, and on 16 June 1943 they signed a formal agreement. It recognized OWI responsibility for broadcasting and FBIS responsibility for monitoring, acknowledged the inability of FBIS to provide OWI with needed information in certain foreign outposts, and agreed that this gave OWI ample reason to conduct monitoring in those posts. OWI was left free to undertake monitoring at any point it was deemed

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necessary outside the United States and British Isles, but accepted the obligation to supply FBIS with its monitored material, with FBIS paying communications costs where facilities were not already available. FBIS also was given the right to attach one or more editors to each OWI monitoring station to make sure that FBIS would receive the material it needed. The Bureau of the Budget approved the agreement, after noting that this did not obligate it in advance to approve FBIS requests for funds to finance editors assigned to OWI posts. This completed the series of OWI-FBIS agreements, and incidentally, ended the series of clashes between the two organizations.\*

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\* ON THE BEAM for 14 August 1943 said that the history of the war years would show "at least three treaties" between OWI and FBIS. It mentioned the agreement in London, the transfer of FBIS North African personnel to OWI, and the overseas agreement. Actually, the North African transfer was not a formal agreement, but transfer of FBIS analysts to OWI was, and the most important formal domestic agreement was that taking OWI out of monitoring in the United States, the one reached in regard to San Francisco monitoring. FBIS Records, National Archives.

Some administrative agreements were made in implementing this final arrangement. A Shepherd memorandum dated 15 February 1944 said FBIS would pay communications costs on 500 words a day from Naples or Bari. Another memorandum on 20 May 1944 reported an informal agreement by OWI on 1 February to pay half the cost of all traffic from Cairo. The February charge of \$568.32 was split between FBIS and OWI. Job 49-19, CIA Records Center.

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Financial relations between the two units remained complicated. The question of responsibility for communications was never clear, and most FBIS personnel assigned to OWI foreign posts were placed on the OWI payroll. Theoretically, FBIS was liable for reimbursement for salaries paid these people, but claims were seldom made. After a visit to London in 1945, Charles Hyneman wrote a memorandum for Russell Shepherd recommending steps to restore Spencer Williams in New Delhi and Edward Berkman in Cairo to the FBIS payroll. Hyneman said: "I have no objection to OWI's paying their bills, but I think they are in a bad spot as long as they work for us but have someone else in control of their movements and their fortunes." Berkman had also been worried about this situation, and Hyneman wrote him saying he would be restored to the FBIS payroll. Leigh reported on 16 October 1943 that Leonard Leiberman and B. F. Ellington had been transferred to the OWI payroll as of 7 October. Hamblett wrote to ask if FBIS would insist on reimbursement back to June, and Leigh replied that it would not. Leiberman took charge for OWI of the Bari post, which included a news team and a Balkan monitoring team.

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Relations with the Armed Forces

Wartime intelligence gleaned from the enemy radio was of course a valuable asset to the military and was widely used. Yet, being strictly a civilian organization, FBIS had its problems with the Armed Forces, and its authority was sometimes questioned. Secretary of War Stimson gave early endorsement of monitoring, writing Fly on 18 July 1941 that his examination of the spot bulletins convinced him that the new service would make a valuable contribution to War Department information. Both War and Navy were among early subscribers to the 24-hour A Wire service, and interest also was shown outside Washington. Several military units in London were eager to get lateral services offered by FBIS in London, while in San Juan the G-2 office in February 1942 requested the full file sent from Puerto Rico to Washington and offered to supply Army teletype operators so the service would not be delayed. The offer was accepted on a temporary basis. In August 1942, when the Bureau of the Budget suggested that an Army representative be brought in to testify before Congressional committees as to the value of the FBIS product, Col. John V. Grombach of G-2 readily volunteered his services. There was never any formal agreement with the Armed Services as to fields of responsibility, but Graves said in a memorandum on

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19 November 1942 that there was a "tacit understanding" that the Army would depend upon FBIS for monitoring of voice broadcasts, while FBIS would leave to the Army interception of code messages from the enemy.

During the war a high percentage of Daily Report copies went to military subscribers. In January 1943 the confidential classification on these publications was changed to restricted, in part because military officials had complained that the higher classification limited the book's circulation.\* Col. Alfred McCormack of G-2 wrote on 17 February 1943 testifying to the adequacy of FBIS coverage. He said that irregular Army intercepts of enemy broadcasts also were sent to his office. As a test, he had checked 24 of these intercepts against FBIS releases and found all but one were adequately covered by FBIS. That one had been fully reported in the American press. The Daily Report faced a growing demand for use in military training courses, and occasionally, because of its limited publication facilities, FBIS was forced to reduce the number desired for a single address. Comments solicited

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\* Leigh wrote a Naval officer on 2 January 1943 announcing the change and saying he regretted that the earlier classification had handicapped the Navy in making full use of the Daily Report. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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from military officials discounted the value of analytical material, but stressed the importance of obtaining every possible intelligence item FBIS could intercept.

The War Department issued a daily publication called the War Department Digest of Foreign Broadcasts, which relied almost wholly on the Daily Report and A Wire. A War Department official wrote on 12 January 1945 asking if it would be possible to get a greatly increased number of Daily Reports. He explained that he would like to discontinue the War Department Digest, which was entirely dependent on FBIS sources, with the latter being "much better, more comprehensive, more voluminous." When FBIS found late in the war that it would have to resort more and more to military communications if it were to continue operations on a satisfactory scale, it found most of the military quite receptive. Julian Behrstock wrote from London on 2 January 1945 that when he informed the Army Air Force, as instructed, that names of prisoners of war obtained from enemy broadcasts could no longer be relayed to London after 31 December 1944 because of communications costs, military officials advised the War Department that it was important this service be maintained, and that facilities of the Signal Corps should be offered to FBIS.

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A letter from Paul Porter, who had succeeded Fly as FCC Chairman, on 22 February 1945 expressed appreciation of the service FBIS was getting from the Signal Corps and agreed to a Signals request that it be allowed to retain full copies of all FBIS messages.

It was in the Pacific that the military showed its greatest appreciation for the services of FBIS, and it was here that relations were closest. Both Army and Navy Intelligence in Hawaii had done some small-scale monitoring of the Japanese radio, as FBIS publications were too long in transit to be of much value to them. The military, in cooperation with OSS, also had done some monitoring in the Aleutians. When Spencer Williams was in Honolulu in the fall of 1943 investigating the possibility of FBIS monitoring in Hawaii, he talked to Robert C. Richardson, Commanding General, Central Pacific. As a result, Richardson wrote FBIS on 25 November 1943 requesting that broadcasts from Tokyo, Manila, Hsinking, and Chungking, monitored on the Pacific Coast, be prepared for his command. He offered to make arrangements to fly the copy daily by bomber from San Francisco to Honolulu. Arrangements were made, and attempts at monitoring by the military in Hawaii ended. One Japanese monitor who had worked for Naval Intelligence in Hilo was given

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top priority for travel to the Mainland to join the FBIS staff.

The telefax transmitting system that Puerto Rico used to send copy to Washington was shipped to San Francisco and later to Hawaii, with the idea that when monitoring actually was begun in Hawaii it could be used for sending material to the Mainland. Before the system had begun to operate satisfactorily, actually before it had a real test, the Signal Corps offered to handle FBIS traffic between Hawaii and San Francisco. The offer was accepted. Commercial communications were never resorted to in the Pacific. Naval communications were used between Guam and Honolulu, Army communications from Honolulu to San Francisco.

The experience of Army and Navy Intelligence in trying to monitor Tokyo worked to the advantage of FBIS. In setting up monitoring operations in Hawaii and Guam, and in running tests in other Pacific Islands, FBIS had the full cooperation of both G-2 and ONI. One of the Honolulu contacts in G-2 was Maj. Frank Blake, who joined FBIS after the war and was in charge at various times of three different FBIS monitoring posts. Full Army cooperation was available in setting up of a monitoring post in Hawaii, and both the Army command under Gen. Richardson, and the Navy under Adm. Chester Nimitz, aided

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in outpost tests and establishment of an outpost station. On Guam, FBIS was able under Navy jurisdiction to move in and start monitoring even before the island had been fully cleared of Japanese stragglers. Hyneman, in a conference with Elmer Davis on 28 August 1944 following a visit to the Pacific, remarked on the cooperative attitude of both the Army and Navy toward FBIS.

The most uncomfortable situation arose on Guam in 1946, after FBIS was taken over by the War Department. The staff on Guam had used Navy facilities, and when FBIS became part of the Army, inter-service antagonisms arose which had nothing to do with FBIS operations.

In Washington, relations with the military were not always so satisfactory. In several instances anticipated military support failed to develop, with unfortunate results. In the fall of 1942 FBIS was expanding as rapidly as possible to meet demands for broadcast intelligence, but was facing more and more handicaps. In spite of full access to the British monitored output, there still were serious gaps, with inadequate coverage of the Far East and important deficits in the Middle East, the Balkans, the USSR, Africa, and even Spain and Portugal.

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Dr. Leigh was in close touch with a Colonel Middleton, assigned at the time to the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had been requested to prepare a report on foreign broadcast monitoring for consideration at the next meeting of the National Intelligence Committee. At Middleton's request, Leigh prepared for him a full report on FBIS capabilities and deficiencies, stressing gaps in broadcast coverage that needed to be filled "as a necessary auxiliary to continuing war operations," and suggesting that the Joint Chiefs consider giving support to filling these gaps. Leigh's report showed that to get the needed coverage, FBIS would require an additional \$2,262,258 on an annual basis -- \$921,865 for the remainder of the 1942-43 fiscal year. Leigh's hope was that the Joint Chiefs would swing their considerable support, thus making money available through a deficiency appropriation or transfer of funds from the Armed Forces. The report called for monitoring at Lisbon, Teheran, Cairo, and Stockholm, expansion of Pacific Coast monitoring, and funds for copying of German press transmissions in London. The document was forwarded to Colonel Middleton for presentation to the Joint Chiefs, and correspondence during the coming six weeks indicated that Leigh was placing high hopes on a favorable response. General.

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George V. Strong read the report and wrote Fly on 21 December 1942 declaring that he believed the expansion Leigh recommended would be "of substantial value from a military standpoint" and it was his recommendation that it be carried out at the earliest possible date. Fly wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull on 28 December 1942 saying that FBIS was anticipating a "request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff" for monitoring posts at Lisbon, Algiers, Cairo, Teheran, and Stockholm. He desired information on communications from those points.

Leigh learned on 9 January 1943 that Colonel Middleton had been transferred, and his place taken by a Colonel Montague. He also learned that at the meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee the question of expansion of foreign broadcast monitoring had been removed from the agenda on the grounds that a message from General Eisenhower's headquarters asking that a monitoring staff be sent to North Africa showed that his command "was already dealing with the matter." Leigh's report was not read by the Joint Intelligence Committee and never reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Further correspondence between Leigh and Colonel Montague showed that Montague resented the fact that Middleton had encouraged the report. Colonel Montague

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claimed that Colonel Middleton had "no authority" to prepare a report for the Joint Chiefs, but only to "draft a paper on broadcast monitoring for consideration of the Joint Intelligence Committee."

Disappointment in North Africa

Leigh's experience with the Joint Chiefs of Staff was followed by the Algiers debacle. As early as October 1942, definite plans were shaping up in England for African-Mediterranean monitoring. Rhodes reported on 23 October that a meeting had been held to discuss sending a team to Gibraltar or to Freetown in Africa, and that FCC expected to send trained staff members. Representatives of the military were in on the planning. Meantime the landing in North Africa took place and on 19 November 1942 a message signed by General Dwight D. Eisenhower asked that a monitoring staff be sent to North Africa. Rhodes interviewed General McClure in London, who gave him detailed instructions on what was expected of the North African team. After Rhodes arrived in Algiers his commanding officer messaged London asking that B. F. Ellington and James A. Jones be sent. Anderson reported this to Washington on 24 December 1942. At further requests from Eisenhower's headquarters, two FBIS Washington monitors were sent to North Africa, and on 10 March 1943 Colonel Hazeltine, in charge of PWB

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there, asked that the FBIS staff in the area be increased to 16.

FBIS had no funds available for such an expansion. It was obvious that growth of the North African post was now out of the hands of FBIS, and necessary funds would have to be found if requests were to be met. In a memorandum dated 15 March 1943, Leigh declared that the Army would have to supply money for the North African post, or FBIS would have to drop it. On 19 March 1943 Fly wrote Secretary Stimson asking that War Department funds be transferred to the account of FBIS to carry on the monitoring operation in North Africa, including the Hazeltine-requested expansion. Statements made by Leigh and other FBIS officials in the coming weeks indicated a strong belief that the money would be forthcoming, for all information from North Africa showed that the monitoring operation had the strong support of General Eisenhower.

On 22 April 1943 Fly got his letter. It was signed by Acting Secretary of War Patterson, declared that the transfer of funds asked by Fly could not be made, and further stated bluntly that there was "no known authorization" for presence of FCC personnel in North Africa. The monitoring services provided by FBIS in North Africa, the letter continued, would not be desired after 31 May 1943.

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In a memorandum for Chairman Fly dated 6 May, Leigh noted that despite Patterson's statement that there was no authorization for FBIS personnel in North Africa, all moves to the area had been cleared through Gen. George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of General Staff, G-2; through General Eisenhower; and through the Chiefs of Intelligence and the Signal Corps in Algiers. The Hazeltine wired request for staff expansion had been captioned: "Eisenhower to Leigh." Leigh was puzzled as to interpretation of the Patterson letter: did it mean the monitoring operation was to cease, or that FBIS must relinquish its control? He continued to investigate, and on 31 May made a final report to Fly. General Strong, known by Leigh to be thoroughly cognizant of the importance of foreign broadcast monitoring, had informed him that the decision outlined by Patterson was a "direct and personal one" by Secretary of War Stimson.\* Leigh and Strong decided that the best solution was to

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\* Stimson, the memorandum further explained, had been irritated by the large number of civilian agencies in North Africa, and was determined to cut them down by any means possible. FBIS was doubly vulnerable; it was a small group that could be absorbed by a larger group, and it did not have the money to finance its operation. The request for War Department funds had sealed the fate of FBIS in the area. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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transfer the operation to OWI, and on 3 June 1943 Strong issued formal approval for attachment of at least one FBIS staff member to the group. The remainder of the staff was given the choice of transfer to OWI or return to FBIS in the United States. Alan Hamlett returned to the United States. Leiberman and Ellington transferred to OWI. Jones and Rhodes both remained on the FBIS payroll for some time.

After Rhodes went forward to organize other monitoring teams, Jones remained in charge in Algiers. The monitoring staff with headquarters in Algiers eventually grew to 250 men, though only the two remained on the FBIS payroll. Rhodes bore the title "Chief African and European Field Correspondent," and was expected to provide information files to FBIS Headquarters. FBIS London started in May 1943 to supply Algiers with a file of 10,000 words daily from BBC monitoring, but various handicaps, not the least of which was inadequate communications facilities, prevented war front monitoring units from supplying FBIS with much of value. In September 1943 Rhodes reported that the Algiers post was supplying 150 clients with information, and on 26 October 1943 he returned to FBIS the \$10,000 contingency fund that had been set up at Army insistence, explaining that OWI now was bearing the monitoring costs and there was no further

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need to draw upon FCC.

Contacts with other Governmental Units

A list of all U.S. Government offices with which FBIS had contacts during its first half dozen years would be almost the equivalent of a U.S. Government directory. In replying to charges by counsel for the Cox Committee, Dr. Leigh placed in the files of the Committee 42 letters from heads of departments, all testifying to their use of FBIS materials.\* A report for Hyneman on 4 May 1945 by Audrey Menefee showed that in April alone her Far East Division received 170 requests for special services. Answering these requests required 90 hours of work by her staff. OWI was responsible for 57 of these requests, but the other 123 came from a long list of offices, including the Red Cross, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the British and Australian Embassies. Even the War Relocation Administration, which became familiar with FBIS through its efforts to recruit Japanese monitors, found FBIS reports "extremely useful." Replying to a survey questionnaire on 19 July 1943, the manager

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\* Page 3085, Volume III, Report of Special Congressional Committee Investigating the FCC, GPO, 1944.

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of one of the relocation camps asked that he continue to get the Daily Report, as he found it "essential" in handling rumors that "might be traced to Japanese broadcasts." A letter from the Preventive Medicine Division, Office of the Surgeon General, on 26 August 1943 asked that it be placed on the Daily Report mailing list, as it had learned the publication "contains much valuable information of a medical and public health nature."

Naturally the State Department was one of the government departments most directly and fundamentally interested in information broadcast by the foreign radio, and its various offices made it perhaps the largest single subscriber to FBIS products. The State Department played a major part in organizing FBIS. Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, writing on 10 September 1941, described foreign broadcast monitoring as one of his "pet ideas for years" and praised progress already made by the infant service. Relations between State and FBIS personnel usually were cordial and straightforward at all levels of contact. Of course State approved every move made by FBIS outside the United States. Eventually, State-FBIS relationships became somewhat routinized and did not produce special and

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unusual problems during the war as did those with some other organizations, though some State Department requirements levied on FBIS were beyond its capacity and some State officials apparently failed to realize the extent of the work their needs would demand. For example, on 19 April 1944 a State Department letter asked FBIS to cover four times a week a BBC broadcast beamed to the West Indies. Ben Hall reported that the project would require the time of one monitor 24 hours a week, and a study showed that the material consisted only of repeats from other programs or was "junk" that no one would have any use for. State apparently withdrew the request.

One wartime unit that came to depend to an unusual degree upon FBIS was the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW). In the early months of the war BEW discovered that FBIS was the reservoir for a wealth of economic information that did not get into regular publications. Graves reported to FCC on 27 May 1942 that BEW wanted to engage with FBIS in a joint effort. Field offices would be asked to file every small bit of economic information, while BEW personnel would cull through data not used in the regular services and aid FBIS in issuing a special economics publication. The idea of a joint FBIS-BEW publication was threshed about for some months, but

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never got off the ground. BEW did station some of its own personnel in FBIS offices to collect material from transcripts discarded by the Wire Service and Daily Report. On 5 August 1942 Milo Perkins of BEW wrote Fly expressing disappointment that FBIS was unable to supply more Far East broadcasts, but praised the service as the exclusive source of economic information from a large part of the world.\* On 3 September 1942, answering a letter from Fowler Hamilton of BEW, Leigh, explaining that cable costs of \$50 a day prevented FBIS from getting more material from London, suggested that BEW station a man in London to glean more economic information. On 29 January 1943 BEW offered to pay cable costs to get 2,000 words a day added to the London file. BEW also gave considerable help in setting up the Denver office, and Harold Graves wrote Spencer Williams on 2 January 1943 that efforts by BEW were largely responsible for Budget Bureau approval of funds to expand West Coast monitoring.

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\* Perkins described as "extremely serious" the fact that only about 15 percent of Japanese and Japanese-controlled broadcasts were being monitored, as BEW would like to get 100 percent. He cited several important developments that had been disclosed through broadcasts, including the shortage of Japanese transportation, and called expansion of FBIS Far East coverage "vital to the war effort." Fly replied on 10 August 1942, saying his letter would be brought to the attention of the Bureau of the Budget. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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Another office which offered FBIS special problems was CIAA, under Nelson Rockefeller, who wrote Fly as early as 5 March 1942 expressing appreciation for the "invaluable aid" being supplied his organization by FBIS. Rockefeller wrote again on 29 July 1942. This time he praised material being received from Kingsville, saying that the CIAA daily news roundup of Latin American affairs was including 400 to 500 words a day obtained from Kingsville transcripts. However, he noted that the Kingsville bureau was far too small to supply his agency with the material it needed, and urged its immediate expansion. Fly replied on 3 August 1942 that FBIS would like to expand Kingsville, but this would depend on the adequacy of the requested supplemental appropriation. CIAA also wanted more material from London, so Leigh informed it on 20 February 1943 that if it could bear the added cable cost of \$3,328 a year, a special Latin American cable would be filed from London. CIAA agreed and the cable continued until April, when CIAA asked that it be discontinued. There was another instance in which CIAA changes in plans inconvenienced FBIS. Sometime in the summer of 1942 the office suggested a daily analysis of Latin American broadcasts and FBIS analyst John W. Gardner launched the project, which was praised

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by CIAA officials. Early in January 1943 a letter from Francis Jamieson of CIAA said that the "stopgap" daily analysis could now be discontinued, as CIAA was preparing its own analysis. Gardner, in a memorandum to Leigh on 13 January 1943, advised against attempting to dissuade Jamieson, but noted that when the analysis was requested and FBIS undertook the work at great inconvenience there was no suggestion that it would be temporary. Leigh wrote on 22 January 1943 saying that since State and other departments also wanted the daily analysis, it would be continued. Allen Rivkin of CIAA, in a letter dated 11 March 1943, again asked that the service be discontinued, as it was "no longer useful" to CIAA.\*

After COI was reorganized, FBIS continued to serve OSS in Washington and in London, but relations were never close. Goodwin Watson wrote OSS on 8 February 1943 in reply to a request that would require the services of two more analysts. Watson suggested a

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\* Rivkin said further: "Our own CIAA propaganda analysis covers all the material you cover in your publication, in addition to a great deal more you do not cover." He then said: "Thanks for the other releases I get, however. I find them interesting and extremely helpful." FBIS Records, National Archives.

The Cox Committee counsel made much of this CIAA exchange in an effort to show that FBIS sought to force useless materials on its subscribers, but failed to mention the last statement in the Rivkin letter.

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letter to help FBIS in getting supplemental funds to finance such an expansion. Colonel Donovan himself wrote Fly on 22 March 1943 praising the "invaluable service" rendered his organization by FBIS and suggesting regular conferences of FBIS analysts and OSS personnel. It was in the Pacific that FBIS and OSS interests came closest. On 8 August 1944 Naval Lt. James R. Withrow of OSS wrote Edward Hullinger, reporting that OSS had permission to establish a transmitter in the Aleutians and was awaiting permission from Admiral Nimitz to place one in the Central Pacific, where it would be glad to cooperate with FBIS. Hullinger discussed plans with Withrow while he was on the West Coast and received another letter from him on 13 October 1944 promising to provide Japanese monitors to expand the FBIS monitoring operation, both in Hawaii and in an outpost. He suggested eight to ten Japanese in the outpost, to be under supervision of three or more FBIS editors. Of course this cooperation was contingent upon a favorable reply from Admiral Nimitz to the OSS application for a transmitter station. The cooperative venture failed to develop, and Russell Shepherd wrote Hyneman from Hawaii on 10 March 1945 explaining the reason. The Navy, which was in control in the Pacific, "was not interested

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particularly in psychological warfare," and had "failed to give OSS the welcome it had expected."\*

Probably the FBI and the Justice Department had the most unique tie-up with FBIS during and immediately after the war. Lloyd Free wrote the Department of Justice on 12 August 1941 that Americans occasionally made statements over the foreign radio and FBIS would be glad to supply details. J. Edgar Hoover wrote on 3 July 1941 expressing appreciation for a transcript sent him and requesting continued FBIS cooperation. In the summer of 1942 leaders of an organization called "Friends of Progress" were charged with subversion on the basis of domestic broadcasts and publications, and tried in California. Harold Graves was asked to testify, using broadcast transcripts to show the source of some statements disseminated. Graves received a letter from the California Attorney General on 29 October 1942 thanking him for his assistance and reporting that all the accused were convicted. Graves also was called

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\* Shepherd further explained that Naval officials considered that with OWI transmitters in the Pacific, it was providing all the propaganda needed. Donovan, he said, had visited the Pacific and "got absolutely nowhere." This helped to explain the "favorable treatment" FBIS had received, Shepherd said, as it provided "the missing link" in the intelligence organization. Organization and Management, History of FBIS, FBIS Headquarters Records.

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upon to testify at the trial of William Dudley Pelley in Indianapolis, and during 1942 and 1943 there was a frequent exchange of letters between FBIS and the Justice Department concerning identity of certain Americans broadcasting over enemy radio stations. FBIS supplied evidence used in cases against a long list of broadcasters, including Fred W. Kaltenbach, Robert H. Best, Jane Anderson, Douglas Chandler, E. D. Ward, Edward Leo Delaney, John Holland, and Ezra Pound. In some cases Americans were reputed to have made broadcasts, but failure of FBIS to provide verification prevented their being prosecuted.

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## Chapter 6 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Even during the earliest days of planning, when it was envisioned that U.S. monitoring would concentrate on shortwave broadcasts beamed to the Western Hemisphere, it became apparent that posts established within the continental United States could not satisfactorily do the job. That led to selection of Puerto Rico as one of the first monitoring posts. Soon after monitoring was under way at Portland and Puerto Rico it became evident that the former could not adequately cover the Far East and the latter was not a satisfactory site for monitoring Africa, the Middle East, and South Europe. No doubt Lloyd Free, who was familiar with BBC monitoring, also was aware that an effective monitoring system would have to move beyond broadcasts beamed to this hemisphere, that any foreign broadcast monitoring system worthy of the name would have to operate outside the United States. This called for international negotiations.

### British-American Arrangements

It is not clear exactly when Lloyd Free started negotiations for establishment of a staff in England, but it must have been very soon after he assumed office on 16 June 1941. Of course approval by FCC was the first step, then acquiescence by the State Department,

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which instructed Ambassador John Winant in London to investigate the attitude of the British Government and the BBC monitoring station. Free may also have made his own contacts in London, but he definitely approached British officials in the United States. On 26 August 1941 he wrote Gerald Cook, BBC representative in New York City; contents of the letter made it apparent that he already had discussed the matter with Cook. Mr. Free declared that official approval was complete on this side, and that he awaited only acceptance from London to start action.\* Formal State Department approval actually came much later, but Free must have been assured verbally that the plan was acceptable.\*\*

The Pearl Harbor attack came so quickly after Free and Rhodes arrived in London that very little had

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\* Free recalled in the letter that the "proposed arrangement" was that the U.S. representative would have access to data of the BBC Monitoring Service, so that he could send out daily reports by telephone and the BBC printed material by airmail. In exchange, FBMS was to provide the British with its own data, specifically, with broadcasts from the Far East and those beamed to Latin America. FBIS Records, National Archives. Such a detailed analysis of the planned agreement indicates that Free had held considerable discussion with the British, though no printed records of this discussion have been found.

\*\* See pages 32, 33 and 34.

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been done toward completing detailed arrangements with the BBC. At a meeting held on 10 December 1941, the BBC promised to provide FBIS with office accommodations at Evesham; to tie in its flash service from the monitoring post to the FBIS London office; and to allow FBIS personnel at Evesham the use of a BBC line to London in case of an emergency. No exclusive FBIS line from Evesham to London was yet available. It was agreed that there would be no charge to FBIS "except where the BBC was actually out of pocket." BBC officials described as "extremely useful" the services promised them by Free. They expressed a preference for Japanese and Chinese broadcasts of news and intelligence value, but were content to leave selection of material and other details to FBIS. Any material cabled to the BBC from the United States would be at FBIS expense.

It was obvious that FBIS was getting much more from the arrangement than were the British. On the other hand, the BBC was going to absolutely no extra expense. Cable costs both ways would be an FBIS obligation, and though the Americans were left free to decide what they would send the British in return, the volume of material they received would depend entirely upon the effort and expense to which they

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were willing to go. The BBC at the time was listening to about a million words a day. All of this was made available to FBIS, provided it could supply staff and communications facilities to make use of it.

The BBC did not change its monitoring coverage, its methods or procedure, to meet the needs of FBIS, but it did display from the start a liberal and cooperative attitude. Rhodes had no authority to hire non-American employees, and was badly in need of an experienced secretary. The BBC offered the services of a capable BBC secretary, Mrs. E. L. Trinder, on a reimbursable basis. She continued to draw BBC pay, with FBIS billed for the amount on a quarterly basis. On 3 March 1942 the BBC informed Rhodes that a teletype line from Evesham to London was now available, along with suitable office space at Evesham, at no cost to FBIS. The BBC took the precaution of adding that if the needs of FBIS were considerably expanded the offer of free services might have to be reconsidered, but in that case it would do its best to meet any request on a reimbursable basis. A wire from Tom Grandin, who was anxious to get a BBC representative in Washington to select copy to file to London, assured the BBC on 6 September 1942 that similar free facilities would

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be provided such a representative.\*

FBIS in Washington launched its daily cable to the BBC as soon as the harassed staff could get to it. Called the D Wire, it included material monitored in Portland, Puerto Rico, and Kingsville, prepared and filed by the Daily Report staff. On 26 February 1943 responsibility for the file was transferred to the A Wire staff. Instead of preparing a daily file as in the past, A Wire editors began filing immediately to London any item that seemed to fit specifications. FBIS editors remained largely in the dark as to specific needs of the BBC, and British plans to send a representative to work in Washington never materialized. Rhodes assured Grandin on 28 August 1942 that the copy was widely appreciated in London and was improving the image of FBIS. Anderson pointed out on 4 April 1943 that the value of the copy could not be gauged by the 15 percent which the BBC published, as FBIS was distributing the copy among

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\* FBIS also served another British agency, the Ministry of Information (MOI) in the Foreign Office, but here arrangements were different, as MOI had nothing to offer in return. Service to MOI started on 14 April 1943 with utilization of B Wire facilities to New York and Press Wireless from New York to London. MOI paid communications costs of 3 cents per word. This file carried more than 10,000 words a month in 1943, but on 30 May 1944 the British asked that it be restricted to 250 words a day. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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local British as well as American offices and had considerable evidence it was appreciated. British officials informed Leigh on 3 June 1943 that the immediate filing of D Wire items to replace the daily cable was "a definite improvement," and it was hoped the practice would be continued.

FBIS staff members were slightly embarrassed at the puny service FBIS gave the BBC in exchange for access to its daily million-word monitoring file, but there is no indication that the British were dissatisfied. There was an occasional opportunity to provide additional service. With expansion of Pacific monitoring the D Wire grew, and on 3 January 1944 the British Political Warfare Mission in San Francisco, broadcasting to the Far East, asked the San Francisco monitoring station to copy for it daily an entire BBC program. FBIS readily agreed, though the monitoring had to be done on the East Coast and sent by wire to San Francisco.

Another British request reluctantly had to be sidetracked. In March 1945 the British Political Warfare Mission contacted Charles Hyneman on the possibility of stationing an editor and from four to eight Japanese monitors at the FBIS Guam station. FBIS was badly in

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need of competent Japanese monitors and was quite willing to meet any British request in repayment for BBC services, but in this case, because of closeness of the Guam operation to the Navy, the suggestion had to be rejected.\*

On the other hand, FBIS found it impossible to induce the BBC to increase its coverage. In the fall of 1942, with Puerto Rico failure to obtain desired broadcasts from Spain and Portugal, FBIS, hard pressed to meet the demands of subscribers, asked the BBC to add certain broadcasts from those countries. Also the BBC was urged to increase coverage of German Hellschreiber. Anderson wrote Grandin on 17 November 1942 that the British were adamant. Their personnel were overworked, with no possibility of getting additional monitors.

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\* Russell Shepherd, in Hawaii, talked to intelligence officers in Honolulu and wrote Hyneman on 10 March 1945 that the military was strongly opposed to admitting British to the field of operations. If the FBIS were to allow British personnel on Guam it would jeopardize its good relations with the Navy. At any rate, approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be obtained first. Hyneman discussed the matter with Capt. Gilbert Meyers of the Joint Chiefs and learned that Shepherd's estimate was correct -- that the military did not want British observers in the Theater. Shepherd letter of 10 March and Hyneman memorandum of 14 June 1945 -- Organization and Management, History of FBIS, FBIS Headquarters Executive Files.

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There was no fear during the war that the BBC would alter its terms of agreement with FBIS, but after transfer of FBIS to the War Department, Alfred M. Brace, new chief of the London Bureau, thought he detected clear danger signals. He warned Headquarters that thought should be given to a new FBIS-BBC agreement. Access to BBC output had become such an important asset to FBIS that its loss would cripple the service or force a complete reorganization. Brace pointed out that the BBC was hard pressed financially, and though it was not spending funds directly for the benefit of FBIS, it might logically decide that FBIS should contribute financially in proportion to the benefits it received. Brace also feared a sharp curtailment in the BBC operation.

Finally Shepherd sent a list of proposed FBIS services to the BBC for Brace to present "as soon as the British make a specific proposal concerning a basis for continued cooperation." Brace revealed the list to Maj. Gen. C. L. Bissell on 30 May 1946. FBIS publications would continue to go to British, Canadian, and Australian offices in Washington, as well as to the BBC; FBIS Pacific posts would move forward, perhaps to Manila and Tokyo; Latin American coverage would be expanded;

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the BBC would be welcome to send editors to Washington and to any FBIS post; the D Wire would continue via Signals and would be expanded to 5,000 words a day; and FBIS would take over the Cairo monitoring post operated by MOI on 1 June 1946, with the BBC welcome to the full output of the station. Apparently these plans appealed to the BBC, which soon made clear that cooperative arrangements would continue without revision.

United Nations Monitoring Network

The idea of a united monitoring operation for all allied nations was discussed in London early in 1942. Rhodes reported to Grandin on 26 May 1942 that he attended a meeting with representatives of the BBC, MOI, COI, and the Chinese Propaganda Ministry. Immediate steps were proposed to pool the monitoring output of London, the United States, Australia, New Delhi, and if possible Chungking and Kuibyshev. MOI, like OWI later, had been commissioned to conduct monitoring outside its own country and already had working arrangements in New Delhi with the Indian Government. Rhodes continued to keep the home office informed. On 1 August 1942 Chairman Fly complained to the Secretary of State that progress in the London discussions was hampered because of "a lack of understanding" among the conferees as to what U.S. office was responsible for monitoring.



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He asked that State inform British officials that FBIS held this responsibility. Rhodes later informed Grandin that MOI had instructed all British agencies to clear questions concerning U.S. monitoring with FBIS. Rhodes reported to Grandin in October that MOI was going to Ankara with the idea of setting up a monitoring operation, and also was considering one in Accra. On 7 October he wrote urging that FBIS send a man to Stockholm to investigate monitoring possibilities there.

Talks also took place in Washington. Robert Burns, chief of the BBC Monitoring Service, visited Washington, and Leigh wrote him on 10 January 1943 that his visit had advanced the cause of cooperative monitoring. Leigh also informed him that the State Department on 6 January 1943 had formally approved a "U.N. Monitoring Committee." Leigh went to London in June 1943. In requesting State Department approval for the trip, Fly noted that Leigh would meet with British and Australian officials "to discuss joint and cooperative activity in the monitoring field." On 12 July 1943 Leigh held a meeting with various MOI representatives. A report of the meeting shows monitoring coverage by U.S., British, Australian and Chinese agencies was discussed, as well as current

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practices for exchanging products and plans for future development of broadcast monitoring.\*

Following Leigh's trip to London, regular reports of meetings of the U. N. Monitoring Committee were filed. Leigh was Chairman. A liaison office was maintained in London under the direction of MOI employee Penelope Robinson, Committee Secretary. The FBIS London Bureau Chief attended meeting as the representative of Leigh. Writing to Julian Behrstock on 29 December 1943, Leigh instructed him to push discussion of PWB monitoring activities at the next meeting and suggest that Robert Burns be Committee Chairman for the coming year. Reporting to Leigh on 9 June 1944, Behrstock informed him that the last meeting of the U.N. Monitoring Committee concentrated on monitoring in the Mediterranean, with Maj. Frazer, head of the MOI post at Cairo, present. In a formal request for a file of monitored material from New Delhi on 7 September 1943, Leigh described sending such a file as "part of the general cooperative arrangement

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\* This must have been the organization meeting of the U.N. Monitoring Committee, though the report of the meeting does not show this. Leigh told the Cox Committee that the U.N. Monitoring Committee was organized in July 1943. See Page 3458, Report of Special Committee Investigating the FCC. GPO 1944.

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whereby we look forward to sharing our monitored material with the United Nations." In a memorandum dated 7 January 1944, Leigh noted "the problem of integrating Far East coverage from Portland-San Francisco-Hawaii-Broome-Melbourne-Darjeeling-Delhi, all being tapped and released in a U.N. network."

In the summer of 1943 Vincent O. Anderson was sent from London to Stockholm to direct a monitoring enterprise there. The American Legation had set up a small monitoring unit, which later was enlarged by OWI for its own operations. With an FBIS man placed in charge, the station became known as a unit of the U.N. Monitoring Network. Early in 1944, when FBIS considered closing down the operation, it was continued at MOI and BBC insistence. When a new director was sent to take over New Delhi monitoring by MOI in June 1943 -- a BBC man named Stanley Harrison -- he stated that in moving the operation from Delhi to Darjeeling one of his main goals was to avoid duplication of Portland and San Francisco coverage and supply the British and Americans with new material.

With the exception of some cooperation from the Australians, the U.N. Monitoring Committee remained essentially a British-American organization. In July 1943 Leigh discussed with CIAA the possibility of

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bringing Brazil into the network, and also suggested a monitoring post at Montevideo, but nothing came of it. The Dutch East Indies Government joined with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation in establishing a monitoring service which at one time employed 29 monitors. Both FBIS and the British received transcripts from Melbourne, but it was decided that the dearth of exclusive material available there made it impractical to attach FBIS editors to the operation. Leigh reported to Owen Lattimore on 7 February 1944 that he was "chagrined" to learn that the Dutch East Indies post at Broome, Australia, had been sending copy to the BBC but not to FBIS or OWI. OWI planned a Chinese monitoring post in cooperation with the Chinese Government, but was never very successful.

One weakness of the U.N. Monitoring Committee was failure to bring French and Russian monitoring into the network. The goal of a monitoring system that would exchange materials with them was propounded regularly at Committee meetings, and various efforts were made to enlist the services of the Free French and of the Russians, but with little success. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow, in reply to a request sent by Fly through the State Department, stated on 7 July 1944 that "in spite of repeated requests" the Soviet

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Government had failed to supply any information concerning its monitoring operations or its desire to cooperate with other allied nations. Julian Behrstock wrote, upon leaving the London Bureau to return to the States in April 1945, that "one matter of unfinished business" in London was fulfillment of the plan to bring France and the USSR into the U.N. Monitoring Network. Charles Hyneman, giving his estimate of the U.N. Monitoring Committee on 31 July 1945, said that the Committee "formalizes to some extent relations between MOI-BBC and FBIS-OWI, which would be carried on about as effectively if there were no Committee."

Working Arrangements with Canada

Canadians evinced an early interest in FBMS. Fly was informed by the Secretary of State on 2 May 1941 that the Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC) had asked if it would be "legitimate" for it to get the product of FBMS when ready for distribution. On 5 June 1941 Fly informed the manager of CBC that State had approved Canadian receipt of FBMS reports and analyses. FBIS also was informed by the Canadian Embassy in the fall of 1942 that the Canadian Navy was depending upon FBIS for information concerning Canadian POW broadcasts from Berlin, and the Embassy would be glad to send a messenger daily to get the information. In December 1942 the

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Canadian Wartime Information Board applied for the A Wire file, and received it as soon as State Department approval was available -- 19 February 1943. In March 1943 the Canadian Government informed the BBC that Canada had decided to make direct use of FBIS and BBC materials rather than set up its own monitoring system. Edward Hullinger reported to Leigh on 2 September 1943 that he had been interviewed by a Canadian intelligence officer, who expressed great enthusiasm for FBIS services and said he hoped they would not be discontinued.

As a matter of fact, Canada did establish a monitoring post nine miles from Ottawa and another at Grey's Point in British Columbia. Miss Sally Solomon set up the Ottawa station in 1941 with the cooperation of the CBC. She visited FBIS 21-22 December 1943 and left a description of her monitoring post. Her primary clients were the Canadian Wartime Information Board and military intelligence, and the entire staff of the post consisted of three persons. After FBIS materials became available, this Canadian post concentrated on broadcasts beamed to French Canada. At Point Grey the monitoring was done by the Wartime Information Board, and its chief concern was prisoner messages. It cooperated with FBIS Portland

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through exchange of prisoner information. As a rule information obtained at Point Grey duplicated Portland monitoring, but the exchange was of value for verification purposes.

FBIS Attaches in Foreign Posts

A letter from Rhodes to Graves on 27 June 1942 remarked that, "now that the U.N. monitoring scheme has been raised and may go through," FBIS should consider use of London as a training ground for men to be assigned to the outposts. This was in keeping with Headquarters thinking, though it was not considered necessary to send all overseas representatives first to London. Plans already were underway before the end of 1942 to tap the London staff to obtain editors for Algiers and Stockholm, but it was thought editors also would be needed for Lisbon, Istanbul, New Delhi, and Australia; obviously the London training ground could not supply all of them. Plans for a monitoring station in Lisbon were rather far advanced in 1942, with Douglas Orangers, an editor and monitoring manager in Washington, selected for the post. Rhodes wrote the U.S. press attache in Lisbon on 6 December 1942 that the project had made "real progress," and Orangers should be there by the end of the month. Owen Lattimore of OWI wired Leigh from San Francisco on

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9 January 1943 that he agreed with Leigh's plan to station FBIS men in New Delhi and Chungking, and that he had arranged a conference to discuss the matter with Spencer Williams, who tentatively had been selected for the New Delhi assignment.

Actually, Algiers and Stockholm were the only posts to which FBIS men were immediately sent. Negotiations proved more difficult than had been expected, and new budgetary problems arose for FBIS. The Lisbon project was delayed pending development of the Algiers station and eventually dropped. OWI sent William Carter, a former FBIS editor and bureau manager, to New Delhi in April 1942, and his report to Grandin dated 28 April convinced FBIS officials that it would be worthwhile to send a man to that post. FCC was asked at once to approve this position. The FBIS representative was to work with MOI and OWI, but his sole duty would be to provide FBIS with needed broadcast information. A formal request was sent to MOI on 7 September 1943 for acceptance of one FBIS man at New Delhi, with a possible second one to be sent later. Meantime, a file from OWI in New Delhi was received by FBIS, with Graves reporting on 10 July 1943 that the Far East Division was enthusiastic concerning prospects. Leigh was informed on 11 December 1943 that

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the Government of India had approved stationing of an FBIS representative as "a further step toward the complete coordination of our respective monitoring efforts in the Far East." Grandin, who was traveling in the Middle East in the fall of 1943 under the auspices of OWI in an effort to iron out some of the monitoring problems, included New Delhi in his itinerary and made final arrangements for an FBIS man there. However, Williams was by that time involved in plans for an Hawaii post, and did not leave for New Delhi until June 1944. He was formally transferred to the OWI payroll, but under the agreement with OWI was recognized as an FBIS representative, with OWI entitled to claim reimbursement for his salary.

Tentative plans to attach FBIS men to OWI staffs in Istanbul, Chungking, and other centers were all abandoned, and the only other post to get a representative not directly under control of PWB was Cairo. By late 1943 MOI had a monitoring station there with more than 70 employees. MOI was notified through the London Bureau on 23 December 1943 that Edward Berkman was going directly from Washington to Cairo and would arrive soon. On 14 February 1944 Chairman Fly formally notified Elmer Davis that Berkman was being transferred

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to the OWI payroll and would proceed at once to Cairo, but with the sole responsibility of serving FBIS.\* Despite this stipulation, OWI sought to transfer Berkman to Bari, and it was not until 13 May 1944 that his position in Cairo was clarified to the satisfaction of everybody.\*\* He was designated as a radio attache of the U.S. Legation in Cairo, on the payroll of OWI, but working with the MOI monitoring post. Hyneman wrote Berkman on 26 February 1945 informing him that his situation, and Williams' in New Delhi, had been gone over thoroughly, and it had been decided to ask OWI to bill FBIS for their salaries, something that OWI had neglected to do.

Berkman and Williams remained at their posts and

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- \* The letter informed Davis that although Berkman would be attached to OWI, his duties would be "to review, edit, and prepare a file of monitored material to be transmitted to Washington for the use of FBIS, OWI, and other war agencies." OWI would pay his salary and he would be under OWI administration, but his salary was reimbursable. FBIS Records, National Archives.
- \*\* On 4 May 1944 a cable from James Jones in Cairo asked Washington to approve transfer of Berkman to Bari to assist Lieberman, who was in charge there. Berkman wrote questioning the move and complaining that OWI seemed to feel he was under its complete supervision. The 13 May wire was signed by Leigh and an OWI official and made clear that Berkman was working for FBIS alone, and would transfer to Bari only if Berkman himself decided this was best. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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continued to supply FBIS with information, even into the post-war period. Anderson, who also was named radio attache at the U.S. Legation in Stockholm in October 1943, continued to file material through London until the Stockholm post was closed on 2 January 1945.\*

On the other hand, transfer of FBIS personnel to PWB jurisdiction proved to be a rather poor investment from an FBIS standpoint. PWB, a joint U.S.-British organization, utilized the efforts of several civilian groups, including MOI, OWI and OSS. Its monitoring operations were strictly field activities designed to serve the military command. FBIS assumed that field units would make much valuable information available to Washington. This assumption proved unfounded. The posts were short of personnel and equipment. In monitoring for field usage they duplicated to a great extent the work of regular FBIS monitoring posts. They produced

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\* The Stockholm project also offered another example of FBIS cooperation with other U.S. offices. The Legation gave administrative support; OWI supplied working personnel. Anderson wrote Shepherd on 21 January 1944 that cooperative arrangements were working well, with OWI bearing most of the cost. FBIS paid communications costs, which ran as high as \$219 a month. As Radio Attache at the Legation, Anderson was entitled under State regulations to a living allowance of \$1,700 a year, but FCC regulations prevented a single man from drawing more than \$1,000. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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little of value in Washington, communications for getting it there were not readily available, and the overworked staff members had little inducement to prepare special files for FBIS Headquarters.

Four of the original FBIS staff members transferred to Algiers remained in the area and each one eventually became head of a field monitoring post. James Jones remained an employee of FBIS, while Rhodes, Ellington, and Lieberman transferred to OWI. When Rhodes left for a front post, Jones was in charge at Algiers and made some rather unsuccessful attempts to get information to Washington. When Grandin visited the area in the fall of 1943 he tried to coordinate monitoring in the area so it would provide a maximum of service to Washington offices, but PWB monitoring did not easily lend itself to such coordination. Writing to Leigh on 28 November 1943, Grandin said one of the main problems was duplication. If the forward posts could get a file of 10,000 words a day from Washington and London it could avoid much of this duplication. This also did not prove practicable. Jones wrote to Leigh on 11 May 1944 that PWB monitoring faced a crisis. With a shortage of personnel and equipment he must tackle the problem of providing

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for at least five forward posts, which made it impossible to give any attention to the needs of FBIS in Washington. Jones also asked that another FBIS editor be sent to Algiers, but was informed by Leigh on 14 June 1944 that the organization could send but one man to such a post. As long as Jones was still with FBIS they would have to depend on him.

In Western Europe, following the Normandy invasion, PWB followed a different system. It did not depend upon field teams, but instead asked FBIS to provide it with a basic file from London. The request, from Hamblett and C.D. Jackson, was forwarded to Leigh in Washington. He reported on 18 February 1944 that two men would be added to the London staff to provide the file. Keiste Janulis, one of the earlier editors sent to London, was assigned to head the project. On 24 July 1944 he was transferred to OWI in line with the agreement that OWI would be in charge of outpost operations involving FBIS personnel. This work continued until the end of the war in Europe. During the Paris Peace Conference a similar file was prepared in London five days a week, this time under direct supervision of the FBIS London Bureau Chief and by FBIS personnel.

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Chapter 7 CONGRESSIONAL HANDICAPS

Officials of FBIS discovered eventually that problems with CSC, OWI, the Bureau of the Budget, the War Department, and all other divisions of the Executive Branch of government were minor in comparison with those raised by Congress. FBMS was unique in that it was set up by Executive Order and started operating on funds provided by the President, but like other executive agencies, it could not operate for long without Congressional appropriations. Officials were convinced finally that no government service can operate adequately without the approval, understanding, and good will of individual members of Congress.

Overtime Pay Bill

The first serious blow dealt FBIS by Congress was without malice, and was acknowledged to be, theoretically, beneficial. In December 1942 Congress passed a law placing all government offices on a 48-hour week, with straight overtime to be paid over 40 hours. This amounted to a 20 percent pay raise for government employees, who admittedly were underpaid and in dire need of the raise. The difficulty was that no additional funds were provided to take care of this pay raise. The theory was that government

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employees worked 40 hours a week; therefore, if they were forced to work 48 hours, an office could continue to do the work it had been doing with 20 percent fewer employees and the same total in salary payments. In time Congress was convinced that its premises were faulty, and provided additional appropriations to cover half of the extra payments, but this relief did not come until the end of the fiscal year. FBIS, like many other offices, had to borrow from the President's fund to complete the fiscal year and repay the loan when Congress provided the funds. Also, when the overtime pay act was passed, half the fiscal year was already ended. Necessary adjustments to meet additional costs had to be made over a period of just six months.

The problem faced by FBIS was essentially the same as that faced by other government offices, but it was hit harder than some for various reasons. In trying to get its operations on an efficient basis it was in a period of massive expansion, and thought it had appropriations sufficient to meet these expansion costs. Suddenly its costs increased considerably. Another fact not taken into consideration by Congress was that many government employees already were working considerably more than 40 hours a week. This was true

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in FBIS, where most personnel were on a 44-hour week and many working considerably more than that. Goodwin Watson, explaining the predicament in a letter on 19 January 1943, said no one objected to a pay raise of 20 percent, but the Analysis Division already was working an average of 50 hours a week, so the only solution was to cut the staff.

Fortunately for FBIS, qualified personnel had been hard to find. The personnel quota envisioned in the original appropriation was 447, of which 130 were in the field and 317 in Washington, but many positions were unfilled. Still some cuts in actual staff had to be made, especially in the field. Leigh wrote Edward Rand in Puerto Rico on 3 April 1943 explaining the situation to him. Sixteen field employees had to be dropped. Since capabilities of Puerto Rico had been misjudged from the beginning, with its monitoring product of doubtful value in relation to that of the other stations, Puerto Rico would have to bear the brunt of the field reduction. Leigh wrote Rand again on 19 August 1943 in an attempt to placate him with the assurance that the necessary reduction in the Puerto Rico staff was not a reflection on his efforts or those of bureau personnel.

Eventually it was decided that no employees at all in Washington would need to be dismissed, but



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recruitment halted abruptly, even though the growing demand for monitored material made the need for expansion urgent. Many promising candidates, some already being processed, were notified that the vacancies for which they were being sought no longer existed. It was a depressing period for FBIS officials, as correspondence in the early months of 1943 clearly shows. Most of the top echelon began to consider leaving FBIS, and by the end of 1943 Graves, Grandin, and several top analysts had resigned.

#### Citations Against Employees

The House Un-American Activities Committee under the chairmanship of Martin Dies wasted little time in selecting certain FBIS employees as likely targets. Lloyd Free and Harold Graves considered it a major triumph when they induced Goodwin Watson of Columbia University to come to FBIS to head the Analysis Section, and were glad to publicize the appointment. Watson accepted in a letter to Free dated 22 October 1941, in which he said: "The urgency of the world crisis and the importance of the analysis of broadcasts have grown in my thinking to outweigh my doubts and reservations." Watson entered upon duty 17 November 1941, and on 18 November Martin Dies wrote Fly expressing "deep concern" over FBIS selection of a man "who has been a propagandist for communism and for the Soviet Union for many

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years," and had written "numerous articles in praise of the Soviet way of life." Dies named 13 organizations, all of which he called communist front groups, and said Watson belonged to all of them. Fly's reply assured Dies that he had been misinformed. Watson had been thoroughly investigated and in fact belonged to only one of the 13 organizations Dies named-- Consumers Union, a respected research organ. Fly further noted that of 200 published articles by Watson, only two or three showed any concern with the Soviet Union, which Watson had visited as a member of an educational study committee, and they were objective studies, not "propaganda praising the Soviet way of life." The publicity given Dies' charges and Fly's reply brought a mass of letters and telegrams denouncing Dies and praising Watson. Graves noted in a letter to Free in London on 27 November 1941 that Dies seemed to be getting a very bad press on the issue. For example, the Washington EVENING STAR gave Fly's reply good position on Page 2, while Dies' charges appeared on Page 8.

A bad press did not deter the Dies Committee. Names of two other FBIS employees were added, along with names of several Interior Department employees, and a rider was attached to an appropriation bill denying the use of any appropriated funds to pay salaries

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of these men. The other two FBIS men were Frederick Schumann, another analyst, and William E. Dodd, Jr., son of a former Ambassador to Germany, who had been hired as an editor in December 1941. The House passed the bill with the rider, but the Senate Appropriations Committee deleted the rider. Watson was called to testify before the Senate committee on 4 February 1942. Writing about his experience on 10 February, he noted that none of the senators charged that he was a communist or a fellow traveler, but there was "considerable hostility" because some of his writings had reflected "socialistic views." "If a person holding socialistic views was to be ruled unfit for federal employment," Watson remarked, "this must be considered a 'new standard'."

All three men continued to work for FBIS. Watson was reclassified at a higher grade and was sent to London to help set up analysis work there. In November 1942 it was decided to transfer Dodd to London, but an application for a passport brought a rejection. Leigh's query to the Passport Division failed to produce a satisfactory explanation.

Dies bided his time during 1942, but when the new Congress met in 1943 the subject was reopened. In a House speech on 1 February 1943 he listed 39 "communists" he said were in government departments, and at the head

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of the list were Dodd, Watson, and Schumann. A rider immediately was attached to a House Post Office and Treasury appropriations bill denying payment of salary to any employee on the list. The press reacted at once -- unfavorably. It was pointed out that only one employee on the list, William Pickens, worked for either the Post Office or the Treasury. Pickens was a Negro, in charge of the war bond drive among Negroes, and had earlier been exonerated in an attack by the Dies Committee. The outcry was so great that many Congressmen questioned the wisdom of the Dies rider. Much was said about the right of the men charged to have "their day in court." As a result, a special subcommittee under the chairmanship of Congressman Kerr was named by the Un-American Activities Committee to investigate the 39 employees and take testimony from them.

The Kerr subcommittee started hearings on 2 April 1943 and made its report on 21 April. It called all three FBIS employees to testify -- in executive session. The subcommittee adopted its own very general and obscure definition of subversion and was later accused of having its final report prepared before the men were called to testify. Most of the 39 names were dropped, but three were found guilty of "subversive activity" and pronounced "unfit" to be employed by

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the U.S. Government. The three were Dodd, Watson, and an Interior Department official named Lovett. It was made clear that the employing agencies should fire these three men at once, which FCC and the Interior Department refused to do.\* The Kerr hearings and report got much publicity, and the critical public response encouraged FBIS and FCC officials to remain defiant. In May 1943 alone the files show 81 letters written or signed by Fly in answer to letters protesting the Kerr subcommittee action and urging FCC to remain firm.

Angered by the defiance of executives, the House approved by a large majority a rider forbidding payment of salaries from federal funds to the three men. The Senate rejected the rider, but House members on the conference committee were adamant and kept it in. Four times the Senate voted against the rider, but finally bowed to House insistence and approved it 48 to 32. As the attachment was on a very urgent appropriation bill, the President signed the bill, at the same time denouncing the rider and declaring it

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\* For more complete discussion of the Dies and Kerr hearings and demands, see article by Robert E. Sushman of Cornell, "The Purge of Federal Employees Accused of Disloyalty," PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Volume III, Number 4, autumn 1943. Also article by Robert D. Leigh, "Politicians versus Bureaucrats," HARPERS MAGAZINE for January 1945.

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unconstitutional.\*

The Dies Committee victims were not the only FBIS employees charged by certain Congressmen with being subversives. Peter Rhodes, Audrey Menefee, and Hans Speier were subjected to attack in the House. FBIS was somewhat concerned over statements critical of Mrs. Menefee, for her husband, a writer for the Washington POST, had been dropped from COI following charges that he was a member of communist front organizations. Later he was exonerated, but did not return to government employment. FBIS officials obtained the FBI file on Mrs. Menefee. Graves gave it a careful study and reported on 31 May 1943 that one informant accused Mrs. Menefee of engaging in a Seattle contest for subscriptions to the DAILY WORKER, a charge which she was able to disprove. Fly reported in a letter to J. Edgar Hoover on 28 April 1942 that the investigative record showed one informant calling the New York school where analyst Hans Speier taught a "refuge for exiled European communists." This was countered by the report of another informant that the

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\* The action eventually was ruled unconstitutional, but long after Dodd and Watson had left FBIS. The effective date of the cutoff was 21 November 1943. Both men worked a few days after that to establish a court case and then resigned. Schumann already had resigned and returned to his teaching post at Williams College. The Berlin and Vichy radios made propaganda of the affair, pretending to accept the Dies charges as accurate and lambasting Roosevelt and Henry Wallace as supporters of communism. FBIS distributed the broadcasts, sending special copies to the White House. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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school was "a nest of pro-Nazi activities." Leigh himself wrote a memorandum for FCC on 12 August 1943 replying at length to a charge by an "unnamed source" that he had belonged to subversive organizations.

In January 1943 CSC reported to FBIS that unfavorable reports had appeared regarding Helen and Lois Nanbara, Japanese monitors at Portland. It was recommended that they be dropped. As the sisters had worked faithfully for FBIS for two years and Japanese monitors were hard to find, their case was appealed. They continued to work until the end of the war.

On 8 April 1943 an OWI employee in San Francisco sent Leigh a clipping from the Chicago newspaper PM quoting charges that Spencer Williams was guilty of "anti-Soviet bias," along with an OWI defense of Williams as an objective and loyal worker. Leigh replied on 17 April expressing appreciation for the letter and displaying considerable grim amusement at the charge.\*

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\* Leigh said he considered Williams a first-rate newsman who would not allow his personal prejudice to interfere with his work, adding that it was a little refreshing to hear such charges, in view of the current difficulty caused by Dies Committee action against "communists" in FBIS. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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Cox Committee Investigation

The most serious and difficult confrontation FBIS had with Congress paralleled efforts of the Dies Committee to force FBIS employees off the payroll, and no doubt the two developments were somewhat inter-related. About the time the war started a Georgia Congressman named Eugene Cox, previously an enthusiastic supporter of FCC, ran afoul of the law in connection with representation before FCC of an Atlanta radio station applying for a license. Instead of ignoring the doubtful legal position of the Congressman, FCC under Fly's direction turned the case over to the Justice Department and made clear that it would urge prosecution. In retaliation, Cox prepared a bill calling for a Congressional investigation of activities of FCC. For about a year he held the proposed investigation as a threat, but at the start of 1943, when it became clear that Fly would not back down, Cox angrily demanded that Congress approve the investigation. The House obliged, and named Cox chairman of a special investigating committee, with a majority of its membership from the Republican-Southern Conservative coalition of the House. Cox immediately named as special investigator a New York lawyer named Eugene Garey, described by press and

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radio commentators as an uncompromising and sometimes unethical investigator.

FCC immediately offered to cooperate with the committee by allowing access to its files, but it soon was obvious that the investigators did not want cooperation. With no warning, the committee requisitioned FBIS files and sent a truck early in the morning to get them. As Dr. Leigh reports, the truck took away three-fourths of FBIS personnel files, for which there were no duplicates, and held them for more than a year.\* There were no known charges against FBIS, but as part of FCC it was suspect in the eyes of Cox Committee investigators. Using the requisitioned files to ferret out leads, the investigators then began calling up employees to testify.\*\* Ten FBIS employees were subpoenaed at 8:00 a.m. after working all night, and subjected to hours of grilling.

After months of such operations the committee

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\* Robert D. Leigh article, "Politicians versus Bureaucrats," HARPERS MAGAZINE, January 1945. Leigh explains that the investigators wanted the files for a "fishing expedition." They were seeking clues to any irregularities, or, barring that, facts which could be twisted to serve as the basis for charges.

\*\* This second phase of the investigation Leigh refers to as the "Star Chamber testimony." There was no limit on the questions asked the employees, with timid ones being threatened and disgruntled ones utilized to the fullest. Their statements were all recorded, and often taken out of context in hearings.

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investigators were able to gather sufficient material to levy a few specific charges against FCC, and to build a much greater array of indirect accusation and innuendo. As for FBIS, only one actual irregularity was found. In one shift of night clerical workers it was discovered that a woman who was ill and had no accumulated sick leave was allowed to draw her pay with no record of absence. Others on the shift alternated in working for her on their own days off and marked her present each night. The supervisor had approved the procedure. As soon as this irregularity was discovered, FBIS allowed the supervisor to resign and made necessary corrections, but not before the Cox Committee publicized the case.\* The investigators found it possible to make public various other spurious accusations against FBIS. It was accused of "masquerading" as a war agency; of using "intelligence" in its name to misrepresent its operations; of being no more than a "glorified news gathering agency" serving the press and radio; of

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\* Testimony of Chester Teitgen, the supervisor, runs to 21 pages, dated 11 September 1943. Leigh, Shepherd, and Horace W. Schmahl queried Teitgen and made a complete record. Other affidavits include one by Edith Anderman taken 10 September 1943 and one by Lulu Martin Adderley taken 9 September. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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being of no value to war activities; of being illegally established; of duplicating the work of OWI; of operating overseas illegally; of spending money for unauthorized purposes; of operating illegally at a deficit; of fraudulently obtaining supplemental appropriations; of monopolizing scarce manpower for useless operations and obtaining unwarranted deferments; of employing 15 to 20 subversive and dangerous persons; of illegally charging other government agencies for its services; of hiring inexperienced and poorly informed analysts; and of forcing its "useless and unwanted publications" on other offices.

As all of these accusations were duly publicized, FBIS officials asked permission to testify, to answer the charges, but were continually put off. By accident FCC got hold of a paper giving instructions to the committee staff. This showed clearly that the investigators were after headlines, not facts. A strategy meeting was called and FCC decided to play the same game, competing for headlines. This strategy succeeded. The Press began to expose the investigating committee, especially Chief Investigator Garey. The Washington POST ran a series of 16 editorials critical of the

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aims and methods of the committee. Public reaction was so strong that one FCC member who usually opposed Fly's views and was sympathetic toward Cox, agreed to petition the Speaker of the House to dismiss Cox as chairman of the investigating committee. Cox resigned, after an emotional speech and the plaudits of many Congressmen. Congressman Lea of California was named to head the committee. He fired Garey and promised FCC a fair hearing and an opportunity to testify in open meetings.

Officials of FBIS, along with heads of other FCC departments, spent a great deal of 1943 preparing rebuttals to Cox Committee accusations. The complete FBIS testimony was ready in November, but it was many months before officials were given a chance to present it. The work of preparing statements for the hearings was divided among the staff, and of course handicapped considerably the regular work of FBIS. The actual testimony was given in May 1944. Leigh made a lengthy statement covering much of the work of FBIS and giving replies to publicized accusations. Stewart Hensley described work of the Wire Service, Ellis G. Porter the Publications Section, and Harold Graves, who

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had left FBIS by then and was a Naval officer, described work of the Analysis Division. Each one was questioned at length by committee members and the Chief Investigator.\* The Lea Committee submitted its final report on 2 January 1945. It cleared FBIS of any charges of wrongdoing and stated clearly that it had proved it was rendering an efficient and worthwhile service. Two members of the Committee, Congressmen Miller and Wigglesworth, filed a dissenting minority report expressing "grave doubt" as to the value of FBIS materials.\*\*

FBIS officials got a lesson in the necessity of obtaining the good will of Congressmen. Limited FBIS reproduction facilities made it impracticable to send Daily Reports, for example, to all members

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\* The Report of the Committee, "Hearings of the Special House Committee Investigating the FCC," GPO 1944, is in three volumes numbering more than 4,000 pages. Testimony of FBIS officials starts in Volume III, Page 3439, and fills most of the remaining pages of the volume.

\*\* ON THE BEAM of 3 February 1945 quotes the following passage from the majority report: "Obviously the United States could not conduct an intelligent program for counteracting enemy propaganda without a reasonably accurate knowledge of that propaganda. Monitoring of foreign broadcasts is the only way in which such knowledge can be obtained fully and promptly, and it was perfectly logical and natural that FCC was selected to do this job." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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of the House and Senate. This was early recognized, and a solution sought. The practice had been adopted of sending copies to the Speaker of the House and the Vice President, and five copies each to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. From time to time a Congressman wrote asking FBIS for copies of its publications. The practice was to refer the petitioner to his Committee Chairman. He was told that if he could not obtain a copy in this way, then FBIS would reconsider its refusal. No doubt some resented these refusals, and Garey attempted to play upon this resentment, charging that FBIS officials did not want Congressmen to see the books.

Fly complained in a letter to the Washington EVENING STAR on 31 December 1943 that a STAR writer, Helen Lombard, had tried to "smear" FBIS by saying that apparently FBIS officials thought their product "unfit for the innocent ears of Congress."

A series of letters between Leigh and Congressman George Dondero from November 1943 to January 1944 illustrates the attitude of some Congressmen. When told to consult the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Dondero indignantly refused and demanded that copies be sent to him at once, pointing out that

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no "military secrets" were involved, so there was no reason why he could not get his own books without argument. He was placed on the Daily Report distribution list, and in two months wrote asking that the books be stopped, as they did not "give me what I want, which is the undeleted, undiluted, and unexpurgated copy of the broadcasts as you receive them from abroad." Leigh patiently explained that it would be impracticable to send him actual transcripts of broadcasts, and denied that editing for publication involved any censorship, dilution, or deletion. On 18 October 1943 Leigh suggested to Fly the possibility of changing the method of distributing publications to Congressmen, but after considering the various angles, Fly advised no change. After 1943, however, it was standard procedure to send books immediately to Congressmen who directly requested them.

Charles Hyneman faced another problem on 7 March 1945. It had become the practice to send immediately to Congressmen copies of broadcasts mentioning their names. Hyneman asked Fly if he thought this practice should be followed when the broadcast statement "would be distasteful" to the individual Congressman. Apparently the new FBIS Director had been impressed with the importance of pleasing Congressmen.

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Punishment for FCC Defiance

While the fight with the Cox Committee was still under way, and long before FBIS officials had a chance to testify -- while the House-Senate conference still was arguing the Dodd-Watson-Lovett rider -- the FBIS appropriation for fiscal 1944-45 came before the House. Following the Overtime Pay Bill setback, FBIS had been able to obtain a moderately satisfactory appropriation for 1943-44 and had started once again to build an organization capable of meeting the demands for expanded monitoring. The table of organization provided for slightly more than 500 employees, a modest increase of about 15 percent. Of course vacancies accounted for part of that 500; the working staff was not that large.

The House Appropriations Committee, apparently with little internal dissent, recommended a cut of 25 percent for each department of FCC, including FBIS. In preparing his 1944-45 budget estimates, Leigh had taken what he considered to be a realistic approach and requested practically no increase. Bureau of the Budget approval was quick. Difficulty in the House Appropriations Committee had been expected, so its recommendation was only a slight shock. Leigh fully expected to get relief from the Senate.

It soon became apparent that the Senate Appropriations

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Committee, under the chairmanship of Senator McKellar, could not be depended upon automatically to restore the cut. McKellar demanded proof that the FBIS product was of sufficient importance to merit the funds requested, and suggested to Leigh that he get testimony from important users. Leigh argued that it was more appropriate for the Committee to seek information from FBIS subscribers; their statements would carry more weight if they were not solicited by FBIS. McKellar dismissed this idea with the statement that his committee had no facilities or staff for such an investigation, and it was up to FBIS. Leigh had no choice. He wrote many important users, informed them that the FBIS appropriation was in the balance, and asked their support.\* The response was quite satisfactory. Some users replied to Leigh, but others followed his suggestion and wrote directly to the Senate Appropriations Committee. Elmer Davis wrote the Committee on 27 January 1944 explaining that OWI depended heavily upon FBIS, that the appropriations cut proposed by the House would "seriously

\* In a letter to recipients of the A Wire dated 18 February 1944 Leigh said: "Because of our close connection day-to-day with our wire users, we have never made any written inquiry as to the importance or the kind of use you make of our service. On the other hand, the only valid proof of our usefulness as a service agency is evidence of the value which our users find in our product." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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impair the efficiency of some of our operations," and would very likely force OWI to engage in monitoring operations at much greater cost to the government.

The Senate committee gave full hearings to the FBIS appeal, spending a day and a half taking testimony from FBIS officials. Leigh reported that there seemed to be little opposition to a full restoration of FBIS funds.\* Therefore it was a considerable shock, ten days later, when the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a cut of \$500,000 in the FBIS appropriation, only slightly less than the House had approved. Of course both houses approved the committee recommendation, and FBIS was forced into a drastic retrenchment program for the second time.

Leigh was understandably bitter, and there is slight wonder that he resigned within two months after completing the FBIS case before the Lea Committee. Explaining the budget cut in ON THE BEAM for 1 April 1944, Leigh declared that he could not give his own analysis of the reason for the cut "without overstepping the bounds of discussion proper" to such a house organ. Writing on 19 April 1944 to explain a reduction in publications,

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\* Leigh: article in HARPERS MAGAZINE for January 1945, "Politicians vs Bureaucrats."

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Leigh stated that he could write a seven-page letter on the matter, but it would be "within the realm of political discussion" rather than administrative correspondence. Answering a request from Senator Burton Wheeler for an FBIS analytical publication, Leigh wrote on 4 May 1944 that it was "most unfortunate" that the request should come just as the publication was being discontinued because of Congressional action. He noted that Wheeler had tried to prevent the cut.

Leigh and Fly pointed out several times that neither the House nor Senate Committees had given any reason for the FBIS cut, except that House records made vague reference to unsupported and inaccurate charges of Cox Committee investigators. In his HARPERS article written soon after he left FBIS, Leigh noted that the real reason for the FBIS cut was never given in any Congressional statement, and when Fly attempted to cite the reason before the Senate Appropriations Committee he immediately was ruled out of order. Actually, it was a punitive cut, made to punish Fly and FCC for defiance of Congress and for Fly's effrontery in asking the Department of Justice to prosecute Eugene Cox, a member of Congress. FBIS was punished simply because it was

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part of FCC and was supported by Fly. The intrinsic value of FBIS and its work, or the lack of it, had absolutely nothing to do with the matter.\*

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\* Leigh quotes one member of Congress, speaking privately: "Surely it was a punitive cut. Larry Fly has been defiant of Congress for a long time. He has been openly defiant. Now his chickens have come home to roost." Leigh agreed that it was a punitive cut, but added reflectively that it was not exactly clear as to who was punished -- perhaps the war agencies depending upon FBIS, but not FCC. Leigh reflected further on the merits of the case: "If the essence of politics is compromise, were we not playing an impossible role in adhering resolutely to fair play and principle? What is the proper relationship of bureaucrats to politicians, of administrators to the legislature?" Article, "Politicians vs Bureaucrats," HARPERS MAGAZINE for January 1945.

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## Chapter 8 ADJUSTMENTS TO MEET PROBLEMS

Any new governmental unit normally would expect dozens of problems to iron out, and such an organization as FBIS, dealing with new operations and new and untried procedures, could expect to get more than its share. In FBIS, however, there were a few persistent and recurring problems that forced the service to make major readjustments in seeking a solution. At least four of these, some peculiar to the nature of FBIS, deserve special treatment.

### Budgetary Limitations

The most persistent handicap to the orderly building of an efficient monitoring system was the shortage of funds. There was no complaint during the first year of operation, but on 13 May 1942 Harold Graves reported that in 14 months FBMS had grown from nothing to a staff of nearly 400. He estimated that employees needed for a complete and efficient system would total 623. To reach that goal, it was clear, the service would need to increase its income substantially each year. Yet on 27 November 1941 Graves reported to FCC that the Bureau of the Budget had reduced the requested \$1,013,250 for personal services in Fiscal 1942-43 to \$657,574 -- only \$11,000 more than was actually available for the current year. This \$11,000 was for planned Alaskan monitoring of Japanese and Siberian broadcasts; no increase in

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personnel was provided anywhere else. The requested \$122,000 for communications, he reported, had been cut to \$52,000. Actually, by October 1942, just one quarter into the new fiscal year, the Bureau of the Budget approved a substantial supplementary appropriation, but it eliminated funds requested to expand analysis work in Washington and London. Projected plans for two analysts in London had to be delayed a year. The total eventually provided for personal services in 1942-43 was \$1,132,227.

Effects of the Overtime Pay Act were not as disastrous as they first appeared thanks to a supplemental appropriation in the fall of 1943. The table of organization, 473 in the spring of 1943, was reduced to 447. By March 1944 it was back up to 502, though of course not all positions were filled. This was still far short of the 623 Graves wanted for effective monitoring. In the spring of 1943 the Monitoring and Translation Division had 150 employees covering broadcasts in 45 languages. To keep within the budget, ten languages were dropped. Another important change was elimination of the distinction between monitors and translators. After the spring of 1943 all linguists were called monitors, no matter how deficient they might be in the actual processes of monitoring. After 1943 adjustments all FBIS posts were said to be listening

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to about 1.2 million words a day, a little more than the BBC was monitoring. Processed copy was 40,000 words a day.

The cut in the 1944-45 budget demanded drastic revisions. Leigh reported on 5 January 1944 that new commitments in London and Hawaii and in the handling of Romaji copy would make it very difficult to get through fiscal 1943-44 without a deficit. With the reduced budget in prospect at the start of the fiscal year, 1 July 1944, reductions had to be decided upon months in advance.

One decision was to liquidate the Analysis Division, as information brought out during the Cox Committee hearings indicated that subscribers could do without analysis better than other FBIS services. The Southern European Review ceased publication on 20 April 1944, the Weekly Review and the Central European Review on 27 April, the Western European Review on 28 April, and the Eastern European Review on 3 May. Far East analysts remained, organized into a Far East Division under Audrey Menefee, with analysts and editors publishing the Far East section of the Daily Report.

A very small European analysis staff continued irregular special reports, utilizing material sent

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by the two analysts in London. At the end of 1944 all European analysis was dropped, leaving only the Far East analysts. In the summer of 1943 there had been 48 employees in the Analysis Division.

The Morning Review, a roundup of enemy propaganda themes broadcast during the past 24 hours which reached subscribers' offices early in the morning, was abandoned in March 1944. It had been started in December 1943. The size of the Daily Report was cut, as well as the staff to produce it, at an estimated saving of \$127,000 a year. Consideration was given to elimination of the Daily Report entirely, limiting distribution to the Wire Service, but this plan was rejected. The processing and duplication operation, reduced in size by the cut in publications, was organized under a single shift. The estimated saving here was \$33,500. Two top positions -- Chief Editor and Senior Administrative Officer -- were abolished, but two lower-paid employees were added to the administrative staff. The Kingsville and Puerto Rico stations were closed to make way for expansion of Far East monitoring, but it was decided to maintain the London office at full capacity and make no reduction in the Wire Service. Monitoring in Washington was drastically reduced, with regular sampling and coverage of special programs replacing

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full monitoring. By the end of 1945 only 35 monitors were on duty in Washington covering 15 languages.

Funds available for fiscal 1944-45 totaled \$969,636 for personal services and \$407,166 for communications. The engineering staff also suffered some reductions. Dave Cooper wrote to BRU at Portland on 22 July 1944 saying that the staff of engineers there must be held to 12, including four code monitors.\* Subscribers were notified on 13 September 1944 that FBIS no longer could mimeograph leader speeches and issue them in English and the original language. Leigh, issuing his farewell statement to the staff in ON THE BEAM for 4 July 1944, stated that FBIS now was entering its third stage. The first period was one of creation, the building of a monitoring system with no guiding precedents. The second stage was one of development and defense: Expansion and opening of bureaus; making of cooperative arrangements with OWI and foreign nations; defense of the integrity and operations of FBIS. The third stage, he said, would be one of new dependence on FBIS for information as the war moved to the Pacific.\*\*

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\* Forbes letter to Tarbell on 28 June 1944 placed staff ceilings of 40 and 28, respectively, on the San Francisco and Portland stations. Job 49-19, CIA Records Center.

\*\* Leigh's final remark: "Directors come and directors go, but FBIS goes on night and day through the years. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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Some Congressional hostility toward FCC and FBIS still was evident even after punishment had been duly administered. On 12 December 1944 Stephen Greene sent a memorandum to FCC calling attention to a critical speech made by Senator Gillette denouncing the "news blackout" put into effect by some executive agencies and citing as an example discontinuance by FBIS of the Southern and Eastern European Surveys. Greene pointed out that it was solely the appropriation cut which caused these publications to be abolished. Commissioner Jett of FCC relayed these facts to Gillette on 14 December 1944, and four days later got a reply thanking him for his "thoughtful courtesy," but not acknowledging the Senator's error.

For fiscal 1945-46 the House approved an FBIS appropriation of \$1,166,000. While inadequate, this was expected to enable FBIS, under its new Director Charles A. Hyneman, to continue essential operations.\* Thus Hyneman was considerably alarmed early in 1945 to get a request from Senator McKellar to report to his committee the effect a ten percent cut would have on

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\* This provided for a staff of 280 at old salaries with no arrangement for night differential. It assumed that the war with Japan would continue throughout the fiscal year and that European and Latin American monitoring would end no later than 31 December 1945. Job 51-13, CIA Records Center.

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FBIS operations. Hyneman reported that such a cut would make it necessary to halt monitoring of European and Latin American broadcasts at the beginning of the fiscal year rather than the end of the calendar year as planned. Yet, despite this warning, Hyneman insisted that FBIS employees in London should enjoy the same living allowance as other U.S. Government employees, and succeeded in getting the measure approved.

Shortage of Qualified Personnel

As the war progressed, finding qualified personnel to fill FBIS positions became increasingly difficult. A letter signed by Chairman Fly informed CSC on 4 March 1943 that FBIS was in need of 53 CAF-2 typists, with the clerical staff so badly depleted that loss of a few more would seriously damage FBIS work. Answering OWI complaints of poorly prepared publications, Leigh explained on 19 November 1943 that the problem was a shortage of "time, manpower, and equipment." Typewriters were poor and some typists were worse. Inter-office memoranda during 1943 showed considerable concern over poor clerical work. FBIS officials depended upon CSC for relief, as chief complaints of clerical employees were low grade and the inconvenience of night work. Finally, CSC approved reclassification of 97 FBIS positions, mostly clerical; 172 had been requested.

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In the six months ending 1 July 1942 the number of departures was 33 percent of the entire staff; in the six months ending 1 July 1943 it dropped to 26 percent. Attempts also were made to get night differential payments, but this was not successful. The first night differential was paid 1 July 1945.

The problem of finding qualified personnel was not limited to clerical positions. Competent editors were hard to locate, and capable linguists, easy to find before the war, became more and more scarce. Leigh regarded inadequate pay as the chief cause of inability to find satisfactory replacements. In a plea for higher grades for monitors in 1942 he pointed out that nearly half of all FBIS linguists had college degrees; about ten percent had Ph.D.'s; one-fourth of them were authors of books or articles. Yet most of them were receiving little more than \$2,000 a year and only one as much as \$3,200. There was a steady movement of analysts, monitors, and editors to new war agencies, such as OWI, OSS, and CIAA. FBIS management was reluctant to attempt to hold them, since in most cases they were going to higher-paid positions. On 7 July 1942 Goodwin Watson wrote Nelson Rockefeller concerning an offer that had been made by CIAA to FBIS analyst John W. Gardner. Watson said that of course

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FBIS was reluctant to let him go, but he thought the solution was for officials of the two offices to discuss the matter fully and decide where he could do the most good.

Eventual CSC approval of reclassifications made FBIS positions more attractive. Ben Hall wrote the chief of the Portland Bureau on 29 January 1945 that positions now were fairly well standardized with CSC approval. A trainee linguist would get a salary of \$2,300; monitors up to \$3,200. Editorial trainees would start at \$2,600 and advance to \$4,600. Clerical employees were graded up to CAF-5. This represented a considerable improvement in three years.

Another manpower problem was the needs of the armed services. Original FBIS policy was to seek deferments for editors, linguists, and analysts, but not for clerical or administrative employees. Criticism of government agencies that requested deferments grew stronger as the war progressed, and FBIS did not feel it legitimately could make further appeals. The practice was adopted of merely writing a draft board to outline the work of the individual, with no request for deferment. When the Cox Committee was set up it immediately requisitioned all information on statements to draft boards, which made it even more incumbent upon

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FBIS to refrain from attempts to hold men who were eligible for the draft. The result was more and more FBIS employees called into the armed forces. In order that the best use might be made of FBIS training, information was released to such agencies as OWI and OSS on former FBIS employees in the armed services. Some were sought out by PWB and placed on monitoring teams. In a memorandum on 5 November 1943, Leigh proposed a policy of asking draft boards to defer men in key positions for as much as six months, or until replacements were available. Men in 1-A were no longer to be considered for appointment, and a special effort must be made to locate qualified women, and men permanently deferred for physical reasons.

A considerable file of correspondence with draft boards exists. Senior Administrative Officer Thompson Moore wrote a San Francisco draft board on 30 January 1943 explaining that although West Coast employee Hans Frankel's name did not appear on the first list of key employees, his responsibilities now clearly placed him within that group as defined in a letter from the President's office. Hyneman reported on 15 November 1944 that no further effort could be made to gain deferment for Brad Coolidge. FCC had declared further efforts contrary to policy, as FBIS had had sufficient time to train someone to replace him. Spencer Williams complained

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in a message to Washington on 25 March 1944 that just as he finally had found a man who was not a Japanese national or a Nisei to handle Romaji, FCC had refused to request his deferment and he had resigned.

In a desperate effort to solve the engineering shortage, Hyneman wrote officials in G-2 on 21 April 1944 suggesting that five Morse code operators in uniform be assigned temporarily to FBIS. Much more intelligence material of value to G-2 could be obtained, he explained, if FBIS had personnel to exploit it.

Recruiting and holding competent Japanese monitors and translators led to some unique practices. The most promising source of such personnel seemed to be the war relocation camps, so visits to these were started in 1942. Directors of such camps were notified by FBIS on 18 December 1942 that Mrs. Mary J. Mueller soon would visit the camps in search of translators. Mrs. Mueller reported on her trip to Graves on 31 December. She was handicapped first because the best prospects were Japanese citizens, who were ruled out. The second problem was that promising Nisei she located were opposed to going to Portland. The trip did lead to the hiring of a few satisfactory monitors, and FBIS officials continued to comb relocation centers for prospects, even as late as June 1945.

The West Coast Command would not allow FBIS to use

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Japanese monitors in San Francisco, which made Portland the only possible location for the few recruited. Many were opposed to going to Portland. Others were willing, and were given clearance to join FBIS, but were refused clearance to live in Portland. One Japanese monitor in Portland wrote Spencer Williams on 10 October 1943 saying Leigh was trying to get a permit for his fiancée to go to Portland so that they could be married; Leigh apparently did not know, the letter continued, that Williams already had applied for a permit and was turned down. Permission for the girl to reside in Portland never was granted, but eventually the monitor was transferred to Washington so he could be kept in the organization. It was much easier to get clearance for Nisei to live in Denver, so with the opening of a Denver post to translate Romaji the problem of finding Japanese translators was considerably simplified. The Denver staff later was transferred to Headquarters and gained the reputation of being one of the most efficient units in FBIS.\*

Communications Problems

Probably all federal agencies had manpower problems

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\* Writing to Larry Tejiri on 8 January 1945, Edward Hullinger said: "The Romaji staff, without exaggeration, is regarded as one of the finest, if not the finest, language technician staffs in government." He added that in addition to being efficient, they were well liked as individuals. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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during the war, and certainly FBIS was not the only one with financial worries. The problem of communications was more peculiar. The instant FBIS started setting up field monitoring posts it had to answer the question of how information gleaned in the field would be transmitted to Headquarters. Private telephone and telegraph systems were available, and radio was used for long distance communications to some extent. It was assumed originally that these commercial facilities could be tapped, but there was no conception of the costs involved in establishing satisfactory communications for a far-flung monitoring system. Actually, it was believed at first that most field information could be sent airmail, with commercial communications facilities reserved for an occasional urgent message. That thinking was changed quickly by the war, though it undoubtedly would have changed soon under peacetime conditions.

Portland started sending transcripts by airmail, but this was soon considered unsatisfactory. Western Union then was utilized. All monitored material was summarized in one night letter, which was carried by car to the Portland Western Union office at 2:00 a.m. Even this practice raised communications costs much above original estimates. Soon after the war started it

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became evident that Portland would have to keep in touch with Washington 24 hours a day. The answer was a leased teletype line between Portland and Washington. OWI in San Francisco requested a copy of all material sent, and was willing to pay for the line from Portland to San Francisco. This helped some in meeting communications costs. By the time Kingsville was prepared to send any significant amount of copy, the lesson had been learned. Teletype service 24 hours a day was installed at once.

Puerto Rico offered a different problem. Naval radio facilities were available, and FCC sought as early as 1 August 1941 to learn if these facilities could be used for urgent FBIS messages. Administrative messages from Washington to Puerto Rico were accepted, but Rand reported on 5 January 1942 that Navy circuits were so overtaxed that they could not be depended upon at all for sending radio broadcast material. Airmail was resorted to until FBIS got its own telefax system installed in March 1942. The system did not work well. Engineers at Silver Hill found it impossible to copy a full program accurately. New antenna had to be installed, and it was May before the telefax could satisfactorily handle copy for Washington. Even then it was never considered an adequate setup. A skilled typist was

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required to transfer material from the tape in readable form, and errors were frequent.

It was between London and Washington that the major problems arose. The idea of transmitting information verbally by telephone quickly was abandoned, and London was instructed on 6 March 1942 to send all copy via RCA at regular press rates. The London office of Cable and Wireless would do the sending, with copy from the London FBIS office delivered to Cable and Wireless by messenger pending establishment of teleprinter arrangements. After a week, RCA was dropped and Press Wireless (PW) was used with lower negotiated rates. The idea of sending via PW directly from Evesham was considered, but never attempted. Teleprinter service between London FBIS and the Cable and Wireless cable head was inaugurated 4 April 1942, with service rapid and fairly satisfactory. After OWI started sending material over the same line, a contract was made with Western Union (WU), and the London staff alternated in sending over PW and WU, the latter being more satisfactory but also more expensive. In August 1942 another contract was negotiated with Commercial Cables, so FBIS and OWI had three lines available to the United States. Two serious problems remained: the question of priority and the high cost.

PW offered the lowest rates, but frequent delays caused considerable concern, both in Washington and London.

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Most of the delay was traced to the office of Cable and Wireless, which blamed British Censorship. Agreements were made with Censorship, but delays continued. It was only after many meetings, some threats, and intervention through the State Department that Cable and Wireless changed its methods and procedures to give speedy service to FBIS messages.

Early in 1943 FBIS obtained indisputable evidence that Rome and Berlin were monitoring U.S. commercial radio circuits. As a result, only selected copy was routed via PW. Analytical material, and broadcast texts that it was felt should be kept from the enemy, were sent via WU or Commercial Cable -- at a much higher cost. A survey made in May 1943 showed London was filing 15,329 words a day, with nearly 9,000 moving via PW, the remainder divided equally between the two cables.

Because of high communications costs, London was at first held to a daily quota of 9,000 words. On 11 July 1943 the quota was raised officially to 15,000, but it was difficult even to hold down to this figure. Julian Behrstock reported on 1 October 1943 that because of bad reception in Washington and subsequent requests to London, and "the big war news," the quota had been consistently exceeded. By 30 September 1943 the accumulated excess for the quarter was 70,000 words. By the end of the year this had been reduced some, but on 2 July 1944 the London

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daily quota was raised to 18,000. The budget cut that went into effect on 1 July 1944 actually placed a greater burden on the London staff and London communications, for with a reduction in Washington monitoring it became more and more necessary to get material from London that could have been monitored at Headquarters. In August 1945 the daily average from London was 22,497 words.

The budget estimate of communications costs for fiscal 1943 was \$245,556, of which \$132,000 was for London. The actual cost from London was \$159,684. Portland communications costs during the same year were \$48,000. Stewart Hensley reported to Leigh on 14 May 1943 that the quota of \$426 a day for cable costs that he had allowed London at the beginning of the month had been exceeded by \$1,290 in just five days. On 11 May 1943, cable costs from London reached \$825. Much of this excess cost, Hensley reported, resulted from a tieup in PW, which forced London to file most copy by cable. On 15 April 1944 Hensley revealed communications allocations for the 1944-45 fiscal year--a total of \$329,029, with \$220,120 assigned to London. San Francisco was to have \$77,564. On 7 February 1945 Hyneman wrote Behrstock asking a detailed wordage report each month, to show amounts filed on each line. He said he was amazed to find that neither the FBIS nor FCC accounting office had

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an accurate record of FBIS communications costs. Hyneman had written Russell Shepherd in the Pacific promising him \$100,000 for communications, but had to write again on 8 March 1945 to report that all communications funds were exhausted; there was nothing for the Pacific.

FBIS officials in 1942 were unduly optimistic concerning communications possibilities. Peter Rhodes wrote Leigh on 9 September 1942 to inform him that a British representative on his way to Australia had promised to investigate the possibility of sending monitored material from there directly to Washington, where it would be combined with Portland copy. Fly wrote the Secretary of State on 23 December 1942 asking about communications facilities from Lisbon, Cairo, Algiers, and Teheran, saying FBIS hoped soon to be filing information from all those centers. Facilities did not develop that easily, and on 8 May 1944 FBIS still was trying to get a regular file out of Algiers. Leigh wrote OWI that day suggesting that the two offices might obtain the use of a joint circuit and thus get the large Balkan file that was said to be available from PWB monitoring.

The Army Signal Corps eventually came to the rescue of FBIS in solving some of its communications problems. Vincent Anderson wrote on 30 April 1943 asking that

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Signals be asked to carry a file of 5,000 words a day from London to Algiers. The Army already had agreed, he said, but wanted a formal request on file in Washington. A year later, when PWB monitors in the Mediterranean area asked for 10,000 words a day from Washington and London, the FBIS response was that the file was available if Signals could transmit it. In the Pacific there was never any need for high communications costs, for Signals took over the task from the start. Behrstock announced on 31 January 1945 that on 2 February Signals would start carrying part of London's traffic to Washington.

#### Unfavorable Reception Conditions

Another problem that forced FBMS to make major adjustments was entirely peculiar to the nature of the service. When FBMS was set up it was assumed that broadcasts beamed to the United States -- which was all that FBMS would want -- could be heard from just about any point in the United States. Sites for monitoring posts were selected by examining a map showing FCC installations. It soon was learned that finding a suitable monitoring site was not that simple. Puerto Rico was expected to cover broadcasts from Africa and Southern and Western Europe. After the station was operating it was found that it could cover the Caribbean area adequately, but

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most European and African stations it could hear were monitored satisfactorily in Washington. It could receive from much of Latin America, but very little of significance that could not be covered by Kingsville. The plan to make Puerto Rico a major monitoring post was abandoned by the summer of 1942, with the staff significantly reduced. Puerto Rico was then allowed to run tests of Latin American stations with the idea of keeping it as a supplement to Kingsville, but this also proved impracticable. When the Overtime Pay Act forced a reduction in field staff, it was decided that Puerto Rico must be closed out. Leigh wrote Edward Rand to that effect on 3 April 1943. Tom Grandin then made a trip to Puerto Rico and recommended keeping the station open for a time, with only Rand, one translator, and one custodian retained. Late in the summer Rand wrote to Leigh urging that he again be allowed to build up the staff and attempt to monitor significant material, but was informed on 25 August 1943 that a final decision had been reached. The station was closed on 3 February 1944. Rand was transferred to Washington. Part of the staff already had been sent to Kingsville.\*

\* A memorandum to FCC signed by Leigh early in 1944 asked permission to close the station. Leigh described the Puerto Rican experience, pointing out that the original purpose of the station was to intercept broadcasts from Africa and to and from the Caribbean. Despite the general failure of the station to fulfill its original purpose, its material had been quite valuable at times, especially during Vichy control of the French islands in the Caribbean. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.



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The story of the Kingsville station was just as dismal. Kingsville was selected because it was a major RID station and was thought to be an ideal spot for monitoring Latin American broadcasts. Equipment was good -- the Kingsville antenna described as the best in FBIS -- and part of the year a significant number of important Latin American stations could be monitored adequately. However, it was learned soon that for six months of the year broadcasts were covered by a static that made translation difficult. Also, most of the personnel stationed at Kingsville found the climate depressing and living conditions not the best. George Chesnutt, the Texan in charge of Kingsville during its early tests, became so discouraged that he wrote in the summer of 1942 recommending that the station be abandoned. Instead, Washington decided to build it up and transferred part of the Puerto Rico personnel. After Elliot Tarbell was placed in charge, he was even more discouraged, and urged that an effort be made to find a better location.\* Chesnutt and Rawls, the engineer

\* In a letter to Leigh dated 3 August 1943, Tarbell urged Florida tests, arguing that Southern Florida was 800 air miles nearer to South America; that an additional full hour of evening reception could be obtained there; and that a change could be made with no loss in coverage. Tarbell thought static conditions would not be as bad in Florida, and certainly could be no worse. He added that Engineer Rawls had informed him that in his early reports from Kingsville he had been instructed by RID to say nothing of the static, with the result that Washington had been kept in the dark regarding true conditions at Kingsville. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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in charge at Kingsville, ran a series of reception tests in the fall of 1943. They traveled through much of Florida, making tests near Pensacola, Tallahassee, south of Miami, and other places. They agreed that the Lake Worth area was far superior to Kingsville as a reception point for Latin American broadcasts and recommended that the Kingsville post be transferred there. FBIS and RID made further surveys and decided that establishment of a station at Lake Worth was feasible. An actual site was located and an option on the property signed. Tarbell, anxious to get away from Kingsville, urged that the transfer be made at once.\*

There were two reasons why the Lake Worth station

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\* Tarbell was extreme in his denunciation of the Kingsville location. Writing Leigh on 14 March 1944, he explained that he had not attempted to hire more monitors because of Congressional measures affecting FBIS, but added: "I am not sure if it makes too much difference if we have more translators. According to the best I can make of it, in more than 16 months down here, the average output of the Latin American stations, with the exception of occasional short spurts, is about the worst drivell imaginable. ... Despite all the efforts to make it look otherwise, the conviction has grown on me that a lot of money is being spent for what is being brought back." "I've had too much of Texas. If, after I leave here, I ever again see anyone wearing Texas boots, I shall shoot him as a predatory animal." Answering this letter, Leigh assured Tarbell that he would find conditions more pleasant at San Francisco, where he was being transferred. This prophecy was not borne out, for Tarbell was equally critical of much that he found there, and resigned from FBIS before he had been there long. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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was never opened. First, CIAA had changed its operations to the extent that it was not in as great need as it had been of monitored material from Latin America. In 1942 and early 1943 it urged FBIS to expand Kingsville, but by the end of 1943 had become lukewarm in its demands. In the second place, the appropriations cut in the spring of 1944 forced FBIS to cut its operations everywhere but in the Pacific. It was decided that Kingsville, of doubtful value at best, readily could be dispensed with. The last broadcast copy was filed from Kingsville on 8 April 1944. The second FBIS monitoring post was abandoned.

It was never the intention of FBIS officials that monitoring of Latin America would be completely abandoned. Before Kingsville closed, George Chesnutt was sent to San Francisco in January 1944 to run reception tests. Similar tests were run at Silver Hill. It was found that a considerable portion of Kingsville coverage could be monitored from these two points. As Kingsville operations ended before any regular monitoring of Latin America was being done in San Francisco or Silver Hill, users of FBIS material began to complain of the shortage of Latin American information. The BBC, getting Kingsville broadcasts on the D Wire, had never shown any great enthusiasm

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for the material, but as soon as it was reduced the attitude changed. Leigh wrote to the BBC on 8 April 1944 assuring the British that both San Francisco and Washington would soon be monitoring essential Latin American broadcasts.

Portland reception also was disappointing, and though San Francisco was a slight improvement, the two combined could not begin to get all the Far East broadcast material desired. Also, since Japanese continued to be barred from San Francisco, Portland retained exclusive coverage of Japanese language broadcasts. In the early months of the war it was hoped that monitoring in Australia and India eventually would supply the needed material that Portland was not able to get, but communications from both places proved difficult, and the extent to which the material duplicated Portland coverage was a disappointment. The idea of monitoring in Alaska was soon abandoned as impracticable, and efforts to get monitored material through the Russians from Vladivostok proved fruitless. Rhodes wrote on 11 July 1942 that the U.S. Consulate General in Vladivostok reported that U.N. monitoring there was "impossible," but Rhodes added hopefully that if the Japanese attacked Siberia the attitude might change.

Reports began to drift in concerning monitoring in Hawaii by Naval Intelligence. Leigh said on 20 October 1942

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that RID reports from Hawaii were not promising and reported George Sterling as believing that Portland was a better monitoring point than Hawaii, though further tests should be made with improved antenna. Meantime, complaints of the inadequacy of Far East monitoring began to build up. Milo Perkins of BEW wrote Fly on 5 August 1942 expressing his disappointment that FBIS was able to cover only 15 percent of Japanese broadcasts. He cited the importance of information Portland was providing to bolster his argument that failure to get more was "extremely serious." Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) head Leo T. Crowley wrote Leigh on 10 November 1944 urging that FBIS attempt to cover Romaji code transmissions, adding that he understood Japanese medium wave could be heard in Hawaii and believed FBIS should seriously consider monitoring from there.

FBIS officials began to study RID reports from Hawaii. On 8 March 1943 Graves reported to Leigh that he had talked with RID Hawaii supervisor A. P. Walker, who verified reports that Japanese medium wave could be heard in Hawaii from February to April and perhaps longer. Graves further reported on 7 June 1943 that medium wave had faded out by the middle of May, and RID was of the opinion that substantial improvement must be sought elsewhere, perhaps on Midway. Leigh

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acknowledged to OWI in May 1943 that FBIS was monitoring only one-sixth of Japanese broadcasts, though adding that under the circumstances this was not bad. By summer of 1943 pressure from OWI for improvement was becoming intense. Williams sent a report reflecting OWI dissatisfaction. Following his study of the report, Graves wrote a four-page memorandum for Leigh. He was strongly skeptical that any additional worthwhile broadcast material could be obtained in Hawaii, pointed out the problems of housing, staffing, and communications if an attempt were made to set up a post there, but agreed that it was necessary to give the matter further study.

The Graves report was dated 12 June 1943. On 5 July Spencer Williams sent another memorandum quoting Vincent Mahoney of OWI as stating positively that important Japanese broadcasts not heard in Portland had been picked up in Hawaii, and requesting that RID be instructed to record broadcasts there and send them to OWI for servicing. Mahoney also called San Francisco coverage of Filipino broadcasts "filthy," adding that they too were available in Hawaii. Williams verified that OWI "was in a dither," but added that to his knowledge only two items not monitored in Portland had turned up from Hawaii, though one of them was "very important" and was being used by OWI to pressure FBIS. Williams' parting shot was that he

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was sure OWI had in mind its own monitoring in Hawaii if FBIS did not act.

Writing to Williams on 16 July 1943, Graves asked for two things: Some convincing evidence that improved material was available in Hawaii; and some "full-dress indication" of OWI's interest that could be presented to the Bureau of the Budget. On 5 August 1943 Tom Grandin, on a trip to the West Coast, telephoned Washington to urge that action be taken at once. He wanted to go immediately to Hawaii, but that idea was vetoed by FCC. Upon his return to Washington, Grandin wrote a report dated 23 August 1943 in which he stated flatly that on the West Coast there was "considerable dissatisfaction with services rendered by FBIS." It was his opinion that the situation could not be improved on the West Coast. Grandin added that he had talked with Lee Dawson of RID, who thought additional Japanese broadcasts could be picked up in Hawaii and needed manpower could be recruited there.\*

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\* Grandin made a five-point recommendation: 1. That a further effort be made to add to the Portland Japanese staff; 2. That more Morse operators be obtained to handle Romaji; 3. That Koreans be recruited to monitor Japanese in San Francisco; 4. That further reports be obtained on Hawaii with the aim of establishing a monitoring post there; and 5. That Budget Bureau authorization for more field personnel be sought. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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RID stepped up its recordings of Japanese programs in Hawaii, which were sent to Portland for processing. Opinion there was divided as to their worth. OWI and BEW, supported by some other agencies, continued to demand better Far East coverage. FBIS and FCC officials finally concluded that serious consideration must be given to Hawaii monitoring, and authorized Spencer Williams and E. F. Rudesill, head of the BRU staff at San Francisco, to make a trip to Hawaii for a complete investigation. They arrived in Hawaii on 15 October 1943, visiting Oahu and several other islands. Williams made a full report to Leigh dated 29 December 1943, and Rudesill reported to George Sterling. Williams remained in Hawaii until 23 November, but Rudesill developed an eye ailment and left for the Mainland the first week in November. Williams in his report said that RID and Army and Navy officials were very cooperative. He found Japanese monitors available in Hawaii, and because of the better treatment Japanese in Hawaii had received, recruitment would not be as difficult as on the Mainland. He recommended a post on Oahu rather than one of the other islands, because of living, travel and communications problems, and decided that of the four acceptable sites they examined on Oahu the one at the Waimano Home was the best. Rudesill, agreeing that reception conditions on Hawaii were good, reported that the best site



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he visited was at Koloa on the Island of Kauai.

OWI, upon learning of Williams' report, joined enthusiastically in urging an FBIS post in Hawaii. In a message to Washington on 3 February 1944 Rex Tussing, senior editor at San Francisco, quoted several OWI officials in San Francisco, relaying their argument that if Japanese medium wave were a duplication of shortwave, as many insisted, then Portland was missing a considerable amount of short-wave.\* The State Department joined in urging a Hawaii post. Cordell Hull in a letter to Fly on 22 February 1944 said State would be "extremely glad" if FBIS could pick up Japanese medium wave, and he understood it could be heard in Hawaii. FBIS plans for a Hawaii station got under way.

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\* Mahoney was quoted as saying: "The continental prospect has not lived up to promise, and we altogether underwrite the proposed FBIS location in Honolulu, having every confidence that, if rapid communications between Honolulu and San Francisco are a certain aspect of the operation, it will result in important augmentation of intelligence from Japan and the Far East." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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Chapter 9 CHANGE IN WAR FOCUS

The decision to establish a monitoring station in Hawaii was approved by FCC on 21 January 1944. After reading Williams' report on his Hawaii investigation, Leigh wired him to come to Washington at once for conferences. Already Leigh had expressed enthusiasm for a Hawaii station, calling it much more practical than one in Alaska. He had taken the precaution of placing a request for funds to monitor in Hawaii in the 1944-45 budget before Congressional hearings were launched on 13 December 1943. Verbal approval by FCC already was given, but after conferences with Williams and a thorough examination of his findings in Hawaii, FCC pronounced its formal blessings on the project.

This decision came none too soon. Preparations for the Normandy landing were going on full blast, and most observers were predicting that the war in Europe would end in a matter of months following the landing. Odds that war in Europe would be over by the end of 1944 were considered good. These same observers were forecasting that in the Pacific heavy fighting would continue. Very few thought the Japanese would surrender before they were thoroughly defeated, and some of the most knowledgeable authorities considered that they might be able to hold out for years after the war ended in Europe. With peace in Europe still more than a year

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away, attention already was beginning to focus on the Pacific. Subscribers to FBIS products acknowledged that its coverage of the European radio had been excellent. Its weakness was in Far East coverage, and with the change in focus, improvement in this area was essential.

Expansion in the Pacific

Norman Paige, who had opened the San Francisco station, was selected to organize the Oahu project. Satoru Sugimura, a native of Hawaii and a veteran Portland monitor, was named to recruit and train a Japanese monitoring staff, and RID named Waldemar Klima to head BRU operations. They arrived in Honolulu in March 1944, with Williams accompanying Paige to get him started, and were given temporary quarters in the RID Punchbowl station. The first local monitor hired was Kiyoshi Nakano, who later handled monitoring on Iwo Jima and remained with FBIS for ten years; the second was Tadao Tamaru, who later trained monitors in Tokyo. Paige and Sugimura started at once to train the staff and process recordings made by RID. Klima tried recording at several RID sites, but put up antennae at the HA-9 RID site at Waialua, 40 miles away, and established it as the BRU station. By November the staff had grown to 11 and daily wordage filed to San Francisco was 2,500. The original plan was to use

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the telefax system shipped from Puerto Rico to file copy to San Francisco, and it actually was installed in the Punchbowl. Reception in San Francisco was unsatisfactory, and never improved much. Fortunately, it was not necessary to perfect this circuit, as the Army Signal Corps soon agreed to transmit material to the Mainland at no expense to FBIS. It was only necessary to get copy to the Signals office at Ft. Shafter, outside Honolulu.

The Honolulu file was received enthusiastically in Washington, as well as by such Honolulu offices as OWI, OSS, Naval Intelligence, and G-2. Operations began during the period of good Japanese medium wave reception, and this material had long been coveted by FBIS subscribers. However, the old problem of erratic reception plagued BRU here also. At times reception was astonishingly good. At other times interference, static, and fade-outs made it impossible to get complete texts. Eventually the engineers decided that reception would never be satisfactory on Oahu and advocated moving to Kauai, perhaps to the site Rudesill had originally recommended.\*

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\* An article by Klima written at the request of George Sterling and dated 20 April 1964 gives considerable detail concerning engineering problems on Oahu and the search for an improved location on Kauai. See "Monitoring Enemy Propaganda Broadcasts," 9-2 Organization and Management, History of FBIS, FBIS Executive Files.

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Charles S. Hyneman, who succeeded Leigh as FBIS director on 27 July 1944, found himself involved in Pacific problems almost immediately. Paige, in charge of the Hawaii operation, obviously was more interested in a Pacific outpost well beyond Hawaii than in the Hawaii station. He urged immediate steps to establish such an outpost, and gained the approval of military officials in Honolulu. FBIS officials in Washington approved the plan for an investigative trip to the outposts, as well as Klima's recommendation for an eventual move to Kauai. Paige wanted to make the trip in June 1944, but military operations in the Mariannas forced a delay. In a letter to Edward Hullinger dated 27 June 1944 he complained of delaying tactics by the Navy, declaring that the Army was ready to move.

Final military endorsement eventually came through, with Paige, Klima, and Sugimura departing for the Marshalls via Naval Air Transport on 31 July 1944. They first went to Naval Headquarters on Kwajalein, then to Ebeye and Namur. Reception tests completed, Klima and Sugimura flew back to Honolulu on 14 August. Paige went on to Guam and Saipan. He reported both the Army and Navy "extremely cooperative," and stated that FBIS would have a choice of two prime locations for an outpost: on Guam under Navy sponsorship; or on Saipan under the Army.

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Despite his earlier impatience with the Navy, Paige favored the Guam site, though he declared that both the Army and OWI were anxious for an FBIS post on Saipan. The only trouble with Guam was that the area selected for FBIS operations still was being cleared of Japanese, and would not be available before November. Because of this, he recommended a temporary post at Eniburr immediately, to be moved to Guam when possible. He claimed he could start operations within two days if he had approval for the immediate transfer of personnel.\*

Klima and Sugimura were not so enthusiastic about monitoring on Eniburr. Both of them reported that

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\* Paige, a voluminous letter writer, made several reports from the outposts and from Honolulu after he returned. These observations are from a letter to Hullinger dated 17 August, and one to Hullinger-Hyneman on 6 September. Paige urged that FBIS move fast, both on Kauai and on Eniburr, but though he was vague concerning details for the Kauai operation, he asked that he be authorized at once to take three engineers, three Japanese translators, and two English monitors to Eniburr. FBIS Records, National Archives.

Paige got one proponent in FBIS for his plan to hurry the forward post. Hullinger in a 27 June 1944 memorandum for FCC urged that steps be taken to establish a post at Eniwetok. He claimed that State, OWI, OSS and FEA would back up the measure by letters, and though the Army and Navy would not "stick their necks out," they also approved. Hullinger proposed a major listening post at Eniwetok, with the Honolulu post used only for relays and backstopping. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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Hawaii reception was far superior to that of Portland, but Sugimura said that tests they ran in the Marshalls showed very little improvement over Hawaii. Following instructions from Washington, Klima made tests on Kauai as soon as he returned from the West Pacific and recommended that the Hawaii post be moved to Kauai as soon as possible. In a letter to BRU chief David Cooper on 7 September 1944 he pointed out that no reception tests had yet been run on either Saipan or Guam, while Kauai would be a definite improvement over the Waialua site and could be put into operation in a short time. FBIS officials overruled Paige on the immediate move to Eniburr, and Hyneman on 18 September instructed Klima to proceed with plans for Kauai.

Fly wrote to General Richardson on 29 September 1944 confirming FCC approval for an FBIS monitoring station on Kauai and an outpost later in the West Pacific. He also announced that Hyneman would leave immediately for Hawaii to complete agreements and plans. While in Hawaii, Hyneman gave final approval to the site selected by Klima on Kauai at the Kekaha Sugar Plantation. He met with Adm. Chester Nimitz as well as Gen. Robert C. Richardson during his trip. Target date for opening the Kauai post was set for 1 November 1944.

Hyneman wrote full descriptions of his meetings on

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Oahu and Kauai and plans for the new station. In a letter to Shepherd and Cooper in Washington, Newton Edgers in San Francisco, and Masters in Portland, he described on 13 October 1944 his meetings with Army officials in Honolulu. Two officers went with him to Kauai to support the negotiations, and recommended to the Army in Honolulu that the Kekaha site, then occupied by the Army, be relinquished to FBIS. Hyneman arrived on Kauai on 9 October 1944 and stayed three days, completing agreements with both the Army and the Kekaha Sugar Co. The Army agreed to spend \$29,195 to reconstruct and repair buildings on the site, and retain ownership of the temporary buildings it had moved there. Kekaha Sugar Co. agreed to lease the four acres of land and the permanent buildings on it, and give antenna rights in the surrounding cane fields, for a rental of \$150 a month.\*

In a letter to Satoru Sugimura on 21 October 1944, Hyneman described the layout on Kauai and asked Sugimura

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\* A letter from Shepherd on Kauai to Hyneman dated 6 March 1945 recommended that the Army be reimbursed \$29,195 for its work in renovating the Kekaha area. Shepherd quoted this figure, the same one quoted to Hyneman in the fall, as the amount claimed by the Army, adding that according to "private information" the Army actually had spent \$45,000. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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to take the position of chief monitor, recruiting and training Japanese monitors for both Kauai and a western outpost. He told Sugimura that he planned to send Paige to the outpost, but doubted that his plan for 8 to 10 OSS translators there ever would materialize; at any rate, perhaps Sugimura would have other ideas on staffing the outpost with translators. It was obvious by now that Hyneman was somewhat disillusioned with Paige. He wrote Shepherd on 19 October 1944 that upon his return to Honolulu from Hilo he had a letter from Paige urging that plans for Kauai be abandoned.

Paige was not happy over Hyneman's decisions. He informed Hyneman on 6 November 1944 that the Navy was ready for an FBIS move to the West Pacific; any delay would be the fault of FBIS.\* He also was unhappy because he could not get permission to publish articles based on his Pacific trip. On 7 November 1944, even before he received Paige's complaints, Hyneman

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\* Paige added: "You realize that as long as I am on the job, and in view of past performances, I demand the right of approval on men selected to travel and work with me." This apparently was a reference to the projected use of OSS men. Hyneman in a memorandum dated 7 November said Lt. Withrow of OSS could not understand why Paige insisted on OSS civilians rather than officers with OSS already available. Hyneman concluded that perhaps Paige was afraid the OSS "would want to run the show." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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appointed Russell M. Shepherd to take charge of Pacific operations. He assumed that Shepherd would delegate to Paige the running of the West Pacific outpost when it was established.

The original plan was for Portland to close as soon as Kauai was in operation, with San Francisco to remain open. Upon visiting the West Coast on his way to Hawaii, Shepherd recommended that this policy be reversed, with Portland remaining open for an indefinite period and San Francisco to close as soon as practicable.\* This recommendation was approved. Shepherd transferred personnel from both West Coast stations to Kauai, but more from San Francisco. As soon as the Kauai station was in operation, San Francisco ceased monitoring, but remained open for some months as a relay point until copy from Kauai was flowing smoothly. Then a small

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\* In a message from San Francisco, Shepherd stated that despite talk of San Francisco's reception advantage, "Portland seems to have a slight edge." He explained further that Portland was more of a "going concern, due to fewer changes in supervision" and fewer upheavals in monitoring schedules. Actually, what played the greatest part in inducing Shepherd to reverse plans was the personnel situation at San Francisco. Two factions among the editors had been squabbling for a year, with Spencer Williams doing little to settle the duelling. Tarbell was bitter at the situation he found there, and already had resigned prior to Shepherd's arrival. Newton Edgers had been placed in charge of the station, effective 1 October. Shepherd was not enthusiastic about Edgers being in charge, and decided to close out the station and move Edgers to the Pacific. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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staff under the direction of Roland Way remained throughout the San Francisco Conference setting up the United Nations to supply American personnel at the Conference with a daily file of monitored material. The San Francisco station finally closed on 25 June 1945.

Progress on the Kauai station was not as rapid as had been hoped, but on 23 November 1944 the first contingent of transferees from Honolulu arrived and operations soon got under way. By 4 December it was possible to close out FBIS activities at the Punchbowl, though FBIS maintained an office in downtown Honolulu to facilitate distribution of broadcast information to Oahu offices. The entire transmittal of material from Kauai was through Signals, over land lines on both Oahu and Kauai, and by radio from one island to the other and to San Francisco. There were communications problems -- breakdowns in the land lines, delays in transit, insistence on the part of Signals operators that military forms be used -- but the improved reception on Kauai more than made up for these inconveniences. David Cooper, who spent several months in the Pacific, helping with the construction and getting BRU organized, said in a report on 24 March 1945 that Kauai received clearly many programs that could not be heard at all on the West Coast, and no Far East broadcast was received better on the Coast than on Kauai.

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Of course not everyone was pleased at developments. Rudesill, who originally had selected Kauai, attempted in a memorandum to Hyneman on 18 September 1944 to reverse the trend. He argued that any monitoring station in Hawaii should be limited to coverage of Japanese medium wave, that both San Francisco and Portland should be retained and improved. In fact he opposed any station in Hawaii, declaring that all that was needed was a "very small" outpost in the West Pacific. Other West Coast employees were bitter over plans to close eventually both stations, and announced that they would under no circumstances transfer to Kauai. Hyneman in a letter to Shepherd on 8 March 1945 remarked that there were several problems which he wanted to study, including "the matter of sabotage of Hawaii on the West Coast.\*"

Plans for the West Pacific outpost went ahead, though Paige resigned in January 1945. Newton Edgers replaced him, and departed for Guam on 18 January. Sugimura, and John Pfau accompanied Edgers, and three Japanese translators from Kauai left by boat the next day. Monitoring on Guam started as soon as equipment

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\* Tarbell in a letter to Hyneman dated 26 September 1944 cited Paige as the chief culprit, saying he had been "knocking Kauai to members of the staff plenty." He added that he would like to apply "a kick in the pants," as Hyneman suggested, but was unable to administer it, and also had no replacements. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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could be installed, as Admiral Nimitz was anxious to get immediate broadcast reports there. Guam filed material to Kauai and to Washington, but a great deal of its usefulness came through its direct service to the military command.\* There was no organization similar to PWB working in the Pacific, so FBIS, which had been forced by War Department orders to drop its monitoring station in North Africa, found itself setting up the same kind of a post on Guam at military urging. OSS plans for cooperation with FBIS never were carried through, so Guam remained strictly an FBIS enterprise. On 13 August 1945, Stephen Greene, who only recently had arrived to take charge on Guam, taking with him engineer Don Fisher and monitors Kenneth Pak and Kiyoshi Nakano, proceeded to Iwo Jima. In 24 hours a monitoring post was in operation, also concentrating largely on serving the local command. One monitor, Nakano, remained on Iwo Jima and continued the work until 29 September 1945, when the post was closed.\*\*

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\* Hyneman said in a letter in January 1945 that the highest priority had been given to getting FBIS civilians to Guam, and quoted Captain Redman as saying: "In order to get the Admiral off my neck, I will have FBIS on Guam by Tuesday if they only have a pair of headphones on." FBIS Records, National Archives.

\*\* Shepherd and John Pfau first surveyed Iwo Jima in February 1945 with the idea of setting up a forward post to supplement Guam and serve the military command in the region. They abandoned the project because of a shortage of land and a high level of interference from military equipment in the area. ON THE BEAM for 22 June 1945.

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The daily Kauai file reached 5,000 words in a matter of days, and by Christmas 1944 was close to 10,000. Paige originally had discussed with the Signal Corps a daily file from the Pacific of 6,000 words, but Hyneman got an agreement to transmit 35,000 words a day, though approval of that figure in the Army's Washington Headquarters was slow in coming. Sugimura spent most of his time recruiting and training Japanese monitors, and by the summer of 1945 had 17 at work on Kauai. The entire staff was about 50.\* In a memorandum dated 7 February 1945, Hyneman clarified a number of points concerning Pacific operations. All offices and monitoring posts were in a single bureau, the Pacific Ocean Bureau (PACOB), with Shepherd as chief. This included Honolulu, Kauai, Guam, and Iwo Jima. Shepherd was empowered to name the man in charge at any post.

Hyneman and Shepherd agreed on the policy enunciated by Hyneman in a memorandum of 24 February 1945 --

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\* In a letter to Washington dated 18 July 1945, Shepherd asked that total strength in the Pacific be raised by six persons, to 68. He placed the number of Japanese monitors working both at Kauai and Guam at 20, and estimated that monitoring could start on Okinawa six weeks after the Army gave the all clear for the advance. Portland was also being expanded. Ben Hall wrote a letter on 1 June to Philip K. Edwards, who was on his way to take over as chief at Portland, saying that he had requested a total of 66 personnel for the station, at a cost of \$174,960. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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that FBIS should consider the needs in a war theater as first priority, and attempt to supply the command with everything it wanted. This policy seemed to enhance the military estimation of FBIS. In a letter concerning possible cooperation with OSS, Shepherd said on 20 February 1945 that the matter was a "delicate one," since FBIS seemed to be "the only civilian agency favored by Army and Navy Commands" in the area. At the time of the Japanese surrender FBIS Pacific posts were the sole source of Emperor Hirohito's speech signaling the end of the war, and of various other stories out of Japan that made big headlines in the press.

#### Attempts at Constriction in Europe

Taking over management of FBIS in the first month of the 1944-45 fiscal year, following a 25 percent cut in appropriations, the primary concern of Charles S. Hyneman was finding ways to cut expenses. As the policy of expansion in the Pacific could not be reversed, he concentrated on further cuts in European monitoring. Hyneman had received fair warning that less money would be available in 1945-46, and that Congress would expect the service to make drastic reductions within 30 days after an armistice in Europe. He sought guidance from FBIS subscribers and found it

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a discouraging business. Any suggestion that monitoring of European or Axis broadcasts be discontinued or reduced met with protests. He distributed a questionnaire asking for reaction to cessation of all European and Latin American monitoring to accompany any armistice in Europe, or on 31 December 1944 at the latest. Opposition was so strong that he delayed action. He announced on 28 September 1944 that the London file would not immediately be reduced, but that with an armistice in Europe the subject would be reopened.

A reduction in Washington monitoring actually increased demands on London. Julian Behrstock in an office memorandum dated 15 May 1944 warned the London staff that Headquarters was depending on the BBC to make up for the loss in Washington copy. As a result the staff would have to file more summaries and excerpts in lieu of texts to keep within the word limitation. With the increase in Signal Corps filing, which reduced FBIS communications costs drastically, the London file was allowed to expand. In May 1945 London was filing 42,000 words a day.

In the autumn of 1944 Hyneman went to London with the intent of making severe cuts in the "comparatively large" London staff of 10 editors and 27 teletypists

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and clerical helpers. Prior to his departure a memorandum from Stephen Greene pointed out that the 16,000 words a day being filed by London in the summer of 1944 was less than Portland was filing with fewer editors and teletypists. Another practice questioned in Washington was the necessity for continuing to maintain editors at both the London and Caversham offices, a practice followed since 1942.\* Once in London, Hyneman began to see things in a different light. He discovered that in addition to sending the file to Washington, the London staff was providing lateral services to 140 offices in England, sending 10,000 words a day to PWB in Italy, and 5,000 words a day to PWB in France. Writing Shepherd in Hawaii on 26 February 1945, Hyneman acknowledged that he went to London with the idea of making severe staff cuts, "but they took me into camp, from Winant to the query clerks.\*\*"

Charles Hyneman continued to wrestle with the problem, but a letter to Shepherd on 8 March 1945 reflects his frustration. He complained that everyone still wanted

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\* A memorandum in Hyneman's file dated 20 November 1944. CIA Records Center.

\*\* Hyneman quoted Ambassador John Winant as saying: "FCC has the best mission in London; your men are doing one of the best jobs being done here." In the letter Hyneman concluded: "I decided that everything we were doing in the London and country offices ought to be continued." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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all that could be obtained from Europe, while an "economy minded" Senate Finance Committee was talking of another 10 percent cut in the budget.\* By 24 April 1945 he decided that the time for action had come. He announced a planned reduction and requested that all subscribers comment. It called for all Washington monitoring of Europe to stop within 30 days of an armistice or by 30 June 1945, whichever was first; for London lateral services to halt on 30 June; for the London file to continue until 30 December 1945, but limited to 15,000 words a day and filed via Signal Corps; and for the European Daily Report to continue until 31 December. Latin American monitoring was to continue until the end of the year in Washington.

Again Hyneman had to back down. He announced in ON THE BEAM for 22 June 1945 that as a result of pressure from subscribers, primarily the State Department, all monitoring would continue for another 90 days, pending a final decision in September.\* He also announced that

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\* Hyneman's exact words: "OWI, of course, continues to want everything before it happens, and OSS must have everything so it can save the world, but they still turn the teletype off at quitting time each day and let it cool all day Sunday." OSS had complained that cuts in the Daily Report hurt their services. When told that they could get all they needed from the A Wire it was learned that they had been cutting off the A Wire overnight and on weekends. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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Congress had approved a Bureau of the Budget request for \$1,166,000 to run FBIS during fiscal 1945-46 -- a cut of about \$200,000. This, he said, would force elimination of all Washington monitoring by 31 December 1945.

Writing Fred Brace in London on 4 July 1945, Hyneman asked for an outline of essential lateral services. He declared that the State Department and other European subscribers would have to make up their minds to either dispense with these services or make their needs known directly to Congress. At the same time he notified State that many London lateral services would end 31 July 1945. This elicited a request from State that they be continued for another 90 days and a promise to intercede with the Bureau of the Budget and Congress. State did agree, on 2 August 1945, that Latin American monitoring could be halted.

#### Changes at Headquarters

In an effort to streamline the organization so that FBIS could continue to provide essential services and still live within its budget, Hyneman directed a thorough survey of services and operations during August and September 1944. Results of the survey were included in a report to FCC on 4 December 1944. The A Wire was carrying 40,000 words daily to 16 offices;

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B Wire carried 26,000 words to OWI; C Wire transmitted 8,000 to CIAA; D Wire carried 1,000 a day to London; X Wire was supplying OWI in San Francisco with 8,300; and PM Wire was sending 4,000 words a day to the War Department. The Daily Report, averaging 83 pages a day, was going to 467 offices in 52 departments; the Far East Review reached 337 offices in 35 departments; European analytical publications were going to 323 offices in 34 departments. No attempt was made to enumerate queries answered and special services rendered to government offices. Lateral services from London, Portland, and the Pacific were mentioned but not pinpointed.

The extent of cuts already made was reflected in Hyneman's report. In the 1943-44 fiscal year FBIS expenditures reached \$2,016,607. At the time of the survey they were at a rate of \$1,564,389 for fiscal 1944-45. The average number of employees during 1943-44 was 459. This had been cut to 342. The number of monitoring stations had been reduced from six to four, not including foreign stations in the U.N. Monitoring System where FBIS personnel were attached. The average number of Daily Report pages had been cut from 100 to 83, and the average number for other publications from 160 to 85. Yet further cuts would have to be made.

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Chairman Fly wrote Elmer Davis on 15 September 1944 informing him that unless OWI could take over the cost of operation, the B Wire would have to be discontinued on 1 October. The PM Wire also was discontinued early in 1945, but no drastic changes were made in the other wire services until the middle of 1945. On 13 July 1945 Hyneman wrote primary subscribers to the A Wire requesting their reaction to reducing daily wordage to 20,000 and operating the service 12 or 16 hours a day. At the end of July the A Wire was placed on a 16-hour schedule. The Special Reports Section of FBIS, consisting of six analysts in the OWI office, was abolished on 31 December 1944.\* There was some resistance from State but after conferences it was decided on 18 November 1944 to take a "strong line" and tell State that the Special Reports Section would have to go.

Following the regular questionnaire on use of publications, it was found possible on 26 March 1945 to cut copies of the Daily Report by 135 and the Far

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\* A liaison study made among chief FBIS users reported on 29 April 1944 showed that State, War, FEA, and OSS, were reluctant to give up the analytical publications, but were unanimous in saying that if they had to choose they would prefer to drop them and keep the Daily Report. A study later in the year showed that former FBIS analysts now were serving most of the principal users. FBIS had only 9 analysts remaining, while 6 were with OSS, 7 with OWI, and several others with War and Navy. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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East Report by 118. The Daily Report staff, which comprised 45 editors in 1943, had been cut to 16 by December 1945. Part of these cuts in services were more acceptable because of the Special Services Section set up in 1944. A small staff examined all broadcast copy not used in publications or on the wire and sent individual copies by mail or messenger to interested offices.\*

Assistant Director Edward Hullinger resigned in December 1944 and was not replaced. Most of his work was taken over by Senior Administrative Officer Russell M. Shepherd, who had joined FBIS in September 1943. On 16 January 1945 FCC approved a reorganization of the FBIS headquarters office. Describing the changes in ON THE BEAM for 3 February, Hyneman said "it was more a redistribution of functions" than a reorganization, with the main aims being to increase liaison with clients; clarify policies regarding distribution of FBIS material; establish closer contacts with field offices; and more closely coordinate distribution and delivery. Ellis G. Porter was named Chief Editor,

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\* ON THE BEAM for 9 April 1945 described the Special Services Section as the "brain child" of Kurt Lesser. It reported that a mailing list of 50 interested users had been built up, and about 70 items were being mailed daily. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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with "liaison as his chief duty, along with determination of policies regarding distribution and the assigning of field tasks." Three divisions were set up. The Distribution Division under Stephen Greene was responsible for wire services and telecommunications, the Information Center, and the Administrative Services Unit, formerly called Mail and Files. The Far East Division under Audrey Menefee was not changed. It retained the only analytical work done in FBIS. The Monitoring Division, under Ben H. Hall, had supervision over all monitoring activities and the field offices.

In a memorandum for FCC on 2 March 1945 Hyneman suggested that the name of FBIS be changed to avoid confusion with FBI, which reported considerable trouble because of misdirected mail. He suggested International Broadcast Intelligence Service; Broadcast Intelligence Service; Foreign Broadcast Reporting Service; and Broadcast Reporting Service. Hyneman explained that "intelligence" and "reporting" were much more descriptive of FBIS operations than was "monitoring." There was a considerable movement of inter-office memoranda concerning choice of a name, and the preference seemed to be for Foreign Broadcast Reporting Service (FBRS). ON THE BEAM for 9 April 1945 reported that FCC had approved this change in name,

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but next month the publication announced that FCC had reversed itself. The new name was never formally adopted.

Hyneman was Director of FBIS slightly more than a year, from 27 July 1944 to 7 August 1945. He was transferred to other work within FCC and Russell Shepherd named as fourth FBIS Director. Upon leaving office, Hyneman prepared a long report for FCC outlining problems and progress during the year. His primary recommendation was for the immediate future: That the monitoring of Japanese-held territory, very important, must be maintained at a maximum. Selection of the PACOB Chief as new FBIS Director indicated FCC recognized that the focus of attention had changed to the Pacific.

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Chapter 10 CONGRESSIONAL COUP D'ETAT

The sudden surrender by the Japanese on 14 August 1945 was not anticipated by FBIS. Shepherd was called back to Washington for conferences in June 1945, and among matters decided upon was the continued movement into the Pacific as the war progressed. Plans were made with FCC approval to send a forward team to Okinawa as soon as fighting was ended there. It was expected to function just as Guam already was operating -- to give the area command all support possible, and to file as rapidly as possible to Kauai and Washington new monitored material. The sudden end to the war in the Pacific brought to immediacy the question of the future of FBIS.

Need for Peacetime Monitoring

FBIS personnel had given considerable thought to the possible peacetime status of FBIS, but no one suspected that matters would come to a head so soon. The Kauai Station had been in operation about nine months, Guam a little more than six months. Most employees of PACOB had assumed that they would have a year -- perhaps two -- before facing the problem of a possible end to their mission. Employees in Washington were in a better position to understand the situation, for the reducing process already had been in operation there for more than a year. In

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London, where the war already had ended some months earlier, everyone sensed the imminence of change, but few seriously thought there would be a sudden end to monitoring. With the war over in Europe, demand for the monitored product had not been perceptibly reduced.

What few outside the higher echelons of FBIS and FCC realized was that Congress was in a mood to cut off funds. Harold Graves warned FCC in a memorandum as early as 20 February 1943 that the FBIS appropriations bill included a clause saying that no funds would be provided for more than 60 days following an armistice.\* Robert D. Leigh called attention to the same fact in a letter dated 1 December 1943. FBIS officials tried unsuccessfully to get this clause in successive appropriations bills spelled out more clearly. Would funds be withheld 60 days after an armistice, or 60 days after a final peace treaty was signed? Would an annual appropriation already approved by Congress be available until the end of the year, or would the remainder of the

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\* Graves said: "I notice that our appropriations bill is amended so that RID and FBIS will be continued for only 60 days in the event of peace or an armistice. The provisions of the bill, as I know them, are not very clear, but I should like to point out that continuation of FBIS for only 60 days after the close of hostilities would probably be thought of by the State Department as undesirable, since FBIS will continue to have considerable value during any period of peace negotiations." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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appropriation be rescinded 60 days after an armistice?

Coming into office at a time when an armistice in Europe seemed imminent, Hyneman was particularly concerned about postwar prospects. In his report to FCC on 4 December 1944 he noted that he had named a committee to study peacetime monitoring needs of leading FBIS clients. A superficial examination, he said, showed substantial evidence that most agencies thought they would continue to need the monitored product after the war, and would prefer that it be supplied by some independent service agency such as FBIS. He promised a separate report on the subject after the committee had completed its study.\*

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\* Dr. Leigh also had given some attention to the postwar status of FBIS. In a report to Robertson of FCC on 11 September 1943 he estimated that if the war should end in Europe the London wire and staff would be reduced by 50 percent, analysis 25 percent, and the Washington staff 20 percent. Pacific expansion would bring the overall cut to 15 percent. "After a transition period, however long, FBIS as a war agency would cease to exist, in favor of a simplified, much less costly, State Department network of monitoring units attached to its strategic foreign embassies with regular diplomatic communications channels to a central editorial-analysis unit in the State Department. It is difficult to imagine a Twentieth Century diplomatic intelligence agency operating without such a systematic observation and report on radio propaganda and other programs emanating from foreign countries, many of them under direct or indirect government control. I would estimate that the cost of an adequate broadcast monitoring service tied into the State Department and foreign mission headquarters would be less than a million dollars a year, with a staff of 250 or less." Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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ON THE BEAM for 23 October 1944 told of the new study committee. It was made up of seven FBIS employees, including Russell Shepherd, Stephen Greene, and Audrey Menefee. The committee prepared a questionnaire to submit to all FBIS users, seeking studied opinions concerning what need there would be for foreign broadcast monitoring after the war and how it should be handled.

Hyneman elaborated on the findings of the committee in a report dated 3 May 1945. He cited the worldwide monitoring system and the important service it rendered during the war. However, he pointed out, the special value of wartime monitoring resulted from the cutting off of normal avenues of information. Peace would change this. The question was: With normal avenues of information restored, would there still be a need for foreign broadcast monitoring?

The preponderance of opinion was that even in peacetime U. S. officials could not know quickly what national leaders were telling their own people or citizens of nearby countries without some wholesale monitoring of the foreign radio. The report noted that monitoring of radio broadcasts was the fastest, cheapest, and most reliable way of getting general information and intelligence concerning a particular country. The American press could not give sufficient coverage, and dependence on the foreign

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press would be too slow and cumbersome. For example, Hyneman cited a radio speech made by FCC Chairman Fly on 27 April 1945. Associated Press carried 200 words on the speech, and there was no evidence it would be reported textually in any U.S. publication. If a comparable speech were made in a foreign country it might be of considerable interest to U.S. officials to get full text. Its availability would be unlikely without foreign broadcast monitoring.

Hyneman's report insisted that after the war it would be necessary in some department of government to monitor foreign radio broadcasts, and also to conduct an analysis of the foreign press. However, he readily acknowledged that numerous questions arose, and answers still were inconclusive. For example, would radio monitoring of a particular country be of importance only in diplomatic relations with that country, or would there be a general need for analysis and intelligence in various governmental quarters? If the former, perhaps monitoring should be done on a very small scale by embassies; if the latter, centralized monitoring and analyses would be needed. Another unanswered question stressed in Hyneman's report was the extent to which cooperative arrangements abroad would, or could, continue. If such cooperation were retained and expanded,

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the problem of worldwide monitoring certainly would be considerably simplified.

Assuming there would be very little international cooperation, aside from permission for a monitoring team to operate on foreign soil, Hyneman and his committee did come up with a tentative plan for a U.S. peacetime monitoring network. It would consist of major monitoring stations on the East Coast of the United States, in Puerto Rico, Kauai, the Philippines, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Western Europe. These would be supplemented by small listening posts, closely tied to embassies, in Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo or Buenos Aires, the West Coast of South America, Tokyo, Chungking, Teheran, Moscow, and India.

Hyneman seemed to think at the time of his 4 December 1944 report that FBIS would have ample support from the State Department and other governmental units in persuading Congress that the end of the war must not be the end of foreign broadcast monitoring. By the time he made his final report to FCC, 31 July 1945, he had lost much of his optimism. He said that his analysis of the committee study, along with its findings, had been widely distributed among FBIS users, and that one meeting had been held with responsible officials from several departments. So far, he said, there had been no response that would indicate widespread interest in

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what would happen to FBIS at the end of the war. Apparently most agencies had their own problems which seemed more immediate. Some thought had been given in the State Department, Hyneman said, but few officials had evinced more than a lukewarm interest in radio as a major and continuing source of intelligence.

Disillusionment Regarding Soviet Aims

One force at work in the State Department and other offices to create concern over the fate of FBIS was the growing doubt as to the position of the Soviet Union in a postwar world. The protest in certain quarters in November 1944 at FBIS plans to abandon analytical work was based on claims of some officials that they could not afford to lose the Russian analysis. Hyneman's response was that State should set up a strong Russian analysis team to use FBIS materials, and a recommendation that it obtain the services of retiring FBIS Soviet expert Charles Prince. OSS also showed some concern at the loss of Russian analysis. Geroid T. Robinson of OSS, writing Hyneman on 17 January 1945 to express regret that FBIS analytical work had been discontinued, added that he hoped the Daily Report now would carry more Soviet radio material. In December 1944 BBC officials had asked the FBIS London Bureau Chief to sound out Washington on user opinion concerning BBC products. Behrstock reported that the top current need in Washington

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seemed to be more Soviet broadcasts. He added on 9 March 1945 that his latest report from Ellis Porter showing Washington needs stated that most U.S. offices "desired any information from Moscow that touches on Soviet aims and plans in occupied countries."\*

All during the war there was limited cooperation between FBIS and Soviet offices in Washington and London. The Soviet Embassy in Washington asked for copies of the Daily Report as early as 11 November 1942, and the State Department approved. Favorable answers to questionnaires kept the Russians among Daily Report readers through 1945. In London there was frequent contact between FBIS and TASS. In 1943 FBIS London was getting the daily Soviet communique directly from TASS, which received it from Moscow. Peter Rhodes in a letter on 8 October 1942 thanked TASS for the "excellent collaboration" FBIS had received. Julian Behrstock on 16 June 1944 thanked TASS for its "excellent service," reporting at the same time he had been unable to get an

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\* John T. Campbell, writing on the 21st anniversary of the start of BBC monitoring, listed two major reasons making peacetime monitoring essential: First, the tremendous increase in international broadcasting, creating a vast supply of important information; second, "the rift between the two major divisions of the world -- Communist and non-Communist -- which has led to a spate of radio propaganda being put out about which it is essential for governments to be informed." BULLETIN of Association of Broadcasting Staff, BBC, for August 1960.

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HRO receiver from the United States that a TASS official had requested. Vincent Anderson reported to Ambassador Winant from Stockholm in June 1943 that he had visited the TASS office there and had offers of cooperation.

But when it came to formal Russian incorporation into the U. N. monitoring system, cooperation vanished. Rhodes wrote Lloyd Free on 18 March 1942 that a British team had gone to Moscow to rebroadcast an English program, as the Russians had balked at having such a broadcast made directly from London, or even from Moscow unless they were allowed to revise the final draft. Fly wrote Secretary Hull on 22 June 1942 asking information regarding Soviet monitoring of Japanese broadcasts and suggesting the possibility of a liaison representative at a Soviet monitoring post. The Russians were evasive.

The increased demand for Soviet copy was noticeable in Washington in 1944 and 1945. David Cooper suggested to the BRU staff at San Francisco in November 1944 that it might increase its usefulness if it could do some experimenting with Russian Hellschreiber. In a 20 April 1945 request for more wordage via Signals from London, Hyneman suggested an increase of Soviet material. Signals replied that FBIS London might disregard wordage limits to send all the Russian it desired. Hyneman reported on 4 December 1944 that in the past year the percentage of FBIS wordage devoted to monitoring of the USSR had

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increased from 7 percent to nearly 13 percent.\*

Fight to Remain Afloat

Russell M. Shepherd took over as fourth Director of FBIS on 7 August 1945. Just one week later the war was over and he was face to face with the problem of monitoring in the postwar period. Shepherd immediately informed primary FBIS users of the legal requirement that funds of FBIS must lapse in 60 days, and warned that if action were not taken before 31 August, FBIS undoubtedly would close. FBIS employees also were warned by Shepherd on 18 August 1945. He reiterated that affirmative action by Congress would be necessary before 31 August if FBIS operations were to continue, but at the same time reported negotiations under way with State to obtain its assistance. Administrative confidence that Congress would not let the work stop was further demonstrated by the announcement that Julian Behrstock was proceeding to Hawaii to replace Shepherd as PACOB chief. David Cooper was appointed FBIS

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\* According to a memorandum on 4 October 1944, FBIS copy being used on the A Wire was 26.3 percent Japanese, and only 8.72 percent Russian. Of Russian material being used, 49 percent came from the BBC with Washington supplying 27 percent and the West Coast 21. These figures demonstrate not only the small Soviet coverage, but also the extent of FBIS dependence on the BBC. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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administrative officer.

In a new memorandum to the staff on 5 September 1945, Shepherd reported that the FBIS appropriation request and budget estimate had been sent to Congress with positive endorsement by the Bureau of the Budget, the State Department, and several other important government agencies. He expressed confidence that FBIS would continue to operate until the end of the fiscal year.\*

Special efforts were made to enlist State Department support. Letters to various users recalled that FBIS originally was established at the request of State. The position of State was shown rather clearly in a letter to Ellis Porter on 17 July 1945 signed by Assistant Secretary of State J. Holmes. He stated that following extensive conferences, State officials had concluded that "it would be desirable to continue the present services of FBIS during the 1945-46 fiscal year." Specifically, the letter continued, State would like to

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\* The memorandum carried these words: "If this appropriation is approved by Congress, the status of FBIS will be reviewed again in January 1946 in an attempt to make a final determination of what its permanent peacetime status should be.... I feel quite confident that we will continue for the rest of this fiscal year." It was evident that Shepherd was trying desperately to maintain the confidence of his staff, and fend off a final decision on FBIS until he had time to present a sound case. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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have continued the present monitoring from Europe and the material obtained from the BBC. As this was before the Pacific war had ended, there was no question concerning Far East monitoring. Holmes went on to say that State understood that to continue this service FBIS would need more funds from Congress, and would be prepared, "if necessary," to second its request for funds.

Press correspondents and domestic radio commentators also were informed immediately by Shepherd of the situation. Charles Hodges of the Mutual Network wrote Shepherd on 16 August 1945 suggesting that the Daily Report go on a subscription basis. He forecast "considerable public interest." In a reply to Hodges on 21 August Shepherd announced the imminent end of FBIS, adding that if operations were allowed to continue he intended to permit distribution of FBIS products to "all members of the press and radio." An administrative memorandum of 14 September 1945 showed 35 names of newspaper writers and radio commentators added to the Daily Report distribution list.

Late August and early September provided six weeks of tenseness and uncertainty in FBIS. Shepherd pursued his policy of continuing the battle in Congress and among FBIS users; encouraging FBIS employees; but hedging through elimination of all possible expenditures.

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The final copy of the bi-weekly Far East Radio Report was issued on 25 August, but all Far East monitoring continued. The B Wire, carrying 45,000 words a day to OWI when the war ended, was closed down near the end of August. The A Wire early in September started operating from 0800 to 2200, and then was reduced to an 8-hour operation. It was not discontinued until 6 December.

Very soon after 14 August 1945 the House Appropriations Committee called upon FCC to justify its National Defense Activities; including RID and FBIS. The State Department wrote to FCC on 31 August asking that FBIS be continued until the end of the 1945-46 fiscal year, and this request was passed on to the Committee. It had no effect. Appropriations Committee members continued to insist that FBIS and RID appropriations remaining 60 days after the Japanese surrender should be rescinded.\* The press and domestic radio came

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\* Paul Porter, new FCC Chairman, explained the sequence of events in a letter to Assistant Secretary of State William Benton on 20 September 1945. He said he gave the Committee two bases for foreign broadcast monitoring. The war had cut off sources of information; and international broadcasting opened up a new medium of information not readily obtainable except through monitoring. The surrender eliminated the first reason for monitoring, and FCC was not capable of judging the importance of the second. The State Department was. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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to the defense of FBIS. A Mutual Network broadcast on 8 September 1945 severely castigated Congress for demanding an end to such an organization as OWI before its work was ended, and declared that FBIS was "the key to the situation," as it supplied the raw material to OWI, State, and other departments.\* None of this seemed to influence the House Appropriations Committee. FCC gave up and began to work for a reversal in the Senate.

Final decision was made by the House Appropriations Committee on 19 September. It voted to rescind \$930,000 of the \$2,430,000 appropriated for National Defense Activities of FCC. Recognizing RID, but not FBIS, as an integral part of its fundamental regulatory functions, FCC felt that it would be forced to continue RID and liquidate FBIS. The House committee offered no objection to this settlement. On 26 September 1945 FCC issued a news release announcing that FBIS would go out of existence in 30 days, and that 30-day notices were being issued to all employees. Noting that FBIS had been the source of valuable intelligence during the war and had continued to supply the government with valuable information since the

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\* "But our billion dollar government," the broadcast complained, "hasn't the few thousand dollars necessary for continuation of this information service." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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armistice, the notice called it surprising that State had not already taken over the functions of FBIS, as President Truman by executive order already had transferred the activities of OWI, CIAA, and OSS to State.\*

On 15 September, before FCC action, 30-day notices were issued to 34 FBIS employees in Washington and Portland. The thinking then was that if the entire appropriation eventually were restored, no further cuts would be needed to keep within the budget. It almost immediately was evident that more cuts would have to be made. Yet, despite these reductions, as late as 17 September 1945 clearance and travel were requested and approved for Wally Klima so he could accompany Julian Behrstock to the Philippines to survey for expanded monitoring.

On 26 September 1945, 30-day notices were sent to all employees, but Shepherd stressed in the accompanying letters that this did not mean "that the future

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\* Files of FBIS contain an undated Executive Order with the name of President Harry Truman at the bottom ordering transfer to State on 15 October 1945 of the "functions of FBIS of FCC." The document says these functions were to be "transferred and consolidated in the Interim Research and Intelligence Service, which was established in the Department of State in Executive Order Number 9621." Personnel, property, records, and funds were to be transferred, with the Bureau of the Budget instructed to take whatever measures would be needed to effectuate the transfer. Apparently this tentative order had been prepared by Shepherd and perhaps some representatives from State, to be passed by State to the President, but never approved by the Secretary of State. Job 54-27, Box 15, CIA Records Center.

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of foreign broadcast monitoring has been finally determined." He noted that the President had asked Congress to restore the appropriation, that Secretary of State James Byrnes had said he wanted monitoring to continue, that the full House had not acted, and that the Senate very likely would refuse to go along with the rescission procedure. Kauai and London were instructed on 26 September to let local employees go and to return to Washington at once all those hired at Headquarters who could be spared. Kauai returned seven employees at once. By October the number of employees had been reduced to 263; it was 325 on 1 July 1945. Shepherd continued his encouraging messages to employees, pointing out on 16 November that it could not be determined until both Houses had acted if FBIS were to continue.

On 19 October the House approved the recommendation of its Appropriations Committee. When the Senate Appropriations Committee met to consider the issue, the State Department sent a spokesman and a strong recommendation that FBIS be kept intact. The Senate Committee recommended that FCC funds not be reduced, and the full Senate approved its recommendation. The Senate-House Conference Committee met on 1 December 1945 and reported out a compromise calling for rescission of half the money, or \$465,000. This was approved

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on 3 December by both Houses. The compromise was a help to FCC and RID, but did not benefit FBIS. Its operations had continued pending final Congressional action, and with the fiscal year now nearly half over, it had barely enough money remaining to pay travel costs of personnel overseas, ship back equipment, and meet other costs of liquidation. Consequently, all FBIS operations came to a close on 10 December 1945. The FCC order called for complete liquidation by 31 December.

Rescue by the Army

Final closure of FBIS brought an avalanche of protests. Some State Department officials who depended upon FBIS information were particularly vehement in their denunciation of Congressional and FCC action. Statements by FCC Chairman Paul Porter indicated that FCC retained considerable confidence that the service would not be allowed to die. In writing to Congressman James Wadsworth on 19 November 1945, Porter stated that executive departments of the government were "very anxious" that FBIS be continued, and while FCC would be "willing to continue to act as a service agency," it felt that the operation should be transferred to the "division making the most use of it" -- State Department. In his final report on 1945 activities of FBIS, Porter

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remarked that he had been "informed informally" that War, Navy, and State were attempting to make arrangements to take over the functions of FBIS, and had requested that the physical plant be kept intact until a decision was made. Shepherd notified field stations, immediately after the closure announcement went out, that an effort should be made to hold the staff together for a few weeks, as there was an excellent chance that operations would be resumed.

In spite of the widespread belief that State was the logical organization to take over FBIS, and in spite of pressure from FCC and other groups, the State Department could not see its way clear to assume the added responsibility. It was absorbing a number of war agencies, reopening embassies and legations in restored territories, and was beset with numerous problems, including that of insufficient funds. War, Navy, and State did agree that FBIS functions must continue, and under Russ Shepherd's urging decided that action should be taken at once to prevent a complete desiccation of the FBIS staff and loss of trained employees. On 13 December 1945 Shepherd informed FCC that the War Department had signed a letter to the Bureau of the Budget requesting that an executive order be prepared transferring FBIS operations to the Military

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Intelligence Division of the War Department, effective 1 January 1946. Shepherd added that the Bureau of the Budget had given its approval, but it still would be several days before action could be completed.

Shepherd also gave a financial accounting to FCC. After Congressional action rescinding funds of \$465,000, FBIS had only \$701,000 appropriated for the year. Through 12 December, \$650,037 had been spent, leaving a balance of \$50,963. Shepherd estimated that it would cost \$93,926 to liquidate including payment of terminal leave to employees, while operations could continue for 1945 at a cost of \$51,608. In view of these facts, he requested that operations be allowed to continue until transfer to the War Department. Apparently the request was approved, though only token operations were carried on during the following three weeks. There was little monitoring and no publications were issued.\*

On 21 December 1945 Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson wrote Paul Porter asking that personnel of FBIS be transferred to the War Department as of 31 December, with no changes in duties, grades, or accrued leave. Immediate approval was necessary, he said, "to avoid loss of continuity and of experienced

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\* No documents authorizing continued operations have been found, but permission may have been given orally.

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personnel.\* Porter answered the letter on 27 December accepting the War Department offer and reporting that FCC and War Department representatives already had met to "make detailed plans" for the transfer. FBIS employees all were notified before Christmas that FBIS would resume full operations on 2 January 1946, under War Department sponsorship. At first only personnel were transferred, with the War Department taking over FCC equipment on loan. It was reported by FCC on 14 August 1946 that the War Department had agreed to buy the equipment at 55 percent of its original value. State Department approval had to be obtained for property in London and on Guam.

There remained the question of just how the War Department would administer its new acquisition. Shepherd said in a letter to Edward Berkman on 4 January 1946 that his understanding was that FBIS would operate as an autonomous unit under G-2, very much as it had operated under FCC. In London administration was allocated to the theater commander. Fred Brace

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\* Continued pressure on the State Department was evident in this letter. Patterson said: "Systematic coverage of foreign propoganda broadcasts is believed primarily the concern of the State Department," adding that the Navy and War Departments also found the FBIS product valuable. FBIS Records, National Archives.

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reported that both FBIS and the military attache anticipated some administrative headaches. Berkman in Cairo was assigned to the staff of the military attache in the Legation. The Kauai staff was placed directly under G-2 at Ft. Shafter, and a liaison officer named to handle FBIS problems.\* On Guam there was a rather touchy problem of adjustment. With the station under Navy sponsorship, transfer to Army raised the question of whether or not the staff could continue to use Navy facilities. Agreement eventually was reached; FBIS continued in Navy quarters with other Navy facilities.

Much of the success in keeping FBIS afloat was attributed to Russ Shepherd. Writing on 22 February 1946, Ben Hall remarked that Shepherd "did his level best" to delay the liquidation procedure, and did get delays on two occasions while continuing to pressure the War, Navy, and State Departments to make a final decision. Hall added that transfer to the War Department was a recognition of the "need for radio monitoring in

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\* Julian Behrstock wrote Phil Edwards on 19 March 1946 describing the relationship of the Kauai station to the Army. Signals was to pay the costs. Office of Civilian Personnel would handle personnel and payroll problems. Personnel could be hired at once, and plans were in the works to get a ceiling of 52 employees for Kauai and Guam. Total employment at the time was 38, with 8 more in process of being hired. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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peacetime," but there remained considerable uncertainty as to where FBIS "should be located permanently."

Shepherd said on 4 January 1946 that FBIS had been "counted out definitely on two separate occasions, only to be revived at the last gasp," and agreed that on these occasions very few gave it any chance to survive.

There seems to have been one task assigned to FBIS by FCC that was never fully completed. FCC on 12 September 1945 adopted a proposal calling upon FBIS to prepare a history to be turned over to FCC, the Bureau of the Budget, National Archives, and the Library of Congress by the end of the year. Preparation of this history was mentioned several times in correspondence during 1946, but the apparently completed document of 53 pages falls far short of being an adequate and fully documented history of these five years.\*

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\* The FCC resolution said: "The Director of FBIS should be instructed to produce a history of FBIS which should, (a) provide a summary account of the nature of its task, how it organized to perform its task, and, the nature of the service rendered to agencies; and (b) provide in some fullness an account of the procedures, techniques, and facilities developed for reception and monitoring of radio broadcasts. The aim should be to complete the project not later than 31 December 1945." History of FBIS, RC Job No. 54-27, Box 15, CIA Records Center.

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Chapter 11 OPERATIONS UNDER WAR DEPARTMENT

FBIS operations resumed on 2 January 1946 with few changes apparent. The staff was down to 275, slightly over half of the peak figure, but hopes were high. Loss of personnel in PACOB since the spring of 1945 had been about 20 percent, and in London it was at least that low. Most of the decrease was in Washington and Portland. Two field correspondents attached to U.N. monitoring posts still were serving FBIS -- Spencer Williams in New Delhi and Edward Berkman in Cairo. Shepherd immediately wrote to heads of all monitoring posts, and to Williams and Berkman, outlining developments and explaining relations with the Army. There actually would be little change in procedures, he said, but a more "intelligent job of monitoring" could be expected.\*

On 17 January 1946, Shepherd announced the headquarters organization. Ellis Porter would be Chief Editor, his primary function being to establish liaison with primary users of FBIS products and ascertain their needs. Gordon Goodnow would head the Publications Division, publishing the three Daily Reports and

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\* Shepherd attributed this hope of "better monitoring to the fact that, as employees of the War Department, "we will have much closer connections with intelligence requirements." FBIS Records, National Archives.

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overseeing the Wire Service. Philip K. Edwards would be Executive Officer to handle administrative detail internally and establish administrative liaison with the War Department. The same day Porter issued the first FBIS Target List, prepared after conferences with FBIS subscribers. It was sent to all field and Headquarters offices. This first list contained five very general categories of information needed by intelligence offices. The Target List was issued weekly thereafter, signed at first by Porter. By 15 February 1946 the list had grown to 16 items and was signed by "R. F. Ennis, Director of Intelligence, MIS." Steady growth continued, and by 3 July 1946 the Target List contained 22 items, many of them subjects that FBIS was quite unlikely to obtain from broadcast monitoring. Field editors soon began to doubt the value of the Target List, but it remained. With transfer to the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the Target List was continued, signed at first by Richard B. Kline.

#### Solution of Communications Problems

The first noticeable gain for FBIS under War Department sponsorship was its incorporation into the Signal Corps communications system, which had undergone considerable growth and improvement during the war. FBIS communications in the Pacific, 51,000 words a day in August 1945, already were handled fully by the



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military, but this was a special case. The close and direct service given by FBIS in the field somewhat obligated the military; Signals had taken over FBIS transmissions between Honolulu and San Francisco because it felt this would be less confusing than to have FBIS telefax assigned communications channels. In the European theater, too, Signals already was handling part of the FBIS traffic, but in each case there had been a special reason to make it seem that by serving FBIS it was advancing the cause of the Armed Forces. Now, as a division of the War Department, FBIS could insist that Signals was obligated to carry its traffic.

It was in London that benefits of being in the Army communications system were most noticeable. Already, by March 1945, FBIS London was sending more traffic via Signals than through Western Union (WU). In February 1945 the FBIS contract with PW had been cancelled, with Signals being used for the bulk of routine copy and WU for more urgent material. The principal London complaint was that FBIS had to depend largely on OWI in its liaison with Signals. In a letter to Fred Brace in London on 13 March 1946, Ben Hall congratulated him on the noticeable improvement since transfer to the War Department. Now, he said, the Washington office was getting copy directly through

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a Pentagon hookup. Previously it had depended upon an OWI drop, as "FBIS had been forced to depend on OWI to a considerable extent to get things done."\* The United States Information Service (USIS) of State, which had replaced OWI, still filed copy jointly with FBIS.\*\* Brace informed the London staff on 11 April 1946 that Signals was urging the office to file more copy. A minimum of 30,000 words a day was needed to justify the Cherbourg cable. As the USIS file had dropped to 7,500 words a day, FBIS should send a minimum of 22,500. London editors could remember when they were cautioned to keep the file below 15,000 words a day.

Arrangement for use of the Cherbourg cable was reported by Brace on 18 February 1946. He called it "the first fruits" of the transfer to the War Department. Previously, FBIS copy was filed to the USIS office in

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\* This dependence on OWI did not disappear suddenly. A memorandum by Hall on 26 February 1946 outlined difficulties in getting a duplex from the Pentagon so that traffic from Cairo could come directly and not have to go through OWI. It was not until March that arrangements were completed. Job 49-24, CIA Record Center.

\*\* A Brace memorandum from London on 16 July 1946 reported that British Major Eric Frampton had gone on the FBIS payroll at a cost of \$4,500 yearly as of 1 July. Major Frampton had been in charge of USIS communications, and in the agreement for joint use of FBIS-USIS facilities in London, Frampton was transferred to FBIS. At this writing he still is in charge of FBIS communications in England. Ibid.

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Paris, then relayed to Frankfurt for transmission to the United States. A personnel shortage in the USIS office caused frequent delays. Much copy had to be diverted to WU at six cents a word. General Van Voorst in London requested a direct cable from FBIS London to Frankfurt. This was unavailable, so Signals suggested alternatives, one of them being the line to Cherbourg and a direct relay from there to the United States. In June 1946, when Shepherd was in London, he and Brace made a trip to Frankfurt to discuss further improvements in FBIS communications, including the relay of Cairo copy.\*

Army Logistics Support

Aside from communications, Army support for FBIS was in some instances more than satisfactory but in others left something to be desired. Supplies and equipment were easy to get. In August 1946 Shepherd appealed to the Army for electric typewriters, which he said were "absolutely necessary for stencil cutting."

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\* Insofar as Cairo communications were concerned, transfer to the War Department did not solve the problems. In a letter to Hall in Cairo dated 10 October 1946, Shepherd commended Hall on the progress he had made in Cairo, but described ACS copy as "a mess" when it reached Washington. He suggested that Hall file the most important 5,000 words a day via commercial facilities in spite of the cost, moving the remainder via ACS. Job 51-13, CIA Records Center.

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FBIS had ten in use, all of them purchased between January and November 1941. Since they often were used 24 hours a day, some had been in use the equivalent of 15 years and were hard to keep in repair. There was no problem in getting replacements from the Army. Phil Edwards suggested to field offices on 21 May 1946 that it might be a good idea to stockpile supplies and equipment "to the extent we can do so without embarrassing our relations with the service commands." He explained that the War Department budget request for fiscal 1946-47 covered only personal services and communications funds to operate FBIS, with travel, supplies, and equipment to be "squeezed out" of various service departments. In case of transfer to another agency, he said, it might be difficult to find funds for supplies. In Washington, transport was assigned to Fort Myer. FBIS officials could call for Army cars for trips to see War Department officials. Silver Hill vehicles were sent to Fort Myer for repair and maintenance. Similar services were available in the field.

Behrstock informed Shepherd on 28 May 1946 that Fort Shafter had approved a building and improvement plan for the Kauai station to cost up to \$130,000. It included a new water system, enlargement of five

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buildings, painting of all buildings inside and out, and other improvements. Behrstock said the Army had considered complete replacement of all residences at a cost of \$320,000, but had decided against that when it was learned FBIS had only a five-year lease on its property. On the other hand, Behrstock complained vehemently on 3 September 1946 at the rent scale adopted by the Army for Kauai housing. FBIS employees had paid FCC a nominal rental, based on the size of the house, and with little variation, as the houses were all very much alike. The Army sought to apply its own rental scale, based on salary. This would have doubled the total rental, with some employees having their rent tripled. An exception was made, and the old rental rates maintained.

The Army policy arousing most dissatisfaction among FBIS employees was that regarding grades and salaries. All promotions and reclassifications were frozen pending investigations by War Department classification analysts. Investigations were slow, and often the recommendations were considered unacceptable by many FBIS employees. War Department analysts, familiar with offices consisting primarily of clerical employees, invariably thought the average salary and grade for an FBIS office, consisting mainly of editors and monitors, was too high. Many employees had been promised

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promotions long before transfer to the War Department, and others had reason to think their positions would be raised to a higher classification. Months passed, with promotions and classes remaining frozen. Writing to Brace on 17 May 1946, Edwards expressed sympathy for London staff members who had been promised home leave months before, and blamed "Army red tape" for the delay.

In a memorandum on 7 March 1946, just before starting his vacation, Shepherd assured employees the classification survey about to be completed would "cause no concern to the staff." He was overly optimistic. Number of positions approved by the Army was satisfactory -- 160 for Headquarters and 128 in the field. This gave some room for expansion. The grades approved were considered unacceptable. A memorandum for Shepherd from Jesse Levitt on 27 March 1946 denounced the cut of assistant chiefs in the Monitoring Department from CAF-11 to CAF-10. Writing to Behrstock on 23 April 1946, Shepherd explained that classification analysts had cut the Director's grade from CAF-15 to CAF-13. The War Department agreed to a compromise CAF-14. Shepherd said he was appealing this to CSC. The highest grades he was confident of having approved for division chiefs, Shepherd continued,

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was CAF-13. All positions had been cut one to two grades by the analysts, with a top of CAF-12 recommended for field station chiefs. A letter from Wally Klima on 2 August 1946 complained bitterly at his cut in grade as chief engineer in the Pacific from P-5 to P-4, as recommended by a classification analyst from Fort Shafter. She also had recommended cutting the PACOB Chief's grade to CAF-12 and the Chief Field Correspondent at Kauai to CAF-11, but had agreed to delay these cuts pending information from Washington. On the Chief Engineer's cut she was adamant. The struggle over grades continued until after the takeover by CIG, and of course it still was several months before changes were agreed to.

Despite Shepherd's 1945 promise that if FBIS were allowed to continue he would release its information to the domestic press and radio, the War Department soon vetoed that policy. Replying to a query concerning the sending of Daily Reports to university libraries, Shepherd said on 13 June 1946 that a new policy in effect on 15 June forbade distribution to any non-governmental office. During the 1946 summer months, Max R. Shohet, in charge of the Special Services Section, wrote letters daily explaining that FBIS was equipped to serve only the minimum needs of government agencies.

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Replying to a letter from a LOOK magazine writer on 16 August 1946, Shepherd agreed that he could have access to Soviet broadcasts, but only with the understanding that the source of the information not be divulged and that the practice -- opposed to general policy -- would not be considered as a precedent.

A letter to various news writers and radio commentators on 8 January 1946 by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, head of CIA, explained that on 10 June 1946 the War Department had discontinued distribution of the Daily Report to private individuals and organizations. Under CIG sponsorship, he said, that policy would be reversed. FBIS materials would be made available to the "American press and radio for use in the public interest." Because of budgetary limitations, he explained further, the publications would for the present be sent to "radio and press organizations," not to individuals.\*

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\* The Vandenberg action was taken after full discussion by FBIS and several CIG officials. An ORE memorandum dated 7 November 1946 discussed fully the pros and cons of releasing FBIS materials to the press and radio, decided that radio commentators and news correspondents should have access, and recommended that the CIG Director "modify the present policy of suppression of FBIS reports." General Edwin L. Sibert, new head of the Office of Operations, endorsed this recommendation by ORE and others. On the day Vandenberg issued his order, Shepherd wrote to a number of universities and libraries saying that policy had been changed, and FBIS was turning over to the Library of Congress 36 copies of each Daily Report to be distributed. Job 54-27, Box 10, CIA Records Center.

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Plans for Expansion

Writing to Ted Berkman on 4 January 1946, Shepherd remarked that during the past six months of uncertainty there had been no planning for worldwide coverage by FBIS. Now it was necessary to review monitoring possibilities of each station and analyze requirements. Though Shepherd did not mention it in this letter, the first important move was to nail down the cooperative agreement with the BBC. It already was evident that BBC monitoring would continue, and access to its great wealth of information was such a demonstrated asset that FBIS must try to hold it. Pragmatism dictated the first major effort to please BBC, and also to expand FBIS coverage. MOI had built up the Cairo monitoring post, under Major Frazer, to nearly 100 employees. By the spring of 1946 it became evident that MOI, like OWI, was on the way out of monitoring. As soon as MOI made public its intention to close down the Cairo operation, Shepherd moved to take it over. This pleased BBC, for though Cairo monitoring was important to its users, BBC could not even consider operating the post. Shepherd gave immediate assurances that BBC would have access to the Cairo monitored product, and could send as many editors as it wished to Cairo to select copy. The announcement that FBIS

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was taking over the Cairo post was made on 17 May 1946, and as soon as arrangements could be made, Ben Hall was sent there to run the station.

Hall arrived in Cairo early in July 1946, accompanied by John Pfau, who had been an engineer in the Pacific and later headquarters administrative officer, and attempted a reorganization in accordance with FBIS methods and standards. He found it a difficult task. In a letter to Shepherd on 29 July, Hall described the "horrible state" of the office, with "no work schedules," no liaison with communications, and "no effort to improve." Shortly after he arrived, copy delivered two days earlier was returned with the explanation that communications had been reorganized and the copy would have to be sent to Payne Field. Pfau found receiving equipment in a bad state of repair and the office poorly organized. Hall remarked that he and Ellis Porter had often wondered why Cairo needed so many typists; it was because monitors and translators could not or did not type. Everything was copied. On the other hand, Hall found reception good for heavy coverage, and a large number of intelligent and capable employees. He felt that a good monitoring station could be developed.

In the summer of 1946, several FBIS bureau chiefs were called back to Washington to consider future plans.

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Writing to Tom Weiss on 26 June, Julian Behrstock remarked that "if the question came up," he would recommend that the Guam station be moved to Tokyo. He had learned that postwar Japanese broadcasts repeated press articles, so in Tokyo it would be possible to get the information without monitoring. At the time both Kauai and Guam still were devoting considerable effort to monitoring the Japanese radio. Behrstock had sufficient evidence that the subject would come up. In a letter on 19 February 1946, Ben Hall informed him that recommendations being considered were expansion of Washington monitoring, expansion of Latin American coverage, improvement of the London and Cairo offices, and the opening of another station farther out in the Pacific. Writing to Joseph Roop at Kauai on 15 February 1946, Hall reported that consideration was being given to reviving the Analysis Section and the War Department had approved the idea.\*

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\* Shepherd continued to push for an analysis section and in a memorandum for General Sibert on 5 November 1946 reported that the need for a central organization to prepare studies on foreign propaganda had been well established, with both State and War approving the idea of basing such a study on radio broadcasts. He estimated that to set up such a unit FBIS would need 35 personnel and the cost would be \$150,000. If analysis of the central press were added, the cost and size of staff would be several times that. Job 55-5, Box 5, CIA Records Center.

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The Washington talks were held in early August 1946. Projects considered included a monitoring post on Kyushu in Japan, another on Palawan in the Philippines. Only two definite moves were approved: Behrstock was authorized to go to Tokyo to open a post, closing Guam; transfer of Portland to the San Fernando Valley in Los Angeles was agreed upon.

The plan for postwar monitoring worked out by Hyneman's committee in 1945 did not include a West Coast station, for Portland was to close as soon as Pacific stations were operating fully. Portland continued to monitor, covering many of the same sources as Kauai. Communications delays and breakdowns from Kauai emphasized the value of rapid communications with the West Coast. Other considerations, such as refusal of some Portland and San Francisco employees to transfer, and their biased criticism of Kauai, gave Washington planners the feeling that it would be simpler to operate on the West Coast than on the more remote Kauai. When establishment of a large monitoring station in Japan or the Philippines became feasible, critics of Kauai convinced Shepherd and others that a West Coast post should be retained, with Kauai closed.

The obvious disadvantages of Portland remained. Very little consideration was given to keeping the

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station there. The next move, then, was to find another satisfactory West Coast location. Shepherd wrote Amory F. Penniwell, BRU chief at Portland, on 12 June 1946, informing him that word had been received from OSS that the site it had used in the San Fernando Valley was a place of "superior" reception.\* He was instructed to make tests of stations covered by Kauai at this site, especially to learn if reception were satisfactory on Communist Chinese Morse code from Yen-an. Penniwell took a reception-testing team to Reseda, the location in question, and reported the place was all OSS claimed it to be.\*\* Bertha Anderson,

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\* Although Shepherd did not mention it in this letter, it is apparent that the idea of moving to Reseda came from Portland originally, specifically from Penniwell. In a report to Shepherd dated 29 April 1946, Penniwell agreed that it would not do for FBIS to remain at Portland, and recommended a survey of a site in Southern California, 20 miles from downtown Los Angeles. Basing his forecasts on charts and the testimony from engineers in the area, Penniwell declared that FBIS reception would be immeasurably better -- as much as 100 percent better in some categories. He acknowledged that reception might be inferior to that of Portland on Russian broadcasts (ignoring the fact that Russian was becoming the material in greatest demand), but added that "present Portland reception is by far the worst we have experienced to date during the five years this station has been in operation. On 16 May 1946 Philip K. Edwards, Portland Chief, asked Washington to authorize reception tests in Southern California by Penniwell and his assistant, Clyde M. Gregory. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

\*\* In a telephone conversation -- recorded -- between Penniwell in Reseda and Bertha Anderson in Portland on 31 July 1946, the question of costs came up. Penniwell agreed that this would present a serious problem if FBIS could not get equipment directly from Signals for the new project, but insisted that no matter what the cost it would be a good investment. Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

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by then having succeeded Edwards as Portland Chief, wrote Penniwell on 1 September 1946 relaying instructions that he should return to Portland, leaving an engineer in charge. She informed him that the War Department had approved transfer of funds to set up a new installation, though Washington wanted the survey to continue.\* On 9 October 1946 Mrs. Anderson wrote that the Reseda station still had not been approved officially, though it probably would be soon, and forecast that transfer of Portland to Reseda would take place in about six months.

#### Permanent Sponsorship of FBIS

Though War Department officials were willing to take over FBIS to forestall its demise, they had no intention of retaining it permanently, a truth that apparently many Army officers in the field never realized, as they treated FBIS as an integral and permanent unit of the Department. In Washington,

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\* In spite of Penniwell's clear preference for Reseda, he continued the survey at Washington insistence, making tests at a number of places in Southern California. In a memorandum for Pfau on 23 January 1947 he declared that after a thorough search it had become clear that the Reseda site was the best one. The second best, he said, was Camp Ord, near Monterey. The chief trouble with it was that it was "too far north." To take advantage of the fade-in and fade-out periods of the higher frequencies from the Orient, a "more southerly location is desirable." Another argument advanced by Penniwell for selection of the Reseda site was that there seemed to be little likelihood of developments in the area that would interfere with monitoring. Job 54-27, Box 9, CIA Records Center.

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FBIS officials recognized from the first that War Department sponsorship might be only temporary. That made them more determined to resist recommendations for lower classifications issued by War Department classification analysts and kept the freeze on grades and salaries. Ben Hall, writing on 11 March 1946, said it was difficult to establish permanent policy because FBIS might still be transferred to another agency, though he believed it would remain with the Army. Phil Edwards, in a letter dated 17 May 1946, said the status of FBIS was "still wrapped in uncertainty," not as to the permanence of monitoring, but as to its organizational location. Many factors still favored the State Department, he said. Edwards further informed Behrstock in a letter on 21 May 1946 that there was a strong possibility of transfer to State about the end of the fiscal year.

In January 1946, President Truman by executive order created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), which was expected to be a coordinating agency, in essence the successor to OSS. At the same time the President created the National Intelligence Authority, made up of representatives of the War, Navy, and State Departments and the President's personal representative -- at that time Admiral Leahy. The National Security Act

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of 1947 transformed these into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council (NSC).

One of the first tasks assigned to the new CIG was final disposition of FBIS. On 12 February 1946, Adm. Sidney W. Souers was handed a memorandum signed by Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. The memorandum described the taking over of FBIS by the War Department, documenting the account with copies of Secretary Patterson's letter of 21 December 1945 and Paul Porter's reply of 27 December. It then declared it "inappropriate and outside the scope of its responsibilities" for the War Department to continue to sponsor FBIS beyond the end of the fiscal year -- 30 June 1946. Vandenberg proposed that CIG assume responsibility for selecting the "most appropriate" government agency to direct the service. A committee of five members, representing CIG and the remaining four members of the Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB), was proposed to study the matter, decide what functions and facilities of FBIS should be continued in the national interest; what government agency should be assigned responsibility for continuing the operations; and the budgetary arrangements necessary.\*

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\* C.I.G. 1, dated 25 February 1946. Vandenberg's memorandum is Enclosure B of the document. Organization and Management, History of FBIS, FBIS Executive Files.

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The proposal was unanimously approved by IAB, and the committee began its study.\*

The committee recommended that FBIS remain with the War Department. Its conclusions were that the work of FBIS was essential and should be continued, but the operating organization should be liquidated and a new one set up for two reasons: FBIS publications circulated too generally to organizations and individuals, including some foreign agencies, and should be restricted to authorized intelligence offices of the U.S. Government;\*\* personnel of FBIS had not been properly screened for security. The committee found that War, Navy, State, or CIG could readily operate the monitoring service, but if it stayed under the War Department the only action necessary would be the screening of employees. Any one of the others would have to add to the screening the setting up of administrative, budgetary, and communications facilities -- in other words, it would be better to remain with the War Department simply because War already was handling it. The report agreed that the State Department had the greatest use for the product

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\* C.I.G. Directive No. 2, dated 5 March 1946. Organization and Management, History of FBIS, FBIS Executive Files.

\*\* It is interesting to note that when General Vandenberg took over as head of CIG, this policy was reversed. See page 292.

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of monitoring, but did not explain why State should not then, logically, take over the operation. As for CIG, the report stated that it should give direction to monitoring, but made a sharp distinction between "direction," which should be given centrally, and actual "operation."\*

IAB approved the recommendations of the ad hoc committee, but the War Department refused to accept it. It was no more anxious than State to keep FBIS as a permanent acquisition. It advanced the argument that one CIG function was to operate intelligence services when those services were used by various intelligence organs. Therefore, operation of the monitoring service was properly a CIG function. In lieu of this, the War Department said, FBIS should be taken over by State, as the largest user of its services.\*\*

The State Department quickly replied. Its study showed, the memorandum said, that it was impractical for State to take over FBIS. State concurred in the original decision that FBIS should stay with the War

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\* C.I.G. 1/1, dated 26 April 1946. Discussion in committee related as Appendix B. Organization and Management, History of FBIS, FBIS Executive File.

\*\* C.I.G. 1/2, dated 8 May 1946, signed by NIA Secretary James S. Lay. Organization and Management, History of FBIS, FBIS Executive File.

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Department. It also approved the alternative of CIG's sponsoring directly the monitoring service and said it was willing to collaborate closely and support budget requests. The document further described the FBIS product as of great value and recommended a "comprehensive program for relocation of facilities" to improve coverage.\*

This completed the Gaston and Alphonse act. Shepherd notified field offices early in August that FBIS had been taken over by CIG on 31 July. FBIS personnel received information directly from CIG explaining the transfer.\*\* On 31 October 1946 Shepherd announced that transfer of personnel would be made on 3 November to CIG, "which has controlled FBIS operations for some time," with all transfers subject to investigation and reallocation of grades after a survey.\*\*\* The notice bore the additional

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\* C.I.G. 1/3, dated 4 June 1946. The State Department memorandum, signed by William L. Langer and dated 27 May 1946, is an enclosure. Organization and Management, History of FBIS, FBIS Executive files.

\*\* Signed for the Director of Central Intelligence by Col. John Dabney, Assistant Executive Director, the document said that on 31 July the Director of Central Intelligence had "assumed control" of FBIS; that Theater and Army Commanders had been informed of the change in control, but would "continue to service FBIS installations as in the past"; and that the change in control did not imply any "important changes in FBIS personnel or interior administration at this time." Job 49-24, CIA Records Center.

\*\*\* In the Pacific, actual transfer of personnel was not made until the end of 1946, so employees on Kauai and Guam were under the War Department exactly a year.

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information that the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service would immediately become the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), with all publications and letterheads changed accordingly.

The transfer was received with enthusiasm in Headquarters. Phil Edwards wrote Ben Hall in Cairo on 6 November 1946 that the transfer had brought a great deal of confusion, but "nothing like the mess during the first few months under the War Department." This was largely due, he said, to the fact that CIG administrative personnel were "high-grade intelligent men instead of the CAF-3's and 4's we had to deal with in the War Department." They were cordial, too, "and act as though they were selling us something instead of resisting our maneuvers to put something over on them.\*

At first FBIS was placed under the Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD), but was transferred to the Office of Operations (OO) near the end of 1946.\*\*

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- \* Edwards reported approval for new tests in Japan and the Philippines, mentioned the possibility of a Frankfurt station, and said Gen. Sibert definitely would want to move the Middle East station somewhere else if it could not stay in Cairo. He added: "CIG's advisory board is now considering whether FBIS should be directed to undertake newspaper as well as radio reporting, and whether we should establish some sort of analysis division. It has cleared several hurdles already and seems likely to be okayed. Job 51-13, CIA Records Center
- \*\* CIG Administrative Order No. 22, dated 17 October 1946, on setting up the Office of Operations. Organization and Management, History of FBIS, FBIS Executive File

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Gen. E. M. Wright, Executive for CIG, issued a memorandum on 19 November 1946 defining the work of 00 and listing four objectives for FBIS: To monitor pertinent broadcasts of foreign nations; prepare daily transcripts of these broadcasts; distribute the information in accordance with distribution lists approved by OCD; and "arrange for worldwide coverage through establishment of authorized field stations, and/or approved agreements, when necessary, with other national or foreign activities providing a similar service." On 30 September 1946 Gen. Edwin L. Sibert, in charge of 00, was described by Shepherd in a letter to Behrstock as No. 2 man in CIG and "an enthusiastic supporter of monitoring," ready to fight necessary battles for FBIS. Sibert issued a statement for FBIS personnel on 31 December 1946 welcoming them into what he believed would be the "permanent home" of FBIS, informing that the name had been changed to the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch (FBIB), and expressing confidence that they would "continue" to give valuable support "to our intelligence operations."\*

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\* On 2 January 1947 Sibert sent the following wire message to all field offices: "It is with great pleasure that I welcome FBIS into the 00 of CIG. For a long while I have been aware of the very substantial contribution made by your service to national intelligence. I have been aware, also, that for a long while FBIS has been an agency without a home. As a result, all of you have been subjected to strain caused by uncertainty. It is (continued next page)

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Despite the generally hopeful outlook and enthusiasm of FBIS officials, transfer from the War Department to CIG was not entirely frictionless. The CIG Fiscal Office, in a wire to Joseph Roop on Kauai on 11 April 1946, pointed out that the agreement with the War Department failed to allow for reimbursements "for nonexpendable items on hand," and that any FBIS obligations outstanding at the time of the transfer, "contractual or otherwise," must be borne by the War Department. The result of this ruling was long drawn-out litigation concerning some obligations, and considerable hardship for some FBIS employees.\* There also was some question regarding Army communications. The Signal Corps in a letter to CIG on 17 December 1946 informed that no

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(contd from footnote page 305) now my sincere belief that you have found a permanent home and a mother agency having your welfare at heart. As an indication of your new status, and that your agency has joined the Central Intelligence family, it has been designated as the FBIB. Mr. Russell Shepherd has been designated Chief FBIB. The Director of Central Intelligence and I have confidence in Mr. Shepherd and are counting on continued support of your whole organization to our intelligence operations." Job 54-27, Box 2, CIA Records Center.

\* For example, Park Mark, a Chinese monitor hired in San Francisco for work in Kauai, did not get his family and household goods transferred prior to the transfer. He paid the cost himself, and was nearly a year getting reimbursement. CIG claimed it was a War Department cost, but the War Department refused to accept this. Job 51-13, CIA Records Center.

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curtailment of service to FBIS was anticipated in the Pacific, but FBIS traffic from Europe would be dropped by Signals early in the spring of 1947. Sibert protested this action, and in a letter to the Director on 19 December 1946 requested that IAB be called in to handle the matter.\* Signals never carried through with its threat, but it did fail to provide satisfactory communications from Cairo. The high cost of commercial communications was a continuing problem there.

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\* Sibert pointed out that European traffic to Washington amounted to 40,000 words a day, which would cost a half million dollars via commercial channels for one year. Aside from Signals service, no other government communications were available. Job 54-27, Box 10, CIA Records Center.

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